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Abstract
Financial Intermediation and Interest Rate Risk
by
Maxim Zagonov
This thesis analyses the link between interest rate risk faced by nancial interme-
diaries in the G-10 countries, their balance sheet composition and national bank
regulation. The regulatory authorities both in the US and in Europe increasingly
emphasise the issue of bank interest rate exposure. The importance of this topic is
also reasserted by recent developments in the monetary environment. The thesis
o¤ers three major contributions to the area.
First, it empirically investigates the interest rate risk exposure of nancial in-
termediaries across a large international data sample over the 1997 to 2009 time
period. The results verify the importance of interest rate exposure for the major-
ity of analysed institutions, with statistical inferences being robust to the choice
of interest rate proxy, time period, and the adopted econometric methodology.
Second, this research examines the underlying determinants of bank interest
rate risk. Both company and market specic information is considered in the
analysis. The ndings suggest that national regulatory and supervisory char-
acteristics, and notably international diversity among these provisions, are as
important as rm-level accounting variables in explaining the interest rate expo-
sures of individual banks.
Finally, this work empirically addresses the impact of securitization on bank
interest rate risk. In particular, the research questions whether securitization
is conducive to the optimal hedging of bank interest rate risk, or is merely a
funding source enabling these companies to pursue more protable but riskier
projects. The reported results imply that banks resorting to asset securitization
do not, on average, achieve an unambiguous reduction in their exposure to the
term structure developments.
xiii
To my family
for their enormous support
throughout this last decade . . .
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
This thesis employs an international sample of nancial intermediaries and em-
pirically addresses their exposure to interest rate movements. All G-10 countries
and other important regions of Asia (Hong Kong) and Pacic Rim (Australia)
are considered in this analysis. The thesis also examines the link between interest
rate exposure faced by nancial intermediaries, their balance sheet composition
and national bank regulation.
Recent decades have witnessed a profound transformation in the nancial en-
vironment, with trends towards establishing more open and integrated nancial
markets. This development enhanced the functioning of nancial systems world-
wide and facilitated remarkable advances in terms of e¢cient capital allocation,
access to external nance, product quality, and risk sharing.
Against this background, nancial market integration has also exacerbated the
cross-border propagation of shocks and nancial instability, as witnessed during
the global nancial crisis of 2007-2010.
What started as a relatively isolated US subprime episode was then prop-
agated to the rest of the nancial sector worldwide, a¤ecting all major asset
classes. In response, a plethora of research contributions addressed the funda-
mental causes of the crisis in depth. These works have uncovered numerous
deciencies in risk management practices adopted by nancial intermediaries,
ine¢cacies in the existing nancial regulation, and our limited knowledge of the
market mechanism by which the nancial contagion is proliferated, among others.
For instance, Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) addressed the role of rating agencies,
condemning their inability to properly rate the securitised products which are
generally regarded as the key culprit in the crisis. Agencies incentives, and
conict of interest are also emphasised by Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2008).
The awed design of the top managers compensation structure has also been
acknowledged for contributing to the crisis (Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2009). In
a similar vein, the regulatory architecture which allowed, and in some instances
abetted, such short-termist behaviour has also been criticised (e.g., Acharya and
Richardson, 2009).
Much has been learnt about the underlying causes of the recent nancial
events from these contributions. However, the majority of these works do not
address the risks facing the nancial system in the aftermath of the crisis.
In particular, it appears practitioners and academics alike paid little attention
to interest rate risk in recent years. As a result, the oversight and management of
interest rate risk has fallen in priority at many nancial rms. This development
is alarming for at least three reasons.
First, interest rate exposure represents one of the most signicant risks faced
by nancial institutions due to their asset intermediation activities. These ac-
tivities involve transforming short-term savings to long-term investments and
typically result in duration mismatches between interest rate sensitive assets and
liabilities. Such duration mismatches expose nancial institutions to interest rate
uctuation1. In this respect, the interest rate risk was acknowledged as the most
important source of banks market risk by the 2007 industry survey conducted
by the International Financial Risk Institute and Institute of Chief Risk O¢cers.
Second, the importance of interest rate risk was reasserted by recent devel-
opments in the monetary environment. As a consequence of a prolonged period
of historically low nominal interest rates around the world, the concern exists
at present that credit institutions have relaxed their asset-liability management
practices and are less protected than ever against rising interest rates. Further-
more, due to the crisis-induced liquidity constraints, many institutions were forced
to shorten the maturity of their liabilities and are accordingly exposed to greater
renancing risk.
Finally, inadequate management of interest rate risk was responsible for many
infamous crises in the history of banking. The most representative example is
the US "Savings and Loan" crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s which was
triggered by the major shifts in monetary policy2 (Kane, 1989). In this episode,
thrifts have invested a considerable amount of their assets to the xed-rate mort-
gage products and were confronted with rising funding costs due to the late
1The mechanism of this phenomenon is explained in the following section.
2The major shifts are due to the Federal Open Market Committees policy change in 1979
and phasing out of Regulation Q initiated by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act in 1980. Barth (1991) and Curry and Shibut (2000) provide a detailed
discussion on the S&L crisis.
2
1970s phenomenal increase in interest rates. As a result, almost 1,000 Savings
and Loans institutions failed. The interest rate risk was also partly responsible
for the banking crises in Sweden during 1991-1994, and the failure of individual
institutions in other developed countries.
As the aforementioned concerns become increasingly noticeable, regulatory
authorities both in the US and in Europe draw attention to the importance of the
role interest rate risk management plays for banking stability. In particular, this
issue has been agged in the Winter 2009/2010 issue of the FDICs Supervisory
Insights publication and the O¢ce of Thrift Supervision issue of an interagency
advisory on interest rate risk management on January 6, 2010. Both publications
stress the importance of accurately measuring and managing interest rate risk and
conclude that banks have accepted greater levels of interest rate risk in recent
years.
These communications point to the signicant challenges nancial institutions
will face in preserving their protability amidst rising interest rates and ongoing
pressure on net interest margins and capital. A large number of intermediaries
have increased the proportion of xed rate loans in their portfolios. Many loans
are also priced at variable rates with oors, implying that these rates cannot be
increased unless the market rates exceed the prevailing oor level. On the liability
side, credit institutions face an increasingly competitive market for deposits and
therefore higher funding costs. In addition, the majority of companies become
progressively reliant on the short-term, highly interest rate sensitive, certicate
of deposits.
The evidence of increased interest rate risk, combined with greater regulatory
attention, poses a fundamental question of how well the nancial corporations
are prepared for changes in the interest rate environment and what are the most
e¤ective means of hedging interest rate risk. This thesis addresses these and many
other related questions.
In particular, the objective of this thesis is to identify the nancial companies
exposures to interest rate uctuations, assess the determinants of these risks, and
examine the applicability of these determinants in countries with di¤erent regu-
latory regimes and level of market discipline. Among others, the thesis addresses
empirically the following questions:
Whether, and to which degree, are nancial institutions exposed to interest
rate risk? Which interest rate factors are the most signicant and how does
this vary across time and markets (e.g., the G-10 countries)? How do the above
questions t to di¤erent types of nancial intermediaries? What are the sources
driving banks interest rate exposures and to which extend? Is it possible to e¤ec-
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tively manage bank interest rate exposure via securitization? If so, did nancial
institutions successfully utilise this channel in the run-up to the recent nancial
crisis? From an econometric perspective, which model should be used to describe
adequately the institutions interest rate sensitivity? From a policy perspective,
how is interest rate exposure a¤ected by regulation and policy? Which regulatory
frameworks are most conducive to minimising interest rate exposure and why?
1.2 Financial institutions and interest rate risk
Financial institutions encounter various types of interest rate risk. These
risks largely emanate from their asset transformation function which incurs in-
termediating transactions between lenders and borrowers. In doing so, nancial
intermediaries engage in direct contractual agreements with both parties. They
borrow from economic agents with excess funds and lend to agents with liquidity
constrains. These contracts are priced on the basis of interest rates and they make
up ultimately the composition of nancial rms portfolios. In the same vein, the
rm market value is largely tied to the net present value of these contracts.
In fullling this important intermediation function, nancial institutions of-
ten mismatch maturity and liquidity characteristics of assets and liabilities and
expose themselves to interest rate risk. By nature, most assets (mainly loans)
are relatively illiquid and long-term, while most liabilities (mainly deposits) are
liquid, have shorter maturities than loans, and can be withdrawn on demand.
Accordingly, a nancial intermediary with longer term assets relative to liabili-
ties is subject to renancing risk in a raising interest rate environment. A raise
in interest rates reduces the rms net interest income by increasing the cost of
funds relative to the yield on assets. This risk is commonly referred to as the
interest rate margin risk.
In addition to adverse e¤ects on earnings, a nancial intermediary also faces
market value risk when interest rates change. This happens because the underly-
ing market value of assets and liabilities (which theoretically equals the discounted
present value of future and current cash ows from these assets and liabilities)
will be inversely a¤ected by rising interest rates. Accordingly, with rising in-
terest rates, companies retaining positive maturity mismatches between interest
rate sensitive assets and liabilities see the market value of their assets decreasing
more than their liabilities. This reduces the market value of the rms equity and
increases the risk of insolvency.
In a bid to hedge against interest rate exposure, some institutions choose to
match the maturity (or duration) of their interest sensitive assets and liabilities.
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In this respect, Samuelson (1945) and Hicks (1946) rst highlight the relevance
of duration to planning the balance sheet maturity structure in their Duration
Theorem. The theorem implies that if the weighted duration of the asset stream
is greater (less) than the weighted duration of the liability stream the increase
(decrease) in interest rates will adversely a¤ect the individuals net worth. Later,
Redington (1952) formalises the practical applications of the Samuelson-Hicks
Duration Theorem by introducing the immunisation rule. This rule suggests
hedging interest rate risk by perfectly matching durations of asset and liability
streams3. Grove (1974) further generalises by developing the model of the balance
sheet maturity structure based on the duration theorem. Grove demonstrates an-
alytically that the sensitivity of a rms net worth to interest rate developments
depends on the duration mismatch between the rms assets and liabilities. Fur-
ther, the author presents conditions under which immunisation would be optimal
for investors.
The duration matching strategy, however, does not provide a complete protec-
tion against other types of interest rate risk [Saunders and Cornett, 2006]. These
include basis risk, yield curve risk, and risks from optionality embedded in some
assets and liabilities.
The basis risk arises when the relationship between the rates earned on assets
and the rates paid on liabilities change (i.e., assets and liabilities are priced on
di¤erent bases). Even if assets and liabilities are priced on the same basis, nan-
cial institutions are still a¤ected by changes in the shape of the interest rate term
structure (i.e., yield curve risk). Thus, an institution which nances its short-
and long-term assets with medium-term liabilities is exposed to changes in the
yield curve curvature. Another important source of interest rate risk is due to
options embedded in some assets, liabilities, and o¤-balance sheet positions (e.g.,
loan prepayment or funds withdrawal provisions). Such options, when exercised,
introduce an unexpected change in the value of assets and cash ows for the
nancial intermediary [Feid, 1993; Lee and Stock, 2000].
To summarise the discussion so far, the interest rate risk can be formalised
as the risk that uctuations in market interest rates impact adversely an inter-
mediarys nancial condition. Such adverse impacts come from di¤erent, often
complementary and/or o¤setting sources, giving rise to di¤erent approaches for
assessing and managing interest rate exposure.
In general, interest rate risk management aims at curtailing the risks aris-
ing from the duration mismatches discussed above. These risks are commonly
3The immunisation process is discussed in depth by Bierwag, 1977; Rosenblum, 1981; and
Bierwag, Kaufman and Toevs, 1983.
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measured following two approaches.
The rst approach, commonly called the Earning Perspective, relies on
analysing the immediate, short-term, impact of changes in interest rates on banks
accrual or reported earnings. This method generally accounts for the e¤ect of rate
changes on both banks net interest income and non-interest revenues over the
short run.
The second approach, the Economic Value Perspective, essentially measures
the e¤ect of interest rate changes on the economic value of an institutions assets,
liabilities, and o¤-balance sheet positions. In e¤ect, it captures the risk to an
institutions net worth (i.e., its economic value) which results from the existing
duration mismatches and other positions sensitive to interest rates. Since the
economic value is viewed as the present value of future cash ows, the Economic
Value Perspective considers the longer-term impact of interest rate changes. For
this reason, it is commonly regarded as a more accurate approach to assessing
banks interest rate exposure.
The Economic Value Perspective is based on the duration gap analysis and
relates to the work of Redington (1952) discussed above. This involves the com-
parison of estimates of the duration of nancial intermediaries asset and liabili-
ties. The observation of the duration mismatch implies that the market value of
assets and liabilities changes di¤erently when rates change, and thus is indicative
of how the market value of equity will change. Accordingly, the duration gap
analysis represents a comprehensive method of analysing interest rate risk and is
popular among practitioners. A detailed discussion of the theoretical benets and
practical applications of the duration gap analysis is presented in Toevs (1983),
Kaufman (1984) and Bierwag and Kaufman (1985).
Despite its popularity, the duration gap analysis has been widely criticized.
Researchers emphasise that, in practice, several important assets and liabilities
have theoretically ambiguous durations which impedes the accurate estimation of
duration gaps. In addition, the increased interconnectedness of nancial institu-
tions and their involvement in o¤-balance sheet activities may create exposures
not captured accurately by a standard duration gap model. Furthermore, the gap
approach does not take into account the default or credit risk of assets. Neither
does it account for the negative association between interest rate and credit risk
widely recognised by researchers [Drehmann, Sorensen and Stringa, 2010]. Fol-
lowing an interest rate increase, creditors may witness deterioration in the loan
portfolio credit quality, owed to the adverse selection problem and risk shifting.
Finally, as discussed above, the duration matching strategy does not o¤er a com-
plete protection against all known types of interest rate risk which would a¤ect
6
a banks economic value.
From an academic perspective, the use of the gap measure is also complicated
by the lack of consistent information on duration gaps for the majority of nancial
institutions and markets.
Accordingly, instead of using the duration gap measure, prior academic works
in the area analyse the e¤ect of interest rate changes on the capitalised value
of a nancial institutions future cash ows. In particular, the researchers rely
on market e¢ciency and employ equity market data to capture the interest rate
sensitivity of nancial rms equity prices. The majority of contributions use
the two-index asset pricing model introduced by Stone (1974). This model aug-
ments the standard market model with an interest rate factor which captures the
inuence of unexpected developments in the yield curve on asset prices. The coef-
cient estimate on the interest rate factor, i.e. the interest rate beta, is therefore
treated as a measure of interest rate exposure. According to this framework, the
observation of a signicant relationship between the stock price and interest rate
(i.e. signicant interest rate beta) suggests that rms asset-liability composition
and/or dividend policy transmit interest rate uctuations to the market as signals
of changes in earnings prospects. This results in new equilibrium prices.
Since the inception of Stones model, companies exposure to interest rate
risk has become a popular research topic. The researchers have applied widely
Stones model to study the interest rate sensitivity of both nancial and non-
nancial corporations. Overall, the majority of empirical works have conrmed
the instrumental benets of including an interest rate factor to the single-factor
model [Fama and Schwert, 1977; Fogler, Kose and Tipton, 1981].
The works focusing on the US market conclude that most nancial intermedi-
aries are negatively a¤ected by unanticipated interest rate changes [Martin and
Keown, 1977; Chance, 1979; Gultekin and Rogalski, 1979; Lynge and Zumwalt,
1980; Chance and Lance, 1980].
However, the widely acknowledged deciency of these works was the lack of a
unied theory that explained why the e¤ect of interest rate uctuations on stock
returns varies among companies. Flannery and James (1984a) lay theoretical
foundations to address this. In particular, the authors o¤er a theoretical rationale
to relate the stock returns interest rate sensitivity to the maturity composition
of the rms nominal assets and liabilities, and provide empirical evidence to
support this hypothesis. The framework presented by Flannery and James is
largely based on the Samuelson-Hicks Duration Theorem discussed above.
According to Flannery and James, the equity of credit institutions maintaining
a positive duration mismatch between assets and liabilities will react negatively
7
to interest rate increase and vice versa. Accordingly, other things being equal,
an increase in the proportion of long-term assets (long-term liabilities) should
raise (lower) interest rate beta in Stones two-factor model. The estimate of each
banks interest rate beta thus reects the markets assessment of its duration gap.
The ndings of Flannery and James have instigated even more academic in-
terest in the area. Using di¤erent methodologies, data samples and time periods
many works have reconrmed or sometimes questioned Flannery and James con-
clusions [e.g., Booth and O¢cer, 1984; Scott and Peterson, 1986; Bae, 1990;
Saunders and Yourougou, 1990; Madura and Zarruk, 1995; Allen and Jagtiani,
1997; Elyasiani and Mansur, 1998; Oertmann, Rendu and Zimmermann, 2000].
Numerous academic contributions have also extended the Flannery and James
framework by demonstrating that the estimated interest rate betas also convey
the interest rate sensitivity of nancial institutions stocks unrelated to their
balance sheet structure. In particular, the researchers embrace the relevance of
banks income structure [Fraser, Madura and Weigand, 2002], o¤-balance sheet
activities [Hirtle, 1997; Choi and Elyasiani, 1997], and equity capital [Au Yong,
Fa¤ and Chalmers, 2009]. Other works have also acknowledged the intermedi-
aries e¤orts to hedge interest rate exposures through some of these instruments.
Chapter 3 of this thesis provides a detailed overview of the literature in this area.
Based on the discussion above, the interest rate beta from Stones model can
be regarded as a by-product of a nancial institutions e¤orts to manage interest
rate risk given its balance and o¤-balance sheet composition. Namely, this mea-
sure accounts for the rms decision-making, planning and control regarding their
balance and o¤-balance sheet positions that contribute to interest rate exposure.
This interpretation of interest rate risk is endorsed throughout the thesis.
1.3 Thesis outline
The rst chapter of this thesis presents the general background on which the
rest of this work is based on. The background on the underlying research question
is outlined, and the key motivations and thesis objectives are mentioned.
The remainder of the thesis consists of three empirical chapters concentrated
on the identication, measurement and the analysis of the interest rate exposure
faced by nancial corporations. Specically, the second chapter presents an em-
pirical investigation of the nancial institutions interest rate risk exposure across
an international data sample. The material in this chapter addresses the inade-
quacies of the presently popular methods to quantify the exposure of the nancial
intermediaries to interest rate risk. In addition, this chapter also examines the
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foreign exchange risk and risks borne by the real estate market activities.
The third chapter addresses the key determinants of bank interest rate risk.
In particular, this work examines the link between interest rate risk faced by
nancial intermediaries in the G-10 countries, their balance sheet composition,
national regulatory regimes and level of market discipline. Both company and
market specic information is considered in the analysis.
Chapter 4 empirically examines the impact of securitization on banks interest
rate exposure. In particular, the analysis conducted in this chapter questions
whether securitization is conducive to the optimal hedging of bank interest rate
risk, or is merely a funding source enabling these companies to pursue more
protable but riskier projects.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the work presented in the thesis. This chapter
provides a concise summary of the thesis main contributions and examined issues,
draws together the key ndings, and discusses the policy implications of these
ndings. In addition, the chapter outlines some perspectives for future research,
discussing both short- and long-term objectives and future directions in the eld.
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Chapter 2
Revisiting the Interest Rate Risk
of Financial Intermediaries
2.1 Introduction
One of the focal topics in modern nancial theory is addressing the development
and improvement of the asset pricing models. In this context, the empirical iden-
tication of systematic risk factors in capital markets has received great attention
with voluminous literature available.
The systematic market risk as measured by the market beta is unanimously
recognised in the asset pricing theory. There is, however, extensive evidence
that the market factor per se does not fully represent the undiversiable risk
component of the security and portfolio returns. Since Samuelson (1945)1 this
argument has been consistently supported by researchers who focus their atten-
tion on the relevance of the interest rate factor in explaining the variability in
returns of both nancial [Flannery, 1981, 1983; Saunders and Yourougou, 1990;
Elyasiani and Mansur, 1998, 2003, 2005; Elyasiani, Mansur and Pagano, 2007;
Fa¤ and Howard, 1997, 1999] and non-nancial [Joehnk and Nielsen, 1976; Hau-
gen, Stroyny and Wichern, 1978; Sweeney and Warga, 1983,1986; ONeal, 1998]
institutions.
Although stocks of any industry group are potentially a¤ected by interest
rate changes, the asset transformation function of nancial institutions (hereafter
"FI") exposes them to a higher degree of interest rate risk. The reasons for this
are discussed in Chapter 1 and can be found in Staikouras (2003, 2006).
While the attention of the regulators and researchers has lately been on the
credit and operational risks, the issue of interest rate risk has been recently re-
1Samuelson (1945) emphasised the sensitivity of banks equity returns to the interest rate
changes as a result of their asset-liability structure. See Chapter 1 for further details.
visited. The signicance of interest rate risk has been emphasised by the Basel
Committee of Banking Supervision (2004, 2008) and regulatory authorities both
in the US and in Europe. The Committee has introduced the signicantly revised
set of "Principles for the Management and Supervision of Interest Rate Risk".
Within the newly introduced principles the regulators emphasise the signicance
of banks having "a comprehensive risk management process in place that e¤ec-
tively identies, measures, monitors and controls interest rate risk exposures"
(BIS, 2004: p.2) and recognise that "excessive interest rate risk can pose a signif-
icant threat to a banks earnings and capital base" (BIS, 2004: p.5). In a more
recent consultative document titled "Range of Practices and Issues in Economic
Capital Modelling" and issued in August 2008, the Committee revisited the topic
stating that with regards to the interest rate risk in the banking book "close at-
tention should be paid to measuring and managing instruments with embedded
options features" (BIS, 2008: p.7) since these instruments can pose the risks that
are "signicantly greater than suggested by the risk measure" (BIS, 2008: p.7).
Consequently, it is essential for the solvency of the nancial system that banks
maintain prudent levels of interest rate risk.
On the empirical front, the exposure of nancial intermediaries to the various
systematic risks has been a subject of considerable research since the inception
of Stones (1974) two factor model. The model simply augments the standard
market model of asset returns with the interest rate factor proxied by the return
on a bond index. Since its inception the model has been extensively used in both
its original form and numerous modications [Martin and Keown, 1977; Lynge
and Zumwalt, 1980; Flannery and James, 1984a, 1984b; Booth and O¢cer, 1985;
Booth, O¢cer, and Henderson, 1985; Scott and Peterson, 1986; Kane and Unal,
1988; Akella and Chen, 1990; Wetmore, 2003; among others].
Despite this extensive research, previous studies produce rather contrasting
results regarding the e¤ect of interest rate changes on nancial institutions equity
returns. The reason for this can be attributed to the di¤erent data samples, time
horizons and methodological frameworks employed in these works.
In particular, the researchers use di¤erent proxies for the interest rate factor
in Stones model. Both Lynge and Zumwalt (1980) and Booth and O¢cer (1985)
provide evidence of signicant relationship between the short-term interest rates
and the FIs stock returns. On the other hand, Bae (1990) uses the interest
rate proxies of three di¤erent maturities and argues that FI stock returns are
more sensitive to the changes in long-term interest rates. The latter is supported
by Kane and Unal (1987), Akella and Chen (1990), Browne et al. (1999), and
Elyasiani and Mansur (2003, 2004, 2007).
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The treatment of interest rate changes also varies among the studies. Few
works apply current interest rate changes [Lynge and Zumwalt, 1980; Chance
and Lane, 1980; Sweeney and Warga, 1986; Oertmann, Rendu and Zimmermann,
2000]. Others advocate the use of unanticipated changes. These contributions
rely on market e¢ciency recognising that asset values should already incorporate
all the anticipated changes in interest rates. Researches in this group of studies
employ a number of di¤erent expectation generating processes to extract the inter-
est rate "innovations" from the unadjusted series. Flannery and James (1984a),
Yourougou (1990), Akella and Chen (1990), Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992),
Adjaoud and Rahman (1996), and Dinenis and Staikouras (1998) use the fore-
cast error from the autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models
as the proxy for unanticipated interest rate changes. Further, Booth and O¢-
cer (1985) suggest the implementation of a Meiselman-type error learning model,
while Dinenis and Staikouras (2000) support a state space system.
Similarly, the empirical methodologies selected by researchers lack consistency
among the studies. Three key approaches are commonly utilised. First, the sig-
nicance of the interest rate risk factor from Stones model is tested via ordinary
least squares (OLS). This is performed by Chance and Lane (1980), Flannery
(1981, 1983), Giliberto (1985), Bae (1990) and others. The second approach is
to address the coe¢cient signicance using the autoregressive conditional het-
eroscedasticity (ARCH) type techniques. In this group, researchers [Song, 1994;
Wetmore and Brick, 1994; Flannery, Hameed and Harjes, 1997; Elyasiani and
Mansur, 1998; Ryan and Worthington, 2004; and Brewer, et al., 2007] recognise
the inability of OLS to account for the time varying sensitivities of the risk factor
to the underlying asset returns. The third and most recent methodology employed
by researchers is based on the multivariate extension of the ARCH type models.
For instance, Elyasiani and Mansur (2003, 2004), Carson, Elyasiani and Mansur
(2006), Elyasiani, Mansur and Pagano (2007), and Fa¤, Hodgson and Kremmer
(2005) employed the Bollerslevs (1990) Conditional Constant Correlation (CCC)
GARCH model in their works.
Furthermore, the empirical research in the area has demonstrated the rele-
vance of foreign exchange and real estate risk factors2 to the FIs returns generat-
2The importance of foreign exchange factor is highlighted by Grammatikos, Saunders and
Swary, 1986; Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky, 1992; Wetmore and Brick, 1994, 1998; Prasad and
Rajan, 1995; Chamberlain, Howe and Popper, 1997; Tai, 2000; Choi, Hiraki and Takezawa,
1998; Ryan and Worthington, 2004. The researchers emphasise that nancial intermediaries
are continuously exposed to exchange rate movements both directly and indirectly. Likewise,
the real estate factor is considered by Mei and Saunders, 1995; Allen, Madura and Wiant,
1995; He, Myer and Webb, 1996; Lausberg, 2001; Johntson and Madura, 2002; He, 2002; and
Elyasiani, Mansur and Wetmore, 2010. These researchers point that the impact of the real
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ing process. Nonetheless, there is no study which addresses the joint interaction of
market, interest rate, foreign exchange and real estate risk factors while modelling
the nancial institutions stock returns.
Accordingly, the FIs exposure to the various types of risk should be re-
examined using a recent set of data and an extensive sample of countries. While
the extant contributions are mainly concentrated on the US banking industry,
with only a few studies covering other regions or industry sectors [Clare and
Thomas, 1994; Adjaoud and Rahman, 1996; Priestley, 1996; Fa¤ and Howard,
1997, 1999; Dinenis and Staikouras, 1998, 2000], the research presented in this
chapter is unique in several ways.
First, in this chapter, I consider an international sample of banks and insur-
ance companies. The scope of the research is to cover the countries members of
the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision and other important regions of Asia
(Hong Kong) and the Pacic Rim (Australia)3.
Second, to address the risk exposure of FIs in each market, and for the pur-
pose of comparison with the previous empirical works, this research employs both
the conventional Stones (1974) two-factor model and its augmented multi-factor
specication. Additional factors are introduced in the augmented model to repre-
sent foreign exchange risk as well as risk borne from operations in the real estate
market. For both factorisations of the model, factor signicance is tested under
alternative econometric specications including ordinary least squares (OLS) and
the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) type technique.
Third, the same model specications are used across a vast sample of markets.
This helps to shed light on the origins of any disparity in the previously reported
results with the researchers testing di¤erent formulations of Stones model un-
der yet diverse econometric frameworks. Moreover, by testing the homogeneous
model formulation under di¤erent econometric specications, the suitability of
these specications for the analysis of the FIs stock returns is tested.
Fourth, I adopt a framework that allows to capture the sensitivity of the FIs
stock returns to the changes in the entire shape of the term structure. This
extends the standard research methodology of assessing the FIs interest rate
exposure by using a single interest rate factor.
Finally, in the context of the ARCH model specication, I examine the key
factors inuencing the volatility of the FIs equity returns. This is done by extend-
estate market activity on the bank equity positions is not completely captured by the stock
market index.
3Subject to the constraint that each market should be represented by at least three nancial
institutions (banks or insurance companies) with the required data available over the studied
horizon.
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ing the methodology of Elyasiani and Mansur (1998). The approach proposed
in this chapter allows for the conditional volatility of returns to be modelled as
a function of lagged shocks ("2t i and ht j) and lagged innovations in the: (a)
risk factors utilised in the mean equation; and (b) conditional volatilities of these
factors.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a
brief description of the dataset employed, while Section 2.3 outlines the research
design and methodology. The empirical analysis and ndings are presented in
Section 2.4, whereas the concluding remarks are contained in Section 2.5.
2.2 Data description
To assess the FIs risk exposure this study utilises the augmented specication
of the standard market model with the factor signicance being tested under
alternative econometric specications. To this end, the nancial intermediaries
share returns are regressed against a number of macroeconomic factors proxying
interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, the risk implied by the real estate market
conditions, and systematic market risk. These factors are dened individually for
each market and discussed below.
2.2.1 Financial institutions
The study employs a sample of 425 nancial intermediaries across 13 major
nancial markets. The extensive market coverage is necessary to meet the main
research objectives, one of which is to cover the member countries of the Basel
Committee of Banking Supervision4 and other important regions of Asia (Hong
Kong) and the Pacic Rim (Australia). The resulting sample consists of 303
banks and 122 insurance companies.
The requisite data on these institutions are sourced from the Bloomberg data-
base. The key requirement for the data collection is the availability of at least
three banks (insurers) for each market each with annual balance sheet and weekly
share price data being continuously available from January 1997 to December
2007. For each market, two portfolios are formed, the rst one including all
banks and the second all insurance companies.
Since the size of a company may indirectly determine the sensitivity of its
values to interest rate movements [Akella and Chen, 1990; Fa¤ and Howard,
4The member countries of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision are Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, and United States.
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Table 2.1
Mean and median asset size
This table reports mean and median of the banks asset size alongside with the number
of banks in the size based portfolios for each market. All banks are grouped into size
portfolios with classication based on the asset value as of year-end 2004. These portfolios
are identied as Large (with asset value exceeding $50 billion); Medium (with asset value
ranging from $15 to 50 billion); and Small (with asset value less than $15 billion). All data
is in millions of dollars.
Panel A: Banks
Portfolio Mean Median Banks Portfolio Mean Median Banks
AUSTRALIA JAPAN
All Firms $109,057 $44,298 9 All Firms $30,881 $23,479 64
Large $201,245 $202,029 5 Large $74,371 $62,912 10
Medium $16,870 $8,791 4 Medium $26,387 $23,966 42
BELGIUM Small $10,371 $11,493 12
All Firms $545,558 $526,461 3 SWEDEN
CANADA All Firms $211,064 $223,489 4
All Firms $139,371 $147,414 10 SWITZERLAND
Large $228,926 $232,354 6 All Firms $9,969 $7,301 12
Small $5,040 $3,118 4 Small $7,238 $6,775 10
FRANCE UK
All Firms $295,325 $8,424 15 All Firms $504,218 $147,343 9
Large $699,605 $814,304 5 Large $628,196 $545,706 7
Small $6,554 $7,210 10
GERMANY US - Money Center
All Firms $309,738 $49,989 11 All Firms $1,872,077 $460,587 8
Large $644,269 $575,332 5 US - Regional
Medium $47,929 $48,096 3 All Firms $16,182 $2,733 79
Small $13,994 $12,526 3 Large $117,595 $94,040 7
HONG KONG Medium $33,340 $31,470 7
All Firms $143,105 $11,516 10 Small $3,213 $1,875 65
ITALY US - Savings & Loans
All Firms $94,835 $21,046 14 All Firms $13,621 $1,902 42
Large $364,233 $359,390 3 Large $146,281 $106,889 3
Medium $27,470 $21,046 8 Medium $18,630 $16,826 3
Small $5,076 $6,306 3 Small $2,275 $1,192 36
1999], both insurance and banking companies are classied into three equally
weighted portfolios. This classication is based on the asset value as of year-
end 2004. The portfolios are identied as Large (with asset value exceeding $50
billion); Medium (with asset value ranging from $15 to 50 billion); and Small
(with asset value less than $15 billion). Studying the size portfolios is consistent
with Kane and Unal (1988), and Fraser, Madura and Weigand (2002) and allows
direct inferences regarding the risks exposure across rms of di¤erent sizes5.
The US banks are classied further to di¤erent groups according to the nature
5There are, however, a number of disadvantages in employing the portfolio approach, of
these one being the presentation of smoothed returns among the portfolio constituents. In
other words, this approach lters out the key dissimilarities in the return generating process of
the individual institutions.
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of their business (Money Centre Banks, Regional Banks, and Saving & Loans In-
stitutions). This is in line with Song (1994), and Wetmore and Brick (1998). A
similar approach is followed for Italian, German, British and US insurance com-
panies, where categories include Life & Health, Medical, Multiline, Reinsurance,
and Property & Casualty insurance companies. The basic statistics regarding
the asset values of institutions in each market, industry, and size portfolios are
reected in Table 2.1: Panel A for banks and Panel B for insurance companies.
The returns on the portfolios of banks and insurance companies in each size
category are calculated as weekly logarithmic rst di¤erence transformations of
Wednesday stock prices for the portfolio constituents. I chose the weekly sampling
interval instead of daily or monthly for two reasons. First, the ndings of Trzcinka
(1986) and Fama (1976) indicate that the returns calculated at a daily frequency
are not well explained by the normal distribution. By using, however, monthly
sampling frequency the non-normality of daily observation would be avoided just
at the expense of information loss. Second, the use of weekly intervals reduces
distortions due to non-trading holidays, and non-synchronous trading (Lo and
MacKinlay, 1990). This is particularly important for cross-country studies. Fur-
thermore, the calculation of returns based on the Wednesday to Wednesday stock
prices helps avoid the bias introduced by the Monday or Friday market e¤ects
[French, 1980; Pettengill, Wingender, and Kohli, 2003]. The calculated returns
are then used as dependent variables in the model framework. Whereas the
methodological framework is described in the following section, the descriptive
statistics on the portfolios returns are reected in Appendix 2.2: Panel A for
banks and Panel B for insurance companies.
The test statistics reveal that the average weekly returns are typically positive
for most size portfolios and for both banks and insurance companies. For all
portfolios, the unconditional distributions of returns are not normal. The non-
normality is supported by the Jarque-Bera test, which overwhelmingly rejects
normality at the 1% signicance level.
Furthermore, the skewness statistics deviate signicantly from zero for most
portfolios. The values of kurtosis gures are also high, indicating that the return
series are leptokurtic or fat-tailed. The results of the Ljung-Box (1978) serial
correlation test reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in returns for the
majority of analysed portfolios. Based on this evidence, the use of least squares
techniques may result in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. To address
this problem I test the parameter signicance under alternative econometric spec-
ications with pertinent comparisons provided in the following sections.
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Table 2.1 (contd)
Mean and median asset size
This table reports mean and median of the insurance companies asset size alongside with
the number of insurance companies in the size based portfolios for each market. All
insurers are grouped into size portfolios with classication based on the asset value as of
year-end 2004. These portfolios are identied as Large (with asset value exceeding $50
billion); Medium (with asset value ranging from $15 to 50 billion); and Small (with asset
value less than $15 billion). All data is in millions of dollars.
Panel B: Insurance companies
Portfolio Mean Median Banks Portfolio Mean Median Banks
AUSTRALIA SWITZERLAND
All Firms $25,105 $20,854 4 All Firms $106,835 $51,787 7
CANADA Large $177,166 $153,049 4
All Firms $68,439 $86,765 5 UK - Life & Health
FRANCE All Firms $170,157 $159,661 4
All Firms $305,074 $210,578 5 UK - Property & Casualty
GERMANY - Life & Health All Firms $8,582 $1,476 7
All Firms $74,200 $18,293 3 US - Life & Health
GERMANY - Multiline All Firms $5,873 $5,319 12
All Firms $231,974 $70,319 6 US - Medical
Large $455,551 $158,919 3 All Firms $8,044 $3,653 5
GERMANY - Reinsurance US - Multiline
All Firms $118,531 $48,988 3 All Firms $16,459 $3,865 18
Medium $18,361 $13,041 5
ITALY - Life & Health Small $2,785 $2,281 12
All Firms $32,835 $20,841 3 US - Property & Casualty
ITALY - Multiline All Firms $4,947 $2,024 19
All Firms $97,398 $44,604 5 Medium $18,844 $16,985 3
Large $156,850 $45,409 3 Small $2,341 $1,185 16
JAPAN US - Reinsurance
All Firms $31,935 $28,556 6 All Firms $29,545 $8,066 8
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2.2.2 Interest rate proxy
The existing literature suggests that estimation results are a¤ected by the
choice of the interest rate proxy. Therefore, multiple interest rate proxies are
used in this study. All series are obtained from the Bloomberg database.
First, short- and long-term interest rates are sampled. The inclusion of both
short- and long- interest rate proxies is consistent with Flannery and James
(1984a), Bae (1990), Saunders and Yourougou (1990), and Madura and Zarruk
(1995). These factors are represented by the rst di¤erence6 in the market yields
of two sovereign bills with di¤erent maturities (short- and long-term respectively).
The detailed descriptions of these measures are provided in Appendix 2.1.
Second, I also calculate the interest rate term spread as the di¤erence between
long-term and short-term interest rates. This factor is included since the empirical
results of Fama and French (1989), Chen (1991), and Boudoukh, Richardson
and Whitelaw (1997) suggest positive relationships between the size of the term
spread and the risk premium. Hence, when the yield curve structure is inverted
due to the expectations of lower interest rates and poor economic conditions,
nancial intermediaries, commonly playing the role of creditors, are expected to
be negatively a¤ected.
Finally, the variables representing the level, slope and curvature of the interest
rate yield curve are also employed in this study. These measures control for the
sensitivity of FIs stock returns to the changes in the entire shape of the term
structure. Following the reasoning of Diebold and Lee (2006)7 the yield curve
level, slope and curvature are calculated via the Diebold and Lee factorisation of
the Nelson and Siegel (1987, 1988) model:
yt() = 1;t + 2;t

1  e 


+ 1;t

1  e 

  e 

(2.1)
where  represents the maturity of the underlying xed-income security and  is
a decay parameter discussed below.
The Nelson-Siegel model uses just a few parameters (compared for example to
spline methods) and provides enough exibility to capture a range of monotonic,
S-type and humped shapes typically observed in the yield curve data. It ts the
6The use of the rst di¤erence transformation rather than the unadjusted series is determined
by the ndings of Bradley and Lumpkin (1992) who demonstrate the presence of the unit root
(nonstationarity) in time series of both 1- and 10-year Treasury note yields via the Dickey-Fuller
and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Mehra (1996) also nds that 10-year Treasury note yields
and a time series of the Fed Fund rates are nonstationary.
7Diebold and Lee (2006) demonstrate that factor 
1;t from the Nelson-Siegel model governs
the level of the yield curve whereas 
2;t and 3;t govern its slope and curvature.
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term structure using a exible, smooth parametric function based on a Laguerre
function. Notably, due to its ability to provide a good t of the interest rate yield
curves the model is advocated by Diebold and Lee (2006), and Czaja, Scholz
and Wilkens (2010), and is widely used by central banks and practitioners. The
central banks in nine out of thirteen countries members of the Basel Committee
of Banking Supervision construct a sovereign zero-coupon yield curve using the
Nelson-Siegel class of models.
To estimate the yield curve level, slope and curvature, the series of the sov-
ereign zero-coupon yields of 12 di¤erent maturities ( = 3, 6, 12 months, as well
as 2, 3,. . . ,10 years) are collected8 for each market analysed in the study. These
series are used as the initial estimates on the left hand side.
Based on the model parameterization above, the loading on the level (1;t)
parameter is 1 and is independent of time-to-maturity. Taking the limit, it is
easy to see that lim!1 yt() = 1;t and hence the yield curve level can be seen
as a long-term interest rate variable. It also worth noting that an increase in 1;t
would identically a¤ect all yields, thereby shifting the level of the yield curve.
Similarly, the loading on the slope parameter 2;t is driven by the exponential
function starting at 1 and decreasing monotonically to zero with increasing ma-
turity. Therefore, the slope parameter might be seen as short-term interest rate
variable. An increase in this parameter would amplify the short-rates more than
the long ones. In mathematical terms, given lim!0 yt() = 1;t+2;t, it is easy to
see that yt(1) yt(0) =  2;t. The loading on the last parameter 3;t(curvature)
is also driven by the exponential function, now starting at zero (with the  = 0),
increasing for the medium maturities and decaying back to zero as maturity in-
creases. Accordingly, the yield curve curvature (3;t) can be seen as the medium
term interest rate variable. Therefore it is of particular interest to this research
since the medium rates are not covered by any of the interest rate proxies dis-
cussed above.
Following Diebold and Lee(2006), Fabozzi et al. (2005), and Czaja, Scholz
and Wilkens (2006), to obtain the estimates of the level, slope and curvature, the
identied series of zero-coupon yields are regressed on the parameter loadings and
a constant using the cross-sectional ordinary least squares technique. With this
model factorisation the parameters on the right hand side are calculated assuming
the prexed value of decay parameter . Consistent with Diebold and Lee (2006)
8The standard way to construct the term structure of interest rate is by using the zero-
coupon bonds. The Bloomberg database derives and supplies the required series of zero-coupon
yields for di¤erent maturities, derived from coupon bearing Treasury Notes and Bonds following
a bootstrapping approach.
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the value of this decay parameter  is xed at 0:0609. For comparison, the time-
varying decay parameter  is also employed. In this specication  is chosen to
maximize the goodness-of-t statistics of the underlying model at each time t.
Both specications yield statistically identical results. To avoid introducing an
additional time-varying component in the yield-curve model, I resort to the xed
 specication.
As suggested by previous research, only unanticipated changes in interest rates
a¤ect the nancial institutions values. I follow this literature and extract the in-
terest rate "innovations" from the unadjusted series of interest rates discussed
above. The unanticipated interest rate changes are estimated as the di¤erence
between the actual interest rate changes and the ones forecasted via the appro-
priate specication of the ARMA model9. This approach remains one of the most
popular in the literature. The descriptive statistics for all interest rate proxies
are outlined in Appendix 2.3.
The estimated innovations are used as an interest rate factor in the empirical
framework. In particular, the sensitivity test of FIs returns to interest rate risk
is performed using interchangeably short- and long-term interest rates, interest
rate term-spread, and the variable representing the curvature of domestic zero-
coupon yield curve. The use of multiple interest rate proxies helps to identify the
patterns in risk exposure of nancial institutions across the whole term structure.
Finally, following previous empirical works [Scott and Peterson, 1986; Bae,
1990; Flannery and James, 1984] the percentage changes in the underlying inter-
est rate proxies are also calculated. Their unexpected components are used as
alternative to the interest rate proxies discussed above. By utilising both arith-
metic and percentage changes the importance of the approximation technique
choice is tested. Any observed dissimilarities will help to shed light on the rea-
sons for diverse results reported in previous works. Moreover, to further examine
the e¤ects of large interest rate shocks on the value of the analysed companies,
the squared changes in the underlying interest rate proxies are also calculated
and used as alternatives.
9The appropriate order of the autoregressive and moving average parameters used in the
model framework varies across variables and markets covered. Moreover, the use of only one
expectation generating process is supported by the ndings of Bae (1990) who using three dif-
ferent models to form expectations nds identical results regardless of the model employed.
Further, Dinenis and Staikouras (1998) using a sample of the UK institutions report the ro-
bustness of their results to ve di¤erent models used to extract the unexpected interest rate
changes.
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2.2.3 Additional independent variables
The information on the domestic equity market price indices and the REIT
market price indices has also been collected. The historical values for each of the
indices are obtained from the Bloomberg database and the returns are calculated
in the same manner as for the nancial institutions. Whereas the market indices
are listed in Appendix 2.1, all real estate indices are presented by European
Public Real Estate Association/National Association of Real Estate Investment
Trust (EPRA/NAREIT) Equity REIT Index series for each country compiled by
the Financial Times.
The FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Indices are well established and serve as key
benchmarks for investment in eligible listed real estate companies. The use of the
REIT returns as a proxy for the national real estate markets activity is further
supported by Giliberto (1990), Martin and Cook (1991) and is also in line with
the work by Allen, Madura and Wiant (1995).
As regards to the foreign exchange variable, the JP Morgan trade-weighted
multilateral foreign exchange index of the domestic currency against a broad-
based basket of other currencies is used. The foreign exchange index is obtained
for every country in the sample.
Following the literature, the unanticipated changes in the foreign exchange
index are calculated in the same way as for interest rates. The estimated in-
novations in the index are used as a foreign exchange factor in the empirical
framework outlined in the next section. The pertinent statistics for the analysed
indices are displayed in Appendix 2.3.
2.3 Research design and methods
The risk exposure of the FIs stock returns is assessed via both Stones two-
factor model and its augmented multi-factor parameterisation. The parameters
signicance is tested under alternative econometric specications including ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) and generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedas-
ticity (GARCH) with its multivariate extension (MV-GARCH). The impetus of
this selection is to shed light on previous ndings and to identify the origins of
the disparity in previously reported results.
Furthermore, the GARCH framework is ideal for examining the key factors
inuencing the volatility of the FIs equity returns.
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2.3.1 Two factor model
Ordinary least squares estimation
Since Stone (1974), who extended the traditional market model by incorporat-
ing an interest rate factor, this topic has been widely revisited. Following Stones
methodology, various researchers have conrmed the signicance of the interest
rate factor in explaining the variability of the FIs equity returns. Given its wide
recognition and for purposes of comparison with the previously reported ndings,
the conventional Stones two-factor model is used in this chapter:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + "it (2.2)
where Rit and RM;t are the returns on the underlying banking/insurance portfolio
and the market portfolio respectively at time t. RIR;t is the interest rate factor
which represents the unexpected changes (arithmetic, percentage, and squared) in
the underlying interest rate proxy. Following the discussion in Section 2.2.2 I use
four interest rate proxies. These are short- and long-term interest rates, interest
rate term-spread, and the variable representing the curvature of domestic zero-
coupon yield curve. The yield curve curvature is estimated via the Diebold and
Lee factorisation of the Nelson-Siegel model in Equation 2.1.
Despite its popularity, a signicant drawback of Stones model as specied
above is that both positive and negative interest rate changes are assumed to have
the same impact on the underlying equity (portfolio) returns. This contradicts
with the well documented evidence supporting the view that di¤erent types of FIs
exhibit heterogeneous responses to an interest rate increase than to a decline in
interest rates. Chen and Chan (1989) report that the returns of Savings & Loan
institutions are more sensitive to a rate decrease, while the commercial banks
stock returns are strongly a¤ected by a rate increase. Based on this evidence, I
employ the enhanced version of Stones model as follows:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IR;POSRIR;tDIR;t + IR;NEGRIR;t(1 DIR;t) + "it (2.3)
The model accounts for the asymmetric impact of the interest rate changes on
the FIs portfolio returns through a dummy variable DIR;t. This dummy takes a
value of one if RIR;t > 0 at time t and zero otherwise. The interest rate factor
RIR;t is the same as in Equation 2.2.
The signicance of the asymmetry is addressed via the Wald10 coe¢cient
10The Wald test computes a test statistic based on unrestricted regression. The test statistic
(F -statistics) measures how close the unrestricted estimates come to satisfying the restrictions
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restriction test with the null hypothesis stating the equality of coe¢cients IR;POS
and IR;NEG, e.g. both positive and negative interest rate changes have identical
impact on the FIs portfolio returns. Whenever the null hypothesis is not rejected,
the model (2.3) is reduced to the conventional linear form of Stones model (2.2).
Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity estimation
Models (2.2) and (2.3) are estimated via the ordinary least squares estimation
procedure which does not take into account some relevant empirical properties of
the time series data. One of these properties is the time variation of the risk factor
sensitivity to the underlying asset returns. This property is well documented in
the empirical literature11, suggesting that if the banks return generating process
is time-dependant the use of least squares techniques may result in biased and
inconsistent parameter estimates. The heteroscedastic and leptokurtic residuals
of the traditional linear model might inate the parameters standard errors and
lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the parameters statistical signicance.
To address this issue, recent empirical literature suggests using the autore-
gressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) type techniques. Proposed by
Engle (1982) these models make it possible to simultaneously model both the
mean and the variance of the series and relax the assumption of homoscedastic-
ity. This in turn allows the economic time series to exhibit time-varying volatility,
such that periods of unusually large volatility are followed by periods of relative
tranquillity. This phenomenon is also known as "volatility clustering". In the
research context, the univariate ARCH extension of Stones two-factor model,
capturing the time-varying sensitivity of banks stock returns to the market and
interest rate risks, was rst employed by Song (1994). Song emphasises that the
two betas in Stones conventional model depend on the conditional information12
and are potentially time-varying. Therefore, the author suggests the use of the
ARCH modelling strategy as a "natural way to model this time-variation in the
conditional variance and covariance" (Song, 1994: p. 324). This proposition is
supported by Songs ndings which demonstrate that both market and interest
rate risk exhibit a signicant degree of time-variation over the studied horizon.
under the null hypothesis, with inference made based on the associated p-value.
11Song (1994), Kane and Unal (1988), Akella and Chen (1990), Brewer and Lee (1990),
Kwan (1991), and Adjaoud and Rahman (1996) suggest that the sensitivities of the FIs stock
returns to interest rate risk are time-varying. Likewise, Wetmore and Brick (1994, 1998) and
Tai (2000) have established the time-varying properties of the foreign exchange risk in the FIs
stock returns.
12The rationale relies on the fact that the beta coe¢cient is specied as the ratio of the
conditional covariance between the return on a particular asset i and a specied factor, and the
conditional variance of this factor.
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These ndings also question the validity of the results reported in previous studies
assuming constant betas in the modelling of FIs stock returns.
Since then, the basic ARCH framework has been extended and generalized
resulting in the introduction of a whole family of ARCH type models. Bollerslev
(1986) extends the original Engles ARCH model by developing the framework
where the conditional variance constitutes an ARMA (Autoregressive Moving Av-
erage) process. In other words the volatility in this model is dependent not only
on the persistence of the shock occurred (autoregressive component) but also on
the historical volatility patterns (reected by the moving average component).
Following the success of Songs experiment, Bollerslevs ARCH model generali-
sation has also found its applications in modelling the sensitivity of FIs stock
returns. This is done in the context of the two-factor model by Elyasiani and
Mansur (1998), Flannery, Hameed and Harjes (1997), and Brewer et al. (2007).
The model used by these authors is specied as follows:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + "it (2.4)
hit = !0 +
pX
i=1
i"
2
i;t i +
qX
j=1
ihi;t 1 (2.5)
"itj
t 1  N(0; hit) (2.6)
where Rit, RM;t, and RIR;t are as in (2.2). "it is the estimated error term from
the mean equation of portfolio i, and hit is a conditional variance of portfolio i
over week t. The model in (2.4-2.6) is used as an alternative to the Stones model
in Equation 2.2.
While the simple GARCH model above provides robust coe¢cient estimation,
it has some limitations. Specically, the e¤ects of the positive shocks (news) have
the same impact on volatility as the negative shocks. This is not always supported
by empirical evidence, and Nelson (1991) with Bekaert and Harvey (1997) argue
that the asymmetry should be appropriately modelled.
Following this argument, I also employ the extended version of the GARCH
model proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) (GJR-GARCH)
which allows for the asymmetric e¤ect of news. More specically the model
modies the specication in (2.4-2.6) through the use of a dummy variable as
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follows:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + "it (2.7)
hit = !0 +
pX
i=1
i"
2
i;t i +
qX
j=1
ihi;t 1 + i"
2
i;t 1(Ij"i;t 1<0j) (2.8)
"itj
t 1  N(0; hit) (2.9)
where the term (Ij"i;t 1<0j) is an indicator function assuming the value of zero
when "i;t 1 > 0, and 1 otherwise. Accordingly, in the GJR-GARCH(p; q) model
the impact of positive news on conditional variance hit is i, while negative news
have an impact of i+ i. Therefore, when i > 0 one would expect the negative
news to have a greater impact on volatility and vice versa. The parameters !0,
i, and i are assumed to be positive. The covariance stationarity condition is
satised by assuming i + i + i=2 < 1. In the case when the i coe¢cient is
insignicant the model is reduced to the simple GARCH (p; q) model in (2.4-2.6).
Multivariate GARCH estimation
There is a growing interest in the literature towards identication of the key
factors inuencing the nancial corporation returns riskiness (volatility). Accord-
ingly, in this study I utilise an augmented specication of the model in (2.4-2.6),
with the estimation being carried out in the multivariate framework. A similar
augmented specication has been previously employed by Elyasiani and Mansur
(1998, 2004), Ryan and Worthington (2004), and Fa¤, Hodgson and Kremmer
(2005)13. Specically, this model allowed researchers to augment the conditional
volatility equation of banking returns with a conditional volatility of the interest
rate factor.
All aforesaid authors (except Tai, 2000) used the conditional constant corre-
lation (CCC) GARCH model of Bollerslev (1990) in their research. This model
specication imposes the assumption of constant correlation and allows for the
variance and covariance to be separately modelled. Each of the N variances can be
modelled with a univariate GARCH model. This results in a variance-covariance
matrix based on these univariate processes and the correlation matrix.
Whilst, however, the multivariate CCC-GARCH model is computationally
simple it is not without limitations. As argued by Cappiello, Engle, and Sheppard
(2003) the assumption of the conditional correlation stability over time seems to
13Further examples of papers using the MV-GARCH techniques in the research context in-
clude Carson, Elyasiani and Mansur (2006), Elyasiani, Mansur and Pagano (2007), Elyasiani,
Mansur and Wetmore (2010), and Tai (2000).
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be unrealistic and is repeatedly violated in the empirical studies. In this chapter,
the assumption of the constant conditional correlations is relaxed by employing
the BEKK (Bollerslev, Engle, Kroner, and Kraft) parameterisation of the MV-
GARCH model which allows for the time variation of the conditional correlation.
Proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) the BEKK parameterisation ensures the
nal output (variance-covariance matrix) to be positive denite by construction.
The rst-order case of the BEKK model can be written as:
Ht = CC
0 + A(rt 1r
0
t 1)A
0 +BHt 1B
0 (2.10)
where A;B and C are NN parameter matrices, with C being a lower triangular
matrix.
Whilst being superior to the CCC-GARCH case this model also has some
limitations. For instance, the model estimation involves rather heavy compu-
tations due to the several matrix inversions with N(N + 1)=2 + 2N2 parame-
ters to be estimated. For instance, there are 11 parameters in the conditional
variance-covariance structure of the bivariate rst order BEKK model. To ease
this limitation the study employs a special case of the BEKK parameterisation,
namely the diagonal-BEKK model parameterisation proposed by Bollerslev, En-
gle and Wooldridge (1988). The resulting empirical representation of the model
that governs the joint process takes the following form:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + "it (2.11)
RIR;t = 0 + "IR;t (2.12)
RM;t = 0 + "M;t (2.13)
hit = !i;0 + i"
2
i;t i + ihi;t 1 + hIR;t (2.14)
hIR;t = !IR;0 + IR"
2
IR;t i + IRhIR;t 1 (2.15)
hM;t = !M;0 + M"
2
M;t i + MhM;t 1 (2.16)
hi=IR;t = i=IR;t
p
hithIR;t (2.17)
hi=M;t = i=M;t
p
hithM;t (2.18)
hIR=M;t = IR=M;t
p
hIR;thM;t (2.19)
"tj
t 1  N(0; Hit) (2.20)
where Rit, RM;t, and RIR;t are as are as discussed above. The conditional time-
varying variance-covariance matrix of the banking (insurance) portfolios returns
and the underlying macroeconomic factors is represented by Hit, with 
t 1 being
the information set available at time t   1. Given the BEKK parameterisation
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imposed above, the conditional variance-covariance matrix is:
Ht = CC
0 + A("t 1"
0
t 1)A
0 +BHt 1B
0 (2.21)
where matrix C is N N lower triangular matrix of coe¢cients, while A and B
are NN diagonal matrices. Under the assumption of conditional normality, the
parameters of the model are estimated by maximising the log-likelihood function.
2.3.2 Multi - factor model
Ordinary least squares estimation
To account for further sources of risk faced by FIs, a number of additional
risk factors are introduced in Stones model, with the factors statistical signi-
cance being established by examining the FIs stock returns across the markets
covered by the research. Following existing empirical ndings and based on the
discussion in Sections 2.2, these measures include the foreign exchange and real
estate factors. The resultant multi-factor model takes the following form:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + FXRFX;t + PROPRPROP;t + "it (2.22)
where RFX represents the unanticipated changes in the trade-weighted multilat-
eral foreign exchange index of the domestic currency against a broad-based basket
of other currencies at time t. RM and RPROP are the returns on the domestic
equity market price index and the REIT market price index respectively. Model
(2.22) is estimated separately for all banking and insurance portfolios, assuming
the interest rate factor RIR proxied by the unexpected changes in either short-
or long- term interest rates.
Moreover, most studies that employ the augmented specication of the mar-
ket model orthogonalise14 one or more factors. This helps to avoid the problem of
multicollinearity between variables which might result in estimation of unstable
regression coe¢cients. On the other hand Giliberto (1985) argues that following
the orthogonalisation procedure may introduce bias due to model misspecica-
tion, and hence some studies chose to avoid the factor orthogonalisation [Chen
and Chan, 1989; Wetmore and Brick, 1994, 1998]. To ascertain whether orthog-
onalisation is required I consider the individual correlations between factors. In
the case that extreme values are detected the factors are orthogonalised. In all
other cases this study employs unorthogonalised factors.
14See for instance Chance and Lane (1980), Flannery and James (1984), Bae (1990), Madura
and Zarruk (1995), and Fraser, Madura and Weigand (2002).
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In addition, to examine the joint interaction of the interest rate yield curve
level, slope and curvature factors in modelling the nancial corporations stock
returns, I also employ an alternative specication of the multi-factor model in
(2.22). In this specication the FIs returns are modelled as a function of the
market returns and three other interest rate factors representing the unanticipated
changes in the yield curve level, slope and curvature15:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + LevRLev;t + SloRSlo;t + CurRCur;t + "it (2.23)
with RLev, RSlo, and RCur represent the unanticipated changes in the yield curve
level, slope and curvature factors respectively. Due to the high correlations ob-
served between these factors, the orthogonalisation procedure is followed. This
also helps to assess an exclusive impact of changes in each factor on the FIs stock
returns. I follow the approach adopted by Czaja, Scholz and Wilkens (2006) in
recognising the level factor as major driver of the yield curve changes. The slope
and curvature are ranked second and third respectively. Accordingly, I orthogo-
nalise the slope factor with respect to the level factor, while also orthogonalising
the curvature factor with respect to both yield curve level and slope. The orthog-
onalised series are then used in Equation 2.23.
Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity estimation
As already emphasised, models (2.22) and (2.23), estimated via the OLS pro-
cedure, do not take into account the time variation of the risk factors sensitivity
to the underlying asset returns. Accordingly, to account for these data properties,
the GJR-GARCH multi-factor model is deployed:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + FXRFX;t + PROPRPROP;t + "it (2.24)
hit = !0 +
pX
i=1
i"
2
i;t i +
qX
j=1
ihi;t 1 + i"
2
i;t 1(Ij"i;t 1<0j) (2.25)
"itj
t 1  N(0; hit) (2.26)
where the term (Ij"i;t 1<0j) is an indicator function assuming the value of zero when
"i;t 1 > 0, and 1 otherwise. Similar to (2.22) this model is estimated separately
for all banking and insurance portfolios in the sample, with the interest rate factor
being interchangeably proxied by the unexpected changes in either short- or long-
term interest rates. In the case when the i coe¢cient is insignicant the model
15The yield curve level, slope, and curvature are estimated via the Diebold and Lee factori-
sation of the Nelson-Siegel model in Equation 2.1.
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is reduced to simple GARCH (p; q):
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + FXRFX;t + PROPRPROP;t + "it (2.27)
hit = !0 +
pX
i=1
i"
2
i;t i +
qX
j=1
ihi;t 1 (2.28)
"itj
t 1  N(0; hit) (2.29)
A similar approach is applied to the estimation of the multi-factor model in
(2.23). In the research context, a similar multi-factor GARCH parameterisation
found its application in the works by Ryan and Worthington (2004) and Elyasiani
and Mansur (2005).
Augmented GARCH estimation
Comprehensively to investigate the key factors inuencing the volatility of
the FIs portfolio returns, I resort to the method proposed by Flannery, Hameed
and Harjes (1997), and Elyasiani and Mansur (1998). Both papers suggest aug-
menting the conditional volatility equation in (2.24-2.26) by an additional factor
representing the interest rate volatility.
However, in this chapter, I extend this methodology by augmenting the con-
ditional volatility equation of FIs portfolio returns with multiple factors. In par-
ticular, the conditional volatility equation is interchangeably augmented by the
one-period lagged values of: (a) contemporaneous factors Rf = RIR;RFX ;RPROP
utilised in the mean equation; and (b) conditional volatilities (hf) of these factors.
Assuming a simple GARCH (1; 1) process, the resulting augmented specica-
tion takes the following form:
Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + FXRFX;t + PROPRPROP;t + "it (2.30)
hit = !0 + i"
2
i;t 1 + ihi;t 1 + 'Xf;t 1 (2.31)
"itj
t 1  N(0; hit) (2.32)
where the exogenous variable Xf is specied as:
(a) Xft = Rft = RIS;t;RIL;t;RFX;t;RPROP;t (2.33)
(b) Xft = hft (2.34)
Rft =  + "t (2.35)
hft = !0 +
pX
i=1
f"
2
f;t i +
qX
j=1
fhf;t 1 (2.36)
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In the model specication (a) above, variable Rf denotes either the unanticipated
changes in short- or long-term interest rate proxies; the unanticipated changes in
the trade-weighted multilateral foreign exchange index of the domestic currency
against a broad-based basket of other currencies RFX ; or the returns on the
domestic REIT market price index RPROP . Variable hf , in parameterisation (b)
denotes the conditional volatility of the factors described in specication (a).
The resultant model (2.30-2.37) is subsequently estimated for all banking and
insurance portfolios in the sample assuming the interest rate factor RIR in the
mean equation proxied by the unexpected changes in either short- or long-term
interest rates.
2.4 Empirical results
This selection of models and variables outlined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 denes
the structure of this section. The discussion initially tests the two-factor model
via the OLS estimation technique for both banking and insurance companies,
and proceeds thereon with its estimation via the GARCH and MV-GARCH type
models. The chapter continues by examining the multi-factor model. Each of
the two sub-sections concludes by providing a brief comparison of the results
reported for both banking and insurance institutions. This demonstrates an inter-
industry comparison in the nancial services industry and emphasises possible
dissimilarities.
For the convenience of the reader, each section is accompanied by a "highlight"
table indicating the magnitude and coe¢cient signicance for the interest rate
factor in each model under scrutiny16.
2.4.1 Two-factor model
Ordinary least squares estimation
The rst model estimated in this study is Stones two-factor model represented
by Equation 2.2. The model is designed to account for the sensitivity of FIs stock
returns to interest rate movements. In addition, the model in Equation 2.3 which
accounts for the asymmetric impact of the interest rate changes on the FIs stock
returns is also estimated and analysed within this section. The simultaneous
analysis of both models provides additional exibility to my approach. It o¤ers a
16To form the complete view of the models estimation results the reader can request the
fully detailed tables from the author.
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separate treatment of the e¤ects from positive and negative interest rate shocks
on the FIs equity returns, and hence facilitates potential empirical inferences.
The empirical results for the two-factor model are presented in Table 2.2:
Panels A and B, while Table 2.3: Panels A-B present the results for the generalised
version of the two-factor model accounting for the asymmetry e¤ect.
A. Banking institutions
For the banking sector, the market factor is always positive and highly signif-
icant with the results being robust across all markets and "size" portfolios. The
highest coe¢cient of 1:289 is reported for large British banks, followed by Belgian
banks and the US Money Centre institutions with an estimated market beta of
1:252 and 1:187 respectively. The lowest market risk coe¢cient with a value of
0.065 is observed for the portfolio of small French banks, followed by the small
German banks with a market beta of 0:077.
The estimation results in Table 2.2 reveal the signicance of at least one
interest rate factor17 in explaining the return variations in the majority of the
banking portfolios. The noticeable exception is the US Money Centre portfolio.
This group of banks shows no sensitivity to either of the interest rate proxies used,
perhaps demonstrating their ability to comprehensively hedge the interest rate
risk exposure over the studied horizon. These ndings for the US Money Centre
banks support the ones previously reported by Madura and Zarruk (1995), but
contrast with the conclusions of Allen, Madura and Wiant (1995). Employing a
similar methodological framework, Madura and Zarruk nd no sensitivity of the
US Money Centre banks to the adverse movements in either short- or long-term
interest rates over the period between January 1988 and April 1993. Contrary
to these ndings, the paper by the second group of authors, employing a time
horizon overlapping the one used by Madura and Zarruk (from 1979 to 1992),
concludes that returns of the US Money Centre banks exhibit a high degree of
sensitivity to the unanticipated changes in the long-term rates. This disparity
between the ndings in both papers, and those reported in my study, could be
explained by the adoption of di¤erent time horizons and portfolio constituents.
For instance, Madura and Zarruk (1995) employ only money centre banks with
signicant foreign exchange operations.
17The estimation of the two-factor model for Swedish banks produces no signicant coe¢-
cients for the interest rate factor. However, the results from the models asymmetric extension
suggest that there is an asymmetry in the response of the Swedish banks stock returns to the
positive and negative long-term interest rate changes.
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Table 2.2
Two-factor model: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for model Rit = 0+MRM;t+IRRIR;t+"it estimated employing the sample of bank institutions
over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of bank institutions i and the return to the
market at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected arithmetic (column 4); percentage (column %4); and squared (column 4
2)
changes in the domestic short- and long-term interest rates, interest rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at
time t. The unanticipated changes in the interest rate factors at time t are calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors
and ones forecasted via an appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient
signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio 4 %4 42 4 %4 42 4 %4 42 4 %4 42
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.025*** -0.138*** -0.041** -0.022*** -0.124*** -0.043** -0.012** 0.000 -0.036* 0.000 0.000 0.000
Large -0.012 -0.070 0.010 -0.027*** -0.156*** -0.042* -0.022** 0.000 -0.014 -0.002 0.000 0.000
Medium -0.045** -0.243** -0.118** -0.014 -0.080 -0.035 0.004 0.000 -0.067 0.003 0.000 -0.001
BELGIUM
All Firms 0.018* 0.061* 0.062 0.019*** 0.084*** 0.120*** 0.001 0.003 -0.045 -0.004** 0.000 0.001
CANADA
All Firms -0.021** -0.065* -0.016 -0.008 -0.052 -0.034 -0.009 -0.001*** -0.029* -0.002* 0.000 0.001
Large -0.027** -0.092** -0.028 -0.020** -0.129** 0.030 -0.009 -0.001*** -0.027 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Small -0.008 0.000 0.012 0.020 0.128 -0.183 -0.010 0.000* -0.035 -0.004 0.000 0.001
FRANCE
All Firms 0.008 0.026 -0.065 -0.001 -0.002 0.067* 0.000 0.001 -0.014 0.002 0.000* -0.004**
Large 0.042** 0.135** -0.118 -0.002 0.001 0.164** 0.001 -0.002 -0.038 0.004 0.000 -0.011***
Small -0.002 -0.009 -0.034 -0.001 -0.001 0.030 -0.003 -0.002 -0.017 0.000 0.000** -0.001
GERMANY
All Firms 0.022 0.065 -0.033 0.007 0.035 -0.109* -0.011 0.001 0.004 0.005* 0.065 -0.033
Large 0.013 0.008 -0.069 0.001 0.019 -0.061 -0.026* 0.001 0.005 0.013 0.008 -0.069
Medium 0.028 0.103 -0.035 0.028 0.115 -0.216* -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.028 0.103 -0.035
Small 0.030** 0.121** 0.028 -0.005 -0.017 -0.082 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.030** 0.121** 0.028
HONG KONG
All Firms -0.022*** -0.005* -0.003 -0.036*** -0.137*** -0.047*** -0.007** -0.001 -0.015*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
Large -0.020*** -0.005** -0.004 -0.034*** -0.133*** -0.045** -0.006* -0.001 -0.016*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
ITALY
All Firms -0.010*** -0.019 0.007 0.004 -0.012 -0.093** -0.007** -0.004** 0.002 0.004*** 0.000 0.000
Large -0.011* -0.016 0.012* 0.018 0.081 -0.031 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.004* 0.000 0.001
Medium -0.008** -0.019 0.006 0.005 -0.001 -0.077* -0.007** -0.006*** 0.006 0.004*** 0.000 0.000
Small -0.013** -0.023 0.004 -0.015 -0.135** -0.197*** -0.013** -0.004 -0.001 0.006** 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.2 (contd)
Two-factor model: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for model Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + "it estimated employing the sample of bank
institutions over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of bank institutions i and
the return to the market at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected arithmetic (column 4); percentage (column %4);
and squared (column 42) changes in the domestic short- and long-term interest rates, interest rate term-spread, and the curvature
of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The unanticipated changes in the interest rate factors at time t are calculated as the
di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors and ones forecasted via an appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving
average (ARMA) model. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio 4 %4 42 4 %4 42 4 %4 42 4 %4 42
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
JAPAN
All Firms -0.004 -0.002 -0.150* 0.003 0.000 0.013 -0.004 -0.008 -0.016 0.000 0.008 -0.007
Large -0.002 -0.001 -0.130 0.009 0.009 0.041 -0.007 -0.013 -0.014 -0.001 0.005 -0.005
Medium -0.003 -0.002* -0.143 0.001 -0.006 0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 0.000 0.008 -0.007
Small -0.008 -0.001 -0.188** 0.008 0.012 0.024 -0.003 -0.008 -0.015 0.003 0.013 -0.010
SPAIN
All Firms 0.010 0.024 -0.210*** -0.009 -0.028 -0.061 -0.010 -0.011** -0.031 0.000 0.000 -0.006
Large 0.004 -0.007 -0.278*** 0.006 0.043 0.020 -0.011 -0.008 -0.050 0.001 0.000 0.001
Medium -0.002 -0.011 -0.275*** -0.012 -0.056 -0.111** -0.018** -0.014** -0.013 0.001 0.000 -0.011**
Small 0.024 0.077 -0.104 -0.018* -0.063 -0.085 -0.002 -0.010 -0.029 -0.002 0.000 -0.008
SWEDEN
All Firms 0.003 0.028 0.033 0.009 0.044 -0.058 -0.007 -0.010 -0.042 -0.006* 0.000 0.001
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.024*** 0.022*** -0.022 0.005 0.008 -0.094*** -0.011** 0.000 -0.017 0.002 0.000 -0.011***
Small 0.023*** 0.020** -0.023 0.008 0.017 -0.065* -0.010** 0.000 -0.016 0.002 0.000 -0.009**
UK
All Firms -0.018* -0.106* -0.105** -0.010 -0.051 -0.019 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005***
Large -0.014 -0.085 -0.101** -0.003 -0.022 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001* -0.005**
US - Money Center
All Firms -0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.013 -0.062 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.004
US - Regional
All Firms -0.003 -0.006 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002
Large -0.012 -0.023 -0.003 -0.010 -0.044 0.016 -0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.000 -0.001
Medium 0.007 0.016 0.012 -0.004 -0.020 0.081 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003
Small -0.004 -0.007 0.006 0.003 0.017 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.003
US - Savings & Loans
All Firms -0.011** -0.038** 0.014* -0.002 -0.014 -0.007 -0.013*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002
Large -0.036*** -0.116*** 0.037** -0.006 -0.020 0.050 -0.030*** -0.002 -0.024 -0.003 0.001 0.006
Medium -0.021 -0.083* 0.045** -0.006 -0.026 0.050 -0.030*** -0.001 -0.015 -0.006 0.000 0.000
Small -0.008 -0.028 0.010 -0.002 -0.012 -0.016 -0.010** 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.000** 0.001
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Another explanation for conicting ndings in the previous works relies on the
possible time-variation in the interest rate risk sensitivity of analysed institutions.
This hypothesis is supported by Wetmore and Brick (1998). The authors employ
a similar methodology, with the FIs stock returns modelled in the context of a
multi-factor model. They separate the whole period under investigation (January
1986 to June 1995) into ve time horizons to reect the pertinent regulatory
changes. Among other categories of bank institutions, the authors analyse the
returns of the US Money Centre banks for sensitivity to the movements in the
domestic long-term rate for each of the ve horizons. The results suggest the
signicance of the interest rate factor over only one period from January 1986 to
October 1987. This period is covered by Allen, Madura and Wiant (1995) but
not by Madura and Zarruk (1995). For the four remaining horizons, overlapping
the time period considered by Madura and Zarruk, no interest rate sensitivity is
observed.
This evidence supports the view of the time-varying interest rate sensitivity
of the analysed institutions. Hence, the results reported in my study could be
biased to the considered time-horizon. Therefore, appropriately to account for the
possible time-variation in risk sensitivity, I also implement the GARCHmodelling
techniques in latter sections.
I analyse next the model with the interest rate factor proxied by the yield curve
curvature. The empirical results imply the sensitivity of the Belgian, Canadian,
German, Italian, and Swedish banks to the unanticipated movements in the yield
curve curvature with no evident asymmetric response reported for any of these
markets. As Table 2.3 suggests, Belgian, Canadian and Swedish corporations
report losses following a medium-term increase. On the contrary, the institutions
in Germany and Italy prot from the rising medium rates. This may be because
these rms hold more medium-term interest rate sensitive liabilities than assets.
Further, the statistical inferences regarding the interest rate factor signi-
cance are biased to the choice of interest rate proxy and approximation tech-
nique adopted to calculate these proxies (e.g. the use of arithmetic or percentage
changes). For instance, Italian Banks demonstrate the sensitivity to the interest
rate factor proxied by the unanticipated percentage changes in the long-rates,
but show no sensitivity to the factor proxied by the arithmetic changes in the
long-rates. Similarly, small Spanish banks exhibit signicant sensitivity to the
arithmetic rate changes in the long-term rates, while no such evidence is recorded
with percentage changes. This observation enriches the evidence to support the
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Table 2.3
Two-factor model with asymmetry: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for model Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IR;POSRIR;tDIR;t + IR;NEGRIR;t(1 DIR;t) + "it estimated
employing the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of
bank institutions i and the return to the market at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected changes in the domestic short- and
long-term interest rates, interest rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The unanticipated changes
in the interest rate factors at time t are calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors and the ones forecasted via an
appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. variable DIR;t is the dummy variable which takes a value of
one if RIR;t > 0 at time t and zero otherwise. The test statistics (F statistics) for the Wald coe¢cient restriction test with the null hypothesis
testing the equality of coe¢cients IR;POS and IR;NEG is reported in column WALD. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.044*** -0.003 4.366** -0.036*** -0.007 4.130** -0.022** 0.000 2.225 -0.001 0.001 0.122
Large -0.008 -0.017 0.192 -0.041*** -0.013 3.676* -0.025*** -0.019** 0.132 -0.003 -0.001 0.143
Medium -0.097*** 0.012 5.232** -0.026 -0.001 0.482 -0.018 0.029 1.679 0.003 0.002 0.011
BELGIUM
All Firms 0.041** -0.004 2.945* 0.034*** -0.001 3.009* -0.012 0.017 2.541 -0.001 -0.007** 1.561
CANADA
All Firms -0.023 -0.019 0.020 -0.022 0.006 0.988 -0.019 0.000 0.952 0.000 -0.004* 1.014
Large -0.035** -0.017 0.470 -0.020 -0.020 0.000 -0.015 -0.003 0.266 0.000 -0.002 0.355
Small 0.007 -0.025 0.431 -0.027 0.066** 2.803* -0.031 0.007 0.923 -0.001 -0.007* 0.826
FRANCE
All Firms -0.004 0.019 1.467 0.010 -0.015 2.380 0.000 -0.001 0.012 -0.004 0.007*** 7.710***
Large 0.028 0.053* 0.308 0.025 -0.034 2.647 0.006 -0.004 0.106 -0.007 0.016*** 6.550**
Small -0.010 0.005 0.564 0.004 -0.006 0.359 -0.006 0.001 0.253 -0.002 0.003 1.592
GERMANY
All Firms 0.002 0.039 0.908 -0.023 0.041** 4.901** -0.004 -0.020 0.447 -0.005 0.065 -0.033
Large -0.004 0.028 0.239 -0.022 0.028 0.969 -0.014 -0.041 0.411 0.013 0.008 -0.069
Medium -0.024 0.074 1.806 -0.021 0.084** 3.633* -0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.028 0.103 -0.035
Small 0.039* 0.021 0.278 -0.027* 0.021 3.246* 0.012 -0.001 0.320 0.030** 0.121** 0.028
HONG KONG
All Firms -0.028*** -0.013** 4.053** -0.048*** -0.021 2.019 -0.022*** 0.008 11.427*** -0.003 0.005* 3.129*
Large -0.026*** -0.012** 3.820** -0.045*** -0.021* 1.640 -0.021*** 0.010* 12.443*** -0.002 0.004 2.315
ITALY
All Firms -0.006 -0.013** 0.575 -0.015 0.023* 2.985* -0.002 -0.011** 1.190 0.005** 0.004 0.222
Large -0.008 -0.014 0.151 0.008 0.030 0.322 0.004 -0.005 0.332 0.009** -0.001 2.589
Medium -0.006 -0.010* 0.127 -0.007 0.018 1.226 0.000 -0.014** 2.605 0.004* 0.004* 0.000
Small -0.004 -0.021** 1.271 -0.059*** 0.031 5.928** -0.014 -0.011 0.040 0.004 0.007* 0.139
36
Table 2.3 (contd)
Two-factor model with asymmetry: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for model Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IR;POSRIR;tDIR;t + IR;NEGRIR;t(1 DIR;t) + "it estimated
employing the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of
bank institutions i and the return to the market at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected changes in the domestic short- and
long-term interest rates, interest rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The unanticipated changes
in the interest rate factors at time t are calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors and the ones forecasted via an
appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. variable DIR;t is the dummy variable which takes a value of
one if RIR;t > 0 at time t and zero otherwise. The test statistics (F statistics) for the Wald coe¢cient restriction test with the null hypothesis
testing the equality of coe¢cients IR;POS and IR;NEG is reported in column WALD. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
JAPAN
All Firms -0.063** 0.073** 8.839*** 0.010 -0.009 0.422 -0.007 0.002 0.104 -0.005 0.005 1.013
Large -0.059** 0.072** 7.805*** 0.020 -0.010 1.004 -0.008 -0.005 0.014 -0.004 0.002 0.263
Medium -0.060** 0.071** 7.501*** 0.006 -0.009 0.242 -0.009 0.005 0.224 -0.006 0.005 1.017
Small -0.077** 0.082** 10.449*** 0.017 -0.007 0.575 -0.002 -0.005 0.010 -0.004 0.009 1.354
SPAIN
All Firms -0.023 0.038** 4.826** -0.018 0.001 0.871 -0.018* 0.000 0.946 -0.006 0.007* 4.121**
Large -0.030 0.033* 4.252** 0.010 0.001 0.144 -0.023* 0.003 1.379 0.001 0.002 0.021
Medium -0.050** 0.040* 6.560** -0.031** 0.010 2.593 -0.028** -0.007 0.774 -0.009* 0.012** 6.845***
Small 0.006 0.040 0.579 -0.029 -0.006 0.462 -0.007 0.005 0.125 -0.009 0.006 2.270
SWEDEN
All Firms 0.007 -0.001 0.033 -0.033* 0.063*** 7.344*** -0.017 0.008 0.691 -0.003 -0.011 0.610
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.018** 0.031*** 0.847 -0.013 0.025** 4.455** -0.016** -0.005 0.765 -0.004 0.010*** 6.516**
Small 0.016* 0.029*** 0.877 -0.004 0.021* 1.897 -0.014* -0.005 0.525 -0.003 0.008** 4.504**
UK
All Firms -0.035** 0.000 1.886 -0.015 -0.004 0.163 -0.007 -0.001 0.079 -0.005 0.008** 4.982**
Large -0.030* 0.004 1.690 -0.005 -0.001 0.032 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.007* 2.943*
US - Money Center
All Firms -0.003 -0.004 0.006 -0.018 -0.007 0.183 0.003 -0.004 0.604 -0.004 0.003 0.880
US - Regional
All Firms -0.006 -0.002 0.096 0.004 -0.002 0.124 0.000 -0.005 0.186 -0.001 0.002 0.422
Large -0.029* -0.003 1.414 -0.008 -0.011 0.012 -0.002 -0.008 0.108 0.001 0.002 0.042
Medium 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.020 -0.030* 3.372* 0.002 0.005 0.023 0.004 -0.004 1.135
Small -0.005 -0.003 0.023 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.222 -0.001 0.003 0.807
US - Savings & Loans
All Firms -0.015 -0.010 0.099 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.018** 0.599 0.001 -0.003 0.661
Large -0.040* -0.034** 0.034 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.031** -0.028* 0.009 0.000 -0.006 0.339
Medium -0.014 -0.025 0.081 0.013 -0.026 0.780 -0.036** -0.023 0.174 0.000 -0.012 0.786
Small -0.013 -0.006 0.219 -0.004 0.000 0.062 -0.005 -0.017** 1.146 0.001 -0.002 0.396
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view that the choice of approximation methodology adopted to calculate the in-
terest rate factors has evident repercussions on the consistency of the estimation
results.
The empirical results based on the asymmetric two-factor model (Table 2.3)
indicate that positive and negative interest rate changes have di¤erent impact on
the underlying portfolio returns. In particular, small Canadian, medium German,
Italian and Swiss banks benet from a decline in the long-term rate, but display
no response to the positive rate changes. A similar observation is noted for the
Swedish banks. This, in turn, violates a common assumption that both posi-
tive and negative interest rate changes have the same impact on the underlying
portfolio returns. Therefore, this asymmetry should be appropriately modelled
in future studies.
B. Insurance companies
We now turn to analysing the interest rate risk exposure of the insurance
companies. The results presented in Panel B of Table 2.2 indicate that the market
beta is always positive and signicant for all portfolios and markets examined.
The highest value of 1:444 is reported for the portfolio of large Swiss insurance
companies, followed by the UK Life & Health institutions with a market beta of
1:269. This observation for the UK is consistent with the ndings presented for
the banking portfolios where the market beta of British banks is also among the
highest reported.
The results also reveal that, similar to banks, the majority of insurance port-
folios are signicantly related to at least one interest rate proxy. As for banks,
the statistical inferences are biased to the choice of interest rate proxy and an ap-
proximation methodology to calculate this proxy. Noticeable exceptions are the
Australian institutions, where the selected group of insurance companies shows
no sensitivity to the interest rate factor regardless of the choice of approxima-
tion methodology or maturity of interest rate measures. Similarly, Italian Life &
Health insurers are only found to be sensitive to the percentage changes in the
yield curve curvature factor with no sensitivity reported to the remaining interest
rate proxies.
The results from the asymmetric two-factor model are presented in Table
2.3: Panel B. Large Canadian, small Swiss and German Reinsurance companies
benet predominantly from negative changes in the short-rates with no reaction
registered following positive rate changes. The same is true for the Japanese
companies. These insurers, however, are also negatively a¤ected by increases in
Table 2.2 (contd)
Two-factor model: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for model Rit = 0+MRM;t+IRRIR;t+"it estimated employing the sample of insurance companies
over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of bank institutions i and the return to the market
at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected arithmetic (column 4); percentage (column %4); and squared (column 4
2) changes in
the domestic short- and long-term interest rates, interest rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The
unanticipated changes in the interest rate factors at time t are calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors and ones
forecasted via an appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio 4 %4 42 4 %4 42 4 %4 42 4 %4 42
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.017 -0.080 -0.017 -0.009 -0.053 0.063 -0.002 0.000 -0.030 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
CANADA
All Firms 0.019 0.078 -0.020 -0.010 -0.068 -0.010 0.016 0.000 -0.022 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
Large 0.012 0.050 -0.075* -0.002 -0.022 -0.059 0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
FRANCE
All Firms 0.025* 0.084* -0.066 0.018 0.086 -0.037 -0.013 -0.016 -0.105** 0.007** 0.000 -0.014***
Large 0.017 0.066 -0.035 0.018 0.083 -0.043 -0.007 -0.010 -0.091** 0.007* 0.000 -0.016***
GERMANY - Life & Health
All Firms 0.027 0.098 -0.030 0.015 0.080 -0.064 -0.009 0.002 -0.101* 0.003 0.001 0.000
GERMANY - Multiline
All Firms 0.002 0.022 -0.028 0.004 0.016 -0.073 -0.025** 0.001 -0.038 0.006** 0.000 -0.005
Large -0.010 -0.011 0.094 -0.001 -0.008 -0.055 -0.015 0.002 -0.069 0.005 0.000 -0.012**
GERMANY - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.035* 0.122* -0.198** 0.009 0.053 0.247*** -0.012 0.000 -0.093 0.004 0.000 0.005
ITALY - Life & Health
All Firms -0.001 0.010 0.000 0.014 0.056 -0.031 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.001** 0.000
ITALY - Multiline
All Firms -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.017* -0.096* -0.116** -0.007 -0.008** -0.006 0.002 0.001** -0.001
Large 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.021** -0.107** -0.126** -0.008 -0.013** -0.008 0.000 0.001** 0.001
JAPAN
All Firms -0.002 -0.004** -0.364** -0.001 -0.009 -0.035 -0.007 -0.018 -0.051 -0.003 0.003 -0.017
Large 0.015 -0.003 -0.326* 0.003 -0.006 -0.034 -0.007 -0.014 -0.081 0.000 0.005 -0.016
Medium -0.020 -0.004** -0.402** -0.005 -0.012 -0.035 -0.007 -0.021 -0.020 -0.006 0.001 -0.017
39
Table 2.2 (contd)
Two-factor model: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for model Rit = 0+ MRM;t+ IRRIR;t+ "it estimated employing the sample of insurance companies
over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of bank institutions i and the return to the market
at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected arithmetic (column 4); percentage (column %4); and squared (column 4
2) changes in
the domestic short- and long-term interest rates, interest rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The
unanticipated changes in the interest rate factors at time t are calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors and ones
forecasted via an appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio 4 %4 42 4 %4 42 4 %4 42 4 %4 42
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
SPAIN
All Firms -0.036 -0.076 0.021 -0.008 0.001 0.092 0.000 -0.001 -0.157* 0.005 0.000 -0.014
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.031*** 0.063*** -0.041 0.031*** 0.080*** -0.042 -0.010 0.000 -0.074** 0.002 0.000 -0.008
Large 0.019 0.061*** -0.003 0.048*** 0.127*** -0.199** -0.016 0.000 -0.063 -0.001 0.000 -0.009
Small 0.047*** 0.066*** -0.091** 0.007 0.018 0.169** -0.001 0.000 -0.090** 0.005 0.000 -0.007
UK - Life & Health
All Firms 0.023 0.152* 0.016 -0.002 -0.002 0.166** -0.004 -0.001 -0.154** 0.004 0.000 0.005
UK - Property & Casualty
All Firms 0.001 0.016 0.021 0.003 0.018 -0.087 -0.035** -0.003** -0.165** 0.008*** 0.001* 0.001
US - Life & Health
All Firms 0.008 0.042 -0.017 -0.004 -0.017 0.026 -0.010 -0.001 -0.012 0.002 0.000 -0.004
US - Medical
All Firms 0.006 0.054 -0.055** -0.021 -0.110 0.087 -0.012 -0.005 -0.015 0.001 0.000 -0.006
US - Property & Casualty
All Firms -0.011 -0.051** 0.018* -0.014** -0.067* -0.047 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000
Medium -0.003 0.015 -0.001 -0.010 -0.043 0.065 -0.003 -0.003 -0.015 0.003 0.000 -0.005
Small -0.013* -0.063** 0.022* -0.015** -0.072* -0.069 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001
US - Multiline
All Firms 0.002 0.014 -0.010 -0.004 -0.014 0.043 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008 0.002 0.000 -0.004
Medium 0.007 0.040 -0.041*** -0.010 -0.040 0.099 -0.005 -0.003 -0.010 0.002 0.000 -0.005
Small 0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 0.021 -0.005 0.000 -0.006 0.002 0.000 -0.003
US - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.023** 0.054 -0.061*** -0.013 -0.068 0.034 0.002 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
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Table 2.3 (contd)
Two-factor model with asymmetry: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for model Rit = 0+MRM;t+IR;POSRIR;tDIR;t+IR;NEGRIR;t(1 DIR;t)+ "it estimated employing the
sample of insurance companies over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of bank institutions i and
the return to the market at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected changes in the domestic short- and long-term interest rates, interest rate
term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The unanticipated changes in the interest rate factors at time t are calculated
as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors and the ones forecasted via an appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving average
(ARMA) model. variable DIR;t is the dummy variable which takes a value of one if RIR;t > 0 at time t and zero otherwise. The test statistics (F statistics)
for the Wald coe¢cient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of coe¢cients IR;POS and IR;NEG is reported in column WALD. *,
**, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.013 -0.020 0.034 0.010 -0.029 1.611 0.010 -0.029 1.611 -0.009 0.007 3.189*
CANADA
All Firms 0.006 0.035 0.694 -0.020 0.000 0.258 -0.005 0.034* 1.853 -0.002 -0.003 0.035
Large -0.014 0.044* 2.736* -0.021 0.018 0.875 -0.002 0.009 0.143 -0.001 -0.003 0.137
FRANCE
All Firms 0.003 0.047** 1.388 0.003 0.035 0.646 -0.056** 0.033 10.607*** -0.006 0.020*** 7.130***
Large 0.002 0.031 0.620 0.002 0.036 0.747 -0.044** 0.033 8.111*** -0.009 0.022*** 9.848***
GERMANY - Life & Health
All Firms 0.009 0.042 0.522 -0.003 0.036 1.257 -0.043** 0.030 6.025** 0.003 0.004 0.023
GERMANY - Multiline
All Firms -0.007 0.010 0.176 -0.005 0.015 0.386 -0.042** -0.006 1.779 0.005 0.006 0.006
Large 0.015 -0.033 0.679 0.003 -0.006 0.039 -0.037 0.010 1.574 -0.002 0.012* 1.518
GERMANY - Reinsurance
All Firms -0.014 0.080*** 3.948** 0.049** -0.038* 5.929** -0.038* 0.019 3.434* 0.010 -0.002 1.874
ITALY - Life & Health
All Firms -0.003 0.000 0.029 -0.004 0.033 0.868 -0.001 -0.009 0.199 0.006 0.001 0.586
ITALY - Multiline
All Firms -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.052*** 0.019 5.740** -0.014 -0.001 1.282 -0.002 0.006* 2.161
Large 0.002 -0.002 0.085 -0.060*** 0.019 6.125** -0.014 -0.002 0.953 -0.001 0.002 0.420
JAPAN
All Firms -0.088* 0.129** 7.161*** -0.018 0.028 0.982 -0.023 0.020 0.929 -0.016 0.008 2.136
Large -0.064 0.137* 4.599** -0.024 0.050 1.941 -0.033 0.035 1.751 -0.013 0.012 1.655
Medium -0.112** 0.122* 6.768*** -0.012 0.006 0.118 -0.014 0.004 0.133 -0.019 0.005 1.698
41
Table 2.3 (contd)
Two-factor model with asymmetry: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for model Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IR;POSRIR;tDIR;t + IR;NEGRIR;t(1 DIR;t) + "it estimated employing
the sample of insurance companies over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of bank institutions i
and the return to the market at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected changes in the domestic short- and long-term interest rates, interest
rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The unanticipated changes in the interest rate factors at time t are
calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors and the ones forecasted via an appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving
average (ARMA) model. variable DIR;t is the dummy variable which takes a value of one if RIR;t > 0 at time t and zero otherwise. The test statistics
(F statistics) for the Wald coe¢cient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of coe¢cients IR;POS and IR;NEG is reported in
column WALD. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD IR;POS IR;NEG WALD
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
SPAIN
All Firms -0.063 -0.014 0.733 -0.009 -0.007 0.003 -0.037 0.044 4.056** -0.004 0.014* 2.013
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.011 0.052*** 2.336 0.012 0.051** 1.345 -0.036** 0.019 5.165** -0.005 0.009 1.949
Large 0.013 0.026 0.150 -0.005 0.105*** 6.119** -0.036 0.006 1.804 -0.008 0.007 1.262
Small 0.010 0.086*** 6.268** 0.034 -0.021 1.956 -0.034* 0.035* 6.337** -0.002 0.011 1.200
UK - Life & Health
All Firms 0.031 0.014 0.191 0.033 -0.037 3.463* 0.033 -0.037 3.463* 0.010** -0.002 2.057
UK - Property & Casualty
All Firms -0.004 0.006 0.072 -0.033 0.040* 4.429** -0.081** 0.013 11.271*** 0.005 0.012** 0.949
US - Life & Health
All Firms 0.004 0.010 0.074 -0.002 -0.007 0.055 -0.023** 0.009 3.503* 0.000 0.004 0.422
US - Medical
All Firms -0.015 0.017 0.478 0.005 -0.049 0.932 -0.028 0.011 1.008 -0.002 0.004 0.133
US - Property & Casualty
All Firms -0.021 -0.006 0.589 -0.024* -0.003 0.781 -0.008 -0.003 0.097 0.004 -0.001 0.650
Medium -0.017 0.004 0.539 -0.004 -0.017 0.131 -0.023 0.025 3.664* 0.003 0.004 0.015
Small -0.021 -0.008 0.440 -0.027** -0.001 1.206 -0.005 -0.008 0.032 0.004 -0.002 0.892
US - Multiline
All Firms 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.190 -0.013 0.003 0.985 -0.001 0.005 0.870
Medium -0.011 0.017 1.058 -0.003 -0.018 0.202 -0.021 0.018 2.790* 0.002 0.002 0.000
Small 0.008 -0.003 0.430 0.002 -0.008 0.181 -0.008 -0.002 0.159 -0.002 0.006 1.339
US - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.013 0.028** 0.299 -0.013 -0.013 0.000 -0.003 0.008 0.258 -0.002 0.001 0.099
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the short-term rates. A similar observation was also reported for the Japanese
banks, thereby suggesting that the asymmetry for the Japanese FIs should be
appropriately modelled in future studies.
As regards to the developments in the long-term interest rates, Swiss institu-
tions enhance the return gure following the rate decline. There is no pronounced
reaction following the rate increase. A similar asymmetric e¤ect is reported for
the UK Property & Casualty companies where the decline in long-term rates by
one percent benets the return gure by 0:04 percent. Contrary to both Swiss
and UK insurers, the Italian companies are only responsive to the rate increase.
Following the one percent increase in the long-term rates, these companies lose
approximately 0:05 percent in returns. The evidence of an asymmetric response
also extends to the portfolio of German reinsurers. These institutions appear
to be gaining from the rate increase, while they are negatively a¤ected by the
decline in long rate. These ndings contradict the ones reported by Oertmann,
Rendu and Zimmermann (2000) perhaps due to the di¤erent time horizons and
sample of insurance companies adopted in my research.
Having analysed the interest rate exposure of the large sample of nancial in-
stitutions, there seem to be two common ndings for both banking and insurance
companies. First, both banks and insurers are found to be signicantly a¤ected
by unanticipated movements in the term structure of the interest rate. Second,
for both types of companies, the statistical inferences regarding the interest rate
factor signicance are biased to the choice of approximation technique to calculate
the interest rate factor, e.g. the use of arithmetic or percentage changes.
On the other hand, there are also some dissimilarities emerging from the
analysis of both groups. First, the majority of banking portfolios appear to be
more sensitive to the interest rate factor proxied by the domestic short-term
rates. No apparent evidence exists to conrm this for insurance companies. In
particular, 18 of 42 banking portfolios are sensitive to the short-term rates with
just nine being sensitive to the medium-rates and seven to the long-term rates.
For insurance companies, equal numbers of portfolios are sensitive to either of
the short- or long-term rates (6 of 30). Only four portfolios are sensitive to
changes in the medium-term rates. Second, while for banking institutions there
is no evidence of asymmetry in the returns sensitivity to the spread-term changes,
such evidence is found for 11 out of 30 insurance companies.
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Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity estimation
Following the discussion in Section 2.3.1, the study utilises the two-factor
GARCHmodel described by Equations 2.7-2.9. The main reason for the use of the
GARCH type strategy is the concern that the use of a least squares technique may
result in biased and incorrect conclusions regarding the parameters statistical
signicance.
Model (2.4-2.6) is estimated for all banking and insurance portfolios. Table
2.4: Panel A outlines the estimation results for the portfolios of banks. The per-
tinent model outputs for insurance companies are listed in Table 2.4: Panel B.
Each table indicates the magnitude and signicance of the interest rate coe¢-
cients (column "GARCH"). For comparison, the interest rate coe¢cients for the
two-factor model estimated via an OLS type technique (Equation 2.2) are also
reported in column "OLS".
A. Banking institutions
Similar to the results from the two-factor model estimated via OLS, the ma-
jority of banks are signicantly exposed to unanticipated changes in at least one
interest rate proxy. However, the statistical inference regarding the interest rate
factor signicance is occasionally di¤erent to those concluded from OLS based
model. On average, the application of the OLS modelling strategy underesti-
mates the institutions exposure to interest rate uctuations.
In particular, analysing a sample of British banks via GARCH, my ndings
suggest that the shock of 100 basis points in the short-term interest rate would,
on average, result in a decline of the market value of large British banks by
approximately $740 million. This amount is comparable to 20% of the total
capitalisation of a smaller bank Alliance & Leicester plc in the same market
over the examined horizon. On the other hand, the OLS based model failed to
recognise the signicance of these losses.
Given such results I conclude that statistical inferences regarding the interest
rate factor signicance are biased to the choice of the model econometric speci-
cation (OLS or GARCH). This observation also sheds some light to the origins
of the disparity in the previously reported results discussed in Section 2.1.
B. Insurance companies
Turning to insurance companies, the results in Table 2.4: Panel B reveal sig-
nicant relations between insurers values and the interest rate factors for some
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Table 2.4
Two-factor model: GARCH estimation
This table presents the GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for model Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + "it
estimated employing the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly
logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of bank institutions i and the return to the market at time t respectively.
RIR;t represents the unexpected changes in the domestic short- and long-term interest rates, interest rate term-
spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The column headings indicate the choice
of the econometric methodology utilised to estimate the model; that is "OLS" and "GARCH" indicate the use
of OLS or GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.025*** -0.018** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.012** -0.018*** 0.000 0.000
Large -0.012 -0.008 -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.022** -0.022*** -0.002 -0.001
Medium -0.045** -0.003 -0.014 -0.007 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.002
BELGIUM
All Firms 0.018* 0.019* 0.019*** 0.012** 0.001 0.007 -0.004** -0.003**
CANADA
All Firms -0.021** -0.020* -0.008 -0.015* -0.009 -0.005 -0.002* -0.002
Large -0.027** -0.025** -0.020** -0.016* -0.009 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
Small -0.008 0.000 0.020 0.023 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
FRANCE
All Firms 0.008 0.010 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
Large 0.042** 0.029** -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.004
Small -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.001
GERMANY
All Firms 0.022 0.020 0.007 0.005 -0.011 -0.003 0.005* 0.006***
Large 0.013 0.038 0.001 0.006 -0.026* -0.007 0.013 0.003
Medium 0.028 0.003 0.028 0.008 -0.003 -0.006 0.028 0.009***
Small 0.030** - -0.005 - 0.006 - 0.030** -
HONG KONG
All Firms -0.022*** -0.014*** -0.036*** -0.010** -0.007** -0.004 0.001 0.002
Large -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.034*** -0.010** -0.006* -0.003 0.001 0.001
ITALY
All Firms -0.010*** -0.006*** 0.004 -0.010** -0.007** -0.006* 0.004*** 0.003***
Large -0.011* -0.001 0.018 0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.004* 0.002
Medium -0.008** -0.005** 0.005 0.004 -0.007** -0.007** 0.004*** 0.003***
Small -0.013** -0.012** -0.015 -0.015 -0.013** -0.011* 0.006** 0.006***
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Table 2.4 (contd)
Two-factor model: GARCH estimation
This table presents the GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for model Rit = 0 + MRM;t + IRRIR;t + "it estimated
employing the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly logarithmic returns to
the size portfolio of bank institutions i and the return to the market at time t respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected
changes in the domestic short- and long-term interest rates, interest rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-
coupon yield curve at time t. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric methodology utilised to estimate
the model; that is "OLS" and "GARCH" indicate the use of OLS or GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. *, **,
*** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
JAPAN
All Firms -0.004 -0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.000 -0.002
Large -0.002 0.009 0.009 0.005 -0.007 -0.010 -0.001 0.000
Medium -0.003 -0.009 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 0.000 -0.002
Small -0.008 -0.001 0.008 0.010 -0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.000
SPAIN
All Firms 0.010 0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.004 0.000 -0.001
Large 0.004 0.018** 0.006 0.008 -0.011 -0.004 0.001 -0.001
Medium -0.002 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012* -0.018** -0.008 0.001 -0.001
Small 0.024 - -0.018* - -0.002 - -0.002 -
SWEDEN
All Firms 0.003 0.023 0.009 -0.001 -0.007 0.000 -0.006* -0.005
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.024*** 0.011** 0.005 0.005 -0.011** -0.007* 0.002 0.002
Small 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.008 0.007 -0.010** -0.005 0.002 0.002
UK
All Firms -0.018* -0.022** -0.010 -0.017** -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.000
Large -0.014 -0.020** -0.003 -0.014** -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002
US - Money Center
All Firms -0.003 -0.001 -0.013 -0.015** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005**
US - Regional
All Firms -0.003 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007* 0.001 -0.001
Large -0.012 -0.002 -0.010 -0.013* -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.002
Medium 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.013 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.003
Small -0.004 -0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.007* 0.001 0.000
US - Savings & Loans
All Firms -0.011** -0.016*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.013*** -0.007* -0.001 -0.002
Large -0.036*** -0.023*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.030*** -0.021*** -0.003 -0.005*
Medium -0.021 -0.032** -0.006 -0.029** -0.030*** -0.019 -0.006 -0.010**
Small -0.008 -0.013*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.010** -0.005 -0.001 0.000
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Table 2.4 (contd)
Two-factor model: GARCH estimation
This table presents the GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for model Rit = 0+MRM;t+IRRIR;t+"it
estimated employing the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly
logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of insurance companies i and the return to the market at time t
respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected changes in the domestic short- and long-term interest rates,
interest rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The column
headings indicate the choice of the econometric methodology utilised to estimate the model; that is "OLS"
and "GARCH" indicate the use of OLS or GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. *, **, ***
indicate the coe¢cient signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.017 -0.016 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004
CANADA
All Firms 0.019 0.022** -0.010 -0.019* 0.016 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
Large 0.012 0.020** -0.002 -0.013 0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001
FRANCE
All Firms 0.025* 0.025** 0.018 0.004 -0.013 -0.005 0.007** 0.007***
Large 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.007* 0.006**
GERMANY - Life & Health
All Firms 0.027 -0.003 0.015 0.014 -0.009 0.000 0.003 0.004
GERMANY - Multiline
All Firms 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.000 -0.025** -0.019*** 0.006** 0.008***
Large -0.010 -0.013 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015 -0.007 0.005 0.009***
GERMANY - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.035* 0.033** 0.009 0.011 -0.012 -0.002 0.004 0.004
ITALY - Life & Health
All Firms -0.001 0.001 0.014 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.001
ITALY - Multiline
All Firms -0.001 0.001 -0.017* -0.021*** -0.007 -0.007** 0.002 0.001
Large 0.000 0.002 -0.021** -0.023*** -0.008 -0.011*** 0.000 0.000
JAPAN
All Firms -0.002 -0.023 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006
Large 0.015 -0.022 0.003 0.003 -0.007 -0.003 0.000 -0.003
Medium -0.020 -0.024 -0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.006 -0.010*
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Table 2.4 (contd)
Two-factor model: GARCH estimation
This table presents the GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for model Rit = 0+MRM;t+IRRIR;t+"it
estimated employing the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. Variables Rit, and RM;t, denote weekly
logarithmic returns to the size portfolio of insurance companies i and the return to the market at time t
respectively. RIR;t represents the unexpected changes in the domestic short- and long-term interest rates,
interest rate term-spread, and the curvature of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t. The column
headings indicate the choice of the econometric methodology utilised to estimate the model; that is "OLS"
and "GARCH" indicate the use of OLS or GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. *, **, *** indicate
the coe¢cient signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH OLS GARCH
Short-term IR Long-term IR IR Term Spread IR Curvature
SPAIN
All Firms -0.036 -0.024 -0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.005 0.003
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.031*** 0.016* 0.031*** 0.008 -0.010 -0.001 0.002 0.003
Large 0.019 0.001 0.048*** 0.015 -0.016 -0.006 -0.001 0.002
Small 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.007 0.014 -0.001 0.020*** 0.005 -0.002
UK - Life & Health
All Firms 0.023 - -0.002 - -0.004 - 0.004 -
UK - Property & Casualty
All Firms 0.001 -0.008 0.003 0.007 -0.035** -0.020*** 0.008*** 0.009***
US - Life & Health
All Firms 0.008 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.010 -0.009* 0.002 0.003
US - Medical
All Firms 0.006 -0.004 -0.021 -0.023 -0.012 -0.003 0.001 0.004
US - Property & Casualty
All Firms -0.011 -0.012** -0.014** -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.001
Medium -0.003 -0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.003
Small -0.013* -0.015** -0.015** -0.013** -0.006 -0.005 0.001 0.000
US - Multiline
All Firms 0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.008* 0.002 0.001
Medium 0.007 -0.003 -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 0.002 0.004*
Small 0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.007 0.002 0.001
US - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.023** 0.018*** -0.013 -0.012 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 0.003
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markets. Similar to banks, a detailed examination of the results uncovers sev-
eral dissimilarities in the empirical outputs of the model estimated via OLS and
GARCH. Just as for banks, the application of the OLS technique for insurance
companies tends to understate the signicance of interest rate risk for the major-
ity of the examined portfolios. This further emphasises the importance of model
choice.
As an example, OLS appears to be unsuccessful in establishing the portfo-
lio returns sensitivity to the unanticipated movements in the term-spread for
Swiss and the US Multiline insurers. Further, OLS fails to conrm the tendency
of Canadian insurers to post losses following a long-rate increase. On the con-
trary, it overestimates the signicance of the interest rate risk exposure of Swiss
institutions.
Multivariate GARCH estimation
Given the growing research interest in identifying the key factors inuencing
the volatility of companies returns, I employ a multivariate extension of the
previously specied two-factor GARCH model in this chapter. The model is
described by Equations 2.11-2.20.
The pertinent empirical results are outlined in Table 2.5: Panels A to B for
banks and insurance companies respectively. The table indicates the magnitude
and signicance of both, the interest rate coe¢cient from the mean equation
(column " MV-GARCH") and the coe¢cient for the interest rate conditional
volatility factor from the volatility equation (column "CV-IR"). For comparison,
the interest rate coe¢cients with respective signicances for the two-factor model
estimated via OLS (Equation 2.2) and GARCH (Equations 2.7-2.9) are also re-
ported in column "OLS" and "GARCH" respectively. Due to the convergence
problems with carrying out the BEKK model estimation the results for some
markets are incomplete.
A. Banking institutions
The estimation results reveal some signicant interest rate betas and signi-
cant coe¢cients for the interest rate conditional volatility factor in the volatility
equation. More specically, the coe¢cients reported for the univariate GARCH
and MV-GARCH models vary signicantly. The identical results are reported
only for Australian, French, Italian, Swiss, British and large US Savings & Loans
banks.
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Table 2.5
Two-factor model: MV-GARCH estimation
This table presents the MV-GARCH regression results for the model in equations 2.11-2.20, estimated employing the
sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric methodology
utilised in the model estimation; that is "OLS", "GARCH", and "MV-GARCH" indicate the use of OLS, GARCH,
or MV-GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. The coe¢cient for the interest rate conditional volatility
factor from the volatility equation appears in column "CV-IR". *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio OLS GARCH MV-GARCH CV-IR OLS GARCH MV-GARCH CV-IR
Short-term IR Long-term IR
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.025*** -0.018** -0.110*** 0.034*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.047*** 0.027***
Large -0.012 -0.008 -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.042*** 0.034***
Medium -0.045** -0.003 -0.270*** -0.238*** -0.014 -0.007 -0.018 0.047***
BELGIUM
All Firms 0.018* 0.019* -0.003*** 0.034*** 0.019*** 0.012** 0.366*** -0.02***
CANADA
All Firms -0.021** -0.020* 0.029*** 0.029*** -0.008 -0.015* -0.123*** 0.024***
Large -0.027** -0.025** 0.070*** 0.022*** -0.020** -0.016* -0.02*** 0.026***
Small -0.008 0.000 - - 0.020 0.023 - -
FRANCE
All Firms 0.008 0.010 0.048*** 0.027*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.075 0.000
Large 0.042** 0.029** 0.062*** 0.045*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.059*** 0.025***
Small -0.002 -0.005 0.016*** 0.018*** -0.001 0.002 0.003*** 0.000
GERMANY
All Firms 0.022 0.020 -0.023*** 0.017*** 0.007 0.005 -0.044*** 0.000
Large 0.013 0.038 -0.085 0.000 0.001 0.006 -0.054*** 0.000
Medium 0.028 0.003 - - 0.028 0.008 - -
Small 0.030** - - - -0.005 - - -
HONG KONG
All Firms -0.022*** -0.014*** - - -0.036*** -0.010** - -
Large -0.020*** -0.014*** 0.004*** 0.009*** -0.034*** -0.010** -0.13*** 0.000
ITALY
All Firms -0.010*** -0.006*** 0.000*** -0.005*** 0.004 -0.010** -0.377 0.023***
Large -0.011* -0.001 0.005*** -0.007*** 0.018 0.003 -0.272*** 0.000
Medium -0.008** -0.005** -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.005 0.004 0.118*** 0.000
Small -0.013** -0.012** - - -0.015 -0.015 - -
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Table 2.5 (contd)
Two-factor model: MV-GARCH estimation
This table presents the MV-GARCH regression results for the model in equations 2.11-2.20, estimated employing
the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric
methodology utilised in the model estimation; that is "OLS", "GARCH", and "MV-GARCH" indicate the use
of OLS, GARCH, or MV-GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. The coe¢cient for the interest rate
conditional volatility factor from the volatility equation appears in column "CV-IR". *, **, *** indicate the
coe¢cient signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio OLS GARCH MV-GARCH CV-IR OLS GARCH MV-GARCH CV-IR
Short-term IR Long-term IR
JAPAN
All Firms -0.004 -0.005 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.065*** 0.000
Large -0.002 0.009 0.013*** -0.001*** 0.009 0.005 0.032*** 0.000
Medium -0.003 -0.009 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.065*** 0.000
Small -0.008 -0.001 -0.024*** 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.068*** 0.000
SPAIN
All Firms 0.010 0.004 -0.022 0.014*** -0.009 -0.006 0.030 -0.008***
Large 0.004 0.018** - - 0.006 0.008 - -
Medium -0.002 -0.002 - - -0.012 -0.012* - -
Small 0.024 - - - -0.018* - - -
SWEDEN
All Firms 0.003 0.023 0.015*** 0.039*** 0.009 -0.001 0.454*** 0.000
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.024*** 0.011** 0.025*** -0.008*** 0.005 0.005 - -
Small 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.008 0.007 - -
UK
All Firms -0.018* -0.022** -0.009*** 0.000 -0.010 -0.017** 0.049*** 0.028***
Large -0.014 -0.020** -0.004*** 0.005*** -0.003 -0.014** 0.041*** 0.03***
US - Money Center
All Firms -0.003 -0.001 - - -0.013 -0.015** - -
US - Regional
All Firms -0.003 -0.007 -0.003*** 0.013*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.174 0.000
Large -0.012 -0.002 -0.010 -0.013*
Medium 0.007 -0.002 -0.024*** 0.070*** -0.004 -0.013 -0.135*** 0.000
Small -0.004 -0.005 -0.036*** 0.072*** 0.003 0.001 -0.204** 0.000
US - Savings & Loans
All Firms -0.011** -0.016*** - - -0.002 -0.005 - -
Large -0.036*** -0.023*** -0.072*** 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 - -
Medium -0.021 -0.032** 0.066*** 0.244*** -0.006 -0.029** - -
Small -0.008 -0.013*** 0.005*** 0.006*** -0.002 -0.004 - -
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Table 2.5 (contd)
Two-factor model: MV-GARCH estimation
This table presents the MV-GARCH regression results for the model in equations 2.11-2.20, estimated employing
the sample of insurance companies over 1997-2007. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric
methodology utilised in the model estimation; that is "OLS", "GARCH", and "MV-GARCH" indicate the use
of OLS, GARCH, or MV-GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. The coe¢cient for the interest rate
conditional volatility factor from the volatility equation appears in column "CV-IR". *, **, *** indicate the
coe¢cient signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio OLS GARCH MV-GARCH CV-IR OLS GARCH MV-GARCH CV-IR
Short-term IR Long-term IR
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.017 -0.016 -0.066*** -0.152*** -0.009 -0.011 -0.011*** 0.108***
CANADA
All Firms 0.019 0.022** 0.043*** 0.030*** -0.010 -0.019* - -
Large 0.012 0.020** 0.043*** 0.033*** -0.002 -0.013 0.144*** 0.000
FRANCE
All Firms 0.025* 0.025** 0.005*** 0.023*** 0.018 0.004 -0.179*** 0.000
Large 0.017 0.016 -0.003*** 0.024*** 0.018 0.006 -0.164*** 0.020***
GERMANY - Life & Health
All Firms 0.027 -0.003 0.039*** 0.074*** 0.015 0.014 0.027 0.118***
GERMANY - Multiline
All Firms 0.002 -0.001 -0.020*** 0.025*** 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.099***
Large -0.010 -0.013 -0.030*** 0.055*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.050*** 0.132***
GERMANY - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.035* 0.033** - - 0.009 0.011 - -
ITALY - Life & Health
All Firms -0.001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.006*** 0.014 0.003 0.223*** 0.000
ITALY - Multiline
All Firms -0.001 0.001 0.002*** -0.005*** -0.017* -0.021*** 0.384*** 0.051***
Large 0.000 0.002 0.002*** -0.005*** -0.021** -0.023*** -0.270*** 0.015***
JAPAN
All Firms -0.002 -0.023 - - -0.001 -0.001 - -
Large 0.015 -0.022 -0.056*** 0.208*** 0.003 0.003 -0.020*** 0.034***
Medium -0.020 -0.024 - - -0.005 0.000 - -
52
Table 2.5 (contd)
Two-factor model: MV-GARCH estimation
This table presents the MV-GARCH regression results for the model in equations 2.11-2.20, estimated employing
the sample of insurance companies over 1997-2007. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric
methodology utilised in the model estimation; that is "OLS", "GARCH", and "MV-GARCH" indicate the use
of OLS, GARCH, or MV-GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. The coe¢cient for the interest rate
conditional volatility factor from the volatility equation appears in column "CV-IR". *, **, *** indicate the
coe¢cient signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio OLS GARCH MV-GARCH CV-IR OLS GARCH MV-GARCH CV-IR
Short-term IR Long-term IR
SPAIN
All Firms -0.036 -0.024 -0.127*** 0.132*** -0.008 0.000 - -
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.031*** 0.016* 0.052*** 0.000 0.031*** 0.008 -0.070*** 0.000
Large 0.019 0.001 - - 0.048*** 0.015 - -
Small 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.152** 0.000 0.007 0.014 - -
UK - Life & Health
All Firms 0.023 - - - -0.002 - - -
UK - Property & Casualty
All Firms 0.001 -0.008 -0.163 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.000
US - Life & Health
All Firms 0.008 0.004 0.033*** 0.012*** -0.004 -0.001 - -
US - Medical
All Firms 0.006 -0.004 - - -0.021 -0.023 - -
US - Property & Casualty
All Firms -0.011 -0.012** -0.011*** 0.028*** -0.014** -0.009 - -
Medium -0.003 -0.004 0.032*** 0.038*** -0.010 -0.007 0.001*** 0.000
Small -0.013* -0.015** - - -0.015** -0.013** - -
US - Multiline
All Firms 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.018*** -0.004 -0.002 - -
Medium 0.007 -0.003 - - -0.010 -0.007 -0.256 0.000
Small 0.001 0.006 -0.001*** 0.015*** -0.003 0.000 - -
US - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.023** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.064*** -0.013 -0.012 -0.007*** 0.081***
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With univariate GARCH, the model tends to underestimate the signicance
of the interest rate exposure for the portfolios of large and medium Australian,
small French, large Italian and Japanese, Swedish, and US Regional banks. This
further suggests that statistical inference can be biased to the choice of model
specication and is in line with the ndings reported in previous sections.
Analysing the volatility of portfolio returns, the signicant coe¢cients for the
interest rate conditional volatility factor take positive values for 27 out of 36
portfolios. This implies that the higher volatility of the domestic interest rates
feeds into increased volatility of banking returns.
B. Insurance companies
The results for the portfolios of insurance companies are similar to those
reported for banks. Therefore, the theoretical rationale applied to analyse the
model outputs is identical to the one presented above.
To conclude, having analysed Stones two-factor model under alternative econo-
metric specications and considering di¤erent interest rate proxies, there are some
common ndings for both banking and insurance companies.
First, the majority of banking and insurance portfolios are found to be sig-
nicantly a¤ected by at least one interest rate factor, with just a few exceptions
reported. Second, there is strong evidence of asymmetric response in the FIs
returns to positive and negative rate changes. Finally, the statistical signicance
of the interest rate factor and consequent inferences made are biased to the choice
of the model econometric specication, approximation methodology adopted to
calculate the interest rate factor (e.g. arithmetic or percentage changes), and
the choice of the interest rate proxy. For instance, in this research I used four
alternative interest rate proxies, two approximation strategies to calculate the
interest rate factors and three model frameworks. The reported statistical infer-
ences appear to be biased to the choice of these items.
On the other hand, there are also some dissimilarities emerging from the
analysis of both groups. First, the majority of banks appear to be more sensitive
to the unanticipated changes in the short-term interest rates. There is no apparent
evidence to conrm this for insurance companies. Second, while for banking
institutions there is no evidence of asymmetry in the returns sensitivity to the
spread-term changes, such evidence is found for 11 out of 30 insurance companies.
54
2.4.2 Multi-factor model
Ordinary least squares estimation
In this section we employ the multi-factor model described by Equation 2.22.
In this model, the FIs stock returns are modelled as a linear function of the
short- or long-term interest rates in combination with two additional factors.
These factors capture the unanticipated changes in the foreign exchange index
and the returns on the domestic REIT market price index (Section 2.2.3).
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.6: Panels A and B. Columns
"Short-term IR" and "Long-termIR" provide the results for the FI portfolios
with the interest rate factor being proxied by the unanticipated changes in short-
and long-term interest rates respectively. Column "Nelson-Siegel" reports the
estimation results for the multifactor model in which the portfolio returns are
modelled as a function of the interest rate yield curve level, slope and curvature
factors.
A. Banking institutions
The empirical results show signicant relationships between the nancial cor-
porations stock returns and both foreign exchange and real estate factors, beyond
the e¤ect of market and interest rate risks. While the importance of the foreign
exchange factor is less pronounced, the relevance of the real estate factor in ex-
plaining the banking values across the majority of markets is overwhelming. For
instance, the only markets with insignicant real estate factors are Australia and
Belgium. For the remaining markets positive relations between FIs and real es-
tate returns are reported, suggesting that a substantial amount of rms funds is
allocated in real-estate related assets. The highest coe¢cient is observed for the
portfolio of US Savings & Loan institutions (hereafter "S&L"), which is expected
given that real estate lending has historically been one of the major components
of S&Ls loan portfolio. This is consistent with ndings of Allen, Madura and
Wiant (1995) who studied the relationships between real estate and US banking
industry over the 1979-1992 period.
The coe¢cient of the foreign exchange factor is signicant for France, Japan,
Spain, Switzerland, UK and the US Regional and Savings & Loan banks18. For
these institutions the foreign exchange coe¢cients are negative, with the only
18For the US Savings & Loans banks the coe¢cient on the foreign exchange factor is signicant
only in the model with the long-term interest rate proxy.
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Table 2.6
Multi-factor model: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for the model in equation 2.22 (columns "Short-term IR" and "Long-term
IR") and equation 2.23 (column "Nelson-Siegel") estimated employing the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007.
*, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio IR FX PROP IR FX PROP Lev Slo Cur
Short-term IR Long-term IR Nelson-Siegel
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.025*** 0.000 -0.004 -0.023*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.016*** -0.014* -0.001
Large -0.012 -0.001 0.007 -0.027*** 0.000 0.012 -0.024*** 0.015* -0.003*
Medium -0.046** 0.001 -0.006 -0.017 0.002 -0.012 -0.002 -0.062*** 0.001
BELGIUM
All Firms 0.018* 0.000 -0.020 0.018*** 0.000 -0.008 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.000
CANADA
All Firms -0.023** 0.000 0.134*** -0.010 0.000 0.131*** -0.003 0.006** -0.002
Large -0.028*** -0.001 0.119*** -0.021** -0.001 0.117*** -0.014** 0.004 -0.002
Small -0.011 0.002 0.168*** 0.016 0.002 0.164** 0.021* 0.009 0.000
FRANCE
All Firms 0.007 0.000 0.102*** -0.001 0.000 0.102*** -0.002 0.004 0.003*
Large 0.041** 0.001 0.183*** 0.000 0.001 0.186*** -0.006 0.012 0.008**
Small -0.004 -0.001* 0.059*** -0.001 -0.001* 0.058*** 0.000 0.001 0.001
GERMANY
All Firms 0.019 0.001 0.104*** 0.005 0.001 0.105*** -0.002 0.013 0.006**
Large 0.011 0.001 0.116*** 0.000 0.001 0.117*** -0.003 0.015 0.002
Medium 0.011 0.000 0.077 0.058 -0.017 0.081 0.006 0.016 0.013**
Small 0.029** 0.000 0.009 -0.005 0.000 0.011 -0.006 0.008 0.006**
HONG KONG
All Firms -0.018*** -0.005 0.293*** -0.032*** -0.004 0.323*** -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.005**
Large -0.016*** -0.004 0.279*** -0.031*** -0.003 0.305*** -0.021*** -0.007** -0.004**
ITALY
All Firms -0.008** -0.001 0.146*** 0.001 -0.001 0.150*** -0.006 -0.002 0.006***
Large -0.010 -0.001 0.103*** 0.016 -0.001 0.106*** -0.005 0.001 0.006**
Medium -0.006* -0.001 0.141*** 0.002 -0.001 0.144*** -0.002 -0.003 0.005***
Small -0.010* -0.001 0.204*** -0.020* -0.002 0.210*** -0.016* -0.003 0.007**
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Table 2.6 (contd)
Multi-factor model: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for the model in equation 2.22 (columns "Short-term IR" and "Long-
term IR") and equation 2.23 (column "Nelson-Siegel") estimated employing the sample of bank institutions over
1997-2007. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio IR FX PROP IR FX PROP Lev Slo Cur
Short-term IR Long-term IR Nelson-Siegel
JAPAN
All Firms -0.010 -0.001* 0.105*** 0.000 -0.001* 0.103*** 0.009 -0.018 0.003
Large -0.008 -0.002*** 0.089*** 0.007 -0.002*** 0.087*** 0.011 -0.017 0.004
Medium 0.011 0.000 0.077 0.058 -0.017 0.081 0.008 -0.014 0.002
Small -0.014 -0.002** 0.090*** 0.007 -0.002** 0.087*** 0.010 -0.031 0.007
SPAIN
All Firms 0.013 0.001* 0.026 -0.007 0.001 0.023 -0.009 0.018** 0.001
Large 0.002 0.000 -0.029 0.005 0.000 -0.028 0.001 0.017* 0.002
Medium 0.002 0.001* 0.057** -0.008 0.001 0.054** -0.011 0.012 0.003
Small 0.029 0.002* 0.045 -0.014 0.002 0.038 -0.015 0.022 0.000
SWEDEN
All Firms 0.003 0.001 0.152*** 0.011 0.001 0.153*** 0.010 0.001 -0.007*
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.022*** -0.003*** 0.090*** 0.002 -0.003*** 0.089*** -0.004 0.021*** 0.005**
Small 0.020*** -0.003*** 0.093*** 0.005 -0.003*** 0.092*** 0.000 0.018*** 0.005**
UK
All Firms -0.021* 0.001 0.114*** -0.010 0.001 0.113*** -0.008 0.007 0.001
Large -0.017 0.002* 0.100*** -0.003 0.002 0.099*** -0.003 0.006 0.002
US - Money Center
All Firms -0.004 0.000 0.161*** -0.011 0.000 0.155*** -0.009 -0.007 -0.002
US - Regional
All Firms -0.005 0.000 0.271*** 0.005 -0.001 0.271*** 0.000 -0.008 0.001
Large -0.013 -0.001 0.224*** -0.006 -0.001 0.219*** -0.011* -0.011 0.000
Medium 0.007 -0.003** 0.204*** 0.000 -0.003** 0.205*** -0.003 0.006 0.000
Small -0.006 0.000 0.283*** 0.007 0.000 0.284*** 0.002 -0.009 0.001
US - Savings & Loans
All Firms -0.010* 0.000 0.274*** 0.002 -0.001 0.275*** -0.003 -0.016** -0.002
Large -0.034*** -0.003 0.311*** 0.001 -0.004* 0.312*** -0.005 -0.053*** -0.006
Medium -0.020 0.001 0.631*** 0.004 0.001 0.633*** -0.009 -0.018 -0.008
Small -0.007 0.000 0.241*** 0.002 0.000 0.242*** -0.003 -0.013* -0.001
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Table 2.6 (contd)
Multi-factor model: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for the model in equation 2.22 (columns "Short-term IR" and "Long-
term IR") and equation 2.23 (column "Nelson-Siegel") estimated employing the sample of insurance companies over
1997-2007. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio IR FX PROP IR FX PROP Lev Slo Cur
Short-term IR Long-term IR Nelson-Siegel
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.016 0.001 -0.072 -0.010 0.001 -0.075 -0.010 -0.013 -0.001
CANADA
All Firms 0.017 -0.004*** 0.259*** -0.012 -0.003*** 0.263*** -0.006 0.006 -0.001
Large 0.010 -0.003*** 0.289*** -0.004 -0.003*** 0.291*** -0.002 0.010** 0.002
FRANCE
All Firms 0.025 0.002* 0.206*** 0.022* 0.002** 0.208*** 0.005 0.013 0.012***
Large 0.017 0.002** 0.162*** 0.022* 0.003** 0.164*** 0.006 0.008 0.010***
GERMANY - Life & Health
All Firms 0.023 -0.001 0.085*** 0.011 -0.001 0.085*** 0.001 0.028* 0.005
GERMANY - Multiline
All Firms 0.000 0.000 0.063** 0.003 0.000 0.062** -0.004 -0.002 0.006**
Large -0.010 0.001 0.052 -0.001 0.001 0.051 -0.004 -0.022 0.004
GERMANY - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.034* 0.001 0.092*** 0.007 0.001 0.093*** 0.005 -0.001 0.005
ITALY - Life & Health
All Firms -0.001 -0.002* 0.063* 0.011 -0.002 0.062* -0.004 -0.008 0.003
ITALY - Multiline
All Firms 0.001 0.000 0.148*** -0.019** 0.000 0.149*** -0.019** 0.000 0.002
Large 0.002 0.000 0.134*** -0.023** -0.001 0.134*** -0.026*** 0.004 0.000
JAPAN
All Firms -0.010 -0.002** 0.166*** -0.005 -0.002** 0.166*** 0.001 0.026 -0.002
Large 0.010 -0.004*** 0.193*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.193*** 0.000 0.028 0.006
Medium -0.030 -0.001 0.138*** -0.009 -0.001 0.138*** 0.000 0.028 0.006
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Table 2.6 (contd)
Multi-factor model: OLS estimation
This table presents the OLS regression results for the model in equation 2.22 (columns "Short-term IR" and "Long-
term IR") and equation 2.23 (column "Nelson-Siegel") estimated employing the sample of insurance companies
over 1997-2007. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio IR FX PROP IR FX PROP Lev Slo Cur
Short-term IR Long-term IR Nelson-Siegel
SPAIN
All Firms -0.034 -0.002 0.139*** -0.006 -0.002 0.142*** -0.012 -0.015 0.005
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.031*** 0.000 0.004 0.031*** 0.000 0.008 0.014 0.023** 0.007*
Large 0.021 0.001 -0.049 0.050*** 0.002 -0.046 0.029*** 0.013 0.006
Small 0.046*** -0.001 0.076 0.005 -0.002 0.081 -0.007 0.037*** 0.009**
UK - Life & Health
All Firms 0.024 -0.001 0.201*** -0.003 -0.001 0.197*** -0.005 0.006 0.007**
UK - Property & Casualty
All Firms 0.003 -0.002 0.214*** 0.003 -0.002 0.214*** 0.008 -0.017* 0.010***
US - Life & Health
All Firms 0.006 0.000 0.239*** -0.002 0.001 0.240*** -0.003 0.007 0.002
US - Medical
All Firms 0.005 -0.001 0.185** -0.018 -0.001 0.181** -0.014 0.009 0.000
US - Property & Casualty
All Firms -0.013* -0.001 0.317*** -0.010 -0.001 0.312*** -0.011** -0.005 0.000
Medium -0.007 0.004* 0.195*** -0.010 0.004* 0.191*** -0.014* -0.006 0.002
Small -0.014** -0.001 0.340*** -0.010 -0.001 0.334*** -0.011* -0.004 0.000
US - Multiline
All Firms 0.001 0.000 0.216*** -0.002 0.000 0.215*** -0.005 0.001 0.002
Medium 0.005 0.002 0.242*** -0.008 0.002 0.240*** -0.009 0.012 0.002
Small 0.000 -0.001 0.212*** 0.000 -0.001 0.213*** -0.003 -0.003 0.002
US - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.022** 0.001 0.081 -0.013 0.001 0.081 -0.005 0.023* 0.000
59
exception reported for the portfolio of Spanish and UK large institutions. The
positive foreign exchange coe¢cient registered for these banks implies that these
institutions have a net-long position in foreign currency, as positive values of the
foreign exchange factor imply the depreciation of domestic currency. The oppo-
site is true for the banks in France, Japan, Switzerland and the US (Regional),
perhaps implying their tendency to have net-short positions in one or more foreign
currencies. Further, the di¤erence between the exchange rate sensitivities among
the countries may be caused by the divergence in bank operations across mar-
kets and the regulatory conditions prevailing in di¤erent countries. For instance,
the US banks have historically dominated the foreign exchange trading market
(Madura and Zarruk, 1995). Hence, the values of the US banks are signicantly
a¤ected by the unanticipated changes in foreign exchange.
It is worth mentioning, that regardless of the interest rate proxy, the co-
e¢cients on the REIT factor remain statistically similar. Nevertheless, some
di¤erences are reported for the coe¢cient of the foreign exchange factor. Specif-
ically, while using the short-rates to proxy the interest rate factor, the portfolios
in Spain and UK exhibit some sensitivity to the foreign exchange factor. This is
however not the case when it comes to the model with the long-term rates.
Turning to the empirical results for the multi-factor model with the yield
curve level, slope and curvature factors, the chapter refers to the column "Nelson-
Siegel" of Table 2.6. Since both slope and curvature factor are orthogonalised with
regards to the yield curve level, the exclusive impact of each factor on the FIs
returns can be studied.
As expected, the statistical inferences drawn from the examination of the
parameter estimates on the yield curve level factor are identical to ones reported
from the models with long-term interest rates. The reason for this can be found
in the formulation of the Nelson-Siegel model, where the loading on the level
factor is one and is independent of time-to-maturity. Therefore the yield curve
level can be interpreted as the long-term factor. The slope factor, on the other
hand, can be interpreted as the short-term factor. Its negative and signicant
values reported for the Australian, Hong Kong, and US Savings & Loans banks
means that institutions in these countries record losses following the short-rate
increase.
The table also reports the signicant relevance of the yield curve curvature
factor in explaining the variability of banking returns for 15 of 42 portfolios. The
majority of signicant coe¢cients are positive, perhaps implying that the value
of the rate sensitive medium-term liabilities held by banks is well above the value
of matching assets.
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B. Insurance companies
Similar to banks, the insurance companies are signicantly a¤ected by the real
estate market activity. The coe¢cient on the REIT factor is positive and signi-
cant for 24 of 30 studied portfolios. The sensitivity of the insurers returns to the
real estate values varies across the markets and the type of insurance companies.
The highest coe¢cient of 0:340 is reported for the portfolio of US Property &
Casualty insurance institutions. High REIT coe¢cients are also reported for the
remaining US insurers. This is in line with the ndings of Johnston and Madura
(2002). This signicance may be explained by the fact that insurers commonly
invest a higher proportion of their funds in a variety of real estate assets, such
as equity investment in real estate, loans on commercial and industrial proper-
ties, residential mortgages and others. An extensive discussion on this subject is
available from Kopcke and Randall (1991) and Johnston and Madura (2002).
Insurance portfolios exposed to the movements in the foreign exchange market
include Canadian, French, Italian (Life & Health), Japanese and the US Property
& Casualty insurers. A positive coe¢cient sign is reported only for French and
US corporations, implying the tendency of these institutions to have a net-long
position in foreign currency. The remaining insurers, exposed to the foreign
exchange index uctuations, tend to maintain net-short foreign currency positions
as suggested by the negative foreign exchange coe¢cients.
Analysing the results for insurance portfolios with the yield curve level, slope
and curvature factors, the relevance of the medium-term interest rate in explain-
ing the insurers values is evident. The signicant coe¢cient for the curvature
factor is reported for 8 out of 30 insurance portfolios. The signicant coe¢cients
are always positive implying that the value of medium-term liabilities held by in-
surers in reference countries exceeds that of corresponding assets. The signicant
coe¢cients for the yield curve level and slope factors are reported for six markets.
For the level factor the majority of signicant coe¢cients bear a negative sign,
while the opposite is valid for the yield curve slope factor.
Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity estimation
In this section we estimate the multi-factor model via a GARCH type tech-
nique (eq. 2.24-2.26). The multifactor model in which the FIs returns are mod-
elled as a function of the interest rate yield curve level, slope and curvature factors
is also estimated via GARCH in this section. Table 2.7: Panels A and B present
the results for the portfolios of banking and insurance companies respectively. For
comparison, the foreign exchange and the REIT coe¢cients in the multi-factor
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model estimated via OLS (Equations 2.22) are also reported in column "OLS".
The market and the interest rate factors are not discussed in this section as an
extensive examination of these factors is provided in the previous sections.
A. Banking institutions
The coe¢cient signs reported for the OLS and GARCH models are generally
identical. However, the model estimated via OLS fails to recognise the signicant
exposure of Canadian, Italian, Swedish, and the US Savings & Loan institutions
to the foreign exchange risk. Further, the OLS based model overestimates the
signicance of the foreign exchange factor for the portfolio of small French banks,
small Japanese, and Spanish medium and small banks. For the remaining port-
folios both techniques yield an identical coe¢cient sign for the foreign exchange
factor. Nonetheless, the model based on OLS still overestimates the foreign ex-
change coe¢cients for the Swiss banking institutions.
In addition, the OLS based model persistently underestimates or overesti-
mates the sensitivities of the banking returns to the slope and curvature factors.
The most representative example is reported for the portfolios of US based Sav-
ings & Loan corporations. While the OLS based model does not recognise the
exposure of these rms to the medium rates changes, the model based on GARCH
reports the signicance of the medium-term factor for three out of four examined
portfolios.
B. Insurance companies
Turning to analysing the insurance companies, the REIT betas are generally
positive and signicant, with the exception of Australian and American Medical
insurers. These ndings are somewhat conicting with the ones reported from
the OLS based model. For instance, the OLS based model fails to conrm the
signicant exposure of Swiss and US Reinsurance companies to the real estate
market conditions, while it also overestimates the REIT sensitivity of the US
Medical insurers.
The estimation also reveals the signicant association between insurers values
and the foreign exchange factor for some portfolios. These results are, however,
not robust to the choice of interest rate proxy. With regard to the multi-factor
model with the yield curve level, slope and curvature, the OLS based model fails
to detect the sensitivity of Canadian and American Reinsurance companies to the
level factor, while it also overestimates the signicance of the curvature factor for
the portfolios of Swiss companies. Further, the GARCH based model reports the
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Table 2.7
Multi-factor model: GARCH estimation
This table presents the GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for the model in equations 2.24-2.26 and 2.27-2.29 estimated employing
the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric methodology utilised to
estimate the model; that is "OLS" and "GARCH" indicate the use of OLS or GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. *, **, ***
indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Short-term IR Long-term IR Nelson-Siegel
OLS GARCH OLS GARCH GARCH
Portfolio FX PROP FX PROP FX PROP FX PROP Lev Slo Cur
AUSTRALIA
All Firms 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.015 0.001 -0.004 0.001* -0.010 -0.018*** -0.005 -0.001
Large -0.001 0.007 0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.012 0.000 -0.003 -0.024*** 0.013 -0.002
Medium 0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.018 0.002 -0.012 0.001 0.021 -0.004 -0.059*** 0.001
BELGIUM
All Firms 0.000 -0.020 0.000 -0.048 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.037 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.000
CANADA
All Firms 0.000 0.134*** -0.001 0.098*** 0.000 0.131*** -0.001 0.106*** -0.008 0.005** -0.002*
Large -0.001 0.119*** -0.001* 0.109*** -0.001 0.117*** -0.001** 0.101*** -0.013** 0.001 -0.001
Small 0.002 0.168*** 0.002** 0.160*** 0.002 0.164** 0.002* 0.157*** 0.017 0.008* -0.001
FRANCE
All Firms 0.000 0.102*** 0.000 0.044** 0.000 0.102*** 0.000 0.045** -0.003 0.006 0.002
Large 0.001 0.183*** 0.001 0.087*** 0.001 0.186*** 0.000 0.090*** -0.006 0.010 0.006**
Small -0.001* 0.059*** 0.000 0.008 -0.001* 0.058*** 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.003 0.002
GERMANY
All Firms 0.001 0.104*** 0.000 0.105*** 0.001 0.105*** 0.000 0.109*** -0.001 0.000 0.007***
Large 0.001 0.116*** 0.000 0.084** 0.001 0.117*** 0.001 0.089*** 0.001 0.011 0.005
Medium 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.205*** -0.017 0.081 0.000 0.203*** 0.005 -0.037** 0.009**
Small 0.000 0.009 - - 0.000 0.011 - - - - -
HONG KONG
All Firms -0.005 0.293*** -0.002 0.162*** -0.004 0.323*** -0.002 0.160*** -0.011*** -0.008* 0.001
Large -0.004 0.279*** 0.000 0.130*** -0.003 0.305*** -0.001 0.131*** -0.009** -0.007* 0.000
ITALY
All Firms -0.001 0.146*** -0.001* 0.089*** -0.001 0.150*** -0.001* 0.090*** -0.009** -0.001 0.004***
Large -0.001 0.103*** -0.001 0.051* -0.001 0.106*** -0.001 0.052* -0.005 0.005 0.005**
Medium -0.001 0.141*** -0.001** 0.103*** -0.001 0.144*** -0.001** 0.105*** 0.001 -0.001 0.005***
Small -0.001 0.204*** -0.001 0.157*** -0.002 0.210*** -0.001 0.161*** -0.011 -0.008 0.007***
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Table 2.7 (contd)
Multi-factor model: GARCH estimation
This table presents the GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for the model in equations 2.24-2.26 and 2.27-2.29 estimated employing the sample
of bank institutions over 1997-2007. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric methodology utilised to estimate the model; that
is "OLS" and "GARCH" indicate the use of OLS or GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient signicance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Short-term IR Long-term IR Nelson-Siegel
OLS GARCH OLS GARCH GARCH
Portfolio FX PROP FX PROP FX PROP FX PROP Lev Slo Cur
JAPAN
All Firms -0.001* 0.105*** -0.001* 0.087*** -0.001* 0.103*** -0.001* 0.084*** 0.008 -0.012 -0.001
Large -0.002*** 0.089*** -0.002*** 0.076*** -0.002*** 0.087*** -0.002*** 0.073*** 0.006 -0.009 0.004
Medium 0.000 0.077 -0.001 0.094*** -0.017 0.081 -0.001 0.091*** 0.006 -0.008 -0.002
Small -0.002** 0.090*** -0.001* 0.076*** -0.002** 0.087*** -0.001* 0.071*** 0.010 -0.029 0.003
SPAIN
All Firms 0.001* 0.026 0.001** 0.031*** 0.001 0.023 0.001* 0.030*** -0.005 0.015** 0.000
Large 0.000 -0.029 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.006 0.007 0.022*** 0.000
Medium 0.001* 0.057** 0.001 0.062*** 0.001 0.054** 0.001 0.058*** -0.011* 0.012 0.001
Small 0.002* 0.045 - - 0.002 0.038 - - - - -
SWEDEN
All Firms 0.001 0.152*** 0.003** 0.095*** 0.001 0.153*** 0.003** 0.096*** 0.004 0.006 -0.005
SWITZERLAND
All Firms -0.003*** 0.090*** -0.002*** 0.065*** -0.003*** 0.089*** -0.002*** 0.058** -0.002 0.009** 0.004**
Small -0.003*** 0.093*** -0.002*** 0.070*** -0.003*** 0.092*** -0.002*** 0.062** 0.001 0.009** 0.004**
UK
All Firms 0.001 0.114*** 0.001 0.058** 0.001 0.113*** 0.001 0.047* -0.012** 0.002 0.000
Large 0.002* 0.100*** 0.002* 0.056** 0.002 0.099*** 0.001 0.049** -0.010* -0.001 0.001
US - Money Center
All Firms 0.000 0.161*** 0.000 0.102*** 0.000 0.155*** 0.000 0.090*** -0.008* -0.002 -0.005***
US - Regional
All Firms 0.000 0.271*** -0.001 0.239*** -0.001 0.271*** -0.001 0.240*** -0.001 -0.015** -0.001
Large -0.001 0.224*** -0.001 0.167*** -0.001 0.219*** -0.001 0.162*** -0.009* 0.001 -0.003
Medium -0.003** 0.204*** -0.003*** 0.153*** -0.003** 0.205*** -0.003*** 0.151*** -0.009 -0.006 -0.004
Small 0.000 0.283*** -0.001 0.254*** 0.000 0.284*** -0.001 0.248*** 0.001 -0.015** -0.001
US - Savings & Loans
All Firms 0.000 0.274*** -0.001 0.216*** -0.001 0.275*** -0.001 0.220*** -0.005 -0.025*** -0.004**
Large -0.003 0.311*** -0.002* 0.243*** -0.004* 0.312*** -0.002* 0.245*** 0.001 -0.032*** -0.007**
Medium 0.001 0.631*** 0.003 0.649*** 0.001 0.633*** 0.003 0.642*** -0.024*** -0.040** -0.012***
Small 0.000 0.241*** -0.001 0.187*** 0.000 0.242*** -0.001 0.191*** -0.004 -0.021*** -0.002
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Table 2.7 (contd)
Multi-factor model: GARCH estimation
This table presents the GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for the model in equations 2.24-2.26 and 2.27-2.29 estimated employing the
sample of insurance companies over 1997-2007. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric methodology utilised to estimate
the model; that is "OLS" and "GARCH" indicate the use of OLS or GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. *, **, *** indicate the
coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Short-term IR Long-term IR Nelson-Siegel
OLS GARCH OLS GARCH GARCH
Portfolio FX PROP FX PROP FX PROP FX PROP Lev Slo Cur
AUSTRALIA
All Firms -0.016 0.001 0.000 -0.030 0.001 -0.075 0.000 -0.030 -0.010 -0.017 -0.005**
CANADA
All Firms 0.017 -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.211*** -0.003*** 0.263*** -0.003*** 0.214*** -0.015** 0.007** -0.002
Large 0.010 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.200*** -0.003*** 0.291*** -0.002*** 0.202*** -0.010 0.008** 0.001
FRANCE
All Firms 0.025 0.002* 0.001 0.131*** 0.002** 0.208*** 0.001 0.140*** -0.001 0.016 0.012***
Large 0.017 0.002** 0.001 0.103*** 0.003** 0.164*** 0.001 0.111*** -0.002 0.013 0.009***
GERMANY - Life & Health
All Firms 0.023 -0.001 -0.001 0.087*** -0.001 0.085*** -0.001 0.086*** -0.001 -0.001 0.004
GERMANY - Multiline
All Firms 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.040** 0.000 0.062** -0.001 0.042** -0.007 -0.018 0.007***
Large -0.010 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.051 0.001 0.000 -0.011 -0.045*** 0.007***
GERMANY - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.034* 0.001 0.000 0.057*** 0.001 0.093*** 0.000 0.058*** 0.008 0.000 0.004
ITALY - Life & Health
All Firms -0.001 -0.002* -0.002*** 0.059* -0.002 0.062* -0.002*** 0.058* -0.003 -0.006 -0.001
ITALY - Multiline
All Firms 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.146*** 0.000 0.149*** -0.001 0.140*** -0.017** 0.001 0.001
Large 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.127*** -0.001 0.134*** -0.001 0.118*** -0.022*** 0.005 0.000
JAPAN
All Firms -0.010 -0.002** -0.002 0.144*** -0.002** 0.166*** -0.002 0.146*** 0.005 0.037 -0.003
Large 0.010 -0.004*** -0.002** 0.179*** -0.004*** 0.193*** -0.002** 0.179*** 0.011 0.024 0.006
Medium -0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.083** -0.001 0.138*** 0.000 0.085** 0.011 0.024 0.006
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Table 2.7 (contd)
Multi-factor model: GARCH estimation
This table presents the GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for the model in equations 2.24-2.26 and 2.27-2.29 estimated employing
the sample of insurance companies over 1997-2007. The column headings indicate the choice of the econometric methodology utilised to
estimate the model; that is "OLS" and "GARCH" indicate the use of OLS or GARCH type estimation techniques respectively. *, **, ***
indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Short-term IR Long-term IR Nelson-Siegel
OLS GARCH OLS GARCH GARCH
Portfolio FX PROP FX PROP FX PROP FX PROP Lev Slo Cur
SPAIN
All Firms -0.034 -0.002 -0.002 0.137*** -0.002 0.142*** -0.002 0.138*** -0.006 -0.004 0.004
SWITZERLAND
All Firms 0.031*** 0.000 -0.002* 0.074* 0.000 0.008 -0.002* 0.072 -0.001 0.010 0.004
Large 0.021 0.001 -0.002* -0.018 0.002 -0.046 -0.002** -0.013 0.004 -0.006 0.002
Small 0.046*** -0.001 -0.002 0.121** -0.002 0.081 -0.002 0.103* 0.002 0.036*** 0.006
UK - Life & Health
All Firms 0.024 -0.001 - - -0.001 0.197*** - - - - -
UK - Property & Casualty
All Firms 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.133*** -0.002 0.214*** -0.001 0.135*** -0.001 -0.015** 0.009***
US - Life & Health
All Firms 0.006 0.000 0.002** 0.184*** 0.001 0.240*** 0.002** 0.186*** -0.003 0.002 0.003
US - Medical
All Firms 0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.181** 0.005* -0.017 -0.029*** -0.014 0.006
US - Property & Casualty
All Firms -0.013* -0.001 0.000 0.261*** -0.001 0.312*** 0.000 0.259*** -0.008 -0.012 0.000
Medium -0.007 0.004* 0.005*** 0.113** 0.004* 0.191*** 0.004*** 0.104** -0.010 -0.019* 0.001
Small -0.014** -0.001 -0.001 0.295*** -0.001 0.334*** -0.002 0.275*** -0.010** -0.010 -0.001
US - Multiline
All Firms 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.145*** 0.000 0.215*** 0.000 0.146*** -0.002 0.000 0.001
Medium 0.005 0.002 0.002* 0.139*** 0.002 0.240*** 0.002 0.136*** -0.007 -0.004 0.004
Small 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.163*** -0.001 0.213*** -0.001 0.167*** -0.001 0.002 0.002
US - Reinsurance
All Firms 0.022** 0.001 -0.001 0.134*** 0.001 0.081 0.000 0.114*** -0.013* 0.006 0.002
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sensitivity of the German Multiline and US Property & Casualty insurers to the
slope factor, while OLS appears to refute this observation. The opposite is true
for the portfolios of German Life & Health and American Reinsurance rms.
This observation of inconsistent results between the two models (OLS and
GARCH) further emphasises the importance of model choice while modelling the
assets returns and risk exposure.
Augmented GARCH estimation
To examine the key determinants of the FIs return volatility, the study em-
ploys the system of Equations 2.30-2.36. The model estimation is organised as a
two step process.
First, once the heteroscedastic residuals in the nal version of the multi-factor
model (2.30) are registered via the Engle Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, the
GARCH type modelling strategy is adopted to model the conditional volatility
of returns. The two competing models utilised in the study are GARCH and
GJR-GARCH. Depending on the signicance of factor i(GJR-GARCH) one of
the competing factorisations is employed. The appropriate order of the GARCH
process is specied by evaluating relevant statistical measures (such as Engle LM
test and Ljung-Box statistics of squared standardised residuals ).
In the second step, based on the model specied in step one, the conditional
volatility equation is augmented interchangeably by the one-period lagged values
of: (a) contemporaneous factors Rf = RIR;RFX ;RPROP utilised in the mean
equation (column "Risk factors"); and (b) conditional volatilities (hf) of these
factors (column "CV Risk factors").
The model is evaluated with the interest rate factor being proxied by either
the short- or long-term interest rates. In the interest of brevity, this section
analyses the estimation results only for banking companies, and for the model
with the interest rate factor being proxied by the short-term interest rates. The
pertinent results are outlined in Table 2.8. The table reports only the values for
the ' coe¢cient in (2.30-2.36).
A. Lagged risk factors (Rf)
We rst discuss the results for the model with the conditional volatility equa-
tion being augmented by the lagged factors Rf = RIR; RFX ; RPROP . Repre-
senting, by design, the unanticipated changes in the underlying macroeconomic
variables, these factors are expected to signicantly a¤ect both the rst and sec-
ond moments of the nancial institutions stock returns.
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Table 2.8
Augmented GARCH Multi-Factor Model
This table presents the augmented GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for the model in equa-
tions 2.30-2.36 estimated for the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. The volatility equation
is interchangeably augmented by the one-period lagged values of: (a) contemporaneous risk factors
Rf = RIR;RFX ;RPROP utilised in the mean equation (column "Risk factors"); and (b) condi-
tional volatilities (hf ) of these factors (column "CV Risk factors"). The column headings indicate
the choice of the pertinent augment in the volatility equation. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient
signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio RIS RFX RPROP hIS hFX hPROP
Risk factors CV Risk factors
AUSTRALIA
All Firms 1.1E-04** -7.4E-06** 2.0E-05 - -4.1E-06 -
Large 6.0E-05 2.2E-06 1.5E-04 - -3.7E-05*** -
Medium 7.0E-04*** -5.3E-05*** -1.0E-02*** - 4.1E-05*** -
BELGIUM
All Firms -9.6E-06 4.1E-06* -6.9E-04*** - -2.0E-06** 1.1E-02**
CANADA
All Firms 3.4E-05 4.8E-06 -1.1E-04 1.8E-03* 1.9E-07 1.6E-03
Large 2.0E-04*** 9.3E-06* 6.4E-05 5.8E-03* -1.2E-06 6.6E-03
Small 2.0E-04 -5.4E-06 -8.6E-04 2.9E-02** -8.6E-06 4.0E-02*
FRANCE
All Firms 2.8E-06 -3.3E-06 -2.1E-04** 1.2E-03** 3.3E-06 -6.4E-04
Large -3.0E-06 7.2E-06 1.2E-04 2.7E-03* -3.1E-06 6.8E-03
Small 9.6E-06 -1.3E-06 1.3E-05 3.0E-04** 7.1E-07 4.1E-03
GERMANY
All Firms -4.6E-04*** 3.1E-06 5.1E-04* - -7.1E-03*** 2.4E-02*
Large -1.3E-03* 3.3E-06 3.4E-03*** - -2.0E-05 8.9E-03
Medium 7.3E-04*** -2.3E-05* -2.1E-03*** - -5.6E-05*** -2.8E-02***
Small - - - - - -
HONG KONG
All Firms -4.4E-05 -2.9E-05 -6.4E-04** 6.1E-05 -2.2E-05 2.2E-02
Large -9.0E-06 -4.7E-05** -4.0E-04 8.2E-05 -9.2E-05 1.1E-02
ITALY
All Firms -2.2E-04*** 2.0E-06 -1.5E-04 8.7E-05** -1.3E-06 -
Large -1.0E-04* 9.9E-08 -5.3E-04** 9.3E-05 4.5E-06 -
Medium -9.6E-06 3.1E-06 -3.5E-05 1.2E-04** -2.2E-06 -
Small -4.7E-04*** 2.3E-05** 6.4E-04* 1.3E-04*** -9.2E-06 -
JAPAN
All Firms -3.8E-04 5.3E-06 -7.5E-04** -1.1E-03 -9.0E-07 -2.9E-03
Large -1.9E-04 1.2E-05 -3.6E-04 3.7E-04 7.8E-06 -2.2E-04
Medium -4.5E-04** 8.4E-06 -8.5E-04** 2.1E-04 6.2E-06 8.1E-03
Small -4.3E-04 -3.8E-05** -7.3E-04 -3.1E-03*** -1.6E-05 -4.0E-02**
SPAIN
All Firms 4.5E-05 1.8E-06 -1.4E-04 9.0E-05 -4.3E-05*** 6.3E-04
Large -1.2E-04 4.8E-06 1.0E-04 2.1E-03** -5.2E-06*** 5.4E-03**
Medium -1.7E-04 1.3E-05 -5.0E-04* 1.1E-03 -7.2E-06* 5.9E-03
Small - - - - - -
SWEDEN
All Firms 2.6E-04*** -2.9E-05** -4.2E-04 - 4.0E-05 1.6E-02***
SWITZERLAND
All Firms -5.1E-05** 1.0E-05*** -4.0E-04*** 6.0E-06 - 4.1E-03
Small -4.6E-05 1.0E-05** -4.9E-05 1.5E-05 - 6.9E-03
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Table 2.10 (contd)
Augmented GARCH Multi-Factor Model
This table presents the augmented GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for the model in
equations 2.30-2.36 estimated for the sample of bank institutions over 1997-2007. The volatility
equation is interchangeably augmented by the one-period lagged values of: (a) contemporaneous
risk factors Rf = RIR;RFX ;RPROP utilised in the mean equation (column "Risk factors");
and (b) conditional volatilities (hf ) of these factors (column "CV Risk factors"). The column
headings indicate the choice of the pertinent augment in the volatility equation. *, **, ***
indicate the coe¢cient signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
Portfolio RIS RFX RPROP hIS hFX hPROP
Risk factors CV Risk factors
UK
All Firms -3.0E-05 5.3E-06 -1.5E-04 2.7E-03** -8.7E-06 -2.2E-03
Large -4.3E-05 3.7E-06 -1.4E-04 2.8E-03** 1.1E-06 -5.7E-03
US - Money Center
All Firms -1.2E-05 1.1E-05 -7.9E-04*** -1.6E-06 - 2.6E-03
US - Regional
All Firms -1.8E-05 -4.0E-07 -1.6E-04** 1.1E-04 - -3.7E-03
Large -2.8E-04*** 3.9E-06 -8.1E-04*** 8.1E-04*** - 9.6E-03
Medium 8.8E-05 4.3E-05*** -1.2E-03*** 3.8E-05 - -1.3E-02
Small -2.8E-06 -3.7E-06 -1.4E-04* 3.5E-06 - -1.4E-03
US - Savings & Loans
All Firms -3.0E-04*** 9.2E-06*** -5.0E-04*** -1.0E-03*** - -7.6E-03**
Large -4.4E-04*** 3.1E-05** -1.7E-03*** -1.9E-03 - 4.3E-03
Medium -1.8E-03*** 2.8E-05 1.2E-02*** 4.8E-04 - 3.2E-01***
Small -2.6E-04*** 6.5E-06*** -2.8E-04*** 7.6E-04 - -1.5E-02***
First, I augment the conditional volatility equation with the short-term inter-
est rate factor. The coe¢cient ', therefore, measures the e¤ect of the unexpected
changes of the domestic short-term interest rate at time t  1 on the FIs returns
volatility at time t. A positive and signicant coe¢cient is observed for large
banks in Canada, medium in Australia and Germany and all banks in Sweden.
Negative values are reported for Italian, Japanese, Swiss, American (Regional and
Savings & Loans) and for the "All rms" portfolio of German banks, suggesting
that the riskiness of these institutions decreases following a positive rate shock.
The rationale behind these ndings can be explained by the following rea-
soning. As suggested by Fama (1975), the unanticipated changes in short rates
might be attributed to increased uncertainty regarding the changes in expected
ination, with its negative implications on FI values. Another common nding
in the nance literature also suggests that short-term interest rate volatility com-
monly peaks following a short-rate increase. Combining these expectations with
the observation that the interest rate shocks commonly a¤ect banking values, the
rate changes are expected to be translated into increased volatility of banking
returns. Confronted by these risks, banks would try to hedge themselves against
these adverse rate movements. This objective appears to be achieved within just
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one week (the sampling horizon in this study). As a result, the volatility gure is
reduced in the period following the short-rate increase. The only banks struggling
to prevent the volatility increase in the period following the unexpected short-rate
change are those in Canada, Australia, Germany and Sweden. Surprisingly, the
riskiness of French, Hong Kong, Spanish and British banks is not inated by the
shocks in short-rates even though the banking values in these counties exhibit
signicant sensitivity to the short-term rate changes.
Second, the conditional volatility equation is augmented with the long-term in-
terest rate factor. It appears that Italian, Swiss, American (Regional and Savings
& Loans), and medium banks from Australia and Germany tend to hedge better
against the long-rate changes, with volatility decreasing following the shock in the
long-rate. On the contrary, for the portfolios of Hong Kong and small Japanese
institutions the reverse is true. Similar to the Hong Kong companies, banking
portfolios for Australia and Germany are struggling to prevent the volatility in-
crease in the period following the raise in the long-term domestic rates.
Third, interesting ndings emerge with the volatility equation is augmented
by the lagged foreign exchange factor. It appears that the portfolios with both
rst and second moments of returns distribution being a¤ected by the exchange
rate changes are those of Canadian, Swedish, Swiss, and the US (Regional and
Savings & Loan) institutions. While the depreciation of domestic currency would
negatively a¤ect the return gures of Canadian, Swedish, Swiss, and American
institutions, it would also increase their riskiness in the subsequent period. On
the contrary, the Swedish banks have a tendency to benet by reducing their
volatilities subsequent to domestic currency depreciation.
Finally, the volatility equation is augmented by the lagged REIT factor. It
appears that positive real estate returns improve the banks return volatility gure
in the subsequent period. The negative sign of the ' coe¢cient is reported for
French, small German, Hong Kong, large Italian, Japanese, Spanish, Swiss and
American (Regional, Savings & Loans) banking portfolios. The exceptions are
the portfolios of large German, small Italian and medium US Saving & Loans
banks for which the positive REIT returns would be translated into increased
bank riskiness in the subsequent week.
B. Lagged factors conditional volatilities (hf)
To examine the relations between the values of FIs and risk factors Rf at
volatility level, the study augments the volatility equation in (2.31) with the
lagged conditional volatilities of the corresponding factors utilised in the mean
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Table 2.8 (contd)
Augmented GARCH Multi-Factor Model
This table presents the augmented GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for the model in equa-
tions 2.30-2.36 estimated for the sample of insurance companies over 1997-2007. The volatility
equation is interchangeably augmented by the one-period lagged values of: (a) contemporaneous risk
factors Rf = RIR;RFX ;RPROP utilised in the mean equation (column "Risk factors"); and (b) con-
ditional volatilities (hf ) of these factors (column "CV Risk factors"). The column headings indicate
the choice of the pertinent augment in the volatility equation. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient
signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio RIS RFX RPROP hIS hFX hPROP
Risk factors CV Risk factors
AUSTRALIA
All Firms 1.6E-04 -4.1E-06 4.4E-03*** -2.2E-03*** 3.1E-05 -
CANADA
All Firms -7.9E-05 3.3E-06 -5.3E-04* 1.1E-03*** -5.3E-06** 1.0E-02***
Large 1.4E-05 -5.6E-06 -5.3E-04* 1.3E-03** -2.7E-06 1.0E-02
FRANCE
All Firms -5.0E-05 2.5E-06 -4.3E-04** 7.2E-04** 2.4E-05** -1.2E-03
Large -1.6E-05 2.3E-06 -3.5E-04* 7.1E-04** 3.7E-06 -4.4E-03
GERMANY - Life & Health
All Firms -7.3E-04*** 7.6E-06 1.3E-04 - -5.1E-06 1.9E-02
GERMANY - Multiline
All Firms -7.3E-04*** -2.9E-06 -3.7E-04 - 1.5E-05 2.7E-02**
Large -7.2E-04*** -1.1E-05 8.5E-04** - 2.1E-04** 2.5E-02
GERMANY - Reinsurance
All Firms -2.5E-04 3.8E-06 -2.2E-04 - 3.8E-06 4.8E-03
ITALY - Life & Health
All Firms 9.1E-06 -6.9E-06 1.5E-04 -9.9E-04*** 1.5E-05 -
ITALY - Multiline
All Firms -7.0E-05* 1.4E-06 -1.3E-04 9.0E-05 -6.3E-06* -
Large -2.6E-05 7.9E-06 -2.6E-04* 6.0E-05 -6.5E-06* -
JAPAN
All Firms -1.6E-03*** 4.7E-05*** -1.3E-03** 9.6E-03** 2.8E-05* 4.2E-01***
Large -1.4E-03*** 9.4E-05*** -2.7E-03*** 1.7E-01*** 1.4E-04*** 1.9E-01**
Medium -2.1E-03*** -3.4E-05 -1.3E-03 1.1E-02*** 3.7E-05* 2.4E-02
SPAIN
All Firms 1.9E-03*** -1.7E-06 -1.8E-03** 8.9E-02*** 1.0E-04 -1.0E-01***
SWITZERLAND
All Firms -1.6E-04*** 3.7E-05*** 6.5E-04* 2.8E-04* - 6.1E-02***
Large -9.0E-05 4.6E-05*** -8.9E-05 -2.0E-03*** - 7.5E-02**
Small -4.6E-04*** 6.8E-05*** 1.4E-03* -2.4E-04 - 1.3E-01**
UK - Life & Health
All Firms - - - - - -
UK - Property & Casualty
All Firms -1.4E-04 1.1E-06 -5.6E-04* 9.2E-04* -3.4E-04*** -1.0E-02
US - Life & Health
All Firms -7.6E-05 1.3E-05 -4.9E-04*** -5.5E-04 - 1.5E-02**
US - Medical
All Firms 1.2E-03*** 6.3E-05*** -4.7E-04 -1.2E-03** - -7.6E-02***
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Table 2.10 (contd)
Augmented GARCH Multi-Factor Model
This table presents the augmented GARCH/GJR-GARCH regression results for the
model in equations 2.30-2.36 estimated for the sample of insurance companies over
1997-2007. The volatility equation is interchangeably augmented by the one-period
lagged values of: (a) contemporaneous risk factors Rf = RIR;RFX ;RPROP utilised
in the mean equation (column "Risk factors"); and (b) conditional volatilities (hf ) of
these factors (column "CV Risk factors"). The column headings indicate the choice
of the pertinent augment in the volatility equation. *, **, *** indicate the coe¢cient
signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
Portfolio RIS RFX RPROP hIS hFX hPROP
Risk factors CV Risk factors
US - Property & Casualty
All Firms 3.8E-06 1.4E-05*** -5.4E-04*** 8.7E-04* - 6.9E-03
Medium -5.0E-05 1.8E-06 -8.5E-04*** 1.5E-03** - 1.5E-02**
Small -2.9E-05 3.1E-06 -6.9E-04*** 2.7E-03 - 1.6E-02**
US - Multiline
All Firms 3.3E-05 8.4E-06 -3.5E-04*** 1.1E-03* - 6.8E-03
Medium -9.7E-06 -3.2E-07 -9.3E-04*** 1.0E-03 - 1.6E-02**
Small 2.7E-05 1.5E-05** -5.1E-04*** 2.1E-03** - 1.8E-03
US - Reinsurance
All Firms 4.8E-06 2.6E-05*** -1.2E-04 3.9E-04* - 9.6E-03**
equation.
When the conditional volatilities of the long-term rates are examined the re-
ported coe¢cients are signicant for banks in Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, UK and the US. For banking portfolios in these markets (except portfo-
lios of British and Italian Banks) the reported coe¢cients are negative, suggesting
that increased volatility of interest rates would result in the stabilisation (volatil-
ity decrease) of the banks returns in the subsequent period. These ndings are in
line with those by Elyasiani and Mansur (1998). These authors suggest that the
volatility enhancement benets from the hedging strategies employed by banks
in response to increased uncertainty.
Contrary to the long-term rates, the higher volatility in the domestic short-
term rates translates into the higher volatility of the banking returns in the follow-
ing period (13 of 15 signicant coe¢cients bear a positive sign). These relations
are valid for Canadian, French, Italian, Spanish, British and American Regional
banks. The opposite is true for small Japanese and large American Savings &
Loans institutions. This may be explained by the fact that short-term interest
rates are generally more volatile. Therefore, it is more di¢cult for banks to ad-
dress the issue of the short-rates volatility increase more e¢ciently that for the
case of long-term rates.
Analysing the volatility transmission from foreign exchange to the banking
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returns, the signicant coe¢cients are reported for eight out of 42 banking port-
folios. The coe¢cient sign is negative except for the "Medium" portfolio of Aus-
tralian banks. This suggests the tendency of the banks to improve the volatility
gure following an increase in the volatility of exchange rates. This is perhaps
due to the fact that banks generally maintain a net-short position in foreign cur-
rency and hence benet following a domestic currency appreciation (which is one
of the possible reasons for increased volatility of the FX index).
Having established the positive relations between the REIT and FI returns,
the observation of the positive ' coe¢cients in the conditional volatility equation
for Belgian, small Canadian, large Spanish, Swedish and medium US Savings
& Loans banks is not surprising. This is because banks allocate a substantial
proportion of their funds in real-estate related assets and tend to share the risks
common to the real estate market. On the other hand, the negative coe¢cient
values observed for the "Medium" portfolio of German banks, small Japanese and
small American Saving & Loans institutions provide rather intriguing evidence.
2.5 Concluding remarks
The exposure of nancial intermediaries to various risks has been the sub-
ject of considerable empirical research since the inception of Stones (1974) two
factor model. This model has been extensively used in both its original form
and numerous modications. Despite the extensive interest in the area, the re-
searchers have demonstrated conicting results to date regarding the e¤ect of in-
terest rate changes on nancial institutions equity returns. The reasons for this
are attributed to the di¤erent data samples, time horizons and methodological
frameworks employed in previous works. In addition, the majority of the existing
studies focus on the US market. This limits the extent to which that evidence
produced can be used to cast light on the exposure of nancial intermediaries to
interest rate uctuations in other markets.
Furthermore, the research to date has also demonstrated the relevance of for-
eign exchange and real estate risk factors to the nancial intermediaries returns
generating process. Nonetheless, there is no study which addresses the joint in-
teraction of market, interest rate, foreign exchange and real estate risk factors
while modelling the nancial institutions stock returns.
Motivated by these inadequacies, this research contributes to the existing
literature along several dimensions. First, this study examines the risk exposure
of nancial intermediaries across the widest so far selection of markets. This
includes the countries members of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
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and other important regions of Asia (Hong Kong) and the Pacic Rim (Australia).
Second, the joint interaction of market, interest rate, foreign exchange and real
estate risk factors on the banks and insurance companies stock returns is studied
for the rst time. Third, the study adopts the same model specications across all
markets, with the factor signicance being tested using alternative econometric
techniques. This, in turn, provides robust and up to date empirical evidence on
the studied matter and sheds light to the origins of any disparity in the previously
reported results. Fourth, the analysis extends the literature by employing the
framework that allows capturing the sensitivity of the FIs stock returns to the
changes in the entire shape of the term structure. Finally, this study provides
an in-depth examination of the key factors inuencing the volatility of the FIs
returns.
The empirical results reported in this chapter reveal a number of common nd-
ings for banking and insurance institutions. First, despite the growing quantity
and popularity of innovative risk management instruments, nancial institutions
are found to be signicantly exposed to the adverse movements in at least one
interest rate proxy. This observation indicates the company managers inability
to take accurate views regarding the changes in the entire shape of the term struc-
ture and implement comprehensive hedging strategies. For example, analysing a
sample of British banks, my ndings suggest that a shock of 100 basis points in
the short-term interest rate triggers, on average, a decline of the market value of
large British banks by approximately $740 million. This amount is comparable
to 20% of the total capitalisation of a smaller bank, Alliance & Leicester plc, in
the same market over the reference horizon. Likewise, the empirical ndings for
Australia suggest that a single shock of 100 basis points in the long-term interest
rate would, on average, result in a loss of approximately AUS $811million by the
large Australian banks. This amount is akin to 84% of the total capitalisation
of a smaller Australian bank, Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd., over the examined
horizon.
Second, empirical ndings also show signicant relationships between the -
nancial corporations stock returns and both foreign exchange and real estate
factors. While the importance of the foreign exchange factor is less pronounced,
the relevance of the real estate factor in explaining the nancials values across
the majority of markets is overwhelming. The only banks with insignicant real
estate factor are in Australia and Belgium. For the remaining markets positive
relationships between banking and REIT returns are reported. The values of
insurance companies (for 24 of 30 studied portfolios) are also positively and sig-
nicantly a¤ected by the real estate market conditions. The e¤ect of both the
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foreign exchange and real estate market activity on the nancial institutions val-
ues is di¤erent across the markets. The reasons for the di¤erence between the
exchange rate sensitivities among the countries are attributed to the divergence
in bank operations across markets and the regulatory conditions prevailing in
di¤erent countries. For the real estate factor the di¤erences might be explained
by the market-varying dynamic of property prices due to di¤erences in a number
of specic supply and demand factors. While previous research in the area has
been neglecting the importance of the real estate market, my ndings can o¤er
an essential insight for practitioners in the area of risk management, monetary
authorities and nancial regulators.
Third, for both banking and insurance portfolios, the statistical inferences
regarding the interest rate factor signicance are biased to the choice of inter-
est rate proxy (the author used four alternative proxies), approximation tech-
nique adopted to calculate these proxies (e.g. the use of arithmetic or percentage
changes) and the model econometric specication (OLS, GARCH, MV-GARCH).
For instance, in example of British banks, the OLS based model (as opposed to
GARCH) failed to recognise the signicance of the discussed losses. Similarly,
the amount of the discussed losses for large Australian banks rockets to AUS
$4:7billion with the long-rate factor calculated as percentage changes. The sta-
tistical inferences regarding the signicance of both foreign exchange and real
estate factors are also heavily a¤ected by the choice of econometric specication.
Accordingly, the importance of the factor (model) choice for the consistency of
the empirical results among the studies should be further emphasised.
Finally, examining the factors inuencing the volatility of the nancial insti-
tutions stock returns, the study concludes the relevance of the lagged risk factor
and the conditional volatilities of these factors. The riskiness of nancial institu-
tions changes in the period subsequent to the changes in most of these factors,
with the sign and signicance of the change being di¤erent across the markets
examined. This suggests that institutions of di¤erent types and geographical
origins may employ heterogeneous asset-liability and risk management strategies.
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Appendix 2.1
Market data
Country Denition Ticker
Panel A: National market index
Australia ASX All Ordinaries Index (AOI) AS30 INDEX
Belgium Euronext Brussels benchmark index BEL20 INDEX
Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index SPTSX INDEX
France Euronext Paris benchmark index CAC 40 CAC INDEX
Germany Deutsche Aktein Xchange index DAX DAX INDEX
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index HSI INDEX
Italy Milano Italia Borsa 30 Index MIB 30 MIB30 INDEX
Japan Tokyo Stock Exchange Market Index Nikkei 225 NKY INDEX
Sweden OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholms tradable in OMX30 INDEX
Switzerland Swiss Market Index SMI SMI INDEX
UK Financial Times Stock Exchange All Share Index ASX INDEX
US Standard & Poors 500 Market Index SPX INDEX
Panel B: Short-term interest rate
Australia 3-month Australia bank bill short-term rate Reserve Bank of Australia
Belgium 3-month Government Treasury Bill yield National Bank of Belgium
Canada 3-month LIBOR rate British Bankers Assosia-
tion
France 3-month Government Treasury bill yield Bloomberg
Germany Generic 6-month German Treasury paper yield Bloomberg
Hong Kong 3-month Hong Kong Exchange fund bill yield Hong Kong Monetary Au-
thority
Italy 3-month Italian Treasury bill Bloomberg
Japan 6-month Japan Treasury bill redemption yield Bloomberg
Sweden 3-month Treasury bill yield Bloomberg
Switzerland 3-month Treasury bill yield Bloomberg
UK 3-month Treasury bill yield Bloomberg
US 3-month Treasury bill secondary market rate Federal Reserve Board
Panel C: Long-term interest rate
Australia 10-year Commonwealth Treasury bond yield Australian Reserve Bank
Belgium 30-year Government bond yield Bloomberg
Canada 30-year Government bond yield Bloomberg
France Generic 30-year Government bond yield Bloomberg
Germany Generic 30-year Government bond yield Bloomberg
Hong Kong 10-year Hong Kong Exchange fund note yield Hong Kong Monetary Au-
thority
Italy Generic 30-year Government bond yield Bloomberg
Japan 10-year interest-bearing government bond yield Bank of Japan
Sweden 10-year Government Bond Yield Bank of Sweden
Switzerland 10-year Government Bond Yield Bloomberg
UK Generic 30-year Government bond yield Bloomberg
US 20-year U.S. Treasury securities market yield Federal Reserve Board
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Appendix 2.2
Descriptive statistics for nancial intermediaries
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for autocorrelation up to order q distributed as
2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. RALL, RLARGE , RMED, RSMALL denote returns
on the corresponding markets portfolio of all banks, large banks, medium size and small banks, respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent p-values based on
Whites robust standard error are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL
AUSTRALIA FRANCE ITALY
Mean 0.0019 0.0023 0.0010 - 0.0016 0.0022 - 0.0013 0.0024 0.0035 0.0021 0.0020
St.Dv. 0.020 0.021 0.039 - 0.014 0.040 - 0.011 0.023 0.039 0.022 0.027
Skew. -0.87*** -0.11 -3.12*** - -0.48*** -0.03 - -0.64*** 0.00 0.41*** -0.15 0.79***
Kurt. 8.42*** 3.77*** 35.36*** - 5.73*** 7.41*** - 8.16*** 7.9*** 6.78*** 7.14*** 8.75***
J-Bera 761.6*** 15.1*** 25528.9*** - 196.7*** 455.4*** - 661.6*** 559.8*** 347.5*** 401.4*** 827.5***
LB(6) 12.74 9.40 14.13 - 18.09 16.74 - 61.68 31.56 15.34 25.86 14.96
(0.047) (0.152) (0.028) - (0.006) (0.010) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.021)
LB(12) 19.86 24.64 27.55 - 33.61 46.19 - 69.91 41.13 28.46 39.82 22.32
(0.070) (0.017) (0.006) - (0.001) (0.000) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.034)
BELGIUM GERMANY JAPAN
Mean 0.0016 - - - 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0010
St.Dv. 0.038 - - - 0.024 0.040 0.037 0.017 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.024
Skew. 0.1 - - - -0.42*** 0.33*** -0.56*** 0.78*** 0.21** 0.28*** 0.18* 0.29***
Kurt. 10.99*** - - - 6.46*** 5.72*** 13.1*** 8.11*** 4.02*** 3.83*** 3.92*** 5.35***
J-Bera 1497.6*** - - - 297.2*** 184*** 2420.7*** 667.9*** 27.9*** 22.8*** 22.1*** 133.9***
LB(6) 21.79 - - - 21.20 5.60 65.92 14.08 19.63 24.65 20.16 13.11
(0.001) - - - (0.002) (0.470) (0.000) (0.029) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.041)
LB(12) 38.37 - - - 38.78 10.95 79.33 18.40 30.18 35.68 29.82 23.43
(0.000) - - - (0.000) (0.533) (0.000) (0.104) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.024)
CANADA HONG KONG SPAIN
Mean 0.0024 0.0021 - 0.0030 0.0013 0.0015 - - 0.0023 0.0021 0.0028 0.0022
St.Dv. 0.023 0.026 - 0.036 0.043 0.043 - - 0.020 0.031 0.022 0.023
Skew. -0.04 -0.15 - 0.48*** -0.16 -0.18* - - 0.77*** -0.11 0.23** 5.18***
Kurt. 4.92*** 4.64*** - 5.99*** 8.36*** 8.04*** - - 9.42*** 5.72*** 6.85*** 55.86***
J-Bera 86.6*** 65.7*** - 232.3*** 656.4*** 581.9*** - - 1012*** 172.8*** 348.9*** 67338.8***
LB(6) 4.71 11.84 - 5.42 23.63 19.88 - - 22.86 15.47 12.19 6.95
(0.581) (0.066) - (0.492) (0.001) (0.003) - - (0.001) (0.017) (0.058) (0.326)
LB(12) 7.26 21.45 - 20.75 28.80 24.72 - - 26.47 22.82 17.15 11.83
(0.840) (0.044) - (0.054) (0.004) (0.016) - - (0.009) (0.029) (0.144) (0.459)
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Appendix 2.2 (contd)
Descriptive statistics for nancial intermediaries
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for
autocorrelation up to order q distributed as 2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. RALL, RLARGE , RMED, RSMALL denote returns on the correspond-
ing markets portfolio of all banks, large banks, medium size and small banks, respectively. Heteroskedastic
consistent p-values based on Whites robust standard error are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Banking portfolios
RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL
SWEDEN US - Money Centre
Mean 0.0019 - - - 0.0009 - - -
St.Dv. 0.038 - - - 0.034 - - -
Skew. 0.09 - - - -0.17* - - -
Kurt. 5.98*** - - - 5.28*** - - -
J-Bera 207.2*** - - - 125.8*** - - -
LB(6) 28.08 - - - 7.29 - - -
(0.000) - - - (0.295) - - -
LB(12) 47.15 - - - 27.54 - - -
(0.000) - - - (0.006) - - -
SWITZERLAND US - Savings & Loans
Mean 0.0019 - - 0.0020 0.0013 0.0018 0.0012 0.0012
St. Dev. 0.014 - - 0.015 0.017 0.034 0.041 0.016
Skewness -0.27*** - - -0.21** -1.27*** 0 .00 -1.95*** -1.23***
Kurtosis 5.77*** - - 5.66*** 13.72*** 6.38*** 27.09*** 12.14***
Jarque Bera 190.2*** - - 173.8*** 2780.8*** 262.1*** 13642.6*** 2055.7***
LB(6) 67.91 - - 56.890 17.86 7.27 13.00 27.08
(0.000) - - (0.000) (0.007) (0.296) (0.043) (0.000)
LB(12) 74.81 - - 59.144 27.77 14.883 14.776 38.244
(0.000) - - (0.000) (0.006) (0.248) (0.254) (0.000)
UK US - Regional
Mean 0.0018 0.0019 - - 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0003 0.0012
St. Dev. 0.033 0.034 - - 0.017 0.031 0.026 0.017
Skewness -0.14 -0.05 - - -0.23** -0.06 -0.49*** -0.15
Kurtosis 5.14*** 5.14*** - - 5.17*** 5.38*** 5.12*** 5.20***
Jarque Bera 110.0*** 108.7*** - - 117.3*** 135.4*** 129.5*** 117.1***
LB(6) 16.20 17.46 - - 14.12 5.74 10.04 15.11
(0.013) (0.008) - - (0.028) (0.453) (0.123) (0.019)
LB(12) 32.83 36.85 - - 23.30 18.46 18.23 21.44
(0.001) (0.000) - - (0.025) (0.102) (0.109) (0.044)
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Appendix 2.2 (contd)
Descriptive statistics for nancial intermediaries
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for autocorrelation up to order q distributed
as 2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. RALL, RLARGE , RMED, RSMALL denote
returns on the corresponding markets portfolio of all banks, large banks, medium size and small banks, respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent p-values
based on Whites robust standard error are in parenthesis.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL
AUSTRALIA GERMANY - Life & Health ITALY - Life & Health
Mean 0.0005 - - - 0.0012 - - - 0.0014 - - -
St.Dv. 0.035 - - - 0.023 - - - 0.045 - - -
Skew. -0.77*** - - - 0.68*** - - - -0.06 - - -
Kurt. 9.49*** - - - 5.47*** - - - 6.43*** - - -
J-Bera 1047.6*** - - - 186.9*** - - - 274.0*** - - -
LB(6) 8.05 - - - 27.56 - - - 4.67 - - -
(0.234) - - - (0.000) - - - (0.587) - - -
LB(12) 11.90 - - - 30.54 - - - 15.05 - - -
(0.454) - - - (0.002) - - - (0.239) - - -
CANADA GERMANY - Multiline ITALY - Multiline
Mean 0.0022 0.0033 - - 0.0001 0.0010 - - 0.0017 - 0.0013 -
St.Dv. 0.029 0.029 - - 0.026 0.038 - - 0.029 - 0.030 -
Skew. -0.29*** -0.09 - - -0.74*** -0.66*** - - -0.22** - -0.33*** -
Kurt. 6.95*** 5.78*** - - 8.68*** 8.17*** - - 5.40*** - 5.29*** -
J-Bera 375.3*** 182.3*** - - 807.5*** 665.8*** - - 138.2*** - 132.6*** -
LB(6) 11.82 1.88 - - 14.529 10.05 - - 3.08 - 4.06 -
(0.066) (0.930) - - (0.024) (0.122) - - (0.798) - (0.668) -
LB(12) 24.90 12.39 - - 29.97 31.30 - - 18.87 - 10.42 -
(0.015) (0.415) - - (0.003) (0.002) - - (0.092) - (0.579) -
FRANCE GERMANY - Reinsurance JAPAN
Mean 0.0006 0.0014 - - 0.0014 - - - 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0001 -
St.Dv. 0.043 0.044 - - 0.035 - - - 0.037 0.040 0.041 -
Skew. -0.99*** -0.69*** - - 0.44*** - - - 0.16 0.20* 0.06 -
Kurt. 10.6*** 9.45*** - - 12.83*** - - - 4.21*** 5.01*** 4.16*** -
J-Bera 1448.7*** 1021.2*** - - 2282.6*** - - - 35.8*** 95.9*** 31.1*** -
LB(6) 19.79 28.43 - - 14.37 - - - 10.63 13.41 9.75 -
(0.003) (0.000) - - (0.026) - - - (0.100) (0.037) (0.135) -
LB(12) 35.67 46.68 - - 20.65 - - - 15.06 17.48 16.79 -
(0.000) (0.000) - - (0.056) - - - (0.238) (0.133) (0.158) -
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Descriptive statistics for nancial intermediaries
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for autocorrelation up to order q distributed
as 2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. RALL, RLARGE , RMED, RSMALL denote
returns on the corresponding markets portfolio of all banks, large banks, medium size and small banks, respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent p-values
based on Whites robust standard error are in parenthesis.
Panel B: Insurance portfolios
RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL RALL RLARGE RMED RSMALL
SPAIN UK - Property & Casualty US - Multiline
Mean 0.0030 - - - 0.0005 - - - 0.0008 - 0.0014 0.0005
St.Dv. 0.034 - - - 0.028 - - - 0.025 - 0.035 0.024
Skew. 1.04*** - - - -1.41*** - - - 0.04 - 0.16 -0.11
Kurt. 10.39*** - - - 13.77*** - - - 4.96*** - 6.01*** 4.32***
J-Bera 1367.3*** - - - 2926.7*** - - - 90.4*** - 216.6*** 42.2***
LB(6) 13.878 - - - 47.51 - - - 6.02 - 4.945 8.586
(0.031) - - - (0.000) - - - (0.421) - (0.551) (0.198)
LB(12) 17.93 - - - 55.38 - - - 19.91 - 17.69 22.68
(0.118) - - - (0.000) - - - (0.069) - (0.125) (0.031)
SWITZERLAND US - Life & Health US - Property & Casualty
Mean 0.0008 0.0007 - 0.0009 0.0009 - - - 0.0015 - 0.0014 0.0015
St.Dv. 0.037 0.049 - 0.030 0.028 - - - 0.024 - 0.035 0.024
Skew. -1.24*** -1.38*** - -0.32*** -0.58*** - - - 0.19* - 0.48*** 0.14
Kurt. 12.61*** 15.31*** - 7.99*** 6.26*** - - - 4.35*** - 5.84*** 4.14***
J-Bera 2306.9*** 3727.9*** - 592.6*** 282.3*** - - - 46.7*** - 212.3*** 32.7***
LB(6) 27.06 27.50 - 34.43 4.08 - - - 5.89 - 6.16 8.10
(0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) (0.665) - - - (0.435) - (0.405) (0.231)
LB(12) 39.68 46.09 - 36.88 13.08 - - - 12.03 - 18.65 13.14
(0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) (0.364) - - - (0.443) - (0.097) (0.359)
UK - Life & Health US - Medical US - Reinsurance
Mean 0.0009 - - - 0.0030 - - - 0.0003 - - -
St.Dv. 0.039 - - - 0.046 - - - 0.029 - - -
Skew. -0.74*** - - - -0.67*** - - - -0.46*** - - -
Kurt. 7.77*** - - - 7.05*** - - - 11.25*** - - -
J-Bera 589.7*** - - - 429.5*** - - - 1626.6*** - - -
LB(6) 4.02 - - - 4.82 - - - 2.03 - - -
(0.674) - - - (0.567) - - - (0.917) - - -
LB(12) 14.16 - - - 11.12 - - - 8.55 - - -
(0.291) - - - (0.519) - - - (0.741) - - -
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Descriptive statistics for risk measures
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for auto-
correlation up to order q distributed as 2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. RM , RPROP correspond to the domestic market and property indices, respectively. RIS ,
RIL, RSPR, RLEV , RSLO, RCURV , and RFX denote rst di¤erences in the short- and long-term domestic interest
rates; interest rate term spread; sovereign zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature; and exchange rate index,
respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent p-values based on Whites robust standard error are in parenthesis.
RM RPROP RIS RIL RSPR RLEV RSLO RCURV RFX
AUSTRALIA
Mean 0.0017 0.0013 0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0048 -0.0051 0.0070 0.0088 0.0214
St.Dv. 0.017 0.023 0.080 0.133 0.127 0.150 0.152 0.423 1.364
Skew. -0.79*** -0.52*** 1.04*** 0.11 0.22** 0.04 -0.25** -0.07 -0.55***
Kurt. 5.42*** 5.04*** 23.2*** 3.72*** 4.9*** 3.61*** 4.04*** 7.08*** 3.85***
J-Bera 195.6*** 123.7*** 9690.8*** 13.5*** 89.8*** 8.9** 31.2*** 392.2*** 44.8***
LB(6) 6.44 12.84 19.35 2.40 3.59 4.59 10.77 13.47 3.96
(0.375) (0.046) (0.004) (0.880) (0.733) (0.597) (0.096) (0.036) (0.682)
LB(12) 17.04 14.65 25.85 4.19 9.13 6.53 16.43 14.47 16.34
(0.148) (0.261) (0.011) (0.980) (0.692) (0.887) (0.172) (0.272) (0.176)
BELGIUM
Mean 0.0014 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0038 -0.0057 0.0079 0.0085 0.0474
St.Dv. 0.028 0.015 0.055 0.088 0.093 0.101 0.167 0.333 0.978
Skew. -0.16 -0.51*** -0.45*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.97*** -0.45*** 0.08
Kurt. 8.81*** 4.83*** 12.27*** 3.71*** 4.16*** 4.54*** 40.06*** 12.70*** 3.51***
J-Bera 793.3*** 103.2*** 2036.5*** 32.3*** 49.4*** 70.8*** 32356.3*** 2228.3*** 6.7**
LB(6) 16.83 15.91 57.71 7.08 8.99 4.24 25.37 17.42 4.13
(0.010) (0.014) (0.000) (0.314) (0.174) (0.644) (0.000) (0.008) (0.659)
LB(12) 27.12 24.60 85.28 13.03 12.73 12.94 38.36 24.94 7.71
(0.007) (0.017) (0.000) (0.367) (0.389) (0.373) (0.000) (0.015) (0.808)
CANADA
Mean 0.0015 0.0021 0.0032 -0.0055 -0.0088 -0.0069 0.0095 0.0061 0.0652
St.Dv. 0.022 0.028 0.081 0.083 0.110 0.129 0.290 0.659 1.037
Skew. -0.68*** -0.16 1.14*** -0.13 -0.99*** -0.32*** 0.52*** 0.42*** -0.49***
Kurt. 5.07*** 6.07*** 20.08*** 4.28*** 13.03*** 4.27*** 12.93*** 11.37*** 7.90***
J-Bera 144.9*** 224.1*** 6993.4*** 40.4*** 2459.4*** 47.4*** 2349.0*** 1668.9*** 587.8***
LB(6) 6.26 5.66 50.79 10.68 17.34 17.55 55.15 58.26 5.01
(0.395) (0.463) (0.000) (0.099) (0.008) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.543)
LB(12) 11.65 11.11 75.45 22.78 31.49 25.86 63.40 64.94 9.46
(0.474) (0.520) (0.000) (0.030) (0.002) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.663)
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Descriptive statistics for risk measures
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for auto-
correlation up to order q distributed as 2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. RM , RPROP correspond to the domestic market and property indices, respectively. RIS ,
RIL, RSPR, RLEV , RSLO, RCURV , and RFX denote rst di¤erences in the short- and long-term domestic interest
rates; interest rate term spread; sovereign zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature; and exchange rate index,
respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent p-values based on Whites robust standard error are in parenthesis.
RM RPROP RIS RIL RSPR RLEV RSLO RCURV RFX
FRANCE
Mean 0.0016 0.0027 0.0011 -0.0039 -0.0046 -0.0051 0.0058 0.0116 0.0499
St.Dv. 0.031 0.021 0.058 0.088 0.097 0.106 0.133 0.320 0.974
Skew. -0.13 -0.34*** -0.53*** 0.28*** 0.49*** 0.40*** -0.69*** 0.04 0.04
Kurt. 6.43*** 5.76*** 10.75*** 3.71*** 4.86*** 4.09*** 5.83*** 6.89*** 3.44***
J-Bera 277.8*** 189.8*** 1436.3*** 19.3*** 103.1*** 42.4*** 232.5*** 355.2*** 4.8*
LB(6) 30.19 21.91 37.94 6.93 3.71 3.32 4.97 8.63 3.88
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.328) (0.716) (0.768) (0.548) (0.195) (0.693)
LB(12) 46.92 33.75 70.18 14.20 13.57 12.32 13.28 19.29 7.59
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.288) (0.329) (0.421) (0.349) (0.082) (0.816)
GERMANY
Mean 0.0018 0.0012 0.0033 -0.0038 -0.0066 -0.0060 0.0081 0.0095 0.0500
St.Dv. 0.034 0.034 0.052 0.086 0.095 0.101 0.118 0.318 0.974
Skew. -0.48*** -0.07 -0.37*** 0.31*** 0.43*** 0.42*** -0.59*** -0.22** 0.05
Kurt. 5.95*** 5.6*** 19.69*** 3.6*** 5.8*** 4.11*** 4.94*** 5.16*** 3.45***
J-Bera 225.5*** 158.4*** 6535.3*** 17.5*** 200.6*** 45.7*** 121.0*** 114.1*** 5.0*
LB(6) 16.88 8.67 126.13 2.34 7.47 2.03 10.02 8.43 3.38
(0.010) (0.193) (0.000) (0.886) (0.280) (0.917) (0.124) (0.208) (0.760)
LB(12) 22.78 12.85 148.29 21.66 20.52 19.87 23.75 24.65 8.56
(0.030) (0.380) (0.000) (0.042) (0.058) (0.070) (0.022) (0.017) (0.740)
HONG KONG
Mean 0.0014 0.0006 -0.0075 -0.0076 -0.0005 -0.0082 0.0010 0.0085 -0.0058
St.Dv. 0.035 0.046 0.383 0.172 0.349 0.220 0.432 0.784 0.383
Skew. -0.41*** -0.04 0.68*** 0.38*** -0.13 0.51*** 0.35*** 0.05 0.20*
Kurt. 4.52*** 5.51*** 20.04*** 6.23*** 16.90*** 6.70*** 17.90*** 19.36*** 6.56***
J-Bera 67.6*** 144.1*** 6663.9*** 250.9*** 4404.6*** 335.4*** 5077.6*** 6112.6*** 292.2***
LB(6) 7.69 14.33 36.50 29.65 39.17 12.87 30.77 50.69 19.09
(0.261) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
LB(12) 15.70 18.60 71.80 35.32 70.12 24.38 38.52 61.24 24.83
(0.205) (0.099) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016)
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Descriptive statistics for risk measures
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for autocor-
relation up to order q distributed as 2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively. RM , RPROP correspond to the domestic market and property indices, respectively. RIS , RIL, RSPR,
RLEV , RSLO, RCURV , and RFX denote rst di¤erences in the short- and long-term domestic interest rates; interest
rate term spread; sovereign zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature; and exchange rate index, respectively.
Heteroskedastic consistent p-values based on Whites robust standard error are in parenthesis.
RM RPROP RIS RIL RSPR RLEV RSLO RCURV RFX
ITALY
Mean 0.0016 0.0032 -0.0049 -0.0056 -0.0040 -0.0066 0.0027 0.0063 0.0503
St.Dv. 0.030 0.035 0.238 0.092 0.238 0.120 0.224 0.564 0.979
Skew. -0.39*** -0.16 -0.83*** 0.00 -0.32*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.11 0.09
Kurt. 5.06*** 9.02*** 27.7*** 4.69*** 18.87*** 8.12*** 16.76*** 16.32*** 3.57***
J-Bera 112.4*** 846.8*** 14269.7*** 66.5*** 5872.2*** 637.4*** 4443.5*** 4140.7*** 8.5**
LB(6) 16.26 18.96 134.63 5.25 126.80 9.08 104.41 78.47 4.80
(0.012) (0.004) (0.000) (0.512) (0.000) (0.169) (0.000) (0.000) (0.569)
LB(12) 21.62 30.68 178.07 34.74 167.21 14.90 132.09 111.53 9.70
(0.042) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.247) (0.000) (0.000) (0.642)
JAPAN
Mean -0.0004 0.0011 0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0042 0.0043 0.0070 0.0099
St.Dv. 0.030 0.052 0.043 0.084 0.089 0.123 0.123 0.230 1.180
Skew. -0.07 0.26** 0.33*** 1.76*** 1.34*** 1.02*** -1.03*** -0.15 0.94***
Kurt. 3.72*** 5.00*** 43.00*** 14.44*** 10.20*** 8.73*** 7.95*** 5.75*** 6.52***
J-Bera 12.3*** 97.8*** 36542.4*** 3272.7*** 1349.2*** 846.7*** 657.6*** 175.4*** 362.8***
LB(6) 1.67 20.62 59.09 4.94 15.15 8.92 10.21 11.20 5.02
(0.948) (0.002) (0.000) (0.552) (0.019) (0.178) (0.116) (0.082) (0.541)
LB(12) 6.45 26.75 61.41 22.62 38.44 30.73 24.52 23.76 9.10
(0.892) (0.008) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.002) (0.017) (0.022) (0.695)
SPAIN
Mean 0.0024 0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0046 -0.0009 -0.0057 0.0013 0.0119 0.0505
St.Dv. 0.027 0.033 0.058 0.094 0.093 0.107 0.129 0.288 0.974
Skew. -0.48*** 0.49*** -0.74*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.24** -0.36*** 0.08 0.07
Kurt. 4.38*** 6.38*** 12.49*** 4.49*** 4.89*** 4.27*** 4.50*** 4.94*** 3.59***
J-Bera 65.4*** 287.6*** 2139.9*** 60.5*** 94.6*** 42.7*** 64.2*** 88.3*** 8.5**
LB(6) 8.16 3.63 86.78 6.50 8.12 7.14 9.36 1.99 4.64
(0.227) (0.727) (0.000) (0.369) (0.230) (0.308) (0.154) (0.921) (0.591)
LB(12) 10.42 16.78 155.08 21.06 20.08 30.78 27.17 11.83 12.24
(0.579) (0.158) (0.000) (0.050) (0.066) (0.002) (0.007) (0.459) (0.427)
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Descriptive statistics for risk measures
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for
autocorrelation up to order q distributed as 2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. RM , RPROP correspond to the domestic market and property indices,
respectively. RIS , RIL, RSPR, RLEV , RSLO, RCURV , and RFX denote rst di¤erences in the short- and long-term
domestic interest rates; interest rate term spread; sovereign zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature;
and exchange rate index, respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent p-values based on Whites robust standard
error are in parenthesis.
RM RPROP RIS RIL RSPR RLEV RSLO RCURV RFX
SWEDEN
Mean 0.0015 0.0022 0.0004 -0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0071 0.0071 0.0091 0.0034
St.Dv. 0.034 0.028 0.069 0.106 0.118 0.123 0.140 0.336 0.809
Skew. -0.44*** -0.51*** -0.56*** 0.65*** 0.98*** 0.03 -0.32*** 0.63*** 0.15
Kurt. 5.52*** 4.41*** 18.74*** 5.03*** 7.46*** 4.00*** 5.44*** 6.13*** 4.39***
J-Bera 165.9*** 70.9*** 5799.2*** 135.2*** 551.2*** 23.4*** 148.1*** 265.3*** 47.1***
LB(6) 35.15 7.77 12.63 2.49 1.76 2.07 9.64 8.78 8.17
(0.000) (0.255) (0.049) (0.870) (0.940) (0.913) (0.141) (0.186) (0.226)
LB(12) 54.10 8.88 22.14 9.36 13.13 8.58 23.66 14.61 14.52
(0.000) (0.713) (0.036) (0.672) (0.360) (0.738) (0.023) (0.264) (0.269)
SWITZERLAND
Mean 0.0015 0.0016 0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0035 -0.0027 0.0061 0.0022 0.0122
St.Dv. 0.027 0.015 0.084 0.086 0.106 0.105 0.133 0.265 0.712
Skew. -0.28*** 0.05 0.59*** 0.30*** 0.06 0.19* -0.47*** -0.11 0.37***
Kurt. 7.00*** 6.02*** 16.16*** 4.42*** 8.63*** 4.59*** 6.22*** 4.80*** 4.02***
J-Bera 390.5*** 217.3*** 4168.9*** 56.4*** 758.2*** 63.5*** 269.0*** 79.0*** 37.6***
LB(6) 17.84 8.47 28.05 9.08 4.69 11.36 3.39 9.32 2.57
(0.007) (0.206) (0.000) (0.169) (0.584) (0.078) (0.759) (0.156) (0.861)
LB(12) 27.02 16.28 30.44 15.01 13.58 20.33 9.44 14.53 8.10
(0.008) (0.179) (0.002) (0.241) (0.328) (0.061) (0.665) (0.268) (0.777)
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Descriptive statistics for risk measures
The statistics are based on 570 weekly observations over 1997-2007. LB(q) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for auto-
correlation up to order q distributed as 2 with q degrees of freedom. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. RM , RPROP correspond to the domestic market and property indices, respectively. RIS ,
RIL, RSPR, RLEV , RSLO, RCURV , and RFX denote rst di¤erences in the short- and long-term domestic interest
rates; interest rate term spread; sovereign zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature; and exchange rate index,
respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent p-values based on Whites robust standard error are in parenthesis.
RM RPROP RIS RIL RSPR RLEV RSLO RCURV RFX
UK
Mean 0.0009 0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0059 -0.0045 -0.0059 0.0047 -0.0011 0.0261
St.Dv. 0.022 0.026 0.072 0.093 0.112 0.126 0.152 0.418 0.787
Skew. -0.15 -0.27*** 0.27*** -0.06 0.16 -0.05 -0.47*** 0.58*** -0.45***
Kurt. 6.47*** 4.20*** 12.08*** 4.58*** 4.76*** 5.84*** 7.59*** 5.86*** 4.40***
J-Bera 285.8*** 40.5*** 1953.4*** 59.3*** 75.3*** 190.6*** 518.2*** 224.8*** 65.8***
LB(6) 16.76 5.06 43.60 6.15 6.36 5.81 8.52 5.47 7.89
(0.010) (0.536) (0.000) (0.406) (0.384) (0.445) (0.202) (0.485) (0.247)
LB(12) 27.12 13.58 71.04 15.63 22.92 17.28 12.61 15.38 19.77
(0.007) (0.329) (0.000) (0.209) (0.028) (0.139) (0.398) (0.221) (0.072)
US
Mean 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0040 -0.0042 -0.0005 -0.0039 0.0012 0.0022 0.0032
St.Dv. 0.023 0.024 0.216 0.106 0.226 0.143 0.121 0.330 0.579
Skew. -0.22** -0.33*** -0.29*** 0.23** -0.89*** 0.26** -1.07*** 0.19* 0.09
Kurt. 5.21*** 7.01*** 147.30*** 3.32*** 106.06*** 4.14*** 9.13*** 5.06*** 3.40***
J-Bera 120.0*** 389.9*** 491055.3*** 7.6** 250543.2*** 36.0*** 965.8*** 100.4*** 4.5
LB(6) 8.79 7.32 73.41 7.83 56.47 14.12 17.57 16.39 5.49
(0.185) (0.292) (0.000) (0.251) (0.000) (0.028) (0.007) (0.012) (0.482)
LB(12) 33.37 22.67 74.51 17.33 58.37 24.86 25.39 18.96 8.84
(0.001) (0.031) (0.000) (0.138) (0.000) (0.015) (0.013) (0.090) (0.717)
85
86
Chapter 3
Bank Regulation and Interest
Rate Risk: An International
Perspective
3.1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has highlighted how risk-taking by nancial interme-
diaries can bring the economic and nancial system to its knees. Understanding
what determines the amount of risk assumed by nancial intermediaries is there-
fore of paramount importance.
It is true that most banks are highly leveraged institutions. As a result, their
dominant stockholders face only limited liability and are inclined to collude with
managers and gain at the expense of minority shareholders and depositors by pur-
suing risky projects. In such settings, the burden of overseeing bank risk-taking
falls on the shoulders of depositors, who are commonly banks major debthold-
ers. Against this background, depositors monitoring incentives are limited in
the presence of a deposit insurance scheme. It is, therefore, commonly argued
that provision of deposit protection intensies bank risk-taking incentives. The
available literature on moral hazard supports this view [Merton, 1977; Keeley,
1990; and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998].
This bias has long been recognised by regulators worldwide, taking various
remedies not only to ease the problem of moral hazard but also to minimise the
likelihood of systemic crises in credit and nancial markets.
Nonetheless, the policymakers response varied across countries, cultivating
international heterogeneity in regulations that a¤ect the banking sector. In a bid
to address bank runs, some markets have adopted various forms of explicit deposit
protection schemes, among other measures. Others have chosen not to follow suit,
challenging the e¤ectiveness of such provisions in curtailing moral hazard. Even
within the rst group of countries the design of adopted schemes has varied sig-
nicantly. The governments attempted to make the best use of market discipline
by either extending only partial deposit coverage1 ((e.g. so-called "co-insurance"
is required in Germany and United Kingdom), or introducing insurance premi-
ums tied to bank risks (Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Sweden, and later Hong
Kong). In order further to discipline nancial institutions, regulators have lim-
ited the scope of activities allowed to bankers, e.g. restricting to some extent
banks engagement in securities, insurance, and real estate operations2. This has
led to even bigger di¤erences in the regulatory and supervisory standards across
countries.
Often, the aforementioned regulatory actions have been undertaken as sta-
bilising ex-post, upon the breakout of nancial troubles3, rather than crises pre-
ventative ex-ante measures. As noted by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and later
reconrmed by Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2008), the likelihood of adopt-
ing deposit insurance, or altering the design of an existing scheme, is maximised
during systemic banking crises. These authors therefore raise concerns regarding
the suitability of such provisions design features to the countrys public and pri-
vate contracting environment. This is particularly important given serious time
constraints and immense external pressure from supranational agencies at the
time of adoption. Moreover, insurance design features are often inuenced by
schemes tailor-made to suit the needs of other countries, and therefore may not
lead to the best outcome. The latter argument is also emphasised by Demirgüç-
Kunt and Kane (2002). The authors conclude that country-specic political, legal
and economic conditions need to be carefully considered amidst the design of a
countys nancial safety net.
The outlined concerns have historically motivated interest among academics
and practitioners in modelling the direct inuence of regulatory and supervisory
policies on bank risk taking. An extensive body of literature has also analysed
1The deposit coverage is commonly limited in several ways, by assuming (a) explicit levels
of deposit coverage; (b) co-insurance requirements; (c) protection provision to only home
currency denominated deposits; (d) no guarantees to interbank deposits. For more details, see
Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005).
2The impact of activity restrictions on risk-taking is not necessarily unambiguous. Relaxing
restrictions on banks may result in more risk-taking as banks may undertake a wider range of
activities. However, less stringent banking regulations may also result in lower risk as banks
diversify more.
3The over-generous blanket insurance guarantees have been previously introduced in the
midst of nancial crises in Sweden (1992), Japan (1996), Thailand (1997), Korea (1997),
Malaysia (1998), Indonesia (1998).
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the e¤ects of cross-country regulatory di¤erences. In particular, national bank
regulations and supervisory provisions have been acknowledged as vital external
determinants of individual banks credit risk [Barth et al., 2001, 2004; Godlewski,
2006; González, 2005; Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras, 2008] as well as banks sys-
temic risk in general [Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2008;
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel, 2008].
Despite the considerable interest in the area, none of the existing papers has
explicitly related cross-market variations in banks interest rate risk exposure4
to di¤erences in international bank regulations. Even though several empirical
works have identied certain company-specic determinants of interest rate risk
[Flannery and James, 1984b; Fraser, Madura and Weigand, 2002; Johnson and
Madura, 2002; Au Yong, Fa¤ and Chalmers, 2009], the role of country level
regulations has yet to be examined.
This is surprising for at least two reasons. First, interest rate risk, a by-
product of the maturity transformation role provided by banks, remains a crucial
determinant of bank solvency. Its signicance has been recently articulated by
the Basle Committee of Banking Supervision5 and re-emphasised in the 2007
industry survey conducted by the International Financial Risk Institute and In-
stitute of Chief Risk O¢cers (IFRI-CRO, 2007). This report declares interest rate
risk as being the most important source of banks market risk and, after credit
risk, the second most signicant source of risk for institutions capital adequacy.
Accordingly, as its relevance becomes increasingly noticeable, practitioners and
regulators alike more than ever recognise the need for identifying standardised
determinants of interest rate risk and assessing their applicability under diverse
regulatory conditions.
Second, banks manage their interest rate exposure by altering the composition
of nominal assets and liabilities on the balance sheet or using o¤-balance sheet
instruments. However, the composition of both balance and o¤-balance sheet
portfolios is commonly inuenced by regulatory provisions. This inuence is ei-
ther direct, through regulatory incentives, or indirect, through banks exploring
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. As a result, bank interest rate exposures
should be inuenced by country specic regulatory provisions. Accordingly, the
present study seeks to ll this major gap in the literature, analysing an interna-
tional sample of banks during the period 1997-2008.
The role of interest rate risk in banking stability becomes particularly im-
portant in light of the regulatory actions undertaken by authorities in response
4See for instance Madura and Zarruk (1995), Oertmann, Rendu and Zimmermann (2000).
5See Chapter 1 and 2 for more details.
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to the recent nancial crisis. While aiming to contain the crisis from spreading
and to enhance the ow of credit in the economy, the aggressive policy of reduc-
ing interest rates could adversely impact banking performance in the long run6.
For instance, in a low interest rate environment, depositors would favour rather
short-term investment horizons due to the expectations of higher rates in the near
future. On the asset side, debtors might favour xed-rate longer-term nancing
lines to lock-in the lower chargeable rates. Accordingly, should rates increase
in the future7, nancial institutions may once again discover themselves in an
unfavourable predicament and nd it di¢cult to nance long-term (potentially
xed-rate) assets with short-term, possibly expensive, deposits.
Even if banks assets are favourably placed to yield adjustable rates, their
credit quality is likely to deteriorate as rates rise8. In this respect, the practice
of bilaterally irresponsible lending and borrowing over the preceding decades re-
sulted in the expansion of the household debt to unsustainably high levels. This
potentially imposes further deterioration in the asset quality as the economic re-
cession progresses. Moreover, as the property bubble has burst, many households
nd themselves in negative equity. This situation provokes a rise in the level of
defaults. For example, as estimated in recent research by Hellebrandt, Kawar,
Waldron (2009) of the Bank of England, approximately 7-11% of households in
the UK were in negative equity in the Spring of 2009. A similar statistic is re-
ported for the US by First American Home CoreLogic which tracks data on 90
percent of mortgage loans nationwide. As of June 2009, nearly15.2 million mort-
gages (32.2 percent of all mortgaged properties) in the US were in negative equity
position.
Besides, net interest margins have declined over the last decade forcing banks
to exploit alternative non-interest income sources (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt,
2009). However, the depressed economic environment associated with the re-
cent crisis has put immense pressure on these types of revenue, best characterised
as being cyclical and highly correlated with GDP growth (Stiroh, 2004b). As
a result, bankers have been compelled to rely on the traditional intermediary
6Notably, in many countries such aggressive monetary policy actions have been undertaken
as only a part of a comprehensive stabilisation programme. The government in the US and many
European countries have undertaken extraordinary measures of extending blanket guarantees,
ensuring liquidity and credit provision, and establishing structured bail-out programmes.
7The Bank of Israel was the rst central bank to raise the benchmark interest rate by a
quarter of a percentage point on 24 August, 2009. This move was shortly followed by Norways
central Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the European Central Bank, with latter
raising the benchmark rate by a quarter percentage point (from 1% to 1.25%) in April 2011.
8Large interest rate increases may hinder the ability of borrowers to repay variable rate
loans. Drehmann, Sorensen and Stringa (2006) discuss in detail the link between interest rate
and credit risks.
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sources of income and hence pay closer attention to interest rate risk.
Furthermore, in the midst of the crisis, nancial institutions are forced to
compete for depositors cash sending saving account rates to levels above the base
rate, and often exceeding the mortgage rates o¤ered to customers. Considering
for example the United Kingdom, according to the authors calculations9, in
August 2009 the average spread between interest rates charged on a 5-year xed-
rate mortgage product and paid on a 5-year savings bond was in a region of -0.20
percent, based on three relevant products. The spreads for a similar 3- and 2-year
products were 0.9 and -0.36 respectively. Similarly, the average spread between
the interest charged on the base-rate tracker mortgage and the interest o¤ered
on the instant access account was estimated to be -0.07 percent, based on o¤ers
from ve nancial institutions. Even after taking into account the xed-term
incentives commonly attached to the high yielding instant access accounts, such
statistics raise concerns regarding the banking sector stability at least in the short
run.
Motivated by the arguments above, this research attempts to identify and
examine the underlying sources of bank interest rate risk, and to assess the direct
inuence of bank regulation on bank risk taking. Specically my work contributes
to the literature in three ways.
First, my research provides a robust analysis of the factors a¤ecting nancial
intermediaries susceptibility to interest rate risk. Both company and market spe-
cic information is considered in the analysis. The former comprises conventional
nancial ratios readily observable from corporation accounts. The latter accom-
modates country-specic macroeconomic characteristics and factors representing
qualitative knowledge of country bank regulations and institutional development.
As mentioned above, the majority of the empirical papers in this area have largely
discounted the regulatory characteristics in analysing risk taking behaviour of in-
dividual banks. Despite this oversight an understanding of such relations is of
relevance as: (a) the heterogeneity in cross-country regulatory characteristics and
market discipline may a¤ect bank risk management practices, and alter the rela-
tion between accounting and capital market measures of risk; and (b) given that
country-specic regulatory provisions drive banks risk taking, the likelihood of
moral hazard under a particular regulatory framework can be assessed and rec-
ommendations provided.
Second, this study employs an extensive selection of countries unlike previous
works which focused on the US market. To assess the underlying determinants
9The calculations are based on the publically available market data reported by Moneysu-
permarket Financial Group at http://www.moneysupermarket.com
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of interest rate risk, this study covers the G-10 countries as well as other im-
portant regions of Asia (Hong Kong) and the Pacic Rim (Australia). Focusing
on these extra markets is crucial since: (a) the current global nancial crisis has
emphasised the need for a set of standardised risk measures applicable across
countries; (b) rms risks might be determined by market specic factors due to
the heterogeneous legal structure and regulatory constraints prevailing across the
countries; and nally (c) it allows to assess the extent to which the ndings for
the US rms hold in another major market.
Furthermore, since the analysed period spans 1997-2007, this study also tests
the validity of any reported relationships in a time period that encompasses un-
ambiguously bullish and bearish trends, the pivot of which is commonly set at
March 2000.
I use a multi-factor GARCH framework to measure banks interest rate risk.
This is primarily motivated by the observation of signicant ARCH and GARCH
e¤ects suggesting the presence of time-varying distributions of banks stock re-
turns10. To address the statistical relevance of the proposed risk determinants,
this study utilises a panel data methodology, with controls for time, country, and
institutional heterogeneity.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces a set of testable
hypotheses along with a brief survey of existing literature. The dataset and
research methodology employed are outlined in Section 3.3. The empirical results
are discussed in Section 3.4, with Section 3.5 presenting the conclusions reached.
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses formulation
This section presents a brief survey of empirical studies, guiding us to identify
risk determinants and relevant research hypotheses. Seven testable hypotheses
are formulated to address the research key objectives. An in-depth description of
selected variables, as well as a discussion regarding their suitability and nature of
expected relationships is presented in Section 3.3.1. A more rigorous statistical
discussion is deferred until Section 3.3.2.
The rise of media attention to interest rate risk can be traced back to the
1980s. That decade is best dened as a period of high and volatile interest rates
which caused a signicant number of nancial intermediaries severe distress to the
point of insolvency in large numbers. The most representative example of such
10The use of GARCH framework is supported by Elyasiani and Mansur (1998, 2003, 2005),
Flannery, Hameed and Harjes (1997), Ryan and Worthington (2004), Brewer, et al. (2007),
among others.
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systemic banking failure due to inappropriate asset-liability management is the
US Savings & Loan crises. Since then, the study of interest rate risk is an ongoing
research avenue for academics, practitioners and regulators. Researchers are par-
ticularly interested in the topic since the matter has wide-ranging repercussions
on the implementation of monetary policy, portfolio selection, risk management
and pricing of a wide range of nancial instruments. This interest has led to the
development of a substantial literature that studies the interest rate sensitivity
of nancial companies.
In contrast, there is a shortage of studies examining the underlying determi-
nants of bank interest rate risk, and the reasons why their risk sensitivities vary
across time, institutions and markets.
The work done to date addressing this issue generally falls within two cate-
gories. The rst group of studies takes its origins from the "nominal contract-
ing hypothesis"11 introduced by Kessel (1956) and French, Ruback, and Schwert
(1983). The "nominal contracting hypothesis" is based on the Samuelson-Hicks
Duration Theorem discussed in Chapter 1. Works in this category embrace the
relevance of asset-liability maturity and duration mismatches to the interest sen-
sitivity of bank stock returns, thus giving rise to the so-called "maturity mismatch
hypothesis".
Analysing the behaviour of 67 US based commercial banks over 1976-1981,
Flannery and James (1984b) utilise the measure of the maturity mismatch be-
tween banks assets and liabilities maturing or being repriced within one year.
The resulting measure is reported to be highly signicant in explaining the in-
terest rate sensitivity in the cross-section of analysed banks. These results are
corroborated by Kwan (1991) employing the Flannery and James model in a ran-
dom coe¢cient approach. Analogously, Drakos (2002) provides further evidence
in support of the nominal contracting hypothesis. The author reports that Greek
banks that maintain higher levels of working capital, dened as the di¤erence be-
tween banks current assets and liabilities, have higher interest rate risk. These
ndings are refuted by Saporoschenko (2002), who concludes that the maturity
gap is unable to explain the interest rate exposures of Japanese banks.
Despite its popularity, this approach is not without problems for two rea-
sons. First, there may be di¢culties associated with constructing consistent gap
measures for the majority of banks owing to lack of data. Some assets and lia-
11The hypothesis states that equity returns of companies primarily holding nominal assets and
liabilities will unavoidably be a¤ected through the wealth redistributive e¤ect from creditors
to debtors caused by unanticipated ination and changes in expected ination. Inationary
shocks would therefore benet institutions with higher levels of nominal liabilities than assets.
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bilities also have theoretically ambiguous maturities and the accurate maturity
gaps cannot be estimated. Second, the maturity mismatch hypothesis assumes
no relationships between interest rate and credit risks, leading to a severe un-
derestimation of the analysed exposure [Jarrow and Deventer, 1998; Drehmann,
Sorensen, and Stringa, 2006]. Besides, recent trends towards banks increased
usage of alternative products to manage and adjust their risk exposures relaxed
the correlation between banks assets and corresponding liabilities (DeYoung and
Yom, 2008). This suggests the banks tendency to favour less restrictive forms of
asset-liability management and undermines the relevance of the "maturity mis-
match hypothesis".
The second group of studies relates the interest rate risk exposures to rm-
specic nancial characteristics. This chapter belongs to this group, with my
work extending the scope of internal explanatory variables previously consid-
ered. Furthermore, I also evaluate how these rm level measures interact with
key nancial sector regulations in shaping bank exposure to interest rate risk.
With this in mind, theoretical predictions are built upon the following bank- and
country-specic characteristics.
3.2.1 Bank income structure
Fraser, Madura and Weigand (2002) argue that higher interest rates adversely
impact economic growth and translate to lower revenues realised from banks
non-interest activities (e.g. investment banking operations such as IPOs and
acquisitions). Their empirical results support this view. The authors show that
banks generating a higher proportion of income through alternative non-interest
revenue sources exhibit higher exposure to interest rate risk.
This evidence is consistent with other US studies a¢rming no major improve-
ment in nancial performance associated with increases in non-interest income
[DeYoung and Rice, 2004a; Stiroh, 2004a,b; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006]. DeY-
oung and Roland (2001) highlight that a shift from traditional lending activities
towards fee-generating income, in fact, amplies the volatility of bank earnings.
Contrary to these results, analysing a sample of banking institutions in 15
EU countries over 1994-1998, Smith et al. (2003) nd that increased reliance on
non-interest sources of revenue has stabilised prots for the majority of examined
rms. Likewise Smith et al. (2003) and Chiorazzo, Milani and Salvini (2008)
report that income diversication substantially improves the risk-adjusted per-
formance of Italian banks over 1993-2003, with smaller institutions beneting the
most. The authors also suggest that the level of non-interest income is far more
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important that its source.
Interestingly, Fraser, Madura and Weigand only relate interest rate risk to
banks levels of non-interest income. They fail to address the e¤ect of rate shocks
on rms traditional, interest generating income. Since, however, interest rate
risk commonly arises as a result of the mismanagement of banks interest sensitive
assets and liabilities, I stress the inappropriateness of such selective treatment.
In particular, I emphasise that in the presence of an e¢cient interest rate pass-
through mechanism, monetary policy shocks can a¤ects the revenues streaming
from traditional intermediation activities due to potential deterioration in the
quality of credit portfolio and reduced interest margins. Accordingly, banks rely-
ing more on traditional interest revenues should also bear higher level of interest
rate risk.
Based on these conicting arguments, and disagreement between the above
works analysing US and European based institutions, I infer that it is the degree
of revenue diversication, rather than levels of a particular income source that
determines the extent of risk exposure. The activities that generate non-interest
income are imperfectly correlated with those generating interest revenues. There-
fore, with rising interest rates, the diversication of revenue sources should help
stabilising operating income and give rise to a more stable stream of prots.
Accordingly, the rst testable hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis1: Banks maintaining a higher degree of revenue diversication face
lower interest rate risk
3.2.2 Bank equity capital
Another important driver of bank riskiness, frequently mentioned in the em-
pirical literature, is the level of bank equity capital. The equity capital ensures
bank liquidity and solvency in adverse market conditions. It also serves to reduce
owners incentives for excessive risk taking. If a nancial institution had exces-
sively high debt levels (high leverage), managers and equity holders would have
only a weak incentive to monitor risk taking exploiting the risk-shifting benets
of deposit protection.
On the other hand, as argued by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) managers with pri-
vate benets of control will most likely behave in a risk-averse rather than value
maximising way. Sullivan and Spong (2007) also demonstrate the appropriate-
ness of modelling bank risk aversion as a function increasing with the proportion
of shareholders and managers wealth at risk. Anderson and Fraser (2000) em-
pirically support this view for the US bank holding companies in the early 1990s,
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reporting a negative relationship between managerial holdings and bank risk tak-
ing12.
Fraser, Madura and Weigand (2002) and Au Yong, Fa¤ and Chalmers (2009)
demonstrate that banks with stronger capital positions assume less interest rate
risk. Evidence reported by Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) suggests that only small
banks benet in a meaningful way frommaintaining higher capital levels. Johnson
and Madura (2002) analyse the exposure of the US insurance companies to both
interest rate and real estate risks, and fail to relate the uncovered risk exposures
to the companies level of capital. In a similar vein, ndings of Ballester, et al.
(2009) imply the statistical irrelevance of capital ratios to explaining the risk
exposures of Spanish banks.
Based on the discussed evidence, I formulate the next testable hypothesis with
three key arguments in mind.
First, despite the conicting results I argue that the level of equity capital
remains one of the most important factors in explaining banks interest rate risk
for at least two reasons: (a) given the possibility of increased credit risk following
the interest rate shock, the higher levels of capital readily available to absorb
losses on the loan book can help managers to prevent bank runs and sudden sell-
o¤s; and (b) to the extent that equity capital itself is not-interest rate sensitive,
rms with higher capital levels are less sensitive to interest rate shocks.
Second, I acknowledge the empirical studies reporting that the relationship
between bank capital and risk is not necessarily linear, but rather U shaped
[Calem and Rob, 1999; Haq and Heaney, 2008]. In these works, the authors
suggest that both undercapitalised and well capitalised banks are generally riskier
than those with intermediate levels of capital. These arguments are based on the
view that banks with insu¢cient capital pursue moral hazard risk taking. Well
capitalised institutions, on the other hand, utilise excessive capital bu¤ers in their
exploration of protable, yet frequently riskier prospects.
Finally, I hypothesise that risk-capital relationships are more pronounced in
countries with debtholders not explicitly protected by deposit insurance, and
thus higher standards of market discipline and risk monitoring. In these markets,
managers are forced to maintain equity capital at levels corresponding to the ex-
pected risk exposures. This allows banks to easily observe unanticipated interest
rate shocks, yielding lower interest rate exposures13. Contrary, insured depositors
12Despite this evidence, studies analysing banks response to the introduction of risk based
capital standards provide no evidence to suggest a shift towards reduced risk-taking [Berger
and Udell, 1994; Hancock and Wilcox, 1994].
13Based on the analysed dataset, the median values for ratios of equity capital in markets
with and without explicit deposit insurance are 0.055 and 0.079 respectively. The t-statistics
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have only weak risk monitoring incentives, and the link between risk and capital
weakens. On the basis of the discussion so far, the following augments the set of
testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis2: The relationship between bank capital and interest rate risk is
non-linear.
Hypothesis3: The relationship between bank capital and interest rate risk de-
pends on the national provision of deposit insurance..
3.2.3 Bank balance sheet composition
Empirical studies have also related interest rate risk to the quality and struc-
ture of banking loans and deposits. Fraser, Madura andWeigand (2002) recognise
that banks with higher loan-to-asset ratios and the ones nancing a larger propor-
tion of their assets with demand deposits have less interest rate risk. Nonetheless,
the former contradicts the ndings of Ballester et al. (2009). The authors argue
that since the maturity of loans generally exceeds the one of corresponding lia-
bilities, the higher proportion of such assets would imply a greater asset-liability
maturity mismatch in the banking book. This will translate into higher interest
rate risk.
In line with Fraser, Madura and Weigand (2002) I predict a negative relation-
ship between the level of low cost liabilities and banks interest rate risk. This
is because customer deposits represent a relatively cheap and stable source of
funding.
With regards to the loans-to-assets ratio I recognise that the majority of
bank loans are oating rates and frequently repriced. Therefore, in the long run,
the interest rate margins are preserved yielding lower exposure to interest rate
risk. The specialised commercial banks will enjoy a greater reduction in their
risk exposure due to their strict asset-liability management practices and well
established interest rate transmission mechanism.
On the other hand, in the short run, following the interest rate increase, such
relationships may revert depending on other factors such as bank exposure to
credit risk. For instance, any interest rate shocks passed on to customers will
alter the credit quality of loan portfolios in the short run. This will o¤set the
benets introduced by the e¢cient repricing mechanisms. Accordingly, a bank
with greater initial exposure to credit risk is expected to have higher interest rate
representing the relevant one-tailed t-test with the null hypothesis stating the equality of two
measures is 12.103 with a heteroskedastic consistent p-value based on Whites robust standard
error being (0.000). This leads to rejection of the null hypothesis.
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exposures. Such a proposition is also empirically supported by Jarrow and Turn-
bull (2000) and Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa (2006) reporting that credit
and interest rate risks are correlated and this interrelation should be appropriately
accounted for. Provided these arguments I formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis4: Banks with a higher proportion of repriced assets and low cost
liabilities assume lower interest rate risk.
Hypothesis5: The relationships in Hypothesis 4 depend on the banks credit risk
exposure and specialisation.
Furthermore, banks uninsured liabilities (e.g. interbank deposits which are
not commonly covered by the protection scheme and subordinated debt) are
widely recognised as robust measures of market disciplinary e¤ect (e.g. Morgan
and Stiroh, 2001). Therefore, insured and uninsured deposits merit a separate
treatment under Hypothesis 4.
3.2.4 O¤-balance sheet composition
The evidence presented in the literature is mixed with respect to a banks o¤-
balance sheet activities. Hirtle (1997) and Choi and Elyasiani (1997) associate
the use of derivatives with greater interest rate exposure. Chaudhry and Reichert
(1999) on the other hand dispute these results. The authors suggest that higher
rate risk is only due to the interest rate options, while interest rate swaps are
mainly used for hedging. This evidence is later extended to foreign exchange
derivatives (Chaudhry et al., 2000), and further reconrmed by Reichert and
Shyu (2003) who analyse an international sample of banks. Brewer, Jackson and
Moser (1996) a¢rm a negative association between risks and derivative usage of
Savings & Loan corporations.
More recently, a study of Asia-Pacic banks by Au Yong, Fa¤ and Chalmers
(2009) reports a positive association between the level of banks derivative ac-
tivities and their exposure to the shocks in the long-term interest rates. The
association is negative for the short-rate exposure. The former is supported by
Haq and Heaney (2009). The latter, however, contradicts Ballester et al. (2009)
who relate the level of banks o¤-balance sheet activities to greater interest rate
exposure once short-term rates are considered. To draw on rms o¤-balance sheet
composition, the last two studies [Haq and Heaney, 2009; Ballester et al., 2009]
utilise the BankScope database which provides no specic classication of banks
derivative activities. Further, this database is predominated by information on
contingent liabilities.
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In this respect, banks contingent liabilities, and in particular banks loan
commitments, deserve meticulous attention in the question of interest rate risk.
For instance, in a volatile interest rate environment beneciaries would seek to
exercise their lawful rights on the terms favourable to them but not to banks.
Hence, bank risks are likely to peak due to: (a) reduced interest rate margins as
per increasing funding costs (e.g. because of basis, or yield curve risks); and (b)
the decline in the borrowers creditworthiness during these periods.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the presence of loan commitments is likely to
augment the institutions credit risk due to the presence of adverse selection and
moral hazard problems. Using the information deciency, the borrower is free to
favour riskier projects yielding higher potential returns (moral hazard). On the
other hand, it is possible that a riskier borrower will get a loan that would not
be granted in the spot market (adverse selection). These theoretical relationships
are validated by Angbazo (1997) reporting a positive association between bank
letters of credit and interest rate risk.
On the contrary, Avery and Berger (1991) argue that the projects nanced
via loan commitments or in the spot market can be very di¤erent. The lenders
commonly adopt the rationing or sorting processes aiming to link commitment
contracts with safer borrowers. They examine the relationship between the banks
risk and loan commitments using a sample of approximately 125 US banks over
the 1975 to 1986 period, and suggest that loan commitments are associated with
"no or very little real risk to banks". The authors further point that "banks
rationing or sorting of relatively risky borrowers out of commitment contracts
o¤set the risk created by commitments".
In the light of this contradictory evidence the relationship between banks o¤-
balance sheet activities and their interest rate exposure is ambiguous. However, I
hypothesise that because the existence and design of deposit protection schemes
signicantly alters the moral hazard risk-taking behaviour of banks, the motiva-
tions for derivative usage should di¤er across markets. The nancial institutions
in markets with explicitly adopted deposit protection scheme are more likely to
use derivatives for speculating. The banks lacking such explicit protection, and
the ones forced to share the costs of insolvency by providing some forms of ex-
plicitly specied risk-based premiums, would rather use derivatives for hedging.
Based on this argument the next testable hypothesis is formulated in general
form:
Hypothesis6: Banks o¤-balance sheet activities signicantly a¤ect their expo-
sure to interest rate risk.
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3.2.5 Country macroeconomic and regulatory characteristics
Finally I argue that bank risk exposure is also attributed to the market specic
regulatory constraints and requirements. The quality of industry surveillance and
supervision has long been recognised as a key driver of institutions protability
and risk taking. The most prominent factors acknowledged by the existing lit-
erature include liquidity and diversication requirements, the deposit protection
provision, accounting and information disclosure constraints, and the quality of
the political and court system.
In this respect, many researchers report signicant shifts in banks interest
rate sensitivities associated with various regulatory events14, such as the intro-
duction of new or amendment of existing requirements. Surprisingly, none of the
studies to date has explicitly considered the role of the market specic regulatory
environment in workhorse models of interest rate risk.
There are just a few notable works recognising the impact of cross-country
di¤erences in regulations on bank performance. Bartholdy, Boyle and Stover
(1997) consider a sample of 13 OECD countries over 1985-1990 and nd that
the existence of explicit deposit insurance lowers the deposit interest rate by 25
basis points. Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997), using a sample of 19 developed coun-
tries, examine the impact of banking powers on bank returns on equity while
also controlling for a number of bank and market characteristics. They report
that neither explicit deposit insurance and bank concentration, nor variation in
banking power signicantly inuence the returns on bank equity. Later, analysing
a comprehensive sample of banks across 80 developed and developing countries
over 1988-1995, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) report that both the mar-
ket nancial structure as well as legal and institutional settings have a signicant
impact on the banks protability and interest margins. Their study concludes
by reporting a positive association between foreign ownership, banks protabil-
ity and interest margins. This association is more pronounced in developing
countries. The authors also nd that indicators of better contract enforcement,
e¢ciency of legal system and lack of corruption are also associated with lower
realised interest margins and lower protability. Further, they report that gov-
ernment regulations, such as the design of deposit insurance schemes signicantly
a¤ect bank margins.
In this respect, the importance of the deposit insurance design to the stability
of the banking sector has been meticulously scrutinised with voluminous literature
14See Madura (2000), Neuberger (1991), Brooks and Fa¤ (1995), and Fa¤ and Howard (1999)
for relevant discussions and empirical ndings.
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available. It is commonly agreed that deposit guarantee schemes have two adverse
e¤ects. On the one hand, they boost public condence in the safety of their funds
thereby reducing the likelihood of bank runs and ensuring sound functioning of
the economy. On the other hand they reduce the depositors incentive to monitor
banking risks. It has been well established both theoretically and empirically
that risk insensitive deposit-protection schemes provide both depositors and bank
managers with moral-hazard incentives to accept greater asset risk, thus gambling
with taxpayers money.
Analysing a sample of the US Texas based banks over the period 1919-1926,
Hooks and Robinson (2002) conclude the likelihood of failure of the deposit in-
sured banks exceeded that of the banks not covered by the protection scheme.
The substantial costs of moral hazard are also evident from the US Savings &
Loan crises, the banking problems of the Scandinavian countries, the crises in
Japan, Korea and other Asian countries, as well as the recent nancial turmoil
of 2007-2010. While moral hazard alone was not the only factor at work in these
crises, it nonetheless severely amplied the resolution costs in each case.
As it was mentioned in the introduction, one way to reduce the problem of
moral hazard, and to minimise the likelihood of irresponsible behaviour by banks
and depositors, is to set the amount of protection coverage at a moderate level.
Another way is to charge insurance premiums on the basis of explicit risk assess-
ment, or even to introduce coinsurance requirements with explicit coverage caps
placed on the deposit account balances. This, in turn, would provide depositors
with an incentive to police bank risk-taking and, if carefully designed, to reduce
the likelihood of bank runs. Accordingly, one would expect the risk levels to be
lower for countries recognising some of these or similar measures15.
At the same time, any explicit form of deposit insurance has shown to de-
crease the degree of private market discipline that banks experience (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Kane, 2002). Therefore, I argue that the risk exposure is greater in
countries adopting the explicit form of deposit insurance scheme. Even higher
risks are expected in countries with greater coverage limits and poor quality of
legal institutions16:
15For example the deposit insurance fees charged to banks vary based on the assessment of
risk in Belgium, Canada, France, Hong Kong, and Italy, while no such assessment is in place in
Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK
16Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2008) demonstrate that in countries with poor quality
of legal institutions, the potential for corruption is signicantly greater. Therefore, it can be
argued that the design, particularly coverage and imposed risk controls, of deposit insurance
schemes may well be inuenced by corrupt regulators serving the interests of bankers rather
than the interests of the public.
101
Hypothesis7: Bank interest rate risk is inuenced by the country-specic regu-
latory characteristics.
Empirical research to date has also advocated a number of macroeconomic
variables as determinants of banks risks [Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Caprio
and Klingebiel, 1997], protability [Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998; Flamini,
McDonald, and Schumacher, 2009; Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009], and inter-
est rate margins (Chirwa and Mlachila, 2004). Evidence drawn from these works
suggests a positive correlation between banks protability and the business cy-
cle, and a negative correlation with ination and exchange rate depreciation. For
instance, in times of stagnated economic growth the riskiness of nancial inter-
mediation increases. This occurs because of adverse selection and moral hazard
behaviour of individual borrowers, higher agency costs, eroded fee-generating rev-
enue sources, and interest margins associated with low base rates. Accordingly,
I expect the market specic macroeconomic environment to a¤ect the structure
and quality of the banks balance sheets thus driving risk sensitivities. For this
reason these factors are also included in the model framework.
To improve the t of the empirical model I also include a number of bank-
and industry-level control variables. These variables are thoroughly discussed in
the following section.
3.3 Data and methodology
This study utilises a large data sample consisting of 289 nancial intermedi-
aries from 13 major nancial markets. These include the member countries of
the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision and other important regions of Asia
(Hong Kong) and the Pacic Rim (Australia). The complete list of FIs with the
corresponding market distribution is available in Appendix 3.1.
The requisite nancial data are obtained from the BankScope, Bloomberg,
DataStream, and WorldBank databases. The key requirement for the data col-
lection is that there are at least three banks for each market, each with annual
balance sheet and weekly share price data being continuously available from Jan-
uary 1997 to December 2007.
3.3.1 Data analysis
For each bank in the sample, the returns are calculated as the weekly logarith-
mic rst di¤erence transformations of Wednesday stock prices. The choice of the
weekly sampling interval is justied in Chapter 2. The calculated return series
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are then used as dependent variable in the empirical model which is described
later in this section. The descriptive statistics on the banks weekly returns are
available upon request.
The market portfolios are proxied by the broad domestic value-weighted equity
market indices for each country in the sample. The necessary market data are
obtained from Bloomberg Professional database, with the return series calculated
in the same manner as for banks. The indices used are listed in Appendix 2.1.
As regards to interest rates, Chapter 2 demonstrates that the results may be
biased to the choice of interest rate proxy. Accordingly, I employ four interest
rate variables: short- and long-term interest rates; interest rate term spread;
and the variable proxying the curvature of the interest rate yield curve. The
rst two variables are represented by the rst di¤erence in the market yields of
two sovereign bonds with short- and long-term maturities respectively. These
are obtained from the Bloomberg database for each market in the sample. The
interest rate term spread is calculated as the di¤erence between long-term and
short-term interest rates. The yield curve curvature is estimated via the Diebold
and Lee parameterisation of the Nelson and Siegel (1987, 1988) model discussed
in detail in Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2.
Sensitivity tests of banks returns to the interest rate movements are per-
formed using all four aforesaid interest rate proxies interchangeably. The use of
these particular measures helps directly to identify the patterns in risk exposure
across the whole term structure.
The rst set of hypotheses (H1-H6) examines the underlying sources of banks
interest rate risk with respect to the company-specic nancial characteristics.
Hypothesis 7 examines the relevance of country specic regulatory and macro-
economic conditions. To this end, two groups of variables are constructed accord-
ingly.
The rst group of fundamental determinants consists of nancial ratios sepa-
rated into four categories as per the formulated hypotheses: (1) diversication, (2)
capital adequacy, (3) asset-liability structure, and (4) o¤-balance sheet composi-
tion. The variables in each category are constructed based on the scal year-end
information from the company public accounts, compiled by Bureau van Dijk and
extracted from the Banksope database.
The second group consists of factors related to the structure and quality of the
regulatory framework and macroeconomic environment. I consider the following
six categories: (1) design of deposit insurance, (2) capital adequacy, diversica-
tion and liquidity requirements, (3) information disclosure, (4) political stability
and regulatory quality, (5) nancial development and economic freedom and (6)
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general macroeconomic indicators.
The nal set of variables in each category and pertinent statistics are presented
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively, and discussed below. Table 3.3 also reports
the pairwise correlation between the independent variables.
Firm level nancial structure
The rst category of nancial variables contains a set of revenue diversication
ratios, constructed to test Hypothesis 1. I measure income diversication by em-
ploying the modication of the Hirschman Herndahl Index originally proposed
by Laeven and Levine (2007):
ROID = 1 
Interest income Non-interest incomeTotal operating income
 (3.1)
The index assumes values between 0 and 1, with 1 suggesting the highest degree
of income diversication with di¤erent revenue sources yielding equal proportion
of total revenue; and 0 implying bank concentration in a single revenue gener-
ating activity. I expect this measure to be negatively related to interest rate
risk proxies, in support of the income diversication hypothesis and in line with
Smith et al. (2003) and Chirazzo, Milani and Salvini (2008). To check my results
for robustness, I also use a number of alternative measures. These include the
ratio of non-interest income to the total operating revenues, denoted as (NOIR);
and the ratio of net-interest to total operating income (NITR). Table 3.2 pro-
vides pertinent descriptive statistics for the outlined variables, while Figure 3.1
graphically represents the evolution in the levels of key revenue sources.
Generally, EMU based banks seem to better exploit diversication prospects
as suggested by (ROID) measure. This is due to a comparatively larger propor-
tion of non-interest income in the total operating revenues of these banks (NOIR),
revealing their reliance on fee-based revenue sources. On the other hand, nancial
institutions in non-EMU countries seem to rely heavily on traditional interme-
diary activities. This is suggested by the ratio of net-interest to total operating
income (NITR).
With respect to the indicators of bank capital adequacy, I follow the wide
literature [Fraser, Madura and Weigand, 2002; Johnson and Madura, 2002; Au
Yong, Fa¤ and Chalmers, 2009; Ballester, et al., 2009] and compute the ratio of
book value of equity capital to banks total assets (CAP). To check the robustness
of the CAP ratio I use a number of alternative proxies.
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Table 3.1 
Variables definition and data sources 
This table presents variables considered in the research alongside their detailed definitions and the relevant data 
sources. All underlying variables are sourced from COMPUSTAT, BANKSCOPE, and WORLD BANK data.  While 
the exact definition of all company specific financial variables is provided in Panel A below, Panels B and C present 
the macroeconomic and market specific regulatory variables respectively. The datasources are outlined in Panel D.  
All company specific financial variables in Panel A fall within five categories according to their specification and the 
effect they capture. These categories are Capital Adequacy; Asset Quality and Liquidity; Earnings, Efficiency and 
Profitability; Diversification; and Off-Balance Sheet Structure. 
Panel A.  Company Specific Financial Ratios 
Capital Adequacy 
CAP [Capital Ratio] Equity Capital Total Assets⁄  
TIER_1 [Tier 1 Capital Ratio] Tier 1 Capital Risk Adjusted Assets⁄  
TCA
 
[Total Capital Ratio] Total Capital [Tier 1 and Tier 2] Risk Adjusted Assets⁄  
ETN
 
[Ratio of Equity to Loans] Equity Capital Net Loans⁄  
ETD
 
[Ratio of Equity to Short-Term Funding] Equity Capital (Cust. Dep. & Short-Term Funding⁄ ) 
Asset Quality and Liquidity 
LTA [Loan to Assets Ratio] Net Loans Total Assets⁄  
LCL [Low Cost Liabilities] Customer Deposits Total Deposits⁄  
LPTL [Loan Loss Provision to Net Loans] Loan Loss Provision Net Loans⁄  
LPTA [Loan Loss Provision to Assets] Loan Loss Provision Total Assets⁄  
LOLR [Loan Loss Ratio] Net Charge-offs Net Total Loans⁄                
TDNL [Intermediation Ratio] Total Deposits Net Total Loans⁄  
TDTA [Total deposits to total assets] Total Deposits Total Assets⁄                        
TDTL [Total deposits to total liabilities] Total Deposits Total Liabilities⁄                   
BDTD [Bank deposits to total deposits] Bank Deposits Total Deposits⁄                    
UDTD [Bank’s market discipline] Bank Deposits+Subordinated Debt Total Deposits⁄  
EITA [Proportion of Equity Investment] Equity Investments Total Assets⁄  
OETE [Other earning assets to total earning assets] Other Earning Assets Total Earning Assets⁄        
OETA [Other earning assets to total assets] Other Earning Assets Total Assets⁄        
SLLA [Short-term Liabilities to Liquid Assets] (Deposits & ShortTerm Funding-Cust. Deposits) Liquid Assets⁄  
BDCD [Bank Deposits to Customer Deposits] Bank Deposits Customer Deposits⁄  
LATA [Proportion of Liquid Assets] Liquid Assets Total Assets⁄  
DBDB [Interbank Ratio] Due from Banks Due to Banks⁄  
LASF [Deposit Run-off Ratio] Liquid Assets Deposits & Short-Term Funding⁄  
NLSF [Net Loans to Short-Term Funding] Net Loans Deposits & Short-Term Funding⁄  
DDTF [Low cost funding] Total Deposits Total Funding⁄                 
COFU [Cost of Funds] Interest Expense Total Funding⁄                 
ALER [Average Lending Rate] Interest Income Total Earning Assets⁄                 
Earnings, Efficiency and Profitability  
NIM [Net Interest Margin] Net Interest Income Total Earning Assets⁄  
LTEA [Loans to total earning assets] Net Total Loans Total Earning Assets⁄                 
CTI [Cost to Income Ratio] Overheads (NII + Other Operating Income)⁄  
ROAA [ Return on Assets] Net Income Total Assets⁄  
ROAE [Return on Equity] Net Income Total Equity⁄  
BTTA [Profit before tax to total assets] Before Tax Profit Total Assets⁄                          
PEOX [Personnel Expenses to Operating Expense] Personnel Expenses Total Operating Expense⁄      
Diversification  
SIZE [Value of bank’s total assets] log(Total assets)  
NOIR [Proportion of non-interest income] Non-interest Income Total Operating Income�       
NOIN [Non-interest income to Net income] Non-interest Income Net Income⁄                          
NOIT [Non-interest income to Total Assets] Non-interest Income Total Assets⁄                          
NITR [Proportion of interest income] Net interest Income Total Operating Income⁄       
ROID [Income Diversity] 1 − |(NetInt Inc.−NonInt. Inc) Total Oper.  Income⁄ | 
HERF [Herfindahl Index] 1 −.[(Inter. Income TOR⁄ )2 + (Fee Income TOR⁄ )2 +
(Trading Income TOR⁄ )2 + (Other Income TOR⁄ )2] 
TOR = Inter. Inc. + Fee Inc. + Trad. Inc. + Other Inc. 
ROAD [Asset Diversity] 1-�(Net Loans-Other Earning Assets) Tot. Earn. Assets⁄ � 
Off–Balance Sheet Activities  
CLTA [Contingent Liabilities to Total Assets] Total Contingent Liabilities Total Assets⁄      
CLTL [Contingent Liabilities to Total Loans] Total Contingent Liabilities Total Loans⁄      
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Panel B.  Macroeconomic Variables 
M_GGDG [GDP growth] Growth rate of nominal GDP adjusted for inflation 
M_GGDC [GDP-per-capita growth] Growth rate of nominal GDP – per – capita 
M_INFL [Inflation] Annualised change of the CPI index 
GRCR [Real credit growth] Annual real credit growth 
M_UNEM [Unemployment] Country total unemployment as % of tot. labour force 
M_EXCI [Exchange rate] Real effective exchange rate index (2000=100) 
M_BCGD [Credit to private sector] Domestic credit provided by banking sector/GDP 
Panel C.  Market Specific Variables 
DELO [English legal origin] Dummy for counties with English legal origin 
DFLO [French legal origin] Dummy for counties with French legal origin 
DGLO [German legal origin] Dummy for counties with German legal origin 
DSLO [Scandinavian legal origin] Dummy for counties with Scandinavian legal origin 
D_LAW [Civil law legal origin] Dummy for counties with civil law legal origin 
RIGHT_REG [Creditors rights] Ranges from 0 to 4 based on (yes=1, 0=no): (1) the coun-
try imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent laws 
or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) 
secured creditors are able to gain possession of their 
security once the reorganization petition has been ap-
proved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are 
ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result 
from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; (4) 
the debtor does not retain the administration of its prop-
erty pending the resolution of the reorganization. 
INF_REG [Information disclosure] The ratio of information disclosure ranges between 0 and 
13 and is based on the following questions (yes=1, 0=no): 
(1) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal 
enter the income statement while the loan is still non-
performing? (2) Are financial institutions required to 
produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and 
any non-bank financial subsidiaries (including affiliates 
of common holding companies)? (3) Are off-balance 
sheet items disclosed to the public? (4) Must banks dis-
close their risk management procedures to the public? (5) 
Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed 
is erroneous or misleading? (6) Have they been enforced 
in the last 5 years? (7) Is an external audit a compulsory 
obligation for banks? (8) Are auditing practices for banks 
in accordance with international auditing standards?  (9) 
Is it required by the regulators that bank audits be pub-
licly disclosed? (10) Are auditors required by law to 
communicate directly to the supervisory agency any 
presumed involvement of bank directors or senior man-
agers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (11) Are 
external auditors legally required to report to the super-
visory agency any other information discovered in an 
audit that could jeopardize the health of a bank? (12) Can 
supervisors take legal action against external auditors for 
negligence? (13) Has legal action been taken against an 
auditor in the last 5 years? 
CAP_REG [Regulatory capital requirements] The index of capital requirements is constructed based 
on the following set of questions (yes=1, 0=no): (1) Is this 
ratio risk weighted in line with the 1988 Basel guide-
lines? (2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of 
an individual bank's credit risk? (3) Does the minimum 
ratio vary as a function of market risk? (4) Does the 
minimum ratio vary as a function of operational risk? (5) 
Is there a simple leverage ratio that is required? Thus the 
ratio ranges between 0 and 5, with highest scores reflect-
ing stringent capital requirements. 
ACT_REG [Index of restricted activities] The index ranges from 3 to 12 based on the following set 
of questions (unrestricted =1, permitted =2, restricted =3, 
prohibited =4): (1) What are the conditions under which 
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banks can engage in securities activities? (2) What are the 
conditions under which banks can engage in insurance 
activities? (3) What are the conditions under which banks 
can engage in real estate activities? Higher scores reflect 
more restrictions. 
DIV_REG [Diversification index] The index assumes values between 0 and 5, based on 
(yes=1, 0=no): (1) Are there explicit, verifiable, and quan-
tifiable guidelines regarding asset diversification? (for 
example, are banks required to have some minimum 
diversification of loans among sectors, or are their sec-
toral concentration limits)? (2) Are banks limited in their 
lending to single or related borrowers? (3) Are banks 
limited in their sectoral concentration? (4) Are banks 
required to hold either liquidity reserves or any deposits 
at the Central Bank? (5) Are banks allowed to hold re-
serves in foreign denominated currencies or other for-
eign denominated instruments?   
DIS_REG [Index of banks discipline] The index ranges between 0 and 13, based on (yes=1, 
0=no): (1) Are there any mechanisms of cease and desist-
type orders, whose infraction leads to the automatic 
imposition of civil and penal sanctions on the banks 
directors and managers? (2) Are bank regula-
tors/supervisors required to make public formal en-
forcement actions, which include cease and desist orders 
and written agreements between a bank regula-
tory/supervisory body and a banking organization? (3) 
Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or 
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or 
potential losses? (4) Can the supervisory agency suspend 
the directors' decision to distribute dividends? (5) Can 
the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to 
distribute bonuses? (6) Can the supervisory agency 
suspend the directors' decision to distribute management 
fees? (7) Have any such actions been taken in the last 5 
years? (8) Does the Banking Law establish predeter-
mined levels of solvency (capital or net worth) deteriora-
tion which forces automatic actions (like intervention)? 
(9) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can 
the supervisory agency or any other government super-
sede shareholder rights? (10) Can the supervisory agency 
or any other government remove and replace manage-
ment? (11) Can the supervisory agency or any other 
government remove and replace directors? (12) Can the 
supervisory agency or any other government forbear 
certain prudential regulations? (13) Can the supervisory 
agency or any other government insure liabilities beyond 
any explicit deposit insurance scheme? 
GDI_REG [Index of Generous Insurance] The index ranges between 0 and 2, and is constructed 
based on following (yes=1, 0=no): (1) Is there an explicit 
deposit insurance protection system? (2) Is the county 
ratio of Deposit insurance coverage/GDP-per-capita ≥ 
median over all analysed countries (Deposit insurance 
coverage/GDP-per-capita) ratio? 
SDI_REG [Index of Stringent Insurance] The index assumes values between 0 and 2, with higher 
ratio reflecting more stringent deposit protection re-
quirements imposed in the country.  The index is calcu-
lated based on (yes=1, 0=no): (1) Do deposit insurance 
fees charged to banks vary based on the risk assessment? 
(2) Is there formal coinsurance, that is, are depositors 
explicitly insured for less than 100% of their deposits? 
Note: The market specific regulatory variables are constructed based on La Porta et al. (1998), Kaufman et al. 
(2008), and the Heritage Foundation database. Individual questions and answers are from Barth et al. (2008), and 
the author’s own calculations. 
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Panel D.  Data Sources 
Balance Sheet and Income Statement Items 
Banks Deposits BankScope: Code 6060 Net Income BankScope: Code 6815 
Contingent Liabilities BankScope: Code 7110 Net Trading Income BankScope: Code 6620 
Customer Deposits BankScope: Code 6000 Net-Charge Offs BankScope: Code 2150 
Deposits & Short term fund. BankScope: Code 2030 Other Operating Income BankScope: Code 6630 
Deposits with Banks BankScope: Code 5350 Overheads BankScope: Code 2090 
Due from Banks BankScope: Code 2180 Personnel Expenses BankScope: Code 6650 
Due to Banks BankScope: Code 2185 Post Tax Profit BankScope: Code 6800 
Equity Investments BankScope: Code 5530 Subordinated Debt BankScope: Code 6210 
Government Securities BankScope: Code 5410 Tier 1 Capital Ratio BankScope: Code 7040 
Hybrid Capital BankScope: Code 2160 Total Assets BankScope: Code 5670 
Interest Expense BankScope: Code 6520 Total Customer Loans BankScope: Code 5190 
Interest Income BankScope: Code 6510 Total Deposits BankScope: Code 6080 
Impaired Loans BankScope: Code 2170 Total Earning Assets BankScope: Code 2010 
Liquid Assets BankScope: Code 2075 Total Equity BankScope: Code 6400 
Loan Loss Provision BankScope: Code 6690 Total Net Loans BankScope: Code 5330 
Loan Loss Reserves BankScope: Code 5280 Total Operating Expense BankScope: Code 6710 
Net Commission Revenue BankScope: Code 6560 Total Operating Income BankScope: Code 6640 
Net Fee Income BankScope: Code 6590 Total Problem Loans BankScope: Code 5240 
 
Macroeconomic Data 
GDP Growth World Bank Unemployment World Bank 
Real GDP per capita Growth World Bank Exchange rate World Bank 
Inflation World Bank Credit to private sector World Bank 
Real Credit Growth World Bank 
   
Country Specific Characteristics 
English legal origin LaPorta et al. [2002] Regulatory capital requirements Barth et al. [2008] 
French legal origin LaPorta et al. [2002] Index of restricted activities Barth et al. [2008] 
German legal origin LaPorta et al. [2002] Diversification index Barth et al. [2008] 
Scandinavian legal origin LaPorta et al. [2002] Index of banks discipline Barth et al. [2008] 
Civil law legal origin LaPorta et al. [2002] Index of Generous Insurance Barth et al. [2008] 
Creditors rights LaPorta et al. [2002] Index of Stringent Insurance Barth et al. [2008] 
Information disclosure Barth et al. [2008]  
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Figure 3.1
Key revenue sources
This includes the Tier 1 (TIER) ratio dened as a fraction of Tier 1 bank
capital in its risk adjusted assets; (TCAP) dened as the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier
2 capital to the banks risk adjusted assets; and (ETNL) computed as the banks
equity capital to its net loans. Therefore, (ETNL) represents a banks ability to
cover unexpected losses on credit portfolio with uninsured private funds. As per
Table 3.2, capital ratios just marginally di¤er across the countries. The average
(CAP) value is around six percent.
The ratio of net total loans to total assets (LTA) serves as a measure of the
banks repriced assets and is used to address Hypothesis 4. As per Table 3.2,
the proportion of loans in the banks total assets is similar for both EMU and
non-EMU rms and is at the level of 63 to 65 percent. Nonetheless, it seems
that while non-EMU based banks mainly nance these loans with deposits, EMU
based institutions utilise alternative nancing sources and hence report higher
ratio of net total loans to total deposits (TLTD). To proxy the banks low cost
liabilities I calculate the ratio of customer deposits to total deposits (LCL).
With respect to the banks disciplinary e¤ect, I compute the ratio of interbank
deposits to total deposits (BDTD) and the ratio of subordinated debt to total
banks deposits (SDTD). The evolution of both measures is pictured in Figure 3.2
for cross-country averages, while Figure 3.3 presents the breakdown for selected
aggregates. Both gures also show the aggregated measure of market discipline
calculated as the ratio of uninsured interbank deposits and subordinated debt to
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Figure 3.2
Uninsured deposits and subordinated debt
the total deposits (UDTD).
Both (SDTD) and (BDTD) are higher for EMU-based nancial institutions
indicating higher levels of market discipline in these markets. The lowest values
are observed for countries lacking the explicit form of deposit protection scheme.
The level of subordinated debt appears to be increasing with bank size, as per
Figure 3.3.
I account for bank credit risk under Hypothesis 5 by constructing the ratio of
loan loss provision to net loans (LPTL). With regards to bank specialisation, a
dummy variable (DCAD) assuming a value of 1 for banks with the value of loan-
to-asset ratio exceeding 80 percent (LTA  0:8), and 0 otherwise is constructed.
Only 17 percent of institutions in the sample can be characterised as specialised
commercial banks at one time or another.
To condition interest rate risk to rms o¤-balance sheet activities (Hypothesis
6), I use the ratio of bank is total o¤-balance sheet exposure to its total assets
(CLTA). BankScope does not report more specic information on the banks
derivative positions. The only reported value is classied as the banks total con-
tingent liabilities. The ratio is prominently higher for EMU based rms, perhaps
because o¤-balance sheet activities is their only way of expanding revenue sources
to remain competitive while not altering a tightly regulated capital structure. For
non-EMU rms, the ratio ranges from 0:021 (for Japan) to 0:60 (for the UK).
To improve the t of the empirical model, I control for further nancial mea-
sures that may explain the variation in the banks risk exposures. As banks with
a greater fraction of liquid assets should be less risk-averse, I include the ratio of
liquid assets to total assets (LATA). Banks may provision for losses to di¤ering
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive statistics for company specific financial ratios 
This table presents summary statistics (mean, median, and standard deviation) for the annual company specific finan-
cial ratios over 1997-2007, all supplied from the BankScope database.  All financial ratios are calculated for each bank i  
(i =289) and then averaged across a sample period and either: (1) all banks [Full sample]; (2) across all EMU countries 
banks [EMU countries]; and (3) across all banks based in non-EMU countries [Non-EMU countries].  For an exact defini-
tion of each ratio see Appendix 2. 
  
Full sample EMU countries Non-EMU countries 
Mean Med. St. dev. Mean Med. St. dev. Mean Med. St. dev. 
Capital Adequacy 
            
CAP [Capital Ratio] 0.064 0.057 0.029 0.062 0.056 0.026 0.069 0.064 0.035 
TIER_
 
[Tier 1 Capital Ratio] 0.087 0.080 0.034 0.083 0.077 0.027 0.087 0.080 0.034 
TCAP [Total Capital Ratio] 0.114 0.108 0.033 0.109 0.106 0.025 0.116 0.108 0.034 
ETN
 
[Equity to Loans] 0.124 0.092 0.172 0.115 0.108 0.052 0.127 0.087 0.199 
ETD
 
[Equity to Short-Term Funding] 0.085 0.071 0.045 0.100 0.093 0.044 0.079 0.066 0.043 
Asset Quality and Liquidity 
           
LTA [Loan to Assets Ratio] 0.625 0.644 0.160 0.624 0.655 0.197 0.625 0.643 0.144 
LCL [Low Cost Liabilities] 0.796 0.895 0.229 0.611 0.656 0.231 0.864 0.958 0.187 
LPTL [Loan Loss Provision to Net Loans] 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.008 
LPTA [Loan Loss Provision to Assets] 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
LOL
 
[Loan Loss Ratio] 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.004 
TDN
 
[Intermediation Ratio] 1.308 1.259 0.697 1.147 1.014 0.592 1.368 1.322 0.724 
TDT
 
[Total deposits to total assets] 0.739 0.784 0.176 0.635 0.636 0.167 0.778 0.845 0.163 
TDTL [Total deposits to total liabilities] 1.308 1.259 0.697 0.687 0.681 0.197 0.829 0.923 0.172 
BDT
 
[Bank deposits to total deposits] 0.164 0.067 0.209 0.364 0.304 0.237 0.087 0.026 0.133 
UDT
 
[Bank’s market discipline] 0.208 0.126 0.225 0.404 0.340 0.238 0.120 0.050 0.151 
EITA [Proportion of Equity Investment] 0.016 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.010 0.015 0.017 0.010 0.019 
OET
 
[Other earning assets to total earning 
 
0.334 0.321 0.165 0.330 0.291 0.203 0.335 0.326 0.148 
OET
 
[Other earning assets to total assets] 0.312 0.301 0.151 0.305 0.273 0.186 0.314 0.310 0.135 
SLLA [Short-term Liabilities to Liquid Assets] 8.330 0.908 23.441 11.65
 
2.632 19.885 7.098 0.605 24.520 
BDC
 
[Bank Deposits to Customer Deposits] 0.392 0.078 0.848 1.004 0.442 1.283 0.159 0.027 0.414 
IETL [Level of Interest Expenses] 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.030 0.028 0.015 0.019 0.013 0.018 
LATA [Proportion of Liquid Assets] 0.126 0.095 0.120 0.117 0.088 0.107 0.129 0.097 0.124 
DBD
 
[Interbank Ratio] 23.062 1.495 361.7 1.104 0.591 4.312 31.975 2.721 428.6 
LASF [Deposit Run-off Ratio] 0.175 0.124 0.218 0.208 0.135 0.320 0.162 0.120 0.163 
NLSF [Net Loans to Short-Term Funding] 0.848 0.765 0.454 1.010 0.923 0.682 0.788 0.729 0.310 
DDT
 
[Low cost funding] 0.834 0.892 0.173 0.728 0.738 0.183 0.870 0.949 0.154 
COF
 
[Cost of Funds] 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.034 0.031 0.017 0.020 0.010 0.019 
ALE
 
[Average Lending Rate] 0.042 0.041 0.021 0.052 0.050 0.015 0.038 0.029 0.021 
Earnings, Efficiency and Profitability          
NIM [Net Interest Margin] 0.020 0.019 0.008 0.021 0.022 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.007 
LTEA [Loans to total earning assets] 0.666 0.679 0.165 0.670 0.709 0.203 0.665 0.674 0.148 
CTI [Cost to Income Ratio] 0.950 0.785 0.958 0.990 0.902 0.524 0.936 0.756 1.074 
ROA
 
[ Return on Assets] 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.007 
ROA
 
[Return on Equity] 0.057 0.077 0.720 0.095 0.101 0.151 0.043 0.066 0.838 
BTTA [Profit before tax to total assets] 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.009 
PEO
 
[Personnel Expenses to Operating Ex-
 
0.480 0.488 0.105 0.482 0.490 0.103 0.479 0.487 0.106 
Diversification 
           
SIZE [Value of bank’s total assets] 9.649 9.083 2.059 10.27
 
9.754 1.984 9.415 8.767 2.038 
NOIR [Proportion of non-interest income] 0.323 0.308 0.199 0.408 0.398 0.153 0.291 0.238 0.205 
NOI
 
[Non-interest income to Net income] 2.144 1.483 7.814 2.596 1.835 6.012 1.976 1.353 8.379 
NOIT [Non-interest income to Total Assets] 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.014 
NITR [Proportion of interest income] 0.677 0.692 0.199 0.592 0.602 0.153 0.709 0.762 0.205 
ROID [Income Diversity] 0.542 0.550 0.273 0.708 0.750 0.206 0.480 0.425 0.269 
HER
 
[Herfindahl Index] 0.402 0.438 0.173 0.510 0.530 0.126 0.364 0.367 0.171 
ROA
 
[Asset Diversity] 0.593 0.610 0.229 0.534 0.538 0.251 0.615 0.630 0.217 
Off–Balance Sheet Activities            
CLTA [Contingent Liabilities to Total Assets] 0.256 0.044 1.216 0.639 0.182 2.216 0.132 0.023 0.549 
CLTL [Contingent Liabilities to Total Loans] 0.684 0.074 4.880 1.937 0.267 9.289 0.276 0.035 1.701 
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Table 3.3:  Correlation matrix for selected variables 
COUNTRY LEVEL VARIABLES: 
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COMPANY SPECIFIC FINANCIAL RATIOS: 
 LTA  .02  
            
.71* .48* .43* .29* .38* .25* .38* .33* .26* .03 .22* .11* .13* .55* .05 .07* .01 EFI_REG  
LCL  .03 -.00 
             
.55* .58* .12* .45* .06* .02 .49* .39* .31* .03 .05* .04 .33* .02 .16* .18* KRL_RE
  LPTL  .10* -.11* .06
             
.05* .28* .54* .42* .10* .65* .62* .38* .07* .54* .26* .08* .48* .41* .49* KRC_RE
  LPTA  -.01 .13* .09* .78* 
             
.40* .11* .40* .22* .16* .22* .15* .13* .42* .14* .62* .52* .15* .21* KPS_REG  
TDNL .25* -.73* .14* .12* -.10* 
             
.19* .89* .61* .35* .25* .10* .06* .62* .12* .40* .47* .14* .14* SDI_REG  
TDTA  .22* .19* .30* .01 .08* .22*
             
.03 .43* .27* .29* .38* .12* .50* .05 .22* .38* .25* .36* GDI_REG  
UDTD  -.03 .00 -.94* -.04 -.05 -.13* -.32*
             
.58* .34* .38* .13* .09* .81* .13* .54* .62* .27* .31* DIS_REG  
EITA  .11* -.01 -.09* -.07* -.05 .05 .29* .04
             
.32* .48* .40* .27* .30* .03 .23* .17* .12* .11* DIV_REG  
OETA  -.06 -.96* .02 .11* -.12* .74* -.10* .01 .07*
             
.73* .49* .37* .41* .13* .25* .45* .30* .35* ACT_RE
  SLLA  .19* .14* -.46* -.09* -.08* -.05 .05 .44* .21* -.14*
             
.76* .12* .59* .15* .28* .53* .35* .45* CAP_RE
  BDCD  .02 .12* -.83* -.02 .01 -.14* -.17* .86* .08* -.09* .41*
             
.17* .46* .05 .24* .30* .20* .25* INF_REG  
IETL  .03 -.00 -.50* .02 .03 -.15* -.44* .54* -.25* -.06 .18* .45*
             
.18* .05 .11* .00 .02 .11* RIGHT 
LATA  .25* -.53* .21* .19* .06 .62* .12* -.16* -.19* .56* -.38* -.14* -.03
             
.11* .65* .77* .37* .48* M_BCGD  
LASF  .07 -.38* -.06 .12* .01 .29* -.25* .11* -.20* .41* -.27* .10* .10* .69*
             
.02 .20* .03 .03 M_EXCI  
NLSF  -.17* .49* -.22* -.07* .06 -.54* -.46* .25* -.18* -.46* .01 .28* .22* -.24* .37*
             
.47* .36* .40* M_UNE
   DDTF  .41* .04 .27* .04 .05 .34* .94* -.29* .26* -.02 .07* -.18* -.38* .21* -.20* -.55*
             
.26* .40* M_INFL  
COFU  .01 -.07* -.49* .01 .00 -.12* -.47* .52* -.25* -.02 .17* .42* .99* -.03 .09* .18* -.38*
             
.97* M_GDPC  
ALER  .15* .12* -.36* .04 .09* -.22* -.28* .40* -.29* -.22* .15* .31* .91* -.04 .02 .16* -.20* .90*
              NIM  .39* .38* .14* .07* .18* -.24* .30* -.10* -.16* -.45* .04 -.11* .15* -.01 -.14* -.03 .35* .12* .53*
             LTEA  .04 .98* -.01 -.11* .13* -.75* .13* -.01 -.04 -.99* .14* .10* .04 -.56* -.40* .48* .02 -.02 .19* .43*
            CTI  .32* -.58* .01 .22* -.07* .71* -.11* .02 -.05 .57* -.02 -.04 -.11* .53* .34* -.33* .05 -.08* -.21* -.27* -.59*
           ROAA  .53* -.15* -.02 -.32* -.47* .24* .01 -.00 -.08* .08* .06 -.05 .13* .19* .09* -.17* .19* .15* .23* .29* -.11* .23*
          ROAE  .11* -.12* -.03 -.32* -.48* .07 -.02 .01 -.07 .07* .03 -.04 .12* .01 -.01 -.16* .05 .14* .17* .13* -.09* .02 .63*
         BTTA  .57* -.12* -.03 -.31* -.44* .25* .03 .02 -.09* .05 .08* -.03 .12* .21* .10* -.17* .21* .14* .25* .37* -.08* .27* .96* .56*
        SIZE  -.29* -.32* -.26* -.07* -.15* -.06 -.55* .26* -.18* .23* -.00 .04 .45* -.14* -.04 .01 -.48* .49* .33* -.21* -.26* -.06 .12* .23* .04
       NOIR  .20* -.56* -.26* .02 -.15* .42* -.40* .23* .00 .44* .13* .07* .21* .17* .06 -.32* -.20* .28* .11* -.25* -.49* .62* .32* .20* .33* .33*
      NOIT  .48* -.42* -.07* .09* -.09* .47* -.20* .05 -.07 .29* .05 -.03 .09* .37* .24* -.23* .04 .14* .11* .04 -.35* .70* .54* .19* .58* -.02 .74*
     ROID .02 .11* -.36* -.06 -.02 -.24* -.18* .38* -.09* -.18* .24* .19* .36* -.29* -.27* -.05 -.13* .36* .40* .22* .16* -.16* .09* .17* .10* .47* .35* -.00
    HERF  .05 -.22* -.32* -.02 -.07* .04 -.29* .36* -.05 .15* .20* .16* .35* -.11* -.16* -.21* -.19* .36* .30* -.00 -.18* .15* .17* .20* .17* .51* .65* .20* .83*
   ROAD  -.27* -.49* .04 .04 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.04 .12* .49* -.25* -.11* -.03 .28* .24* -.21* -.01 -.00 -.06 -.14* -.49* -.14* -.11* .06 -.17* .27* -.05 -.17* .02 .04
  CLTA  -.14* -.23* -.10* -.01 -.06 .08* -.17* .12* .06 .24* .02 .02 .10* -.06 -.05 -.12* -.20* .09* .01 -.18* -.23* .14* -.09* -.03 -.08* .23* .21* .02 .07* .19* .05 1.00 
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M_GDPG  .04 .02 -.01 -.20* -.21* -.05 .05 -.04 .01 -.08* .07* -.06 .11* -.13* -.13* -.07* .09* .13* .16* .11* .06 -.14* .31* .22* .26* .19* .06 .05 .15* .11* .06 -.11* 
M_GDPC  -.04 -.03 -.01 -.20* -.20* -.01 .11* -.02 .06 .01 .05 -.03 .03 -.07* -.08* -.09* .11* .05 .07 .05 -.02 -.13* .22* .17* .19* .12* -.01 -.01 .07* .04 .16* -.08* 
M_INFL  -.01 .01 -.24* -.12* -.12* -.15* -.32* .22* -.23* -.11* .09* .06 .38* -.18* -.07 .10* -.26* .40* .45* .26* .08* -.06 .26* .23* .26* .36* .25* .17* .41* .35* -.07* .00 
M_UNE
  
-.03 -.03 -.50* -.04 -.03 -.09* -.02 .51* .09* .02 .23* .35* .35* -.08* -.02 .01 -.02 .34* .47* .37* -.02 -.16* .02 .06 .08* .08* .03 -.06 .30* .26* .13* .07 
M_EXCI  .10* -.04 -.20* .03 -.01 -.07 -.35* .20* -.30* -.03 .06 .08* .35* -.04 .04 .10* -.26* .36* .37* .16* .00 .03 .18* .15* .17* .37* .27* .17* .36* .33* -.09* .05 
M_BCGD  -.19* .07 .48* .05 .08* .10* .51* -.53* .37* .05 -.23* -.30* -.73* .04 -.06 -.13* .37* -.74* -.76* -.31* -.01 -.04 -.28* -.20* -.31* -.49* -.43* -.29* -.58* -.55* .12* -.10* 
RIGHT  -.20* -.21* .25* .06 .07* -.04 -.02 -.20* -.20* .25* -.29* -.22* .02 .21* .17* -.02 -.08* -.01 .01 .00 -.23* -.18* .03 .09* -.04 .29* -.20* -.21* -.05 -.06 .52* .13* 
INF_REG  .17* .05 -.45* -.11* -.17* .05 -.10* .45* -.05 -.10* .39* .35* .38* -.24* -.16* .00 .02 .39* .30* -.05 .08* .10* .28* .19* .23* .31* .33* .19* .35* .37* -.33* .00 
CAP_RE
  
.17* .08* -.19* -.07* -.13* .06 -.07 .21* -.21* -.13* .20* .10* .22* -.10* -.12* -.03 .05 .24* .24* .12* .10* .15* .32* .23* .30* .24* .29* .24* .38* .37* -.29* -.12* 
ACT_RE
  
-.07* .18* .08* -.01 .04 -.10* .08* -.11* .26* -.20* -.02 -.06 -.29* -.11* -.11* .02 .04 -.26* -.19* .09* .20* -.01 -.25* -.17* -.16* -.40* -.08* .02 -.15* -.20* -.16* -.12* 
DIV_REG  .15* -.06 -.46* .00 -.02 .07* .13* .53* .12* .09* .42* .42* .22* -.11* -.11* -.13* .20* .22* .16* .00 -.09* -.01 .06 .07 .05 .15* .10* -.09* .33* .36* .04 -.02 
DIS_REG  -.03 .12* .54* .01 .02 .10* .39* -.64* .25* -.08* -.24* -.39* -.57* .04 -.07 -.10* .32* -.56* -.56* -.20* .10* .01 -.09* -.12* -.12* -.42* -.28* -.07* -.55* -.54* -.08* -.16* 
GDI_REG  -.17* .03 -.06 .05 .09* .03 .35* .12* .27* .05 .07* .11* -.37* -.03 -.08* -.14* .29* -.37* -.29* .07* -.02 -.02 -.26* -.11* -.18* -.35* -.17* -.18* .01 -.01 .13* -.10* 
SDI_REG  .03 -.20* -.45* .04 .05 -.02 -.19* .55* -.15* .22* .26* .40* .47* -.01 .08* .00 -.16* .44* .43* .12* -.21* -.06 .01 .04 .03 .26* .16* -.03 .40* .40* .24* .17* 
KPS_REG  -.05 .02 .20* -.05 -.10* .14* -.04 -.20* .02 -.01 -.13* -.10* -.14* .09* .06 .03 -.04 -.13* -.27* -.38* .01 .25* -.09* -.12* -.10* -.14* .05 .11* -.28* -.20* -.22* .06 
KRC_RE
  
.06 -.09* .14* -.06 -.13* .04 -.23* -.14* -.31* .05 -.12* -.14* .16* .04 .07* .07 -.18* .16* .06 -.20* -.07* .08* .27* .18* .17* .42* .14* .11* .05 .07* -.03 .09* 
KRL_RE
  
-.11* -.01 -.01 -.15* -.25* .10* -.23* -.01 -.13* .00 -.02 .02 .08* -.07 .03 .11* -.21* .09* -.10* -.42* -.01 .23* .13* .09* .07 .23* .19* .16* -.08* -.01 -.28* .11* 
EFI_REG  .16* -.05 .50* .01 -.03 .08* .01 -.52* -.22* .04 -.25* -.40* -.08* .16* .08* -.03 .04 -.08* -.13* -.15* -.04 .03 .22* .11* .12* .15* -.05 .05 -.19* -.17* .05 -.07* 
Note:  This table presents the bivariate correlation between explanatory variables used in the research. Variable definitions and sources are provided in Table 1. * represent significance at the 5% level. 
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Figure 3.3
Uninsured deposits and subordinated debt by country and bank size
degrees and we might expect banks that provision more for losses to intend to
take on more risk. I therefore include the ratio of net loan-loss provision to net
loans (LPTL) to capture this inuence. Finally, as more protable banks may
have less incentive to take risk I include the return on bank equity (ROE) as a
control variable as well.
Country regulatory framework and macroeconomic environment
To characterise the structure and quality of the country-specic banking su-
pervisory system, I use a database compiled by Barth et al. (2004), La Porta et
al. (1998), Kaufmann et al. (2008), and the Heritage Foundation. The detailed
denitions for each variable, including information sources and computational
issues, are outlined in Table 3.1.
The database of Barth et al. (2004) provides detailed information on the
structure of the bank regulation and deposit insurance system. Based on this
database, I construct a set of measures addressing the quality of the regulatory
system from six distinctive dimensions.
The rst indicator, named the Index of Capital Requirements (CAP_REG),
addresses the stringency of capital regulations enforced by authorities. This in-
dex ranges from 0 to 5 with the higher score reecting greater restrictiveness.
Similarly, the Index of Restricted Activities (ACT_REG) ranges from 3 to 12
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based on the degree to which banks can engage in security underwriting, insur-
ance and real estate activities. The Index of Information Disclosure (INF_REG)
measures the strictness of regulatory imposed audit and disclosure requirements.
This index ranges from 1 to 13. To proxy the enforcement of existing regula-
tions (i.e. the degree of supervisory power to discipline banks), I calculate the
Index of Bank Discipline (DIS_REG). The index ranges from 0 to 13. In a sim-
ilar vein, the Diversication Index (DIV_REG) assigns higher scores to a bank
regulatory system explicitly enforcing some form of liquidity and diversication
requirements. This measure takes values from 0 to 5.
Finally, I construct a set of variables capturing the design features of the
deposit protection scheme. Particularly, I distinguish between the "generous"
and the "risk-based" deposit insurances. The former characterises a system ex-
tending automatic deposit coverage to failing banks with comparatively high or
even blanket coverage limits. The latter represents a scheme with some forms
of risk-based insurance premiums or co-insurance requirements. To this end two
indices are constructed accordingly: Index of Generous Insurance (GDI_REG)
and Index of Stringent Deposit Insurance (SDI_REG). Both indices range from
0 to 2. To robust check these measures, I also include the explicit maximum cov-
erage limit provided by insurance weighted by the GDP-per-capita (DIC_REG).
I deconstruct further the Index of Stringent Deposit Insurance into its elemen-
tal components assuming a value of 1 if: (a) there is an explicit co-insurance
requirement (CDI_REG); and (b) the insurance premium is tied to bank risks
(RBI_REG).
I also utilise a deposit insurance dummy EDI_REG, assuming a value of 1 for
the countries with explicitly adopted deposit protection scheme, and 0 otherwise.
A substantial distinction in the attitudes towards risk can be expected in the two
groups of countries. Uninsured depositors have greater risk monitoring incentives.
Higher risk-shifting incentives are expected in countries covered by provision.
Therefore, I anticipate a di¤erential impact of regulatory restriction on curtailing
bank risks in these markets.
Particularly, regulatory restrictions on bank activities deem to better improve
the risk prole of protected banks. The unprotected at-risk debtholders will ad-
equately discipline the riskier banks provided improved information disclosure
requirements. Accordingly, in my empirical framework I also examine an asym-
metric impact of bank regulatory provision in curtailing bank risk in insured
versus uninsured countries.
From La Porta et al. (1998) I include dummies of a countrys "legal origin",
taking a value of 1 if the legal origin of the target bank country is either English,
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German, French, or Scandinavian; and 0 otherwise. These variables are labelled
(D_ENG), (D_GER), (D_FREN), and (D_SCAN) respectively.
To capture countries development, I extract the Index of Political Stability
(KPS_REG) from the database of worldwide governance indicators supplied by
Kaufman et al. (2008). This index measures the likelihood that the government
may be destabilised by "unconstitutional or violent means". From the same
source, I also obtain the measures of Regulatory Quality (KRC_REG), and the
Rule of Law Index (KRL_REG). Each variable lies between  2:5 to 2:5 with
higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
Finally, I include the overall score for the Economic Freedom Index (EFI_REG)
supplied by the Heritage Foundation. By its construction, the indexs score is
based on the countrys business, trade, monetary, investment, nancial, labour,
and corruption freedom as well as property rights and freedom from government.
The macroeconomic conditions are proxied by three key measures. These
include GDP growth (M_GDPG), ination measured as the current period CPI
growth rate (M_INFL), and the real e¤ective exchange rate (M_EXCI).
The summary statistics for regulatory framework and macroeconomic vari-
ables are presented in Table 3.2. Table 3.3 reports the correlation matrix between
these variables, company specic nancial ratios and countries macroeconomic
characteristics across the whole period covered by this study.
3.3.2 Methodology
To address the underlying determinants of bank risks, I follow a two-stage
estimation procedure in line with the available literature [Fraser, Madura and
Weigand, 2002; Johnson and Madura, 2002; Au Yong, Fa¤ and Chalmers, 2009].
In the rst step I model the pertinent risk sensitivities for each bank in the sample
via Stones two-factor model. The GARCH based econometric framework is em-
ployed to account for the presence of a time-varying element in the distribution
of the banks stock returns:
Rit =  +X
0
it + "it (3.2)
hit = !0 +
nX
i=1
1"
2
i;t 1 +
mX
j=1
2hi;t 1 (3.3)
"itj
t 1  N(0; hit) (3.4)
where Rit is the return on bank i (i = 1 to 289) at time t;  is a scalar,  is a
K  1 vector of coe¢cients and Xit is the it-th observation on K explanatory
variables: X 0 = (RM;RIR). RIR is the interest rate factor which represents the
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unexpected changes in the underlying interest rate proxy. I use four interest rate
proxies interchangeably. These are the domestic short- and long-term interest
rates, interest rate term spread, and the curvature of the domestic zero-coupon
yield curve at time t. The yield curve curvature is estimated via the Diebold
and Lee factorisation of the Nelson-Siegel model in Equation 2.1. The unantici-
pated changes are calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in the
respective factor at time t and ones forecasted via the appropriate specication
of the ARMA model. "it is the estimated error term from the mean equation of
portfolio i, and hit is a conditional variance of portfolio i over week t.
The model is estimated on an annual basis for the entire sample period from
January 1997 to December 200717 resulting in 11 annualised coe¢cients for each
interest rate factor. The coe¢cient estimates on the interest rate factors measure
the sensitivity of bank is stock returns to unanticipated changes in the consid-
ered interest rate. The sign and magnitude of the estimated interest rate betas
indicate the direction and extend of the banks on- and o¤-balance sheet repricing
mismatches. A negative sign would suggest a positive duration mismatch between
interest sensitive assets and liabilities in the respective maturity bracket.
In the second step, I treat the estimated interest rate coe¢cients as dependent
variables and relate them to factors theoretically justied in previous sections.
With the exception of a few company specic nancial ratios, the majority of the
explanatory variables I use have been neglected in the literature on interest rate
risk. By examining the appropriateness of these variables to serve as suitable
indicators of the institutions risk exposures, this study develops a platform po-
tentially powerful enough to guide analysts and investors in their assessment of
banks interest rate risk. From the rms management perspective, the patterns
reported are to guide decision making, as well as risk adjustment and control.
From the point of view of policy makers the model might provide considerably
improved information for formulating banking sector policies.
Given these constraints, each type of interest rate exposure is tested under
two empirical model specications. The rst model is solely based on the rms
specic nancial characteristics including but not limited to the ones analysed
in previous studies. The second specication allows me to also account for the
individual country characteristics. These include the quality of regulatory su-
pervision and market development, as well as macroeconomic conditions. The
empirical investigation is built upon these benchmark models, serving to answer
salient research questions and thus, in times, tailored to facilitate the validation
17For individual markets, the adjustments to the estimation horizon are made to account for
the di¤erences in a scal year periods.
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of research hypotheses.
Further, due to the nature of the data samples I depart from typical time series
or cross-section analysis as carried out in previous research, and use a panel data
framework. Compared to cross-sectional analysis, panel data provide unbiased
parameter estimates, while also controlling for unobservable cross-sectional and
time heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2001, 2005).
Indexing nancial institutions with i, countries with j and years with t, the
empirical analysis for individual hypotheses in the second step is carried out
utilising the following benchmark model:
kjit = '+X 0ji;t 1+ S 0j;t 1 +G0j;t 1 + T 0t + "it (3.5)
where, kjit represents country js bank is interest rate risk measure k at time
t. As discussed above, k = 4, representing the measures of FIs equity return
sensitivity to unanticipated term-structure developments.  is an M  1 vector
of coe¢cients and Xjit is the it-th observation on M company specic nancial
ratios, served as explanatory variables. Similarly,  is an L  1 and Gjt is the
jt-th observation on L country specic macroeconomic characteristics; while  is
an S  1 and Sjt is the jt-th observation on S country specic variables charac-
terising the design of existing bank regulations. Tt is a vector of year-dummies of
dimension T  1, and the the disturbance term "it is assumed to be independently
distributed from the M rm level regressors (Xjit); L county macroeconomic re-
gressors (Gjt), and S regulatory characteristics (Sjt). To avoid the sign confusion
e¤ect and to ease the economic interpretation of statistical results I use an ab-
solute value of interest rate beta estimated from (3.3) as dependent variable in
the second step regressions (3.6 and 3.7). Besides, both positive and negative
interest rate exposures represent the risk to the bank economic value and should
be appropriately managed. The use of absolute values is also supported by Au
Yong, Fa¤ and Chalmers (2009), and Ballester, et al. (2009).
Following the formal examination of empirical hypotheses via (3.6), the model
specication is generalised to allow for the time-invariant company specic e¤ect
i: kjit = '+X 0ji;t 1+ S 0j;t 1 +G0j;t 1 + T 0t + i + "it (3.6)
This model is estimated by either treating i as xed (xed e¤ect model), thus
assuming (N +M + L) unknown coe¢cients, with  = (1; : : : ; N)0 being com-
pany specic intercepts; or random (random e¤ect model). In the random e¤ect
specication i  IID(0; 
2
) and is independent of "i  IID(0; 
2
"). Further,
both i and "it are independent of (Xjit; Gjt) for all j, i and t. Therefore, for the
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random e¤ect model, the representation in (3.7) can be conventionalized as (3.6)
with composite disturbance term it = i + "it and (2 +M + L) parameters to
be estimated.
Every e¤ort is taken to detect and address any outliers arising as a result
of measurement or coding errors. Other non-technical representative outliers,
depicting genuine variability in the behaviour of the population units, are retained
in the estimate. They are presumed to convey constitutive information about the
time and cross-sectional heterogeneity of panel units. To get more stable estimates
I reduce the impact of these extreme observations by type I winsorization18, with
xed cut-o¤ points of !  4^ for all time-variant variables (! = Xji; Gj) .
Several tailored specications of (3.6) and (3.7) are estimated to expedite hy-
potheses evaluation. The Hausman specication test for correlated random e¤ect
guides the choice between xed- or random-e¤ect models. Each parameterisation
is rigorously addressed in the empirical results section.
3.4 Empirical results
The discussion starts with results obtained in the rst stage estimation. It
continues thereon with testing the empirical hypotheses addressing the underlying
determinants of interest rate risk.
3.4.1 Bank interest rate sensitivities
The risk exposure of in-sample nancial institutions is assessed via GARCH
two-factor model presented by (3.3). The model is estimated on an annual basis
for a sample of 289 nancial intermediaries, based on weekly return observations
as per the outlined methodology. The estimation period spans the years from
1997 to 2007, resulting in 11 annual coe¢cient estimates for each institution
and each interest rate proxy. We use interchangeable four interest rate proxies.
Accordingly, 44 risk betas are obtained for each bank in the sample, with a total
of 12,716 coe¢cients for the whole sample and reference period.
Table 3.4 presents pertinent statistics for estimated coe¢cients for selected
aggregates. These include the breakdown by: (a) the economic area (EMU/non-
EMU countries); (b) bank size; (c) countries with or without explicit deposit
insurance; and (d) pre-/post- 2000 time period.
18Type I winsorization commonly refers to the procedure of replacing outliers with exact
value of interval limit, whereas with Type II outliers are transformed to predestined weighted
average between their original and the cut-o¤ values.
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Table 3.4
Descriptive statistics for the estimated risk coe¢cients
This table presents summary statistics for the market measures of interest rate risk by: the rm
size; economic area; provision of deposit insurance guarantees; and considered time period. The
market measures of interest rate risk are represented by the coe¢cients estimate from a two-factor
GARCH market model. Specically, for each bank-year, I run a two-factor time series regression
of the banks weekly returns on the market returns (MRK), and unanticipated changes in either
the domestic short-term, long-term, or spread-term interest rates, or the zero-coupon yield curve
curvature (CUR). The estimation requires at least 30 weekly return observations for each bank-year.
The corresponding US zero-coupon yield curve curvature is estimated using Diebold and Lee (2006)
parameterization of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model. The unanticipated changes in the interest
rate factors at time t are calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors
and ones forecasted via an appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA)
model. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively for
an appropriate mean, median, or variance equality test.
Panel A: All rms
SR LR SPR Curv
Mean 0.003 -0.003 -0.011 0.004
Median -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 0.001
St. Dev 0.465 0.079 0.066 0.033
% Level of Signicance:
1% level 6.17% 7.47% 6.11% 6.82%
5% level 10.82% 14.29% 12.88% 14.18%
10% level 15.31% 20.18% 18.18% 19.97%
% Negat. 53.71% 57.10% 64.58% 42.82%
Panel B: Statistics for selected aggregates
SR LR SPR Curv SR LR SPR Curv
Small rms Large rms
Mean 0.018 -0.002 -0.012 0.005 -0.021* -0.006 -0.008 0.001**
Median 0.001 -0.004 -0.007 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 0.0001***
St. Dev 0.459 0.075 0.067 0.037 0.386*** 0.077 0.062 0.021***
EMU countries Non - EMU countries
Mean 0.008 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.006 -0.004 -0.013*** 0.004
Median 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.008*** 0.002
St. Dev 0.136 0.064 0.050 0.045 0.503*** 0.079*** 0.070*** 0.027***
Countries with deposit protection Countries with NO deposit protection
Mean 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.014 -0.004*** -0.013 0.002
Median 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.010** -0.006*** -0.008 0.000
St. Dev 0.462 0.078 0.050 0.034 0.065*** 0.079*** 0.070*** 0.017***
1997 - 2000 period 2000 - 2008 period
Mean 0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.0003** -0.016*** 0.006***
Median -0.002 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004** -0.010*** 0.002***
St. Dev 0.112 0.073 0.053 0.019 0.543*** 0.077 0.072*** 0.038***
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The results reveal a number of interesting patterns. The majority of the
analysed companies are signicantly a¤ected by the unanticipated movements in
at least one interest rate proxy. This indicates the managers inability to take
accurate views regarding the changes in the entire shape of the term structure
and adopt comprehensive hedging strategies.
To further elaborate, approximately 20 percent of the analysed companies
are found to be signicantly exposed to all unanticipated shocks in the short-
, and long-term interest rates, interest rate term spread, and curvature of the
interest rate yield curve. The majority of the signicant interest rate coe¢cients
are negative. This supports the widespread view that banks tend to maintain
a positive mismatch between the maturity of their assets and liabilities. The
variance of the estimated coe¢cients appears to be greater over the second part
(2000-2007) of the sample period, and for non-EMU countries. Notably, the
provision of deposit insurance seems to markedly improve institutions risk prole.
3.4.2 Determinants of interest rate risk
On the basis of the discussion so far, we established the theoretical links be-
tween bank risks and a set of company specic, and country level macroeconomic
and regulatory framework variables. In this section I seek to validate the theory
by empirically addressing the outlined hypotheses.
The hypotheses are addressed using two complementary models. I begin by
conditioning the interest rate betas to the rm level nancial data under ap-
propriate parameterisation of Equations (3.6) and (3.7). This exercise is then
repeated for the remaining models, accounting for the design of implemented
deposit protection, as well as previously discussed macroeconomic and country-
specic characteristics.
Company level nancial data and interest rate risk
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate the impact of bank specic nancial character-
istics on its exposure to unanticipated changes in the interest rate term structure.
Two types of regressions are estimated.
First, in Table 3.5 I conduct a stepwise regression experiment. In columns 1 to
10, I regress each of the interest rate betas on rm nancial indicators following
the pooled ordinary least squares procedure with clustering at the rm level. This
yields a benchmark model in column 11. Based on this model, a more general
random e¤ect specication is estimated in column 12. This specication accounts
for individual rm heterogeneity as per Equation 3.7. In some cases I include the
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interaction terms to facilitate the empirical assessment of the research hypotheses.
Second, the regression in Table 3.6 examines whether the association between
market and accounting measures of interest rate risk depends on the provision
of deposit insurance in the target bank country. This asymmetry is modelled by
the interaction dummy variable (EDI_REG) marking the existence of deposit
insurance with a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. In both regressions, period- and
country-specic e¤ects are modelled accordingly. A number of company specic
control variables are included in all specications.
The rst empirical hypothesis refers to the relationship between bank interest
rate risks and their alternative revenue sources. Table 3.5 indicates that a higher
degree of revenue heterogeneity reduces the amount of interest rate exposure
banks have. However, Hypothesis 1 is only validated when long- and spread-term
interest rate coe¢cients are considered as the dependent variable (Panels B and
C).
I argue that such marked improvement in the bank risk prole is only as-
sociated with the fact that revenue diversication facilitates stabilisation of the
operating income, owing to imperfect correlation between non-interest activities
and those generating interest revenues. Following monetary policy shocks, how-
ever, both sources of revenue are expected to be severely a¤ected. My results
are in line with Barth et al. (2004) who demonstrate that diversifying to non-
traditional revenue generating activities improves bank stability. A similar view
is also articulated by Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who report certain diversication
benets for bank holding companies. These benets however are o¤set by greater
exposure to a more volatile non-interest revenue generating activities.
To enrich the statistical inference, I re-estimate the equation assuming the
level of banks income derived from non-traditional revenue generating sources as
measured by variable NOIR. This ratio is positively correlated with the analysed
market measures of interest rate risk, as in Fraser, Madura and Weigand (2002).
Nonetheless, this relationship is not robust to controlling for further bank nancial
characteristics. For this reason, I do not report this regression in Table 3.5.
Accordingly, the reported ndings cannot be used to assess the risk implica-
tions of tilting the bank product mix towards either revenue generating activity.
The fact, however, that non-interest income is an aggregated accounting item,
including di¤erent revenue streams, calls for further research in the area. For
instance, Lepetit et al. (2008) analyse a sample of European banks and conclude
that the positive correlation between banks risk and the levels of non-interest
income is mainly due to the commission and fee income but not the trading ac-
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Table 3.5:  Panel A 
Determinants of banks’ interest rate exposure [short-term IR] 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression:  
|βSR
where β it|= φ + X’itγ + Cjξ + Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T LR
ROID = 1 − �(NetInt Inc.−NonInt.Inc)Total Oper.  Income � 
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the domestic 
short-term interest rate at time t.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company specific 
financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.  Tt and Cj are vectors of year- and country-dummies of dimension T-1 and 
C-1 respectively.  The disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regressors 
(Xit).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The regressions are estimated for 
the following company specific financial measures, all calculated at time t-1: 
LCL = 
Customer Deposits
Total Deposits
 CLTA = 
Total Contingent Liabilities
Total Assets
 LPTL = 
Loan Loss Provision
Net Loans
 
CAP = 
Equity Capital
Total Assets
 BDTD = 
Bank Deposits
Total Deposits
 ROAE = 
Net Income
Total Equity
 ALER = 
Interest Income
Total Earning Assets
 
LTA = 
Net Loans
Total Assets
 UDTD = 
Bank Depos.+Subord. Debt
Total Deposits
 LATA = 
Liquid Assets
Total Assets
 TLTD = 
Net Loans
Total Deposits
 
DCAD is a bank specialisation dummy, taking a value of 1 for banks with LTA ≥ 0.8 (spec. commercial bank), 0 otherwise; 
and LARGE is a dummy assuming a value of 1 for banks with assets in excess of 50 bn. US dollars, and 0 otherwise.  The 
test statistics (F-statistics) for the Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of coeffi-
cient estimates is reported under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient 
estimate.  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Const. 0.503 0.672 0.654 0.586 0.652 0.637 0.638 0.667 0.651 0.681 0.688 0.670 
 
13.60*** 6.81*** 7.37*** 5.95*** 7.07*** 6.15*** 5.00*** 7.32*** 6.99*** 6.83*** 6.83*** 6.46*** 
ROID 0.013 0.027 0.034 0.021 0.033 
       
 
0.22 0.46 0.58 0.35 0.54 
       CAP 
 
-4.404 -4.430 -4.121 -4.422 -4.376 -4.721 -4.485 -4.637 -4.873 -5.240 -5.405 
  
-2.14** -2.07** -1.88* -2.06** -2.07** -2.00** -2.10** -2.24** -2.20** -2.29** -2.39** 
CAP
 
2 21.536 21.504 20.658 21.462 21.145 23.771 21.809 22.568 23.463 25.091 25.672 
  
2.15** 2.05** 1.93* 2.04** 2.05** 2.08** 2.08** 2.25** 2.19** 2.27** 2.39** 
LTA 
  
0.008 0.154 
 
0.008 0.023 0.008 0.016 -0.006 0.003 0.002 
   
0.15 1.69* 
 
0.15 0.39 0.15 0.30 -0.11 0.06 0.03 
LCL      
0.026 0.141 
     
      
0.48 1.04 
     BDTD        
-0.074 
    
        
-1.43 
    UDTD         
-0.097 -0.109 -0.098 -0.142 
         
-1.86* -1.89* -1.85* -2.36** 
CLTA          
-0.007 
  
          
-1.56 
  
             ROAE 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.010 
 
2.62*** 2.44** 2.44** 2.59*** 2.43** 2.47** 2.42** 2.48** 2.08** 2.09** 2.11** 3.37*** 
LATA -0.123 -0.120 
          
 
-1.70* -1.56 
          LPTL -1.463 -2.184 -2.258 -1.975 -2.261 -2.264 -2.483 -2.254 -2.133 -2.240 -2.196 -2.497 
 
-1.26 -1.60 -1.68* -1.49 -1.68* -1.70* -1.73* -1.69* -1.60 -1.62 -1.60 -1.59 
             LTA*ALER   
-2.620 
        
    
-2.20** 
        LTA*DCAD    
0.008 
       
     
0.15 
       
LTA*(1-DCAD)    
0.011 
       
     
0.16 
       
WALD 
    
0.013 
       
p-value 
    
(0.909) 
       
TLTD      
-0.006 
     
       
-0.28 
     
CLTA*LARGE          
-0.009 -0.011 
           
-2.28** -2.80*** 
CLTA*Others          
0.012 0.007 
           
1.49 1.12 
WALD 
          
8.490 8.388 
p-value 
          
(0.004) (0.004) 
             Country effect: Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effect:       Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             Adj. R 0.29 2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.23 
F - stats. 25.72*** 24.20*** 24.29*** 23.30*** 23.37*** 24.34*** 21.71*** 24.10*** 19.26*** 17.39*** 16.82*** 12.97*** 
Hausman test: 
          
22.792 
              (0.156) 
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Table 3.5:  Panel B 
Determinants of banks’ interest rate exposure [long-term IR] 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression:  
|βLR
where β it|= φ + X’itγ + Cjξ + Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T LR
ROID = 1 − �(NetInt Inc.−NonInt.Inc)Total Oper.  Income � 
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the domestic 
long-term interest rate at time t.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company specific 
financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.  Tt and Cj are vectors of year- and country-dummies of dimension T-1 
and C-1 respectively.  The disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regres-
sors (Xit).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The regressions are estimated 
for the following company specific financial measures all calculated at time t-1: 
LCL = 
Customer Deposits
Total Deposits
 CLTA = 
Total Contingent Liabilities
Total Assets
 LPTL = 
Loan Loss Provision
Net Loans
 
CAP = 
Equity Capital
Total Assets
 BDTD = 
Bank Deposits
Total Deposits
 ROAE = 
Net Income
Total Equity
 ALER = 
Interest Income
Total Earning Assets
 
LTA = 
Net Loans
Total Assets
 UDTD = 
Bank Depos.+Subord. Debt
Total Deposits
 LATA = 
Liquid Assets
Total Assets
 TLTD = 
Net Loans
Total Deposits
 
DCAD is a bank specialisation dummy, taking a value of 1 for banks with LTA ≥ 0.8 (spec.  commercial bank), 0 other-
wise; and LARGE is a dummy assuming a value of 1 for banks with assets in excess of 50 bn. US dollars, and 0 other-
wise.  The test statistics (F-statistics) for the Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equal-
ity of coefficient estimates is reported under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroske-
dasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below 
each coefficient estimate.  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Const. 0.066 0.091 0.114 0.141 0.113 0.113 0.124 0.110 0.114 0.125 0.116 0.129 
 
14.77*** 8.37*** 10.42*** 11.20*** 9.76*** 6.00*** 5.29*** 10.02*** 9.75*** 7.23*** 10.11*** 10.04*** 
ROID -0.026 -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.026 
     
-0.024 -0.026 
 
-2.43** -2.23** -2.55** -2.20** -2.48** 
     
-2.35** -2.51** 
CAP  
-0.656 -0.549 -0.710 -0.546 -0.577 -0.750 -0.572 -0.686 -0.607 -0.521 -0.469 
  
-2.57** -2.01** -2.60*** -2.01** -2.10** -2.34** -2.08** -2.22** -2.14** -1.81* -1.62 
CAP  
2 3.437 3.042 3.553 3.031 3.248 3.995 3.160 3.877 3.472 2.924 2.651 
  
2.47** 2.11** 2.44** 2.11** 2.23** 2.38** 2.19** 2.38** 2.31** 1.94* 1.76* 
LTA   
-0.030 -0.086 
 
-0.030 -0.031 -0.034 -0.032 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 
   
-3.19*** -5.29*** 
 
-3.19*** -2.94*** -3.64*** -3.16*** -4.15*** -4.05*** -3.86*** 
LCL      
-0.006 -0.033 
  
-0.014 
  
      
-0.41 -1.67* 
  
-1.10 
  BDTD        
0.016 
    
        
1.36 
    UDTD         
0.010 
   
         
0.84 
   CLTA          
-0.002 
  
          
-1.56 
  
             ROAE -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
-8.92*** -5.27*** -5.24*** -5.78*** -5.25*** -4.84*** -4.50*** -5.26*** -5.68*** -5.51*** -5.75*** -5.37*** 
LATA 0.075 0.072           
 
5.28*** 5.25*** 
          LPTL 0.474 0.319 0.351 0.229 0.350 0.343 0.326 0.353 0.187 0.310 0.325 0.312 
 
2.28** 1.64 1.80* 1.11 1.79* 1.71* 1.55 1.77* 0.89 1.53 1.63 1.55 
             LTA*ALER   
1.013 
        
    
3.75*** 
        LTA*DCAD    
-0.030 
       
     
-3.22*** 
       
LTA*(1-DCAD)    
-0.028 
       
     
-2.22** 
       
WALD 
    
0.044 
       
p-value 
    
(0.833) 
       
TLTD      
0.007 
     
       
1.64* 
     
CLTA*LARGE          
-0.001 -0.001 
           
-1.32 -1.09 
CLTA*Others          
-0.004 -0.003 
           
-2.25** -2.29** 
WALD 
          
2.742 2.875 
p-value 
          
(0.098) (0.090) 
             Country effect:  Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effect:         Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             Adj. R 0.12 2 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 
F - stats. 9.05*** 8.70*** 8.01*** 8.43*** 7.71*** 7.64*** 6.91*** 7.68*** 6.11*** 7.26*** 7.25*** 6.18*** 
Hausman test 
          
11.008 
                        (0.201) 
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Table 3.5:  Panel C 
Determinants of banks’ interest rate exposure [IR term-spread] 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression:  
|βSPR
where β it|= φ + X’itγ + Cjξ + Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T SPR
ROID = 1 − �(NetInt Inc.−NonInt.Inc)Total Oper.  Income � 
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the domestic 
interest rate term spread at time t.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company spe-
cific financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.  Tt and Cj are vectors of year- and country-dummies of dimension T-1 
and C-1 respectively.  The disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regressors 
(Xit).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The regressions are estimated for the 
following company specific financial measures all calculated at time t-1: 
LCL = 
Customer Deposits
Total Deposits
 CLTA = 
Total Contingent Liabilities
Total Assets
 LPTL = 
Loan Loss Provision
Net Loans
 
CAP = 
Equity Capital
Total Assets
 BDTD = 
Bank Deposits
Total Deposits
 ROAE = 
Net Income
Total Equity
 ALER = 
Interest Income
Total Earning Assets
 
LTA = 
Net Loans
Total Assets
 UDTD = 
Bank Depos.+Subord. Debt
Total Deposits
 LATA = 
Liquid Assets
Total Assets
 TLTD = 
Net Loans
Total Deposits
 
DCAD is a bank specialisation dummy, taking a value of 1 for banks with LTA ≥ 0.8 (spec. commercial bank), 0 otherwise; 
and LARGE is a dummy assuming a value of 1 for banks with assets in excess of 50 bn. US dollars, and 0 otherwise.  The 
test statistics (F-statistics) for the Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of coeffi-
cient estimates is reported under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient 
estimate.  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Const. 0.065 0.085 0.103 0.110 0.101 0.128 0.144 0.099 0.100 0.148 0.102 0.108 
 
15.52*** 6.80*** 7.35*** 7.70*** 6.80*** 5.38*** 4.88*** 7.44*** 6.89*** 5.71*** 6.84*** 7.84*** 
ROID -0.022 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 
     
-0.022 -0.021 
 
-2.03** -1.85* -2.05** -1.91* -2.06** 
     
-2.11** -2.00** 
CAP 
 
-0.563 -0.484 -0.524 -0.481 -0.463 -0.625 -0.502 -0.426 -0.576 -0.353 -0.539 
  
-2.11** -1.78* -1.92* -1.77* -1.72* -1.97** -1.85* -1.42 -2.14** -1.29 -1.95* 
CAP
 
2 2.979 2.676 2.791 2.662 2.599 3.610 2.775 2.518 3.124 1.949 2.919 
  
2.29** 1.99** 2.08** 1.99** 1.93* 2.28** 2.06** 1.70* 2.34** 1.46 2.17** 
LTA 
  
-0.022 -0.039 
 
-0.023 -0.019 -0.026 -0.033 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027 
   
-1.97** -2.73*** 
 
-2.11** -1.52 -2.22** -2.60*** -2.42** -2.50** -2.24** 
LCL      
-0.033 -0.039 
  
-0.046 
  
      
-2.00** -1.66* 
  
-2.53** 
  BDTD        
0.024 
    
        
2.06** 
    UDTD         
0.030 
   
         
2.37** 
   CLTA          
0.001 
  
          
0.83 
  
             ROAE -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
-2.08** -0.15 -0.31 -0.34 -0.33 -0.37 -0.26 -0.30 -1.00 -0.22 -2.03** -0.13 
LATA 0.052 0.050 
          
 
3.97*** 3.90*** 
          LPTL 0.171 0.037 0.056 0.024 0.055 0.051 -0.015 0.053 -0.011 0.031 0.118 0.047 
 
1.34 0.26 0.40 0.17 0.39 0.35 -0.09 0.36 -0.07 0.21 0.86 0.33 
             LTA*ALER    
0.289 
        
    
1.57 
        LTA*DCAD    
-0.023 
       
     
-1.99** 
       
LTA*(1-DCAD)    
-0.021 
       
     
-1.45 
       
WALD 
    
0.092 
       
p-value 
    
(0.762) 
       
TLTD      
0.010 
     
       
2.02** 
     
CLTA*LARGE          
0.000 0.000 
           
0.17 0.37 
CLTA*Others          
-0.002 -0.001 
           
-1.40 -1.04 
WALD 
          
3.967 2.831 
p-value 
          
(0.047) (0.093) 
             Country effect:        Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effect:              Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             Adj. R 0.13 2 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.28 0.13 0.13 
F - stats. 10.32*** 9.81*** 9.52*** 9.19*** 9.16*** 9.71*** 8.97*** 9.28*** 6.93*** 17.39*** 8.24*** 8.08*** 
Hausman test: 
          
16.164 
              (0.512) 
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Table 3.5:  Panel D 
Determinants of banks’ interest rate exposure [yield curve curvature] 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression:  
|βCURV
where β it|= φ + X’itγ + Cjξ + Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T CURV
ROID = 1 − �(NetInt Inc.−NonInt.Inc)Total Oper.  Income � 
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the curvature of 
domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company 
specific financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.  Tt and Cj are vectors of year- and country-dummies of dimension T-
1 and C-1 respectively.  The disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regressors 
(Xit).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The regressions are estimated for the 
following company specific financial measures all calculated at time t-1: 
LCL = 
Customer Deposits
Total Deposits
 CLTA = 
Total Contingent Liabilities
Total Assets
 LPTL = 
Loan Loss Provision
Net Loans
 
CAP = 
Equity Capital
Total Assets
 BDTD = 
Bank Deposits
Total Deposits
 ROAE = 
Net Income
Total Equity
 ALER = 
Interest Income
Total Earning Assets
 
LTA = 
Net Loans
Total Assets
 UDTD = 
Bank Depos.+Subord. Debt
Total Deposits
 LATA = 
Liquid Assets
Total Assets
 TLTD = 
Net Loans
Total Deposits
 
DCAD is a bank specialisation dummy, taking a value of 1 for banks with LTA ≥ 0.8 ( spec. commercial bank), 0 otherwise; 
and LARGE is a dummy assuming a value of 1 for banks with assets in excess of 50 bn. US dollars, and 0 otherwise.  The 
test statistics (F-statistics) for the Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of coefficient 
estimates is reported under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient estimate.  ***, 
** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Const. 0.024 0.031 0.035 0.040 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.039 
 
18.63*** 8.14*** 8.62*** 8.70*** 8.03*** 7.29*** 6.06*** 8.81*** 8.28*** 6.67*** 8.27*** 8.44*** 
ROID -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
     
-0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.72 -0.31 -0.56 -0.27 -0.59 
     
-0.46 -0.42 
CAP 
 
-0.208 -0.199 -0.233 -0.197 -0.202 -0.264 -0.199 -0.197 -0.217 -0.218 -0.211 
 
 
-2.37** -2.21** -2.53** -2.18** -2.22** -2.67*** -2.16** -1.96** -2.24** -2.16** -2.05** 
CAP
 
2 1.182 1.155 1.275 1.149 1.178 1.433 1.153 1.167 1.243 1.241 1.215 
 
 
2.73*** 2.63*** 2.85*** 2.60*** 2.65*** 3.04*** 2.55** 2.38** 2.66*** 2.56** 2.51** 
LTA 
  
-0.004 -0.013 
 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 
  
-1.17 -2.86*** 
 
-1.16 -0.84 -1.42 -1.43 -1.51 -1.47 -1.72* 
LCL  
    
-0.001 -0.013 
  
-0.001 
    
    
-0.21 -1.95* 
  
-0.26 
  BDTD  
      
0.003 
      
      
1.03 
    UDTD    
     
0.003 
       
     
0.82 
   CLTA       
   
0.000 
         
   
-1.42 
           
    ROAE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.07 -0.06 0.27 -0.13 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.24 -0.08 0.27 0.28 3.22*** 
LATA 0.016 0.016 
           
3.73*** 3.69*** 
          LPTL 0.050 0.014 0.022 0.003 0.022 0.022 0.034 0.020 -0.037 0.023 0.024 0.012 
 
0.92 0.26 0.43 0.05 0.42 0.43 0.60 0.39 -0.93 0.43 0.45 0.26 
    
  
 
 
   
  LTA*ALER    
0.172 
 
 
 
   
      
2.97*** 
 
     
  LTA*DCAD    
-0.004 
     
       
-1.19 
       
LTA*(1-DCAD)    
-0.003 
       
     
-0.85 
       
WALD 
    
0.084 
  
 
    
p-value 
    
(0.772) 
  
 
    
TLTD      
-0.000 
     
       
-0.22 
     
CLTA*LARGE          
-0.001 0.000 
           
-1.53 -1.40 
CLTA*Others          
0.000 -0.001 
           
-0.53 -1.46 
WALD 
          
0.225 0.398 
p-value 
          
(0.635) (0.528) 
             Country effect:      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect:            Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             Adj. R 0.18 2 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15 
F - stats. 14.85*** 14.16*** 13.71*** 13.38*** 13.20*** 13.71*** 12.38*** 13.47*** 11.24*** 12.54*** 12.07*** 9.43*** 
Hausman test: 
          
15.315 
              (0.573) 
tivities. Similarly, analysing the determinants of market risk for a sample of US
bank holding companies, Stiroh (2006) reports a di¤erential impact of di¤erent
non-interest income streams on the bank risks.
In contrast the results for short- and medium-term interest rate exposure
(Panels A and D) suggest that banks do no benet in any meaningful way from
diversifying their revenue streams. Once, however, I account for the country legal
origin and macroeconomic characteristics in the following section, a signicantly
negative association is reported.
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, concerning the impact of equity capital levels on
bank risk taking, I reformulate the parameterisation of (3.6) in a non-linear form:
kjit = '+1CAPji;t 1+2CAP 2ji;t 1+X 0ji;t 1+S 0j;t 1 +Cj+T 0t+"it (3.7)
where, kjit, as before, the stock returns sensitivity of country js bank i to unan-
ticipated changes in the selected interest rate proxy k at time t. CAP is the ratio
of bank is book value of equity to its total assets. Xjit is the it-th observation
on (M   2) additional company specic nancial ratios with  being (M   2)1
vector of coe¢cients. Tt and Cj are vectors of year- and country-dummies of
dimension T   1 and C   1 respectively.
In particular, we test the null hypothesis that better capitalised banks are
generally safer, although excessive capital levels instigate higher risk-taking. In
other words, I test whether the capital-risk relationships are in fact U-shaped:
1 < 0 and 2 > 0.
The estimation results reported in Table 3.5 suggest a negative association
between the banks capital levels and all four measures of interest rate risk. It
appears that rms with higher capital bu¤ers enjoy lower exposure to the unan-
ticipated interest rate movements and, through this channel, foster the stability
to the banking sector.
Nonetheless, the realised benets diminish as banks continue to accumulate
excessive capital levels. This implies U-shape capital-risk relationships as per
Hypothesis 1, and in line with Calem and Rob (1999) and Haq and Heaney
(2009). These results are robust to controlling for further nancial variables in
columns (3) to (11).
I also nd that the level of equity capital is more important in curtailing inter-
est rate exposures in countries without explicit depositor insurance as reported
in Table 3.6. This is most likely due to a higher level of market discipline pre-
vailing in these markets, with managers being forced to set aside capital bu¤ers
in accordance to expected risk exposures. Accordingly, following the monetary
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policy shocks these banks appear to be more protected. This outcome validates
Hypothesis 2.
To test Hypothesis 4, I modify the model in (3.8) by also incorporating the
measures of loan-to-assets (LTA) and low cost deposits (LCL). The pertinent
results are reported in column 3 of Table 3.5.
In line with theoretical predictions and the ndings of Fraser, Madura and
Weigand (2002), the loan-to-assets ratio is negatively related to the measures
of interest rate risk. The only exception is reported for the short-term beta.
This implies an increased concentration of adjustable-rate, frequently repriced,
products in the bank loan book resulting in a lower interest rate sensitivity of
these assets. These products are most likely of medium- or long-term maturity,
explaining the insignicant results for short-term beta.
It also appears that banks with a higher level of low cost liabilities (LCL),
such as customer deposits, exhibit lower interest rate risk. However, this rela-
tionship is only supported in countries with explicitly adopted deposit protection
mechanisms. As reported in columns 2, 10, and 14 of Table 3.6, in countries
without such protection bank risks are considerably higher, owing to the unsta-
ble character of at-risk deposit liabilities and increased probability of bank runs.
Accordingly, companies in these countries rely more on alternative, frequently
repriced funds. This results in higher exposure to interest rate risk.
Given these results, it is only justied to closely investigate how the degree
of bank intermediation a¤ects its exposure to interest rates. For this purpose I
employ the ratio of bank net total loans to its total deposits (TLTD).
The ratio bears a positive sign, implying a higher interest rate risk for insti-
tutions relying more on expensive borrowed funds to nance their loan portfolio
(column 7 of Table 3.5). Following the term-structure shock, these liabilities are
repriced, thereby depressing the banks interest margins. These ndings are par-
ticularly alarming amidst the global nancial crisis, characterised by increased
costs of term funding and constrained liquidity. In attempts to revive the econ-
omy, governments worldwide encourage deposit-starved banks to further extend
their lending activities, bringing the loan-to-deposit ratio to its highest level in
decades. Of even more concern is that banks loan-to-deposit ratio is rising in
line with declining net-interest margins (e.g. the UK example presented in the
introductory note), and crisis-induced decline in non-interest income.
Hypothesis 5 states that the relationships between accounting and market
measures of risk can be altered by the banks excessive credit risk or specialisation.
I account for these characteristics by introducing relevant interactive terms as
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follows:
kjit = '+ 1LTAji;t 1 DCAD + 2LTAji;t 1  (1 DCAD)+
+X 0ji;t 1+ S
0
j;t 1 + Cj+ T
0
t + "it (3.8)
kjit = '+ 1LTAji;t 1 + 2LTAji;t 1  ALERji;t 1+
+X 0ji;t 1+ S
0
j;t 1 + Cj+ T
0
t + "it (3.9)
where DCAD is a bank specialisation dummy, taking a value of 1 for banks
with LTA  0:8 (specialised commercial bank), 0 otherwise. Approximately 64
percent of specialised institutions in our sample are small banks with an asset
value of under USD $5 billion. The signicance of the asymmetry in (3.9) is
addressed using the Wald coe¢cient restriction test with the null hypothesis
stating the equality of coe¢cients 1 and 2.
ALER proxies the bank average lending rate calculated as the ratio of in-
terest income to total earning assets. This variable is used as a forward look-
ing measure of bank credit risk, arising as a result of increased loan rates and
consequential deterioration in the asset credit quality. Accordingly, I anticipate
higher interest rate exposure for banks which increased chargeable lending rates
in recent years and have a greater proportion of repriced assets. Under the spec-
ications in (3.10), the impact of loan book concentration on bank risk exposure
f(@k=@LTA) is determined by the bank forward looking measure of credit risk
ALER: @k=@LTA = 1 + 2ALER. The results are outlined in columns 4 and
5 of Tables 3.5.
Interesting ndings are reported for the banks specialisation ratio DCAD.
It emerges that specialisation does not markedly improve the bank risk prole.
Both diversied and specialised lenders enjoy a statistically identical reduction
in interest rate exposure associated with the size of loans portfolio. This sug-
gests that benets introduced by the strict asset-liability management practices
and well established interest rate transmission mechanism, commonly found in
specialised nancial institutions, are counterbalanced by the diversication ad-
vantages enjoyed by their non-specialised peers.
As per specication (3.10), I nd that banks which recently increased their
chargeable lending rates do not signicantly benet from a higher proportion
of repriced assets (column 4 of Table 3.5). In fact these institutions exhibit
higher exposure to the shocks in either medium- or long-term interest rates. This
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supports my empirical hypothesis and accentuates the link between credit and
interest rate risks previously emphasised by Jarrow and Turnbull (2000), and
Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa (2006).
Finally, I argue that institutions with higher proportion of large depositors are
less risky. This is because the majority of deposit insurance schemes introduced in
analysed countries enforce coverage limits leaving large depositors (such as other
banks and subordinated debt-holders) unprotected. Therefore, the exposure to
a potential loss encourages large depositors to closely monitor and possibly alter
the risk-taking behaviour of banks.
Surprisingly, I nd only weak evidence to support this view. Table 3.5 re-
ports conicting results, with the signicant coe¢cients for variables proxying
the market disciplinary e¤ect (BDTD, UDTD) taking either positive or negative
sign. The results in Table 3.6, however, suggest that this signicant associa-
tion is mainly attributed to the markets providing explicit deposit coverage. For
these countries, I nd only some evidence of monitoring by at-risk depositories
translating to a lower short-term interest rate exposure.
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, institutions attracting a higher pro-
portion of interbank deposits show greater exposure to movements in the interest
rate term-spread. Interestingly, this e¤ect is more pronounced when I use an
aggregate measure of uninsured deposits and subordinated debt (UDTD), sug-
gesting that interest rate risk may be a function increasing with the maturity
of the banks uninsured liabilities. Clearly, more research is needed in this area,
as well as in investigating the bank performance attributes guiding unprotected
at-risk claimholders in their decision to invest.
With respect to Hypothesis 6 concerning banks activities o¤-balance, I in-
clude the ratio of the banks total o¤-balance sheet exposure to its total assets
(CLTA) in specication (3.6).
The estimation results, reported in Table 3.5, provide weak evidence in sup-
port of the hypothesised relationship. In the presence of such weak evidence,
I reformulate the regression allowing for a separate treatment of small versus
medium and large banks. Furthermore, as the existence and design of deposit
insurance schemes signicantly alters the moral hazard risk-taking behaviour of
banks [Hooks and Robinson, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga,1998], the mo-
tivations for derivative usage would also di¤er across the markets. For instance,
rms in markets with explicitly adopted deposit protection schemes are more
likely to use derivatives for speculating. Banks lacking such explicit protection
and the ones forced to share the costs of insolvency by providing some forms of
explicitly specied risk-based premiums would rather use derivatives for hedging.
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 Table 3.6 
Bank financials, deposit insurance and interest rate risk 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression:  
|βIR
where β it|= φ + [X’it*EDI_REG + X’it* (1-EDI_REG)]γ + Cjξ + Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T IR
ROID = 1 − �(NetInt Inc.−NonInt.Inc)Total Oper.  Income � 
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the pertinent interest rate proxy (IR = SR, LR, SPR, CURV) at time t.  There 
are four panel regressions for each interest rate proxy as per the first row of the Table.  γ is a 2M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company specific finan-
cial ratios, served as explanatory variables. EDI_REG is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 for countries adopted an explicit deposit protection scheme, and 0 otherwise.  Tt and 
Cj are vectors of year- and country-dummies of dimension T-1 and C-1 respectively.  The disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regres-
sors (Xit).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The regressions are estimated for the following company specific financial measures all 
calculated at time t-1: 
LCL = 
Customer Deposits
Total Deposits
 CLTA = 
Total Contingent Liabilities
Total Assets
 
CAP = 
Equity Capital
Total Assets
 BDTD = 
Bank Deposits
Total Deposits
 ROAE = 
Net Income
Total Equity
 
LTA = 
Net Loans
Total Assets
 UDTD = 
Bank Depos.+Subord. Debt
Total Deposits
 LPTL = 
Loan Loss Provision
Net Loans
 
The (+) sign in the second column of the Table corresponds to the coefficient estimates for countries adopting an explicit deposit insurance, while (-) corresponds to the coefficients for 
countries with no explicit deposit protection.  The test statistics (F-statistics) for the Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of these coefficient 
estimates is reported under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard 
error are reported in italics below each coefficient estimate.  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
  Short - term interest rate Long - term interest rate Interest rate spread term Yield curve curvature 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Const. 
 
0.696 0.706 0.704 0.688 0.112 0.120 0.105 0.105 0.096 0.133 0.089 0.090 0.036 0.038 0.037 0.038 
  
6.90*** 5.62*** 6.81*** 6.58*** 13.62*** 7.14*** 12.45*** 11.53*** 10.96*** 6.25*** 11.47*** 10.66*** 8.50*** 7.34*** 8.55*** 8.00*** 
ROID (+) 0.067 
   
-0.026 
   
-0.020 
   
-0.001 
   
  
0.96 
   
-2.33** 
   
-1.83* 
   
-0.26 
   ROID (-) -0.101 
   
-0.041 
   
-0.046 
   
-0.005 
   
  
-1.06 
   
-2.40** 
   
-3.27*** 
   
-0.82 
   WALD 
 
2.083 
   
0.611 
   
2.760 
   
0.452 
   p-value 
 
(0.149) 
   
(0.435) 
   
(0.097) 
   
(0.502) 
   CAP (+) -4.856 -4.574 -4.658 -5.037 -0.308 -0.270 -0.276 -0.272 -0.286 -0.201 -0.249 -0.149 -0.207 -0.195 -0.207 -0.190 
  
-1.89* -1.83* -1.86* -2.07** -2.20** -1.90* -1.95* -1.70* -2.21** -1.65* -2.01** -1.13 -1.94* -1.85* -1.94* -1.61 
CAP (-) -6.034 -6.861 -6.559 -5.495 -0.606 -0.512 -0.480 -0.372 0.021 -0.106 0.125 0.137 -0.338 -0.528 -0.331 -0.404 
  
-3.48*** -3.53*** -3.70*** -3.25*** -3.12*** -2.78*** -2.86*** -2.42** 0.15 -0.52 1.19 1.05 -1.77* -2.54** -1.81* -2.25** 
WALD 
 
0.281 0.953 0.871 0.062 1.945 1.236 1.076 0.267 4.600 0.188 8.268 3.918 0.381 2.136 0.375 1.125 
p-value 
 
(0.596) (0.329) (0.351) (0.803) (0.163) (0.266) (0.300) (0.605) (0.032) (0.665) (0.004) (0.048) (0.537) (0.144) (0.540) (0.289) 
CAP (+) 2 23.703 21.884 22.608 24.667 1.840 1.748 1.778 1.834 1.544 1.164 1.398 1.012 1.170 1.118 1.165 1.108 
  
1.84* 1.76* 1.81* 2.06** 2.91*** 2.70*** 2.74*** 2.54** 2.61*** 1.93* 2.38** 1.73* 2.20** 2.12** 2.19** 1.88* 
CAP (-) 2 26.921 30.161 28.920 23.426 2.536 2.273 2.277 2.000 -0.216 -0.266 -0.472 -0.254 1.992 2.770 1.955 2.298 
  
3.11*** 3.37*** 3.49*** 3.10*** 2.49** 2.67*** 2.64*** 2.41** -0.41 -0.43 -0.91 -0.44 1.69* 2.33** 1.73* 2.18** 
WALD 
 
0.068 0.458 0.324 0.016 0.350 0.248 0.222 0.023 5.375 2.931 6.229 2.689 0.376 1.530 0.380 0.923 
p-value 
 
(0.795) (0.499) (0.569) (0.899) (0.554) (0.618) (0.638) (0.878) (0.021) (0.087) (0.013) (0.101) (0.540) (0.216) (0.538) (0.337) 
LTA (+) -0.031 -0.027 -0.023 -0.004 -0.043 -0.046 -0.045 -0.043 -0.024 -0.026 -0.026 -0.033 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
  
-0.52 -0.45 -0.38 -0.06 -4.54*** -4.85*** -4.49*** -4.04*** -2.97*** -3.12*** -3.11*** -3.55*** -1.50 -1.46 -1.68* -1.78* 
 
1
3
0
 
                  
LTA (-) 0.076 -0.048 -0.010 -0.043 0.007 -0.009 -0.015 -0.028 -0.097 -0.158 -0.125 -0.143 -0.005 -0.032 -0.009 -0.011 
  
1.00 -0.51 -0.19 -0.88 0.29 -0.28 -0.74 -1.94* -2.42** -2.12** -2.32** -2.70*** -0.38 -1.72* -0.59 -0.83 
WALD 
 
1.156 0.036 0.024 0.219 3.763 1.086 1.786 0.754 3.503 3.250 3.603 4.634 0.004 2.095 0.029 0.111 
p-value 
 
(0.283) (0.849) (0.878) (0.640) (0.053) (0.298) (0.182) (0.385) (0.062) (0.072) (0.058) (0.032) (0.949) (0.148) (0.865) (0.739) 
LCL (+) 
 
-0.004 
   
-0.014 
   
-0.046 
   
-0.003 
  
   
-0.05 
   
-1.00 
   
-2.41** 
   
-0.88 
  LCL (-) 
 
0.049 
   
-0.011 
   
0.018 
   
0.027 
  
   
0.56 
   
-0.54 
   
0.55 
   
2.65*** 
  WALD 
  
0.275 
   
0.016 
   
2.726 
   
6.778 
  p-value 
  
(0.600) 
   
(0.900) 
   
(0.099) 
   
(0.009) 
  BDTD (+) 
  
-0.079 
   
0.012 
   
0.026 
   
0.002 
 
    
-1.35 
   
0.78 
   
2.03** 
   
0.55 
 BDTD (-) 
  
-0.055 
   
-0.022 
   
0.001 
   
-0.010 
 
    
-0.30 
   
-0.80 
   
0.04 
   
-0.77 
 WALD 
   
0.015 
   
1.173 
   
0.523 
   
0.802 
 p-value 
   
(0.903) 
   
(0.279) 
   
(0.470) 
   
(0.371) 
 UDTD (+) 
   
-0.110 
   
0.006 
   
0.033 
   
0.001 
     
-1.83* 
   
0.36 
   
2.22** 
   
0.12 
UDTD (-) 
   
-0.077 
   
-0.029 
   
-0.020 
   
-0.003 
     
-0.50 
   
-0.96 
   
-0.40 
   
-0.23 
WALD 
    
0.041 
   
1.037 
   
1.078 
   
0.068 
p-value 
    
(0.840) 
   
(0.309) 
   
(0.299) 
   
(0.794) 
CLTA (+) -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
  
-1.34 -1.17 -1.58 -1.46 -1.75* -1.78* -1.68* -1.87* -0.17 0.53 0.10 -0.07 -1.50 -1.26 -1.27 -1.42 
CLTA (-) -0.017 -0.057 -0.061 -0.126 0.014 -0.008 -0.006 -0.024 0.031 0.012 0.008 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.010 
  
-0.18 -0.79 -0.83 -1.93* 1.16 -0.53 -0.45 -1.18 1.26 0.57 0.38 0.06 -0.77 -0.66 -1.28 -1.80* 
WALD 
 
0.013 0.511 0.534 3.365 1.720 0.149 0.088 1.142 1.602 0.294 0.144 0.004 0.480 0.351 1.438 2.882 
p-value 
 
(0.911) (0.475) (0.465) (0.067) (0.190) (0.700) (0.767) (0.286) (0.206) (0.588) (0.705) (0.949) (0.489) (0.553) (0.231) (0.090) 
ROAE (+) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
2.27** 2.33** 2.34** 1.94* -7.30*** -7.43*** -7.38*** -8.12*** -0.89 -1.39 -1.05 -1.98** 0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.23 
ROAE (-) 0.018 -0.044 -0.019 0.133 0.010 0.008 0.022 0.033 0.087 0.038 0.087 0.098 0.025 0.015 0.025 0.032 
  
0.07 -0.17 -0.07 0.49 0.20 0.17 0.42 0.52 2.09** 0.83 1.57 1.52 1.08 0.79 1.07 1.36 
WALD 
 
0.002 0.037 0.009 0.214 0.077 0.062 0.244 0.333 4.405 0.712 2.483 2.356 1.164 0.622 1.151 1.865 
p-value 
 
(0.966) (0.847) (0.925) (0.644) (0.782) (0.803) (0.622) (0.564) (0.036) (0.399) (0.115) (0.125) (0.281) (0.430) (0.284) (0.172) 
LPTL (+) -2.843 -2.801 -2.773 -2.639 0.337 0.333 0.337 0.221 0.084 0.068 0.076 0.034 0.012 0.013 0.009 -0.043 
  
-1.74* -1.75* -1.73* -1.63 1.42 1.36 1.38 0.80 0.55 0.43 0.47 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.16 -0.97 
LPTL (-) 2.847 3.142 3.269 2.723 1.320 1.448 1.475 1.022 1.468 1.456 1.662 1.419 0.279 0.266 0.295 0.249 
  
1.33 1.54 1.55 1.34 1.29 1.38 1.38 1.06 2.25** 2.03** 2.28** 2.20** 1.60 1.44 1.47 1.38 
WALD 
 
4.628 5.341 5.350 4.260 0.864 1.065 1.064 0.636 4.271 3.593 4.467 4.325 2.125 1.736 1.886 2.430 
p-value 
 
(0.032) (0.021) (0.021) (0.039) (0.353) (0.302) (0.303) (0.425) (0.039) (0.058) (0.035) (0.038) (0.145) (0.188) (0.170) (0.119) 
                  Country effect:        Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effect:              Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                  Adj. R  
2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
F - stats. 17.41*** 17.40*** 17.19*** 13.79*** 6.13*** 5.83*** 5.63*** 4.47*** 7.20*** 7.45*** 6.90*** 5.35*** 9.97*** 10.17*** 9.85*** 8.34*** 
Number of observations                             
 
1
3
1
 
Accordingly, the following regressions are estimated:
kjit = '+ 1CLTAji;t 1 D_LARGE + 2CLTAji;t 1 OTHERS+
+X 0ji;t 1+ S
0
j;t 1 + Cj+ T
0
t + "it (3.10)
kjit = '+ 1CLTAji;t 1 EDI_REG+ 2CLTAji;t 1  (1 EDI_REG)+
+X 0ji;t 1+ S
0
j;t 1 + Cj+ T
0
t + "it (3.11)
where D_LARGE is a bank size dummy, taking a value of 1 for banks with
total value of assets in excess of 50 billion US dollars in a respective year, and 0
otherwise; EDI_REG is a dummy variable taking value of 1 for countries adopted
an explicit deposit protection scheme, and 0 otherwise. The signicance of the
asymmetry is addressed using the Wald coe¢cient restriction test with the null
hypothesis stating the equality of coe¢cients 1 and 2.
The empirical results for the modied models are outlined in Tables 3.5. There
is strong evidence to conclude that large banks are likely to use o¤-balance sheet
activities for hedging their short-term interest rate exposures. This observation
is consistent with Au Yong, Fa¤, and Chalmers (2009) who also relate an increase
in derivative activities of Asia-Pacic banks to a lower short-term interest rate
exposure. The small and medium size banks, on the other hand, appear to more
e¤ectively use derivatives in reducing their long-term interest rate exposure.
I further conclude that the provision of deposit insurance plays some role in
shaping the bank risk taking behaviour. Conversely to my expectations it appears
that only explicitly protected institutions tend to use derivatives for hedging,
while non-protected banks do not benet from o¤-balance sheet transactions.
Design of deposit insurance and interest rate risk
The relationship between market and accounting measures of risk depends on
the provision of deposit insurance (Table 3.6). Therefore, it seems sensible to
further examine the di¤erential impact of the deposit insurance design features
on bank interest rate exposure. Table 3.7 presents the regression results when
interchangeably including a wide range of variables, each representing a particular
attribute of the adopted insurance scheme.
I report a strongly positive association between bank interest rate risk and
the generosity of the deposit insurance. Both proxies of "generous" provision
(GDI_REG and DIC_REG) are positive and strongly signicant for all interest
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Table 3.7:  Panel A 
Deposit insurance design and interest rate risk 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression:  
|βIR
where β it|= φ + X’itγ + S’jtξ + Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T IR
ROID = 1 − �(NetInt Inc.−NonInt.Inc)Total Oper.  Income � 
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the pertinent interest 
rate proxy (IR = SR, LR) at time t.  There are five panel regressions for each interest rate proxy as per the first row of the 
Table.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company specific financial ratios, served as 
explanatory variables.  Similarly, ξ is an S x 1 vector of coefficients and Sjt is the jt-th observation on S country specific vari-
ables describing the design of existing deposit protection scheme.  Tt is a vector of year-dummies of dimension T-1, and the 
disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regressors (Xit) and S country level 
regressors (Sjt).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The regressions are estimated 
for the following company- and market- specific varibales all calculated at time t-1: 
LCL = 
Customer Deposits
Total Deposits
 LPTL = 
Loan Loss Provision
Net Loans
 
CAP = 
Equity Capital
Total Assets
 CLTA = 
Total Contingent Liabilities
Total Assets
 DIC_REG = 
Protection coverage
GDP-per-capita
 
LTA = 
Net Loans
Total Assets
 ROAE = 
Net Income
Total Equity
  
GDI_REG is a dummy variably assuming a value of 1 if the county’s j ratio of insurance coverage/GDP-per-capita ≥ median 
over all analysed countries, and 0 otherwise; RBI_REG is a dummy taking a value of 1 if the deposit insurance fees charged to 
banks vary based on some assessment of risk, and 0 otherwise; and CDI_REG takes a value of 1 if there is a formal coinsur-
ance requirements, and 0 otherwise.  SDI_REG = RBI_REG+CDI_REG (Index of Stringent Insurance).  The market macro-
economic conditions are proxied by the following measures, all calculated at time t-1: M_GDPG represents year-on-year GDP 
growth, M_INFL measures the inflation as the current period CPI growth rate, and M_EXCI is the real effective exchange 
rate.  D_FREN, D_GERM, and D_SCAN are time-invariant “legal origin” dummy variables assuming the value of 1 if the 
legal origin of the target bank country is 
 
German, French, or Scandinavian respectively; and 0 otherwise.  Heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient 
estimate.  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
Short - term interest rate Long - term interest rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GDI_REG -0.001 
    
0.244 0.028 
    
0.043 
 
-0.03 
    
5.04*** 5.59*** 
    
4.20*** 
DIC REG -0.004      
0.011 
    
  
-0.40 
     
5.29*** 
    RBI REG 
 
-0.195 
     
0.008 
   
   
-5.30*** 
     
1.18 
   CDI REG 
  
0.081 
     
0.020 
  
    
3.65*** 
     
4.36*** 
  SDI REG 
   
-0.014 0.154 
    
0.014 -0.015 
     
-0.84 3.35*** 
    
3.83*** -1.80* 
GDI REG*SDI REG 
   
-0.309 
     
0.001 
      
-5.45*** 
     
0.15 
D FREN -0.009 -0.004 0.026 -0.027 -0.004 -0.042 0.007 -0.011 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.016 
 
-0.38 -0.12 1.24 -1.13 -0.14 -1.79* 1.72* -2.69*** 0.35 -0.38 -0.63 2.49** 
D GERM -0.137 -0.143 -0.283 -0.076 -0.157 -0.207 0.027 0.016 0.002 0.011 0.017 0.025 
 
-2.60*** -3.02*** -5.38*** -1.70* -3.13*** -3.48*** 3.44*** 2.18** 0.24 1.60 2.12** 3.08*** 
D SCAN -0.265 -0.269 -0.187 -0.187 -0.272 -0.431 0.039 0.019 0.005 0.026 0.015 0.051 
 
-5.80*** -7.78*** -5.22*** -5.40*** -7.89*** -5.07*** 3.89*** 2.17** 0.49 2.71*** 1.68* 4.01*** 
M GDPG -0.842 -1.071 -3.397 -0.421 -1.083 -3.133 0.663 0.811 0.306 0.297 0.451 0.708 
 
-0.81 -0.94 -3.43*** -0.50 -1.16 -2.44** 3.02*** 3.71*** 1.55 1.53 2.20** 3.27*** 
M INFL -13.513 -13.731 -16.641 -11.520 -14.050 -14.281 0.638 0.306 -0.182 0.168 0.249 0.663 
 
-6.85*** -7.67*** -8.50*** -7.38*** -7.46*** -6.85*** 2.56** 1.25 -0.68 0.72 0.98 2.57** 
M EXCI -0.823 -0.829 -0.848 -0.843 -0.822 -0.896 0.007 0.018 0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.012 
 
-3.48*** -3.49*** -3.57*** -3.61*** -3.47*** -3.79*** 0.19 0.47 0.12 -0.05 0.03 0.31 
             Const. 0.759 0.777 0.929 0.632 0.791 0.751 0.062 0.069 0.113 0.089 0.086 0.060 
 
6.01*** 6.21*** 7.87*** 5.54*** 6.56*** 5.65*** 3.29*** 4.10*** 6.25*** 5.31*** 4.75*** 3.18*** 
ROID -0.146 -0.147 -0.060 -0.125 -0.144 -0.049 -0.031 -0.030 -0.036 -0.027 -0.035 -0.028 
 
-2.37** -2.39** -0.91 -2.03** -2.30** -0.75 -3.81*** -3.60*** -4.05*** -3.29*** -4.22*** -3.30*** 
CAP -5.335 -5.274 -4.800 -5.571 -5.258 -4.497 -0.639 -0.730 -0.586 -0.628 -0.639 -0.617 
 
-2.29** -2.23** -2.08** -2.41** -2.24** -1.93* -2.28** -2.59*** -1.97** -2.24** -2.24** -2.17** 
CAP 22.572 2 22.085 19.608 25.090 21.946 20.440 3.149 3.744 2.492 3.058 3.027 2.991 
 
1.86* 1.79* 1.65* 2.07** 1.80* 1.69* 2.03** 2.43** 1.56 1.98** 1.95* 1.90* 
LTA 0.049 0.046 -0.003 0.050 0.045 0.016 -0.037 -0.034 -0.040 -0.041 -0.038 -0.038 
 
0.74 0.68 -0.05 0.78 0.67 0.28 -3.82*** -3.72*** -3.67*** -4.25*** -3.79*** -3.86*** 
LCL 0.144 0.145 0.024 0.140 0.136 0.029 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.009 0.017 0.006 
 
3.18*** 3.24*** 0.48 3.05*** 2.82*** 0.58 1.07 0.66 1.17 0.81 1.48 0.46 
CLTA -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 
-1.63 -1.67* -1.79* -1.14 -1.72* -1.15 -1.61 -1.95* -2.46** -1.84* -1.93* -1.63 
ROAE 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
2.19** 2.20** 2.32** 2.07** 2.21** 2.22** -5.83*** -5.38*** -5.57*** -6.03*** -5.71*** -5.88*** 
LPTL -1.686 -1.647 -1.725 -2.195 -1.605 -2.063 0.334 0.328 0.459 0.322 0.365 0.354 
 
-1.38 -1.34 -1.44 -1.69* -1.31 -1.62 1.65* 1.65 2.45** 1.58 1.87* 1.76* 
             Country effect:       No 
 
No No No No No No No No No No No 
Time effect:            Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.30 2 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 
F - stats. 24.72*** 24.73*** 25.95*** 25.11*** 24.74*** 24.25*** 8.31*** 8.39*** 6.84*** 7.66*** 7.52*** 7.83*** 
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Table 3.7:  Panel B 
Deposit insurance design and interest rate risk 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression:  
|βIR
where β it|= φ + X’itγ + S’jtξ + Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T IR
ROID = 1 − �(NetInt Inc.−NonInt.Inc)Total Oper.  Income � 
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the pertinent interest 
rate proxy (IR = SPR, CURV) at time t.  There are five panel regressions for each interest rate proxy as per the first row of 
the Table.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company specific financial ratios, served as 
explanatory variables.  Similarly, ξ is an S x 1 vector of coefficients and Sjt is the jt-th observation on S country specific vari-
ables describing the design of existing deposit protection scheme.  Tt is a vector of year-dummies of dimension T-1, and the 
disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regressors (Xit) and S country level 
regressors (Sjt).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The regressions are esti-
mated for the following company- and market- specific variables all calculated at time t-1: 
LCL = 
Customer Deposits
Total Deposits
 LPTL = 
Loan Loss Provision
Net Loans
 
CAP = 
Equity Capital
Total Assets
 CLTA = 
Total Contingent Liabilities
Total Assets
 DIC_REG = 
Protection coverage
GDP-per-capita
 
LTA = 
Net Loans
Total Assets
 ROAE = 
Net Income
Total Equity
  
GDI_REG is a dummy variably assuming a value of 1 if the county’s j ratio of insurance coverage/GDP-per-capita ≥ median 
over all analysed countries, and 0 otherwise; RBI_REG is a dummy taking a value of 1 if the deposit insurance fees charged to 
banks vary based on some assessment of risk, and 0 otherwise; and CDI_REG takes a value of 1 if there is a formal coinsur-
ance requirements, and 0 otherwise.  SDI_REG = RBI_REG+CDI_REG (Index of Stringent Insurance).  The market macro-
economic conditions are proxied by the following measures, all calculated at time t-1: M_GDPG represents year-on-year GDP 
growth, M_INFL measures the inflation as the current period CPI growth rate, and M_EXCI is the real effective exchange 
rate.  D_FREN, D_GERM, and D_SCAN are time-invariant “legal origin” dummy variables assuming the value of 1 if the 
legal origin of the target bank country is 
 
German, French, or Scandinavian respectively; and 0 otherwise.  Heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient 
estimate.  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
Interest rate term spread Yield curve curvature 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GDI_REG 0.014 
    
0.055 0.007 
    
0.019 
 
3.36*** 
    
4.90*** 4.46*** 
    
5.59*** 
DIC REG 0.002      
0.002 
    
  
1.39 
     
2.87*** 
    RBI REG 
 
-0.014 
     
-0.002 
   
   
-2.27** 
     
-1.75* 
   CDI REG 
  
0.014 
     
0.005 
  
    
3.17*** 
     
3.51*** 
  SDI REG 
   
0.003 -0.005 
    
0.002 -0.005 
     
0.99 -0.73 
    
2.28** -2.03** 
GDI REG*SDI REG 
   
-0.024 
     
-0.005 
      
-3.35*** 
     
-1.96** 
D FREN -0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.010 -0.008 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.007 
 
-1.00 -1.90* -0.93 -2.01** -1.60 0.56 2.36** 0.19 2.37** 0.80 0.99 4.70*** 
D GERM 0.011 0.000 -0.015 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.008 
 
1.63 -0.07 -1.94* 0.94 0.14 0.49 3.44*** 2.10** 0.32 2.62*** 2.20** 2.78*** 
D SCAN 0.005 -0.009 -0.005 0.002 -0.009 0.007 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.008 
 
0.94 -2.10** -1.02 0.39 -2.21** 0.88 1.71* -0.78 -1.18 0.76 -0.96 2.66*** 
M GDPG 0.270 0.151 -0.143 0.101 0.099 0.136 0.194 0.167 0.047 0.106 0.122 0.175 
 
1.30 0.67 -0.65 0.55 0.48 0.64 2.85*** 2.26** 0.73 1.87* 1.93* 2.51** 
M INFL 0.169 -0.194 -0.533 0.015 -0.172 0.137 0.018 -0.128 -0.256 -0.086 -0.121 0.017 
 
0.51 -0.61 -1.54 0.05 -0.52 0.41 0.24 -1.61 -2.94*** -1.15 -1.60 0.22 
M EXCI 0.041 0.041 0.037 0.035 0.038 0.041 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 
 
0.86 0.87 0.79 0.75 0.81 0.87 -0.50 -0.39 -0.62 -0.71 -0.62 -0.42 
             Const. 0.074 0.094 0.116 0.083 0.095 0.071 0.016 0.023 0.033 0.022 0.025 0.015 
 
3.75*** 5.04*** 6.88*** 4.42*** 4.93*** 3.84*** 2.41** 3.84*** 5.65*** 3.61*** 3.95*** 2.34** 
ROID -0.034 -0.035 -0.029 -0.032 -0.036 -0.023 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 
 
-3.28*** -3.41*** -2.93*** -2.89*** -3.54*** -2.13** -2.99*** -3.06*** -2.94*** -2.54** -3.32*** -1.95* 
CAP -0.494 -0.489 -0.431 -0.499 -0.476 -0.388 -0.236 -0.244 -0.214 -0.236 -0.234 -0.202 
 
-1.74* -1.71* -1.51 -1.78* -1.67* -1.37 -2.44** -2.44** -2.14** -2.45** -2.38** -2.07** 
CAP 2.352 2 2.220 1.804 2.421 2.126 1.927 1.237 1.270 1.049 1.253 1.195 1.068 
 
1.62 1.53 1.25 1.70* 1.47 1.34 2.48** 2.43** 2.04** 2.50** 2.34** 2.12** 
LTA -0.018 -0.019 -0.024 -0.020 -0.019 -0.022 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 
-1.43 -1.48 -1.98** -1.62 -1.52 -1.88* -0.46 -0.47 -0.87 -0.72 -0.55 -0.77 
LCL -0.014 -0.016 -0.024 -0.016 -0.013 -0.032 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.002 
 
-1.29 -1.42 -2.01** -1.45 -1.18 -2.67*** 2.60*** 2.33** 1.69* 2.35** 2.72*** 0.60 
CLTA 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.38 -0.72 -0.95 -0.36 -0.71 -0.11 -2.21** -2.46** -2.67*** -2.26** -2.48** -2.00** 
ROAE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.43 -0.27 -0.39 -0.50 -0.33 -0.86 -0.13 0.09 0.14 -0.18 0.02 -0.17 
LPTL 0.033 0.071 0.094 0.003 0.073 0.029 0.041 0.053 0.068 0.034 0.054 0.044 
 
0.23 0.47 0.60 0.02 0.49 0.20 0.63 0.72 0.84 0.52 0.73 0.69 
             Country effect:      No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Time effect:            Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.12 2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18 
F - stats. 8.21*** 7.85*** 8.05*** 8.24*** 7.83*** 8.41*** 12.26*** 11.66*** 11.41*** 11.99*** 11.55*** 11.97*** 
rate proxies, with an exception of the short-term beta. This result is consistent
with a view that depositors, assured in the safety of their wealth, will most
conceivably induce banks to engage in more protable and riskier activities. This
will alter banks risk exposures and aggravate moral hazard. It is also in line
with a view commonly articulated in the literature. For instance, controlling
for a variety of regulatory provisions, Barth et al. (2006) relate the increased
likelihood of banking crises to the generosity of deposit insurance.
To reect on the economic signicance of the outlined ndings, I estimate
approximately a 3:5 percent reduction in the long-term interest rate exposure of
Italian banks, should the Italian government decrease the explicit deposit coverage
ratio (DIC_REG) from its current level of 4:96 to the sample mean of 1:93.
In light of this evidence, the most recent proposal under the Deposit Guaran-
tee Schemes Directive (DGSD) to increase the levels of deposit coverage in the
countries members of the European Union seems alarming at best. Specically,
following the turbulent market conditions over the 2007-2008, on 15 October 2008
the European Commission issued a proposal to improve DGSD. Under this pro-
posal, the minimum level of deposit coverage is proposed to be increased from
EUR 20; 000 to EUR 100; 000 within one year, and to EUR 50; 000 as of 15 Oc-
tober 2008. Surprisingly, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision has not
formally issued any recommendation regarding deposit protection arrangements.
Another reason why deposit protection may induce moral hazard is associated
with banks generally paying only a at-rate premium. Accordingly, I analyse
whether the provision of stringent insurance requirements, such as risk based
premiums and coinsurance, may be the answer to this problem.
Intuitively, the perception seems to be that it is risk based premiums, rather
than coinsurance requirements, that o¤er greater risk-reduction benets. In
terms of coinsurance requirements, it can be argued that risk monitoring incen-
tives should increase together with the proportion of depositors wealth at risk.
Nonetheless, provided that in the majority of past bank systemic failures govern-
ments extended blanket guarantees irrespective of coinsurance requirements, the
depositors risk monitoring incentive diminishes.
The results in Table 3.7 support the aforementioned arguments. The results
are robust to all analysed risk proxies. It is also worth noting that bank in-
terest rate exposure, induced by the provision of generous insurance, may be
o¤set by imposing stringent deposit requirements. The interaction term GDI-
REG*SDIREG enters both regressions 6 and 12 of Table 3.7 signicantly nega-
tive.
With respect to the macroeconomic conditions, I include the measure of GDP
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growth (M_GDPG) accounting for the cyclical output e¤ect, and the measure of
ination computed as the current period CPI growth rate (M_INFL). I argue that
GDP-growth a¤ects several factors related to the supply and demand for loans
and deposits, as well as the credit quality of the banks loan book. Specically, in
the contracting economic environment, asset credit quality commonly deteriorates
and default rates rocket. This paves the way for reduced bank protability and
increased risk sensitivities. Accordingly, I expect a negative association between
GDP-growth and bank interest rate exposure. Given, however, recent evidence
documenting a positive link between bank stock returns and economic growth
(Cole, Moshirian, and Wu, 2008), the lagged M_GDPG variable is used in the
model framework to relax simultaneity bias.
Despite my expectations, the negative coe¢cients are only reported for the
short-term interest rate betas. For the remaining factors, the coe¢cient is pos-
itive. This suggests that amidst macroeconomic expansion banks may pursue
riskier activities and show lower discipline of risk management practices.
The lagged changes in ination rates are also included in the regression since
unexpected changes in interest rates are mainly driven by unanticipated ination-
ary shocks. I assume that banks can reasonably foresee inationary shocks and
timely execute relevant hedges. Therefore, I anticipate a negative relationship
between bank interest rate risk and ination. Results in Table 3.7 support these
expectations.
Finally, I use a set of "legal origin" dummy variables to account for di¤er-
ences in the countries nancial development. The dummies take a value of one
if the legal origin of the target bank country is either German, French, or Scan-
dinavian, and 0 otherwise. These variables are jointly signicant with, though,
diverse coe¢cient signs reported for di¤erent interest rate proxies. It appears
that institutions in countries of English legal origin exhibit highest exposure to
the shocks in the short-term interest rates, while lowest to changes in medium-
and long-term rates.
Country regulatory characteristics and interest rate risk
In Table 3.8 I include a set of country regulatory characteristics that are
believed to a¤ect signicantly bank behaviour.
First, I consider the index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. I only
nd weak evidence that restricting banks activities a¤ect their interest rate ex-
posure. The only signicant coe¢cient (ACT_REG) is reported for the medium-
term interest rate beta (Panel D). This is surprising at best, especially given that
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Table 3.8:  Panel A [Short-term IR] 
Bank financials, bank regulations and interest rate risk             
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression: 
|βSR
where β it|= φ + X’itγ + S’jtξ + G’jtλ+ Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T SR
Each regression also includes the following company- and country-specific variables which are not reported:  the 
measure of revenue diversification ROID, the ratio (and the squared ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank’s 
total assets CAP (CAP
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the domestic 
short-term interest rate at time t.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company 
specific financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.    Similarly, ξ is an S x 1 vector of coefficients and Sjt is the 
jt-th observation on S country specific variables describing the design of existing bank regulations; and λ is an L x 1 
and Gjt is the jt-th observation on L country specific macroeconomic characteristics.  Tt is a vector of year-dummies of 
dimension T-1, and the disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regres-
sors (Xit), S country level regulatory characteristics (Sjt), and L county specific macroeconomic factors (Gjt).  For each 
estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The market-specific regulatory variables are 
as follows:  ACT_REG is the Index of Restricted activities, CAP_REG is the Index of Regulatory capital require-
ments, DIS_REG is the Index of Bank discipline, DIV_REG is the Diversification Index, and INF_REG is the Index of 
Information disclosure.  The detailed definitions for each index, including information sources and computational 
issues, are outlined in Table 3.1. 
2), the ratio of net total loans to total assets LTA, the ratio of customer deposits to total depos-
its LCL, the ratio of bank i’s total off-balance sheet exposure to its total assets CLTA, the ratio of net income to total 
equity ROAE, the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans LPTL, year-on-year GDP growth M_GDPG, M_INFL which 
measures the inflation as the current period CPI growth rate, and the real effective exchange rate M_EXCI, all calcu-
lated at time t-1.  For details see Table 3.1.  The regression also includes time-invariant “legal origin” dummy vari-
ables D_FREN, D_GERM, and D_SCAN which assume the value of 1 if the legal origin of the target bank country is 
German
  
, French, or Scandinavian respectively; and 0 otherwise.  The (+) sign in the second column of the Table 
corresponds to the coefficient estimates for countries adopting an explicit deposit insurance, while (-) corresponds to 
the coefficients for countries with no explicit deposit protection.  The test statistics (F-statistics) for the Wald coeffi-
cient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of these coefficient estimates is reported under 
WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-
values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient estimate.  ***, ** and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ACT_REG 
 
-0.006 
         
  
-1.02 
         CAP REG 
  
-0.017 
        
   
-1.56 
        DIS REG 
  
 
0.027 
       
   
 
4.61*** 
       DIV REG 
  
  
-0.051 
      
   
  
-2.98*** 
      
INF REG 
  
   
-0.007 
     
   
   
-1.43 
     
ACT REG (+)     -0.011     
   
    
-1.29 
    
ACT REG (-)     -0.005     
   
    
-0.94 
    
WALD 
  
    
1.356 
    
p-value 
  
    
(0.245) 
    
CAP REG (+)      -0.019    
   
     
-1.57 
   
CAP REG (-)      -0.029    
   
     
-1.21 
   
WALD 
  
     
0.401 
   
p-value 
  
     
(0.527) 
   
DIS REG (+)       0.037   
   
      
5.60*** 
  
DIS REG (-)       0.021   
   
      
4.09*** 
  
WALD 
  
      
31.006 
  
p-value 
  
      
(0.000) 
  
DIV REG (+)        -0.093  
   
       
-4.41*** 
 
DIV REG (-)        -0.248  
   
       
-4.71*** 
 
WALD 
  
       
20.010 
 
p-value 
  
       
(0.000) 
 
INF REG (+)         -0.008 
   
        
-1.48 
INF REG (-)         -0.006 
   
        
-1.18 
WALD 
  
        
0.320 
p-value 
  
        
(0.572) 
            Country effect:                No No No No No No No No No No 
Time effect:                     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            Adj. R
 
2 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.30 
F - stats. 
 
24.75*** 24.80*** 25.70*** 25.10*** 24.77*** 23.77*** 23.80*** 25.01*** 24.35*** 23.77*** 
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Table 3.8:  Panel B [Long-term IR] 
Bank financials, bank regulations and interest rate risk            
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression: 
|βLR
where β it|= φ + X’itγ + S’jtξ + G’jtλ+ Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T LR
Each regression also includes the following company- and country-specific variables which are not reported:  the 
measure of revenue diversification ROID, the ratio (and the squared ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank’s 
total assets CAP (CAP
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the domestic 
long-term interest rate at time t.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company 
specific financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.    Similarly, ξ is an S x 1 vector of coefficients and Sjt is the 
jt-th observation on S country specific variables describing the design of existing bank regulations; and λ is an L x 1 
and Gjt is the jt-th observation on L country specific macroeconomic characteristics.  Tt is a vector of year-dummies of 
dimension T-1, and the disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regres-
sors (Xit), S country level regulatory characteristics (Sjt), and L county specific macroeconomic factors (Gjt).  For each 
estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The market-specific regulatory variables are 
as follows:  ACT_REG is the Index of Restricted activities, CAP_REG is the Index of Regulatory capital require-
ments, DIS_REG is the Index of Bank discipline, DIV_REG is the Diversification Index, and INF_REG is the Index 
of Information disclosure.  The detailed definitions for each index, including information sources and computational 
issues, are outlined in Table 3.1. 
2), the ratio of net total loans to total assets LTA, the ratio of customer deposits to total depos-
its LCL, the ratio of bank i’s total off-balance sheet exposure to its total assets CLTA, the ratio of net income to total 
equity ROAE, the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans LPTL, year-on-year GDP growth M_GDPG, M_INFL which 
measures the inflation as the current period CPI growth rate, and the real effective exchange rate M_EXCI, all 
calculated at time t-1.  For details see Table 3.1.  The regression also includes time-invariant “legal origin” dummy 
variables D_FREN, D_GERM, and D_SCAN which assume the value of 1 if the legal origin of the target bank 
country is German
  
, French, or Scandinavian respectively; and 0 otherwise.  The (+) sign in the second column of the 
Table corresponds to the coefficient estimates for countries adopting an explicit deposit insurance, while (-) corre-
sponds to the coefficients for countries with no explicit deposit protection.  The test statistics (F-statistics) for the 
Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of these coefficient estimates is reported 
under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient estimate.  ***, ** 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ACT_REG 
 
0.001 
         
  
0.89 
         CAP REG 
  
-0.005 
        
   
-2.10** 
        DIS REG 
  
 
-0.002 
       
   
 
-1.63 
       DIV REG 
  
  
0.002 
      
   
  
0.61 
      
INF REG 
  
   
-0.003 
     
   
   
-2.47** 
     
ACT REG (+)     0.006     
   
    
3.01*** 
    
ACT REG (-)     0.000     
   
    
0.37 
    
WALD 
  
    
20.304 
    
p-value 
  
    
(0.000) 
    
CAP REG (+)      -0.008    
   
     
-3.40*** 
   
CAP REG (-)      -0.024    
   
     
-4.87*** 
   
WALD 
  
     
24.514 
   
p-value 
  
     
(0.000) 
   
DIS REG (+)       0.000   
   
      
-0.22 
  
DIS REG (-)       -0.002   
   
      
-2.65*** 
  
WALD 
  
      
8.304 
  
p-value 
  
      
(0.004) 
  
DIV REG (+)        -0.007  
   
       
-1.51 
 
DIV REG (-)        -0.038  
   
       
-3.19*** 
 
WALD 
  
       
14.999 
 
p-value 
  
       
(0.000) 
 
INF REG (+)         -0.002 
   
        
-1.99** 
INF REG (-)         -0.004 
   
        
-3.49*** 
WALD 
  
        
9.950 
p-value 
  
        
(0.002) 
            Country effect:             No No No No No No No No No No 
Time effect:                  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            Adj. R
 
2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 
F - stats. 
 
6.82*** 7.04*** 6.91*** 6.79*** 7.12*** 7.43*** 7.46*** 6.85*** 6.96*** 7.06*** 
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Table 3.8:  Panel C [IR term-spread] 
Bank financials, bank regulations and interest rate risk 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression: 
|βSPR
where β it
|= φ + X’itγ + S’jtξ + G’jtλ+ Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T 
SPR
Each regression also includes the following company- and country-specific variables which are not reported:  the 
measure of revenue diversification ROID, the ratio (and the squared ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank’s 
total assets CAP (CAP
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the domestic 
interest rate term spread at time t.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company 
specific financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.    Similarly, ξ is an S x 1 vector of coefficients and Sjt is the 
jt-th observation on S country specific variables describing the design of existing bank regulations; and λ is an L x 1 
and Gjt is the jt-th observation on L country specific macroeconomic characteristics.  Tt is a vector of year-dummies of 
dimension T-1, and the disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regres-
sors (Xit), S country level regulatory characteristics (Sjt), and L county specific macroeconomic factors (Gjt).  For each 
estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The market-specific regulatory variables are 
as follows:  ACT_REG is the Index of Restricted activities, CAP_REG is the Index of Regulatory capital require-
ments, DIS_REG is the Index of Bank discipline, DIV_REG is the Diversification Index, and INF_REG is the Index 
of Information disclosure.  The detailed definitions for each index, including information sources and computational 
issues, are outlined in Table 3.1. 
2), the ratio of net total loans to total assets LTA, the ratio of customer deposits to total depos-
its LCL, the ratio of bank i’s total off-balance sheet exposure to its total assets CLTA, the ratio of net income to total 
equity ROAE, the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans LPTL, year-on-year GDP growth M_GDPG, M_INFL which 
measures the inflation as the current period CPI growth rate, and the real effective exchange rate M_EXCI, all 
calculated at time t-1.  For details see Table 3.1.  The regression also includes time-invariant “legal origin” dummy 
variables D_FREN, D_GERM, and D_SCAN which assume the value of 1 if the legal origin of the target bank 
country is German
  
, French, or Scandinavian respectively; and 0 otherwise.  The (+) sign in the second column of the 
Table corresponds to the coefficient estimates for countries adopting an explicit deposit insurance, while (-) corre-
sponds to the coefficients for countries with no explicit deposit protection.  The test statistics (F-statistics) for the 
Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of these coefficient estimates is reported 
under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient estimate.  ***, ** 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ACT_REG 
 
0.002 
         
  
1.59 
         CAP REG 
  
-0.003 
        
   
-1.60 
        DIS REG 
  
 
0.005 
       
   
 
3.61*** 
       DIV REG 
  
  
-0.002 
      
   
  
-0.94 
      
INF REG 
  
   
-0.001 
     
   
   
-0.50 
     
ACT REG (+)     0.003     
   
    
1.58 
    
ACT REG (-)     0.002     
   
    
1.47 
    
WALD 
  
    
0.473 
    
p-value 
  
    
(0.492) 
    
CAP REG (+)      -0.003    
   
     
-1.28 
   
CAP REG (-)      -0.003    
   
     
-0.47 
   
WALD 
  
     
0.001 
   
p-value 
  
     
(0.981) 
   
DIS REG (+)       0.006   
   
      
4.36*** 
  
DIS REG (-)       0.004   
   
      
2.93*** 
  
WALD 
  
      
14.574 
  
p-value 
  
      
(0.000) 
  
DIV REG (+)        -0.002  
   
       
-0.70 
 
DIV REG (-)        -0.004  
   
       
-0.28 
 
WALD 
  
       
0.013 
 
p-value 
  
       
(0.910) 
 
INF REG (+)         -0.001 
   
        
-0.67 
INF REG (-)         0.000 
   
        
-0.18 
WALD 
  
        
0.385 
p-value 
  
        
(0.535) 
            Country effect:               No No No No No No No No No No 
Time effect:                     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            Adj. R
 
2 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11 
F - stats. 
 
7.90*** 7.86*** 8.95*** 7.81*** 7.80*** 7.60*** 7.54*** 8.91*** 7.50*** 7.49*** 
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Table 3.8:  Panel D [Yield curve curvature] 
Bank financials, bank regulations and interest rate risk 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression: 
|βCURV
where β it
|= φ + X’itγ + S’jtξ + G’jtλ+ Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T 
CURV
Each regression also includes the following company- and country-specific variables which are not reported:  the 
measure of revenue diversification ROID, the ratio (and the squared ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank’s 
total assets CAP (CAP
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country’s j bank i to the unanticipated changes in the curva-
ture of domestic zero-coupon yield curve at time t.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation 
on M company specific financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.    Similarly, ξ is an S x 1 vector of coefficients 
and Sjt is the jt-th observation on S country specific variables describing the design of existing bank regulations; and λ is an L x 1 and Gjt is the jt-th observation on L country specific macroeconomic characteristics.  Tt is a vector of 
year-dummies of dimension T-1, and the disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M 
firm level regressors (Xit), S country level regulatory characteristics (Sjt), and L county specific macroeconomic factors 
(Gjt).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The market-specific regulatory 
variables are as follows:  ACT_REG is the Index of Restricted activities, CAP_REG is the Index of Regulatory capital 
requirements, DIS_REG is the Index of Bank discipline, DIV_REG is the Diversification Index, and INF_REG is the 
Index of Information disclosure.  The detailed definitions for each index, including information sources and computa-
tional issues, are outlined in Table 3.1. 
2), the ratio of net total loans to total assets LTA, the ratio of customer deposits to total depos-
its LCL, the ratio of bank i’s total off-balance sheet exposure to its total assets CLTA, the ratio of net income to total 
equity ROAE, the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans LPTL, year-on-year GDP growth M_GDPG, M_INFL which 
measures the inflation as the current period CPI growth rate, and the real effective exchange rate M_EXCI, all 
calculated at time t-1.  For details see Table 3.1.  The regression also includes time-invariant “legal origin” dummy 
variables D_FREN, D_GERM, and D_SCAN which assume the value of 1 if the legal origin of the target bank 
country is German
  
, French, or Scandinavian respectively; and 0 otherwise.  The (+) sign in the second column of the 
Table corresponds to the coefficient estimates for countries adopting an explicit deposit insurance, while (-) corre-
sponds to the coefficients for countries with no explicit deposit protection.  The test statistics (F-statistics) for the 
Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of these coefficient estimates is reported 
under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient estimate.  ***, ** 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ACT_REG 
 
0.001 
         
  
2.25** 
         CAP REG 
  
-0.001 
        
   
-2.33** 
        DIS REG 
  
 
0.001 
       
   
 
3.36*** 
       DIV REG 
  
  
0.000 
      
   
  
0.06 
      
INF REG 
  
   
0.000 
     
   
   
-0.49 
     
ACT REG (+)     0.001     
   
    
2.66*** 
    
ACT REG (-)     0.001     
   
    
2.05** 
    
WALD 
  
    
2.141 
    
p-value 
  
    
(0.144) 
    
CAP REG (+)      -0.002    
   
     
-2.25** 
   
CAP REG (-)      -0.002    
   
     
-1.27 
   
WALD 
  
     
0.167 
   
p-value 
  
     
(0.683) 
   
DIS REG (+)       0.001   
   
      
3.75*** 
  
DIS REG (-)       0.001   
   
      
2.75*** 
  
WALD 
  
      
5.000 
  
p-value 
  
      
(0.026) 
  
DIV REG (+)        0.001  
   
       
0.52 
 
DIV REG (-)        0.003  
   
       
0.68 
 
WALD 
  
       
0.487 
 
p-value 
  
       
(0.486) 
 
INF REG (+)         0.000 
   
        
-0.63 
INF REG (-)         0.000 
   
        
-0.15 
WALD 
  
        
0.430 
p-value 
  
        
(0.512) 
            Country effect:                No No No No No No No No No No 
Time effect:                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            Adj. R
 
2 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 
F - stats. 
 
11.56*** 11.57*** 11.88*** 11.34*** 11.35*** 11.16*** 11.10*** 11.52*** 10.90*** 10.90*** 
the empirical literature has repeatedly highlighted the importance of activities
restrictions on bank risks. Accordingly, I consider the regulatory restrictions on
bank insurance and securities activities separately in Table 3.9.
It emerges that nancial institutions only benet from regulatory impediments
to engaging in insurance activities. Restricting banks operations in the securities
market actually increases their exposure to interest rate shocks. Instinctively,
increased bank risk taking may be driven by owners seeking to compensate for
the utility loss associated with more stringent restrictions. On the other hand,
introducing an additional source of non-interest income from operations in the
securities market would increase the degree of bank revenue diversication and
arguably lower its risks. Yet, alternative theoretical views suggest that banks
will have greater prospects to increase their risks if a larger scope of activities is
allowed. In this respect, Laeven and Levine (2009) stress that the relationship
between bank risk and activity restrictions depends on the institution ownership
structure. Regrettably, due to data unavailability, I am unable to control for the
ownership structure. This will need to be addressed in future research.
As per the insurance activities, the size of the coe¢cient is economically large.
In the case of Switzerland, if regulators loosen the tight restrictions on bank insur-
ance operations from a current level of 4 to a level of 1, implying no restrictions,
the Swiss banks short-term interest rate exposure would increase by approxi-
mately 20 percent.
Assuming a marked distinction in the attitudes towards risk in countries with
and without deposit insurance, I anticipate a di¤erential impact of regulatory
activity restriction on curtailing bank interest rate risk. This asymmetry is mod-
elled by an interactive deposit insurance dummy EDI_REG, assuming a value
of 1 for countries with explicitly adopted deposit protection scheme, and 0 oth-
erwise. The empirical results in Table 3.9 support these predictions, suggesting
that banks with protected depositors are generally more responsive to the reg-
ulatory impediments. In particular, it seems that these banks benet from in-
surance activities restrictions to a much greater extent than their non-protected
peers. Controlling for this asymmetry might also complement the ndings of
Laeven and Levine (2009) in the sense that the bank ownership structure may
have distinctively di¤erent impacts on the e¤ectiveness of national regulations in
countries with and without explicit insurance provision. Such a consideration is
particularly appealing as the authors, in their work, provide the evidence of the
di¤erential impact the explicit deposit protection has on the risk taking behaviour
of widely held banks relative to institutions with concentrated ownership.
Second, I examine the e¤ect of capital regulations on bank interest rate risk.
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 Table 3.9 
Bank financials, activity restrictions and interest rate risk 
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression: 
|βIR
where β it
|= φ + X’itγ + S’jtξ + G’jtλ+ Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T 
IRit represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the pertinent interest rate proxy (IR = SR, LR, SPR, CURV) at time t.  
There are four panel regressions for each interest rate proxy as per the first row of the Table. γ is anM x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company 
specific financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.    Similarly, ξ is an S x 1 vector of coefficients and Sjt is the jt-th observation on S country specific variables describing 
the design of existing bank regulations; and λ is an L x 1 and Gjt is the jt-th observation on L country specific macroeconomic characteristics.  Tt is a vector of year-dummies of 
dimension T-1, and the disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regressors (Xit), S country level “activity restriction” variables (Sjt), 
and L county specific macroeconomic factors (Gjt).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting in 3179 observations.  The country level “activity restriction” vari-
ables are as follows:  INS_REG is the index of restrictions on insurance activities ranging from 1 to 3 based on the following question (unrestricted =1, permitted =2, restricted 
=3, prohibited =4): What are the conditions under which banks can engage in insurance activities?; and SEC_REG is the index of restrictions on security activities also ranging 
from 0 to 3 based on question (unrestricted =1, permitted =2, restricted =3, prohibited =4): What are the conditions under which banks can engage in securities activities? Each 
regression also includes the following company- and country-specific variables which are not reported:  the measure of revenue diversification ROID, the ratio (and the squared 
ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank’s total assets CAP (CAP2), the ratio of net total loans to total assets LTA, the ratio of customer deposits to total deposits LCL, the 
ratio of bank i’s total off-balance sheet exposure to its total assets CLTA, the ratio of net income to total equity ROAE, the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans LPTL, year-on-
year GDP growth M_GDPG, M_INFL which measures the inflation as the current period CPI growth rate, and the real effective exchange rate M_EXCI, all calculated at time t-
1.  For details see Table 3.1.  The regression also includes time-invariant “legal origin” dummy variables D_FREN, D_GERM, and D_SCAN which assume the value of 1 if the 
legal origin of the target bank country is German
 
, French, or Scandinavian respectively; and 0 otherwise.  The (+) sign in the second column of the Table corresponds to the 
coefficient estimates for countries adopting an explicit deposit insurance, while (-) corresponds to the coefficients for countries with no explicit deposit protection.  The test statis-
tics (F-statistics) for the Wald coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of these coefficient estimates is reported under WALD, with the associated 
p-value reported in brackets below.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coeffi-
cient estimate.  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
Short - term interest rate Long - term interest rate Interest rate spread term Yield curve curvature 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
INS_REG 
 
-0.069 
   
-0.014 
   
-0.012 
   
-0.004 
   
  
-5.31*** 
   
-5.93*** 
   
-4.87*** 
   
-4.61*** 
   
SEC_REG 
  
0.042 
   
0.012 
   
0.012 
   
0.004 
  
   
1.72* 
   
2.33** 
   
2.70*** 
   
3.10*** 
  
INS_REG (+)  
-0.109 
   
-0.015 
   
-0.019 
   
-0.007 
 
    
-6.52*** 
   
-4.47*** 
   
-5.88*** 
   
-7.05*** 
 
INS REG (-)  
-0.050 
   
-0.014 
   
-0.008 
   
-0.003 
 
    
-5.59*** 
   
-6.34*** 
   
-3.67 
   
-3.81 
 
WALD 
   
19.339 
   
0.138 
   
11.768 
   
24.515 
 
p-value 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.710) 
   
(0.001) 
   
(0.000) 
 
SEC_REG (+)   
0.045 
   
0.018 
   
0.013 
   
0.005 
     
1.74* 
   
3.30*** 
   
2.64*** 
   
3.21*** 
SEC_REG (-)   
0.036 
   
0.003 
   
0.011 
   
0.004 
     
1.48 
   
0.58 
   
2.23 
   
2.48 
WALD 
    
0.403 
   
22.579 
   
0.207 
   
0.414 
p-value 
    
(0.526) 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.649) 
   
(0.520) 
                  Country effect:              No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Time effect:                   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                  Adj. R
 
2 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 
F - stats.  25.45*** 24.83*** 24.85*** 23.83*** 7.94*** 7.15*** 7.62*** 7.53*** 8.66*** 8.18*** 8.98*** 7.86*** 12.50*** 11.83*** 12.84*** 11.37*** 
 
1
4
2
 
 Table 3.10 
 Bank financials, governance quality and interest rate risk  
This table shows the panel estimation results for the regression: 
|βIR
where β it
|= φ + X’itγ + S’jtξ + G’jtλ+ Tt’θ + εit,     i = 1,…, N ; j = 1,…, C; t = 1,…, T 
IR
Each regression also includes the following company- and country-specific variables which are not reported:  the measure of revenue diversification ROID, the ratio (and the 
squared ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank’s total assets CAP (CAP
it represents the stock returns sensitivity of country j’s bank i to the unanticipated changes in the pertinent interest rate proxy (IR = SR, LR, SPR, CURV) at time t.  
There are four panel regressions for each interest rate proxy as per the first row of the Table.  γ is an M x 1 vector of coefficients and Xit is the it-th observation on M company 
specific financial ratios, served as explanatory variables.    Similarly, ξ is an S x 1 vector of coefficients and Sjt is the jt-th observation on S country specific variables describing 
the design of existing bank regulations; and λ is an L x 1 and Gjt is the jt-th observation on L country specific macroeconomic characteristics.  Tt is a vector of year-dummies of 
dimension T-1, and the disturbance term εit is assumed to be independently distributed from the M firm level regressors (Xit), S country level regulatory characteristics (Sjt) 
supplied from Kaufman et al. (2008) and the Heritage Foundation, and L county specific macroeconomic factors (Gjt).  For each estimated model j=13, i=289 and t=11 resulting 
in 3179 observations.  The market-specific regulatory variables are as follows:  EFI_REG is the Economic Freedom Index with scores based on the country’s business, trade, 
monetary, investment, financial, labour, and corruption freedom as well as property rights and freedom from government, KRC_REG is the measure of Regulatory Quality 
capturing the governments’ ability to originate and implement sound regulations to promote the development of the private sector, KPS_REG is the Index of Political Stability 
measuring the likelihood that the government may be destabilised, and KRL_REG is the Rule of Law Index capturing the “extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society” including contract enforcement, police, courts, etc.  Variables KRC_REG, KPS_REG, and KRL_REG lie between -2.5 to 2.5 with higher scores corre-
sponding to better outcomes.  For more details see Table 3.1.   
2), the ratio of net total loans to total assets LTA, the ratio of customer deposits to total deposits 
LCL, the ratio of bank i’s total off-balance sheet exposure to its total assets CLTA, the ratio of net income to total equity ROAE, the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans 
LPTL, year-on-year GDP growth M_GDPG, M_INFL which measures the inflation as the current period CPI growth rate, and the real effective exchange rate M_EXCI, all 
calculated at time t-1.  For details see Table 3.1.  The regression also includes time-invariant “legal origin” dummy variables D_FREN, D_GERM, and D_SCAN which assume 
the value of 1 if the legal origin of the target bank country is German
 
, French, or Scandinavian respectively; and 0 otherwise.  The test statistics (F-statistics) for the Wald 
coefficient restriction test with the null hypothesis testing the equality of these coefficient estimates is reported under WALD, with the associated p-value reported in brackets 
below.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics below each coefficient estimate.  ***, ** and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
Short - term interest rate Long - term interest rate Interest rate spread term Yield curve curvature 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
EFI_REG -0.014 
   
-0.002 
   
0.000 
   
-0.001 
   
 
-4.27*** 
   
-3.92*** 
   
-0.07 
   
-5.06*** 
   KRC_REG 
 
-0.595
   
-0.018
   
-0.038
   
-0.015
  
  
-8.97*** 
   
-1.88* 
   
-3.97*** 
   
-4.61*** 
  KPS REG 
  
-0.305
   
-0.034
   
-0.024
   
-0.007
 
   
-4.87*** 
   
-3.68*** 
   
-2.24** 
   
-2.13** 
 KRL_REG 
   
-0.271
   
-0.049
   
-0.026
   
-0.013
    
-4.98*** 
   
-5.07*** 
   
-3.25*** 
   
-4.50*** 
                 Country effect:           No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Time effect:                Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 Adj. R 0.31 
2 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.17 
F - stats. 25.55*** 29.42*** 25.92*** 25.79*** 7.49*** 6.93*** 7.33*** 8.09*** 7.79*** 8.55*** 8.09*** 8.19*** 12.58*** 12.38*** 11.54*** 12.23*** 
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In particular, I consider the stringency of regulatory oversight of bank capital
CAP_REG and predict that more strict capital regulation will foster bank sta-
bility.
As predicted, the capital stringency is negatively related to bank medium-
and long-term interest rate exposure. When I consider the long-term interest
rate betas, the stricter requirements seem to benet uninsured banks more. This
suggests a greater importance of capital bu¤ers for countries without explicit
deposit insurance. The magnitude of the reported coe¢cient is economically sig-
nicant. For instance, if regulators in Australia restrict their capital requirements
from the current CAP_REG index value of 2 to a value of 4 (as in the UK), Aus-
tralian banks will benet from almost a 5 percent reduction in their exposure to
the shocks in the long-term interest rates.
Next I account for the degree of o¢cial supervisory power to enforce regu-
lations and undertake corrective actions when necessary (DIS_REG). Empirical
results in Table 3.8 suggest that banks do not benet in any way from greater
supervisory power. On the contrary, for the majority of the analysed interest
rate measures of risk the coe¢cient is positive. This implies higher interest rate
exposure for banks headquartered in countries where regulators are given broad
regulatory powers.
Some supervisory agencies enforce various liquidity and diversication require-
ments. Therefore, I construct the Diversication Index (DIV_REG) to test the
e¤ect of such provisions on bank interest rate risk. There is a negative relationship
between the degree of diversication enforcement and bank short-term interest
rate exposure. The e¤ect is even more pronounced for countries with unprotected
depositors, with the reported coe¢cient being economically large. Similar con-
clusions are extended to the long-term interest rate beta, with, however, banks
in countries with deposit protection not beneting from stricter diversication
requirements.
A growing body of studies highlights the importance of transparency in nan-
cial markets. Yu (2005) reports the instrumental impacts of better disclosure on
corporate credit spreads. Accordingly I include the ratio of information disclosure
proxying the strictness of regulatory imposed audit and disclosure requirements
(INF_REG). The level of information disclosure is negatively related to banks
long-rate interest rate exposure. The e¤ect is more pronounced in countries with-
out explicit deposit insurance. These results are consistent with a view that unin-
sured depositors greatly value accurate disclosure of bank activities, resulting in
a higher level of market discipline and more e¢cient and prudent banks.
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Market development and interest rate risk
I use a set of governance indicators supplied by Kaufman et al. (2008) to
capture the impact of country development on banks interest rate exposures.
First, I extract the Index of Political Stability (KPS_REG) to capture coun-
tries political environment. The index measures the likelihood that the govern-
ment may be destabilised by "unconstitutional or violent means". From the same
source I also obtain the measures of Regulatory Quality (KRC_REG). This mea-
sure represents the governments ability to originate and successfully implement
"sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector devel-
opment". In addition, I calculate the Rule of Law (KRL_REG) measure which
captures the "extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules
of society" including contract enforcement, police, courts, etc. Each variable lies
between  2:5 to 2:5 with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
Finally, I include the overall score for the Economic Freedom Index (EFI_REG)
supplied by the Heritage Foundation. By its construction, the indexs score is
based on the countrys business, trade, monetary, investment, nancial, labour,
and corruption freedom as well as property rights and freedom from government.
Hence, the qualitative information captured by this index is most likely incor-
porated in the measures supplied by Kaufman et al. (2008). Nonetheless, I
include this index given its popularity in the empirical literature [e.g. González,
2005; Haq and Heaney, 2009], and given that all regulatory framework measures
are utilised interchangeably in the empirical model. The estimation results are
presented in Table 3.10.
The market development variables all enter the Table 3.10 regressions signif-
icantly negative. This outcome implies that greater levels of economic freedom,
better governance and e¢ciency of the legal system, and higher quality of gov-
ernment supervision are associated with more stable and prudent functioning of
the nancial system and lessen bank equity risks.
3.5 Concluding remarks
The exposure of nancial intermediaries to interest rate risk has been the
subject of considerable empirical research since the inception of Stones (1974)
two factor model. This interest has led to the development of a substantial body
of literature. The researchers have o¤ered useful insights to modelling the interest
rate risk exposure under di¤erent asset pricing and econometric frameworks.
In contrast, there is a shortage of studies examining the underlying deter-
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minants of bank interest rate risk. Even though several empirical works have
identied certain company-specic determinants of interest rate risk, none of the
existing papers has explicitly related cross-market variations in banks interest
rate risk exposure to di¤erences in country level regulations. Nor has any robust-
ness check of the proposed nancial measures to the individual country regulatory
environment been conducted hitherto. This chapter lls this important gap in
the literature analysing an international sample of nancial institutions over the
period 1997-2007.
The ndings provided in this chapter conrm and extend previous evidence
regarding the interest rate risk exposure of nancial intermediaries. Particularly, I
nd the majority of the analysed companies are negatively a¤ected by unexpected
interest rate movements. An evaluation of these risks indicates their close linkage
to the company specic nancial characteristics such as bank income and asset-
liability structure, capital, and the o¤-balance sheet composition. I, however,
conclude that this association between market and accounting measures of interest
rate risk depends crucially on the provision and design of deposit insurance in
the target bank country.
The chapter also reports the vital role of institutional and regulatory charac-
teristics in explaining the cross-market variability in banks exposure to interest
rate risk. Interestingly, the provision of explicit deposit insurance may alter this
role, markedly a¤ecting the e¢cacy of national regulations.
Particularly, I observe a di¤erential impact of regulatory activity restrictions
on curtailing bank interest rate risk in countries providing the deposit protection
relative to the markets with unprotected depositors. Financial institutions only
benet from regulatory impediments to engaging in insurance activities. On the
other hand, restricting bank operations in the securities market actually increases
their exposures to the interest rate shocks. Banks with protected depositors,
however, benet from the restrictions to a much greater extent than their non-
protected peers.
More stringent capital regulation seems to also foster bank stability. The
evidence of this is more pronounced for the countries with no explicit deposit
insurance. For these countries, the diversication and information disclosure
requirements also yield material benets in curtailing interest rate risk.
Finally, I also observe that greater levels of economic freedom, better gover-
nance, e¢ciency of the legal system, and higher quality of government supervision
are all associated with lower bank exposure to interest rate risk.
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Appendix 3.1
List of analysed banks and countries
Bank name Ticker Bank name Ticker
AUSTRALIA FRANCE (contd)
Australia and New Zealand Banking Gr. Ltd. ANZ AU CA Ile de France CAF FP
Bank of Queensland Ltd. BOQ AU CA Ile et Vilaine CIV FP
National Australia Bank Ltd. NAB AU CA Toulouse CAMT FP
Suncorp-Metway Ltd. SUN AU CA Mutuel du Morbihan CMO FP
Westpac Banking Corp. WBC AU CA Loire - Haute - Loire CRLO FP
Commonwealth Bank of Australia CBA AU CA Oise CROI FP
St George Bank Limited SGB AU CA du Midi CRMI FP
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd. BEN AU CA Touraine Poitou CRTO FP
Macquarie Group Ltd MQG AU CA Centre Loire CRCL FP
CA Sud Rhone Alpes CRSU FP
BELGIUM
Fortis FORB BB GERMANY
KBC Groep NV KBC BB Bayerische Hypo - und Vereinsban AG HVM GR
Dexia SA DEXB BB Commerzbank AG CBK GR
Deutsche Bank AG DBK GR
CANADA DVB Bank AG DVB GR
Bank of Montreal BMO CN HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG TUB GR
Bank of Nova Scotia BNS CN Berlin - Hannoversche Hypothekenbank AG BHH GR
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce CM CN Eurohypo AG EHY GR
Laurentian Bank of Canada LB CN IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG IKB GR
National Bank of Canada NA CN Oldenburgische Landesbank AG OLB GR
Quest Capital Corp. QC CN
Royal Bank of Canada RY CN HONG KONG
Toronto Dominion Bank TD CN Bank of East Asia Ltd. 23 HK
Canadian Western Bank CWB CN Hang Seng Bank Ltd. 11 HK
Home Capital Group Inc. HCG CN CITIC International Financial Holdings Ltd. 183 HK
Dah Sing Financial Holdings Ltd. 440 HK
FRANCE Industrial and Comm. Bank of China (Asia) Ltd. 349 HK
Societe Generale GLE FP Wing Lung Bank 96 HK
Natixis KN FP Wing Hang Bank Ltd. 302 HK
Credit Agricole SA ACA FP Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. 636 HK
Banque Tarneaud SA TRNO FP Chong Hing Bank Ltd. 1111 HK
BNP Paribas BNP FP
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Appendix 3.1
List of analysed banks and countries (CONTD)
Bank name Ticker Bank name Ticker
ITALY JAPAN (contd)
Credito Bergamasco S.p.A. CB IM The Eighteenth Bank Ltd 8396 JT
Banco di Sardegna S.p.A. BSRP IM The Fukui Bank Ltd 8362 JT
Banca Popolare di Milano Scarl PMI IM The Gunma Bank Ltd 8334 JT
Credito Emiliano S.p.A. CE IM The Hachijuni Bank Ltd 8359 JT
UniCredit S.p.A. UCG IM The Higashi-Nippon Bank Ltd 8536 JT
Intensa SanPaolo Spa ISP IM The Gunma Bank Ltd 8334 JT
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Scarl BPSO IM The Hachijuni Bank Ltd 8359 JT
Banca Popolare di Intra Scrl PIN IM The Higashi-Nippon Bank Ltd 8536 JT
Banco di Desio e della Brianza S.p.A. BDB IM The Higo Bank Ltd 8394 JT
Banca Popolare di Spoleto S.p.A. SPO IM The Hiroshima Bank Ltd 8379 JT
Piccolo Credito Valtellinese Scarl. CVAL IM The Hokkoku Bank Ltd 8363 JT
Banca Popolare dellEmilia Romagna Scrl BPE IM The Hokuetsu Bank Ltd 8325 JT
Banca Carige S.p.A. CRG IM The Hyakugo Bank Ltd 8368 JT
The Hyakujushi Bank Ltd 8386 JT
JAPAN The Iyo Bank Ltd 8385 JT
The Akita Bank Ltd 8343 JT The Joyo Bank Ltd 8333 JT
The Aomori Bank Ltd 8342 JT The Juroku Bank Ltd 8356 JT
The Awa Bank Ltd 8388 JT The Kagawa Bank Ltd 8556 JT
The Bank of Ikeda Ltd 8375 JT The Kagoshima Bank Ltd 8390 JT
The Bank of Iwate Ltd 8345 JT The Kanto Tsukuba Bank Ltd 8338 JT
The Bank of Kyoto Ltd 8369 JT The Keiyo Bank Ltd 8544 JT
The Bank of Nagoya Ltd 8522 JT The Kita-Nippon Bank Ltd 8551 JT
The Bank of Okinawa Ltd 8397 JT The Michinoku Bank Ltd 8350 JT
The Bank of Saga Ltd 8395 JT The Miyazaki Bank Ltd 8393 JT
Bank of the Ryukyus Ltd 8399 JT Mizuho Trust & Banking Co Ltd 8404 JT
The Bank of Yokohama Ltd 8332 JT The Musashino Bank Ltd 8336 JT
The Chiba Bank Ltd 8331 JT The Nishi-Nippon City Bank Ltd 8327 JT
The Chiba Kogyo Bank Ltd 8337 JT The Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank Ltd 8361 JT
The Chugoku Bank Ltd 8382 JT The Oita Bank Ltd 8392 JT
The Chukyo Bank Ltd 8530 JT The San-In Godo Bank Ltd 8381 JT
The Daisan Bank Ltd 8529 JT The Shiga Bank Ltd 8366 JT
The Daishi Bank Ltd 8324 JT The Shikoku Bank Ltd 8387 JT
The Ehime Bank Ltd 8541 JT The Shimizu Bank Ltd 8364 JT
148
Appendix 3.1
List of analysed banks and countries (CONTD)
Bank name Ticker Bank name Ticker
JAPAN (contd) SWEDEN
The Shizuoka Bank Ltd 8355 JT Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEBA SS
The Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co Ltd 8403 JT Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHBA SS
Suruga Bank Ltd 8358 JT Swedbank AB SWEDA SS
The Tochigi Bank Ltd 8550 JT
The Toho Bank Ltd 8346 JT SWITZERLAND
The Tokyo Tomin Bank Ltd 8339 JT Banque Privee Edmond de Rothschild SA RLD SW
The Yamagata Bank Ltd 8344 JT Verwalt & Privat - Bank AG VPB SW
The Yamanashi Chuo Bank Ltd 8360 JT Bank Sarasin & Cie AG BSAN SW
The Towa Bank Ltd 8558 JT Bank Coop AG BC SW
The Daito Bank Ltd 8563 JT Vontobel Holding AG VONN SW
The Fukushima Bank Ltd 8562 JT Hypothekarbank Lenzburg HBLN SW
The Mie Bank Ltd 8374 JT Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank BLKB SW
The Nagano Bank Ltd 8521 JT Basler Kantonalbank BSKP SW
The Tohoku Bank Ltd 8349 JT Bank Linth LINN SW
The Tokushima Bank Ltd 8561 JT Zuger Kantonalbank AG ZG SW
The Aichi Bank Ltd 8527 JT Banque Cantonale de Geneve BCGE SW
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise BCVN SW
SPAIN
Banco De Vasconia SA VAS SM UK
Banco De Credito Balear SA CBL SM Barclays Plc BARC LN
Banco De Galicia SA GAL SM Lloyds TSB Group Plc LLOY LN
Banco De Castilla SA CAS SM Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc RBS LN
Banco De Valencia SA BVA SM Standard Chartered Plc STAN LN
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Agrentaria SA BBVA SM Allied Irish Banks Plc ALBK LN
Banco Santander SA SAN SM The Bank of Ireland BKIR LN
Banco Pastor SA PAS SM Anglo Irish Bank Corp Plc ANGL LN
Banco Popular Espanol SA POP SM HSBC Holdings Plc HSBA LN
Bankinter SA BKT SM Alliance & Leicester Plc AL/ LN
Banco Espanol de Credito SA BTO SM
Banco Guipuzcoano SA GUI SM US Money Center
Banco de Andalucia SA AND SM The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. BK US
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Appendix 3.1
List of analysed banks and countries (CONTD)
Bank name Ticker Bank name Ticker
US Money Center (contd) US Regional (contd)
Wachovia Corp. WB US Ames National Corp. ATLO US
Wells Fargo & Co. WFC US Amcore Financial Inc. AMFI US
JP Morgan Chase & Co. JPM US Banner Corp. BANR US
Citigroup Inc. C US City Holding Co. CHCO US
Bank of America Corp. BAC US Chemical Financial Corp. CHFC US
National City Corp. NCC US Commerce Bancshares Inc. CBSH US
PNC Financial Services Group Inc. PNC US Commercial Bancshares Inc. CMOH US
Community Trust Bancorp Inc. CTBI US
US Regional Farmers Capital Bank Corp. FFKT US
Horizon Financial Corp. HRZB US VIST Financial Corp. VIST US
Sterling Financial Corp. STSA US North Bay Bancorp NBAN US
Alabama National Bancorporation ALAB US Sandy Spring Bancorp Inc. SASR US
Coastal Financial Corp. CFCP US Surety Capital Corp. SRYPQ US
Ameris Bancorp. ABCB US Wilber Corp. GIW US
The First of Long Island Corp. FLIC US First Merchants Corp. FRME US
Bank of Hawaii Corp. BOH US First Midwest Bancorp Inc. FMBI US
WesBanco Inc. WSBC US Patriot National Bancorp Inc. PNBK US
University Bancorp Inc. UNIB US Penns Woods Bancorp Inc. PWOD US
Sun Bancorp Inc. SNBC US Princeton National Bancorp Inc. PNBC US
Pinnacle Bancshares Corp. PPBN US Seacoast Banking Corp of Florida SBCF US
Provident Bankshares Corp. PBKS US Smithtown Bancorp Inc. SMTB US
Regions Financial Corp. RF US Northern Trust Corp. NTRS US
PSB Bancorp Inc. PSBI US Trico Bancshares TCBK US
Ohio Valley Banc Corp. OVBC US Univest Corp. Of Pennsylvania UVSP US
Northern States Financial Corp. NSFC US Whitney Holding Corp. WTNY US
Monroe Bancorp. MROE US Old National Bancorp ONB US
Mercantile Bankshares Corp. MRBK US Old Second Bancorp Inc. OSBC US
Integra Bank Corp. IBNK US Nara Bancorp Inc. NARA US
Fulton Financial Corp. FULT US Hancock Holding Co. HBHC US
Great Southern Bancorp Inc. GSBC US Fremont General Corp. FMNTQ US
Harleysville National Corp. HNBC US Compass Bancshares Inc. CBSS US
Capitol Bancorp Ltd. CBC US Center Bancorp Inc. CNBC US
Cascade Bancorp CACB US Marshall & Ilsley Corp. MI US
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Appendix 3.1
List of analysed banks and countries (CONTD)
Bank name Ticker Bank name Ticker
US Regional (contd) US Savings & Loans (contd)
Popular Inc. BPOP US Astoria Financial Corp. AF US
Simmons First National Corp. SFNC US New York Community Bancorp Inc. NYB US
Summit Bancshares Inc. SBIT US HMN Financial Inc. HMNF US
Tompkins Financial Corp. TMP US Northwest Bancorp Inc. NWSB US
International Bancshares Corp. IBOC US Camco Financial Corp. CAFI US
Doral Financial Corp. DRL US Imperial Capital Bancorp Inc. IMP US
Arrow Financial Corp. AROW US Flushing Financial Corp. FFIC US
Yardville National Bancorp. YANB US BankAtlantic Bancorp Inc. BBX US
Zions Bancorp. ZION US PFF Bancorp Inc. PFFB US
First Bancorp. FBNC US First Federal Bancshares of Arkansas Inc. FFBH US
Comerica Inc. CMA US Provident Financial Holdings Inc. PROV US
First Horizon National Corp. FHN US Dime Community Bancshares DCOM US
Keycorp KEY US OceanFirst Financial Corp. OCFC US
Abigail Adams National Bancorp. AANB US United Western Bancorp Inc. UWBK US
Chester Bancorp Inc. CNBA US
US Savings & Loans CKF Bancorp Inc. CKFB US
Ameriana Bancorp. ASBI US Fidelity Federal Bancorp. FDLB US
Downey Financial Corp. DWNQF US Home Financial Bancorp. HWEN US
First Financial Holdings Inc. FFCH US Meta Financial Group Inc. CASH US
FirstFed Financial Corp. FED US South Street Financial Corp. SSFC US
LSB Corp. LSBX US Webster City Federal Bancorp. WCFB US
Pamrapo Bancorp Inc. PBCI US WVS Financial Corp. WVFC US
Parkvale Financial Corp. PVSA US Wells Financial Corp. WEFP US
Peoples United Financial Inc. PBCT US ASB Fiancial Corp. ASBN US
Sovereign Bancorp Inc. SOV US Great American Bancorp Inc. GTPS US
Washington Federal Inc. WFSL US Park Bancorp Inc. PFED US
Washington Mutual Inc. WAMUQ US IndyMac Bancorp Inc. IDMCQ US
WSFS Financial Corp. WSFS US Hingham Institution for Savings HIFS US
Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin ABCW US
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Chapter 4
Securitization and Bank
Intermediation Function
4.1 Introduction
Banks are leveraged entities whose owners face limited liability and whose opaque
activities are subsidised by virtue of the deposit insurance guarantee and a nan-
cial safety net. These provisions unavoidably amplify owners of banks incentives
to undertake excessive risk.
The policymakers have long recognised this predilection, introducing various
mechanisms conducive to the optimal resolution of the agency problems, curbing
bank risk-taking, and fostering greater market discipline. Incidentally, some of
these provisions may have inadvertently increased the scope for regulatory arbi-
trage, whereby nancial intermediaries exploit loopholes in the regulations and,
as a result, undermine the stability of the nancial system.
Historically, the systematic exploitation of those regulatory loopholes was
driven, to a large extent, by the managers desire to increase the leverage of
a nancial institution without reducing its capital ratios. Fortuitously, the Basel
accord provided a simple means of exploiting the regulatory capital subsidies,
through, for instance, securitization. This raised a question about its prudency
and paved the way for its evolutionary successor (Calomiris and Mason, 2004). As
pointed out by Jones (2000), under certain conditions, banks may enhance their
regulatory capital ratios by resorting to purely "cosmetic capital adjustments",
which have little or no impact on the rms overall stability. For instance, by
providing explicit credit enhancements and guarantees for assets securitized o¤
the balance sheet, a bank retains its credit exposure. However, it no longer re-
quires holding the on-balance sheet capital necessary to support this risk. In
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the run up to the most recent nancial crisis, many have explicitly demonstrated
that such incomplete risk transfer proliferates systemic risk in the nancial sec-
tor, hence rendering the e¤ectiveness of securitization in fostering bank stability
rather elusive [Higgins and Mason, 2004; Franke and Krahnen, 2005; Instefjord,
2005].
In this respect, the recent nancial turmoil prompted by the US subprime
mortgage meltdown clearly demonstrated the detrimental impact a troubled bank-
ing sector has on the wider economy both domestically and internationally. The
nancial markets worldwide su¤ered disastrous losses, with massive declines in
portfolio values of various, including highly rated, securities. The crisis also led
to a severe liquidity shortfall that adversely a¤ected all economic agents. As
credit tightened, the myriad of formally prosperous businesses were forced to le
for bankruptcy, resulting in soaring unemployment and unprecedented decline in
international trade.
Mortgage securitization is generally regarded as the key culprit in the sub-
prime debacle, thus provoking copious discussions on possible remedies for the
market for securitized assets. Recently, a plethora of contributions addressed
these issues both empirically and analytically1. Together these works suggest
that the root causes of the crisis are by no means exogenous, and reside in man-
agers opportunistic behaviour, propensity to short-termism, and concomitant
regulatory policies that abetted these trends. Beyond this point of agreement,
the issue remains an ongoing debate among academics, practitioners, and policy-
makers with many of the underlying causes yet to be fully understood.
Interestingly, none of the aforementioned causes is new, and they have all been
previously regarded as the primary determinants of the major nancial crises in
the past. Three common causes are particularly emphasised: moral hazard and
information asymmetries; global imbalances2; and a poorly designed multi-layered
regulatory framework which further aggravated an already present misalignment
of incentives.
What, however, makes the current crisis di¤erent is a contagion which was
manifested due to highly developed inter-linkages between international nancial
corporations, their complexity, multi-sector involvement, and a speedy trans-
mission of news and investment ows. What started as a relatively isolated US
subprime mortgage episode was then propagated to the rest of the nancial sector
worldwide, a¤ecting all major asset classes. In response, a great deal of research
1A detailed discussion on the mechanisms of the subprime mortgage crisis is o¤ered by
Brunnermeier (2009).
2See Caballero and Krishnamurty (2008).
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has focused on examining the market mechanism by which the nancial contagion
is proliferated, proposing even more solutions to contain the shock spill-overs in
the future [Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Longsta¤, 2010].
Further contributions have also addressed the role of rating agencies, con-
demning their inability to properly rate the securitised products (Skreta and Veld-
kamp, 2009). Agencies incentives, and conict of interest are also emphasised
(Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2008). The design of the compensation structure,
with managers rewards being tied to short-term mark-to-market prots rather
than the long-term protability and solvency of created positions, has also been
acknowledged for contributing to the crisis (Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2009). In
a similar vein, the regulatory architecture which allowed, and in some instances
abetted, such short-termist behaviour has also been denounced (Acharya and
Richardson, 2009).
While much has been learnt from these contributions, they have predomi-
nantly concentrated, with few exceptions, on the underlying causes of the current
events, not the risks facing the nancial system in the aftermath of the crisis. For
instance, none has explicitly addressed the issue of bank interest rate exposure,
the importance of which was reasserted by recent developments in the monetary
environment.
Following an unprecedented reduction in the nominal interest rates, today
the concern exists that banks may have relaxed their asset-liability management
practices and are less protected than ever against rising interest rates3. As em-
phasised by the Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Donald L. Kohn4, ... interest rate risk is inherent in the business of
banking... and ... it is especially important now for institutions to have in
place sound practices to measure, monitor, and control this risk. He further
cautions that as the economy recovers, it is reasonable to expect a tightening in
monetary policy, with associated developments in the entire shape of the term
structure being hard to predict, and ...especially so in current circumstances.
In this respect, the unprecedentedly high issuance of government debt worldwide,
coupled with increasing inationary pressure, may trigger sharp changes in the
interest rate environment. As suggested by Kohn, it is highly unlikely that the
3Over the last two years, the US yield curve has experienced a considerable steepening,
with the interest rate spread widening to a multi-decade level high. This steepening poses a
signicant challenge to the asset-liability managers, particularly in addressing possible non-
parallel shifts in the term structure. The empirical evidence on the adverse impacts of low
interest rates on bank risk is provided in Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marqués-Ibáñez (2010).
4Donald L. Kohn. Focusing on Bank Interest Rate Risk Exposure. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporations Symposium on Interest Rate Risk Management, Arlington, Virginia, January 29,
2010.
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interest rate volatilities will ...return to their previous quiescent state, thereby
posing further concerns for the stability of the nancial sector. The shape of the
term structure is also likely to undergo signicant changes. As the investors re-
turn to higher risk leveraged positions, the yields o¤ered on sovereign instruments
will have to be revisited in order successfully to nance the scal decit. Fur-
thermore, due to the crisis-induced liquidity constraints, many institutions were
forced to shorten the maturity of their liabilities and are accordingly exposed
to greater renancing risk5. And while the prudently managed companies will
presumably access the required funds, the increased competition for credit may
escalate its cost. On the asset side, as many households nd the value of their
debt exceeding the value of the underlying equity, the rate of defaults is likely to
peak with interest rates.
Such economic conditions raise the fundamental question of what are the most
e¤ective and appropriate ways to hedge against unanticipated developments in the
yield curve. In this respect, the theoretical benets of securitization for e¢cient
management of bank interest rate risk (IRR hereafter) are unambiguous. On the
one hand, securitization serves as a channel to transfer interest rate risk from
the nancial intermediary to parties better equipped to bear and manage this
exposure. On the other hand, it provides an opportunity to align the duration
of interest rate sensitive assets and liabilities, thereby reducing the balance sheet
duration gap and concomitant exposure to interest rate movements. Further,
securitization income o¤ers the potential to improve revenue diversication, thus
reducing bank reliance on interest-generating activities6. Despite these sound
theoretical grounds, no empirical account of the impact of securitization on bank
interest rate risk has hitherto been conducted.
Accordingly, the objective of the work reported here is to circumvent the
aforementioned issues in addressing the impact of securitization on bank interest
rate risk. In particular, the study o¤er three major contributions to the literature.
First, utilising an extensive sample of publically traded US bank holding com-
panies, this work empirically veries the importance of interest rate exposure for
5Further to this, according to the O¢ce of Thrift Supervision Quarterly Review of Interest
Rate Risk, in the rst quarters of 2010 the median percentage ratio of xed-rate mortgage loans
held by the US thrifts to their total assets was at the level of 40.6%, while the corresponding
proportion of all adjustable-rate mortgage loans to total assets was at only 22.3%. The e¤ective
duration gap in the thrift industry also remained positive, highlighting the rms susceptibility
to rising interest rates.
6As argued by Keswani, Marsh, and Zagonov (2009), since activities that generate non-
interest income are imperfectly correlated with those generating interest revenues, with raising
interest rates, the diversication of revenue sources should help stabilizing operating income
and give rise to a more stable stream of prots. This view is supported by the empirical ndings
of Smith et al. (2003) and Chiorazzo, Milani and Salvini (2008).
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the majority of analysed institutions over the 2001 to 2009 period. Nearly 95%
percent of analysed nancial intermediaries are adversely a¤ected by yield curve
shocks at one time or another, with the yield curve slope being the most signif-
icant source of risk. Interestingly, the banks resorting to asset securitization are
a¤ected to a higher degree by unanticipated term-structure developments than
their non-securitizing counterparts.
Second, this is the rst study which explicitly relates the level of bank secu-
ritization activities to its interest rate exposure. While the empirical evidence to
date suggests that securitization a¤ects the level of bank credit risk, its solvency,
and e¢ciency, no empirical test to assert its impact on bank interest rate risk
has been conducted. Accordingly, the results reported here o¤er a valuable in-
sight to both managers and regulators seeking to utilise securitization in a bid to
curb bank interest rate risk. This is particularly important in the aftermath of
the global nancial crisis, with the monetary policy decisions creating a unique
environment for interest rate exposure.
The third goal of this chapter is to study whether the securitization of assets
with di¤erent maturities and risk characteristics has a heterogeneous impact on
bank interest rate exposure. The empirical tests suggest that interest rate risk
generally increases with the maturity of assets securitized. To decouple the e¤ect
of securitization from other factors, I consider further channels that may have
a¤ected bank risk. These include numerous bank-specic characteristics and
the macroeconomic environment in which the intermediaries operate. Further,
the research covers both pre-crisis and crisis episodes, thereby o¤ering a unique
opportunity to compare the e¤ectiveness of securitization in curbing bank interest
rate risk between the two periods. The empirical ndings reported in this work
suggest that banks resorting to asset securitization are subject to greater interest
rate exposure in the second, crisis sub-period.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a
brief review of the literature and outlines a set of testable hypotheses. Section
4.3 presents a theoretical model of nancial intermediary interest rate exposure,
while Section 4.4 continues by outlining the supporting empirical framework.
The description of the data sample follows in Section 4.5. Empirical results are
discussed in Section 4.6, and Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Literature review and hypotheses formulation
Securitization is a relatively straightforward process of transforming a pool
of illiquid assets into marketable securities via cash ow repackaging; yet it has
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substantially reshaped the credit markets in recent decades. While originally
conned to the US residential mortgages, today, securitization is applied to a
wide range of asset classes, including credit card, commercial and industrial,
automobile, and home equity loans, among others. Since its inception in the late
1960s, the issuance of securitized assets in the US has been growing steadily to
amount to nearly US $2:11 trillion as of the year end 20097.
On the theoretical front, access to the market for securitised products may
substantially benet the originator by (a) allowing to e¢ciently diversify its credit
portfolio; (b) improving asset-liability management; (c) reducing the cost of -
nancial intermediation; and (d) providing an opportunity to prot by specialising
in operations in which it enjoys a comparative advantage8. As suggested by
Loutskina and Strahan (2009), securitization eases the inuence of bank nancial
conditions and local funding shocks on credit supply. As a result, it increases
liquidity and facilitates the reduction of funding, and therefore banks interme-
diation costs. Further, securitization provides a means to e¢ciently transfer the
risk from the banks balance sheet to other economic players better equipped to
bear it, thereby removing the impediment to further growth implied by capital
and balance sheet constraints. In this respect, there is a vast literature embrac-
ing the benets of increased liquidity and risk sharing [Merton, 1987; Kadlec and
McConnell, 1994].
In terms of bank interest rate risk, securitization o¤ers an opportunity ef-
fectively to tailor the balance sheet duration gap induced by the banks asset
transformation function. Thanks to heterogeneity in the maturity of assets ad-
missible for securitization, the duration of rate sensitive assets can be perfectly
matched to that of corresponding liabilities. Further, by securitizing assets with
embedded prepayment provisions, the lender, in e¤ect, resells the position held
in these options and therefore hedges its exposure to unanticipated increases in
interest rate volatility.
7Aggregate of the US mortgage-related (MBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance,
based on the data compiled by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association,
http://www.sifma.org. The fastest growth was enjoyed by the MBS sector, with a nearly
11.2% [15.8%] compound annual growth rate between 1996 and 2009 [1996 and 2006]. The
corresponding growth rates for the US ABS issuance are -0.8% and 16.3% respectively. The
declining trend in MBS is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, owed to weak house sales,
mortgage loan origination, and new housing start-ups following the crisis. The number of house
sales in the US has reached its peak of 1.28 million in 2005, and declined since to 0.38 million
in 2009. The same is true for new housing start-ups, declining at a compound rate of 28.1%
per year between 2005 and 2009 (source: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov).
8For more insightful discussion on the benets of securitization, see Greenbaum and Thakor
(1987, 2007), and Gorton and Metrick (2009). The reference to further aspects of bank securi-
tization and asset sales activities is o¤ered in Schipper and Yohn (2007).
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Despite the unambiguous theoretical benets o¤ered by securitization, the
empirical evidence and the state of market predicament to date suggest that -
nancial institutions may have been unable fully to enjoy such advantages. With
many rms moving from an originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute busi-
ness model, the agency problems become ever more apparent and a vast literature
analyses this issue in depth [Mishkin, 2008; Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Drucker and
Puri, 2009]. In particular, due to the separation of asset ownership and control
functions, the loan originator lacks the incentive to exert enough e¤ort in moni-
toring the credit quality of pursued projects. Provided with a channel to alleviate
its credit exposure, the intermediary is more concerned with the fees it extracts
from the new loan origination rather than the underlying quality of these loans.
As demonstrated by Keys et al., (2010), the likelihood of originating sub-quality
loans increases with the probability of the loans being sold. Furthermore, the
funds released from asset shifts are commonly used to nance more protable,
yet riskier avenues [Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004; Purnanandam , 2009]. And
while various mechanisms were introduced to minimise moral hazard and to bet-
ter align the interests of bankers and investors (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995),
ine¢cient contractual environment and misplaced regulatory e¤orts precluded a
complete resolution of these problems.
Besides, under poorly designed regulatory capital charges, banks have an in-
centive to securitize safer, low-yield assets while retaining riskier and more prof-
itable ones. As demonstrated by Ambrose, Lacour-Little and Sanders (2004), in-
termediaries commonly securitize safer mortgages and retain the more risky ones
on the balance sheet. An extensive scope of works provides further empirical ev-
idence to support this regulatory arbitrage hypothesis for asset securitization.
Many also agree that even with no capital distortion, the banks are likely to shift
safer assets, owed to excessive costs involved in distribution of riskier instruments
due to the lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970). Additionally, despite the fact that
under FASB140 rule (Financial Accounting Standards Board) securitization is
classied as an asset sale, in practice, this transaction resembles a typical nanc-
ing arrangement with securitizers commonly retaining their credit exposure by
providing various credit enhancements and guarantees. For this reason, the o¤-
balance sheet treatment of such transactions has been greatly criticised in the
literature.
Moreover, with the increased popularity of securitized products, a myriad of
non-depository market players entered the lending business directly to compete
with traditional intermediaries. This translated into increased market competi-
tion, forcing many nancial institutions to accept higher risks to remain com-
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petitive. Under this perspective, securitization is unlikely to be utilised as a
risk-transfer mechanism, but is rather motivated by the desire for greater prof-
itability.
On the basis of the discussion so far, and following the recent events in global
nancial markets, the possibility of banks utilizing securitization to curb interest
rate risk seems rather elusive. This view is reected in the rst testable hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis1: Banks resorting to asset securitization face greater interest rate
exposure. The extent of this exposure varies with the duration of assets securitized.
Against this background, there is evidence to suggest that in the run up to the
subprime crisis banks successfully shifted a great deal of riskier assets owing to
favourable monetary and regulatory conditions. This trend was majorly fuelled
by a low interest rate environment, the increased market demand for securitized
products, and investors excessive reliance on credit ratings reinforced by copi-
ous regulatory provisions. This view is empirically supported by Mian and Su
(2009) and DellAriccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008). However, both papers report a
pronounced decline in the lending standards associated with higher securitization
rates. The former contribution also reports a signicant upturn in bank disin-
termediation over the 2001-2005 period, with a substantial increase in loans sold
shortly after origination.
In the same vein, many have argued that in the last decade banks have
moved from a traditional spread generating strategy to a new equity-maximisation
fees-generating strategy. By assertively strengthening its involvement in the
originate-to-distribute market, many intermediaries, in e¤ect, function as bro-
kers who extract the fees for joining borrowers and lenders. And while the asset
repackaging and sale is costly to the originator, the costs associated with joining
the complementary transactions between borrowers and securitized-debt investors
are considerably reduced through the standardisation of securitized products.
Besides, the company achieves economies of scale by specialising in structured
nance transactions. It also enjoys increasing returns to scale in evaluating the
borrowers credit quality due to lax monitoring. Furthermore, the active players
in the securitization market enjoy better access to derivative instruments which,
as demonstrated by Purnanandam (2007), enable these companies to preserve the
extent of loan origination even as monetary conditions tighten.
With this business model, the importance of interest generating revenues
declines, and does the e¤ective duration of assets held on the balance sheet.
Accordingly, the duration gap remains at minimal levels, and the intermediary is
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less exposed to the risk of changing interest rates. On the basis of this argument,
the following hypothesis is added into the analysis:
Hypothesis2: The relationship between bank interest rate risk and asset securi-
tization is non-linear. The risk initially increases with the value of assets securi-
tized, but declines with bank disintermediation.
4.3 Theoretical background
The interest rate exposure represents a natural risk faced by all nancial inter-
mediaries due to the nature of their maturity transformation business model. In
particular, this type of risk may arise from three key sources. First, by transform-
ing the short-term savings to long-term investments, banks unavoidably mismatch
the duration of the interest sensitive assets and liabilities. The Duration Theo-
rem independently proposed by Samuelson (1945) and Hicks (1946) states that
if the weighted duration of the asset stream is greater (less) than the weighted
duration of the liability stream, the interest rate increase (decrease) will reduce
the individuals net worth. With therefore a positive duration gap, measured as
the di¤erence between the durations of assets and liabilities, rising interest rates
reduce the value of assets more than the value of corresponding liabilities. The
earlier attempt to formalise the practical applications of the proposed theory can
be traced to the work of Redington (1952) who introduces the so-called im-
munisation rule. Under this simplied rule, the agent chooses to always hedge
against interest rate shocks by matching the durations of rate sensitive assets and
liabilities.
Second, when the rates earned on the underlying assets are not perfectly cor-
related with the rates paid on the liabilities, the banks earnings are exposed
to interest rate uctuation. This is referred to as the interest rate margin risk.
Following the Federal Reserves decision to reduce the interest rates to unprece-
dentedly low levels, the bankers have enjoyed a substantial increase in the interest
rate margins. These conditions may substantially change as the monetary policy
tightens, with many banks nding it di¢cult to renance some of their xed rate
assets with variable rate liabilities. Finally, the third source of interest rate risk
arises from optionality embedded in some assets and liabilities (e.g. prepayment
options).This asymmetric source of interest rate risk gained its prominence in
recent decades.
To theoretically formalise the aforementioned sources of interest rate risk, and
to see how securitization may be used in curtailing these exposures, this section
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presents the model of bank intermediation and describes its key attributes. For
simplicity, the model concentrates on the banks duration transformation function
and discounts any other claim attributes and risks. Formally, I assume that
the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned in their combined utility
maximisation (A.1). Accordingly, the bank pursues the strategy of maximising
its after-tax prots. The credit market is perfectly competitive a la Besanko
and Thakor (1987), with the credit contracts designed to maximise the expected
utility of borrowers.
At each planning date t the manager can choose the amount to be invested in
assets and liabilities of di¤erent maturities, conditional on her choices in preced-
ing periods. The maturity of available projects is limited by T , which represents
the managers investment horizon. Some divergences from the target asset mix
are inevitable in the short-run, though the banks choice of principal specialisa-
tion determines the market condition it faces and its ability to promptly adjust
the composition of the asset portfolio. Bank liabilities are subject to similar con-
straints, with relatively stable, manager controlled federal funds, though volatile
deposit base. The latter contracts represent a relatively stable funding source in
the presence of a deposit insurance guarantee. Assuming further that t is contin-
uously dened on the closed interval [0; T ], the banks asset and liability streams
over the investment horizon are A(t) and L(t) respectively. The interest rates
are stochastic and independent of the banks choice of balance sheet structure,
with the function R(t) characterising the market term structure over the interval
[0; T ]. The intermediary can nonetheless negotiate favourable rate conditions on
its assets and liability contracts (e.g., spreads over index rates such as LIBOR)
owing to its market power. The BHCs equity value Q is therefore simply the
di¤erence between the present values of its asset and liability streams:
Q =
Z T
0
A(t)e R(t)tdt 
Z T
0
L(t)e R(t)tdt = A  L (4.1)
where the present values of asset and liability streams are denoted by A and L
respectively.
In a similar manner, the BHCs net income 8t > 0 is dened as:
I(t) = Ra(t)A(t) Rl(t)L(t) (4.2)
where Ra(t) and Rl(t) are interest rates charged on assets and liabilities respec-
tively. For convenience, the regulatory capital charges, as well as the operational
costs of servicing the asset and liability portfolios are assumed away in this spec-
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ication.
Accordingly, following Assumption 1 (A.1) above, the bank shareholders are
concerned with maximising the value of bank prots:
(t) = Ra(t)A(t) Rl(t)L(t) +4Q (4.3)
Note that the equity value Q is una¤ected if the yield curve remains unchanged
over the period; and the bank prots are driven by the net interest margin.
As, however, the term structure evolves, both the bank interest margin and
its equity value would be a¤ected in a number of ways. The exact nature of such
response is convoluted due to the direction of rate movements, the occurrence
of non-parallel shifts in the term structure, and the relationships between the
bank assets and liabilities rates. These considerations unnecessary complicate
the model, and a number of simplifying assumptions are introduced as follows:
A.2 The shifts in the interest rate yield curve are parallel in nature: given a
continuous random variable q with a probability density function f(q)  0 and
a  q  b, the future yield curve can be described by R(t) + q, 8t 2 [0; T ].
Accordingly, assuming R(t) = R in (3), the bank interest income remains un-
a¤ected as long as the adjustment speed of the rates charged on assets and the
rates paid on liabilities is the same:
@Ra(t)
@R
=
@Rl(t)
@R
(4.4)
Under this condition, the prots are determined by the term-structure driven
changes in the market values of the intermediarys assets (A) and liabilities (L):
@
@R
=
@Q
@R
=  
Z T
0
A(t)e R(t)tdt
R T
0
tA(t)e R(t)tdtR T
0
A(t)e R(t)tdt
+
+
Z T
0
L(t)e R(t)tdt
R T
0
tL(t)e R(t)tdtR T
0
L(t)e R(t)tdt
(4.5)
It is easy to see that
R T
0
tA(t)e R(t)tdtR T
0
A(t)e R(t)tdt
and
R T
0
tL(t)e R(t)tdtR T
0
L(t)e R(t)tdt
are simply the weighted average time to maturity, or durations, of assets and
liability streams respectively. Denoting the duration of assets withMDA and the
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duration of liabilities with MDL, we get:
@
@R
=
@Q
@R
= LMDL   AMDA (4.6)
It therefore follows that the managers decision problem is to choose the MDL
and MDA that maximise the value of bank equity Q. Assuming, however, the
stochastic nature of the interest rate movements [E(q)=
R b
a
qf(q)dq], adjusting
the durations is barely an improvement over the immunisation strategy. Hence,
in equilibrium, the manager chooses to always immunize.
Since banks commonly assume a positive asset-liability duration mismatch, to
reduce the sensitivity of a companys value to interest rate uctuation, the risk
manager must either reduce the duration of assetsMDA or increase the duration
of liabilities MDL. In this respect, securitization o¤ers an elegant solution to the
rst problem, owed to heterogeneity in the assets admissible for securitization.
In particular, the lender with a positive duration mismatch can use securitization
in at least two ways to curtail its interest rate exposure: (a) it can securitize the
long term-assets, such as mortgages, o¤ the balance sheet, thereby reducing the
e¤ective duration gap; (b) it can securitize assets with embedded prepayment
provisions and thus hedge its exposure to unanticipated increases in interest rate
volatility.
4.4 Methodological framework
4.4.1 Yield curve modelling
TThe standard research methodology of assessing the interest rate exposure
proposes to use a single interest rate factor (Stone, 1974). Therefore, it fails to
recognize the time-varying nature of the yield curve shape.
In this study, I account for the sensitivity of BHCs stock returns to the
changes in the entire shape of the term structure by employing simultaneously
the level, slope and curvature of the interest rate yield curve. These measures are
calculated via the Diebold and Lee factorization of the Nelson and Siegel (1987,
1988) model discussed in Chapter 2.
Figure 4.1 plots the estimated level, slope and curvature factors, with the
pertinent statistics outlined in the corresponding table.
Compared to the yield curve slope and curvature, the level factor is less
volatile. This observation is not surprising since the yield curve level serves as a
proxy for the long-term interest rate, with the yields at the long end of the term
structure being generally less volatile.
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Figure 4.1
US zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature
4.4.2 Interest rate exposure
To address the underlying empirical hypotheses, I follow a two-stage esti-
mation procedure in line with previous literature in the area. In the rst step,
the interest rate exposure of BHCs stock returns is modelled via a four-factor
GARCH(n;m) parameterisation9 of the market model formalised as:
Rit =  +X
0
it + "it (4.7)
hit = !0 +
nX
i=1
1"
2
i;t 1 +
mX
j=1
2hi;t 1 (4.8)
"itj
t 1  N(0; hit) (4.9)
where Rit represent the weekly logarithmic returns on BHC i(i = 1 to 304) at time
t;  is a scalar,  is aK1 vector of coe¢cients andXit is the it-th observation on
K explanatory variables: X0 = (RM ; RLevel; RSlope; RCurvature). RM is return on
the S&P500 market index. RLevel; RSlope;and RCurvature represent unanticipated
changes in the level, slope, and curvature of the domestic sovereign zero-coupon
yield curve at time t respectively. The unanticipated changes are estimated as
the di¤erence between the actual changes in the respective factor at time t and
ones forecasted via the appropriate specication of the ARMA model. "it is
the estimated error term from the mean equation of portfolio i, and hit is a
9The GARCH based econometric framework is used to account for a time-varying element
in the distribution of BHCs stock returns. See Chapter 2 and 3 for more details.
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conditional variance of portfolio i over week t. The order of lags (n;m) ensures
the adequate treatment of serial correlation in squared returns, with the formal
Engle ARCH Lagrange multiplier and Ljung-Box Q-statistics determining the
correct lag structure.
The estimated coe¢cients measure the sensitivity of bank is stock returns to
changes in the considered interest rate factor. They are treated as independent
variables in the empirical framework to follow.
4.4.3 Securitization and interest rate risk
In the second step, the estimated measures of interest rate risk are related
to proxies of bank securitization and asset sales activities. I use panel data
techniques to fully exploit the potential of the data sample, and to control for
unobserved cross-sectional and time heterogeneity [Baltagi, 2005]. The workhorse
model specication accounts for both company specic nancial characteristics
and the overall economic and business conditions in which these rms operate:
kit = '+ SEC 0i;t 1+ Y 0i;t 1 +G0t 1 + T 0t + i + "it (4.10)
where, kit represents the interest rate risk measure k in year t for bank i. As
discussed above, these measures represent the BHCs equity return sensitivity
to unanticipated changes in the yield curve level, slope, and curvature.  is an
S 1 vector of coe¢cients and SECit is the it-th observation on S securitization
proxies. Similarly,  is an M  1 and Yit is the it-th observation on M company
specic nancial characteristics; while  is an L1 and Gt is the t-th observation
on L macroeconomic characteristics. Tt is a vector of year-dummies of dimension
T  1, and the company-specic e¤ect is measured by i. The model is estimated
by either treating i as xed (xed e¤ect model), thus assuming (N +M + L)
unknown coe¢cients, with  = (1; : : : ; N)0 being company specic intercepts; or
random (random e¤ect model). In the random e¤ect specication i  IID(0; 
2
)
and is independent of "i  IID(0; 
2
"). Further, both i and the disturbance term
"i are independent of (SECit; Yit; Gt) for all i and t. For both model specications
the robust standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
are calculated.
In line with Keswani, Marsh, and Zagonov (2009) and Au Yong, Fa¤ and
Chalmers (2009), the absolute values of interest rate betas are used as dependent
variable in the second step regressions. This aids an economic interpretation of
the estimated results and can be reconciled with the notion that both positive
and negative exposures to yield curve shocks represent the risk to bank economic
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value and should be treated accordingly. Further, to facilitate the validation
of the proposed hypotheses, various parameterisations of the baseline model are
introduced through empirical investigation.
4.5 Sample Selection
The dataset spans the 2001 to 2009 period and consists of the US publicly
traded bank holding companies (BHC). The choice of sample period is driven by
the availability of required data on BHCs securitization activities. I identied
publicly traded BHCs by cross-referencing the institutions appearing both in the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company database and in the
dataset supplied by the University of Chicagos Centre for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). The requisite dataset is accordingly constructed by merging the
income statement and balance sheet data from the Consolidated Financial State-
ment for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C form) with the equity market data
from CRSP on the basis of company name and its geographical location. The
equity returns are of weekly frequency, all adjusted for dividend reinvestment and
stock splits by CRSP. I further check for the dataset consistency with Compustat
using the CUSIP identier.
The focus on BHCs instead of their commercial bank subsidiaries is deter-
mined by two factors. First, the share price data is commonly available for only
the BHC and not individual banks. Second, as noted by Thomas and Wang
(2004), the decisions concerning the companys capital and risk management
strategies are ordinarily undertaken at the highest level, and are not necessar-
ily directed at a single subsidiary.
To ease illiquidity concerns, the banks with nil share price changes for more
that 20% of trading days are excluded from the sample. The same applies for
the acquired entities and rms with missing data on securitization and asset
sales activities, derivative transactions, total loans and assets, and equity capital.
Further e¤ort is taken to detect and address any outliers arising as a result of
measurement or reporting errors in the underlying datasets. Other non-technical
representative outliers, depicting genuine variability in the considered variables,
are dealt with accordingly as per the discussion to follow. This yields a total
of 304 bank holding companies with the required information being continuously
available across the entire sample period. The list of analysed banks is in Appen-
dix 4.1, while the considered variables alongside their detailed denitions can be
found in Appendix 4.2. For each BHC, the annual aggregates of the underlying
data are used. The average value of total assets for these institutions ranges be-
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tween $16; 524 million in 2001 and $35; 682 million in 2009, with the median for
two years being $1; 017 billion and $2; 023 billion respectively.
Bank attributes related to securitization and loan sales activities are from
Schedule HC-S of FR Y-9C lings. For each BHC, I measure the aggregate value
of assets, by category, securitized and sold, or sold but not securitized, within
a given scal year. Additionally, the value of the outstanding principle balance
of assets securitized or sold for each bank-year is also considered. The pertinent
statistics on these measures, by year, are reported in Table 4.1, with a detailed
denition for each variable available in Appendix 4.2. Evidently, the loans secured
by 1-4 family residential real estate dominate securitizations and loan sales. This
is followed by commercial and industrial, and credit cards receivable loans.
To account for further bank characteristics and the macroeconomic environ-
ment in which these institutions operate, I introduce two sets of control variables
accordingly.
4.5.1 Bank specic control variables
There are six rm level controls, all constructed using FR Y-9C lings. First,
given the evidence of signicant U-shaped relationships between bank capital
and interest rate risk (Keswani, Marsh, and Zagonov, 2009), the ratio of equity
capital to BHCs total assets (CAP) is deployed. Here, it should be noted that by
facilitating the diminution in regulatory capital requirements, securitization may
render the capital ratios an unreliable approximation of the true bank capital
constraints. This, however, should not signicantly alter the importance of this
factor in explaining the banks interest rate sensitivity because the equity capital
itself represents not-interest rate sensitive liability. Accordingly, rms with higher
capital levels are expected to be less sensitive to interest rate shocks.
Second, following the rationale outlined in previous works, the measure of
bank liquidity (LATA) is also considered. In line with empirical literature, a
positive relationship between banks liquidity and risk are expected. Care should
be taken in interpreting this variable, since securitization may a¤ect the short-
term fund inows and hence inate the bank liquidity ratios. Third, the ratio of
non-performing loans10 (NPL) is used to measure the quality of the bank asset
portfolio. Fourth, based on the theoretical underpinning outlined in the previous
section and in line with Flannery and James (1984b), the measure of balance
sheet asset - liability mismatch (GAP) is calculated as the di¤erence between
10A loan is considered delinquent if it fails to acquire interest, or when a payment is 90 days
or more overdue but interest is still acquired.
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Table 4.1
Bank loan sales and securitization activities by year
This table presents the summary statistics of the US publically traded bank holding companies (BHCs)
securitization and assets sales activities by year. Reported are the average values of assets by category,
expressed as a proportion of BHCs total assets, securitized or sold within a given year, and the percentage
of BHCs (in italics) involved in issuance of new securitization and loan sales transactions in the same year.
The respective data are compiled from Schedule HC-S of the Federal Reserve Systems FY-9C lings for a
sample of 304 nancial intermediaries analysed in this study.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Loan sales
1-4 family residential 0.0424 0.0226 0.0129 0.0164 0.0146 0.0075 0.0062 0.0087
13.36% 11.30% 11.82% 12.58% 12.58% 12.58% 13.25% 13.71%
Home equity lines 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0040 0.0024 0.0002
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.33% 0.99% 0.66% 0.67%
Credit card receivables 0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006
2.53% 1.37% 2.36% 2.65% 1.99% 1.99% 2.32% 2.34%
Auto loans 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0152
0.00% 0.34% 0.00% 0.33% 0.00% 0.33% 0.00% 0.33%
Other consumer loans 0.0044 0.0091 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
1.08% 0.34% 0.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.33%
C&I loans 0.0126 0.0020 0.0028 0.0018 0.0051 0.0017 0.0107 0.0001
2.53% 2.40% 2.36% 2.65% 2.32% 1.99% 0.66% 0.33%
Other loans 0.0143 0.0019 0.0033 0.0089 0.0040 0.0100 0.0312 0.0168
0.72% 1.03% 1.69% 2.65% 1.66% 1.32% 1.99% 3.34%
Loan securitization
1-4 family residential 0.2218 0.0708 0.0641 0.0342 0.0412 0.0562 0.0325 0.0497
11.55% 8.22% 6.42% 6.29% 4.97% 4.30% 4.30% 5.35%
Home equity lines 0.0086 0.0021 0.0033 0.0093 0.0120 0.0037 0.0000 0.0033
1.81% 0.68% 1.01% 1.66% 1.32% 0.99% 0.33% 1.67%
Credit card receivables 0.0274 0.0049 0.0055 0.0147 0.0101 0.0160 0.0108 0.0060
1.44% 1.03% 0.68% 0.99% 0.99% 1.99% 1.32% 1.67%
Auto loans 0.0147 0.0133 0.0286 0.0119 0.0086 0.0126 0.0203 0.0118
5.42% 1.71% 2.03% 1.99% 0.99% 1.32% 0.33% 1.67%
Other consumer loans 0.0110 0.0031 0.0036 0.0041 0.0040 0.0074 0.0007 0.0011
2.89% 1.03% 0.68% 0.66% 1.32% 1.66% 0.99% 1.00%
C&I loans 0.0264 0.0111 0.0046 0.0036 0.0048 0.0043 0.0029 0.0006
3.61% 3.08% 2.36% 1.66% 1.32% 1.99% 1.32% 1.67%
Other loans 0.0128 0.0055 0.0138 0.0054 0.0094 0.0096 0.0069 0.0246
2.53% 2.05% 2.70% 2.98% 2.98% 3.97% 3.97% 2.01%
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interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities maturing or being repriced
within one year, scaled by the banks total assets. As per the outlined theory, a
positive sign on this variable is expected. Fifth, since the originator commonly
retains an equity-like interest in the transaction, thus maintaining its exposure to
credit and prepayment risks, the bank purchase of credit protection (e.g. credit
default swaps) can be seen as an attempt to hedge this exposure. To this end,
I calculate the banks net credit protection purchase (NECP) as the di¤erence
between the credit protection it buys and sells in a given scal year.
Finally, to control for the e¤ect of bank activity diversication, a set of asset
and revenue diversication measures is constructed. In line with Laeven and
Levine (2007), the diversication of net operating revenue (ROID) is proxied via
a modied specication of a Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as follows:
ROID = 1 
Interest income Non-interest incomeTotal operating income
 (4.11)
This measure assumes values between 0 and 1, with a higher value suggesting
greater degree of income diversication. In support of the income diversication
hypothesis in Keswani, Marsh, and Zagonov (2009), ROID is expected to be
negatively related to interest rate risk proxies.
In addition, the income concentration in both interest and non-interest rev-
enue streams is also captured via a Herndahl-Hirschman Index. In particular,
I consider a broad eight part breakdown for non-interest revenues (H_NOIR),
and a twelve part breakdown for the interest income (H_NITR). In a similar
manner, the loan concentration HHI (H_LOAN) is computed considering ve
major categories of loans. These include agricultural, commercial and industrial,
consumer, real estate, and other loans. More information on the construction of
these variables is given in Appendix 4.2.
To improve the t of the empirical model, I control for further bank charac-
teristics that may explain the variation in the risk exposures. Namely, the return
on assets (ROA) is utilised to proxy the bank operational performance and e¢-
ciency, while the return on equity (ROE) is discounted in the analysis due to its
deceptiveness for rms with highly leveraged balance sheet. It may also be argued
that the level of bank securitization, as well as its risk exposure, is determined by
the growth rate of its assets base. Accordingly, the asset growth rate (AGR) is
added to account for this supposition. Finally, as securitization alters the value of
banks on-balance sheet assets, the size indicator becomes less relevant (DeYoung
and Rice, 2004b) and it is omitted from the analysis.
To this end, Panel A of Table 4.2 provides key comparative statistics for
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the outlined measures between securitizers and non-securitizers, while Table 4.3
presents pairwise correlations for these variables.
BHCs resorting to asset securitization are larger, retain higher capital bu¤ers,
and have better diversied non-interest revenues, while their non-securitizing
counterparts excel in diversifying the interest income. Generally, securitizers seem
to better balance the shares of interest and fee-generating revenues in their to-
tal operating income (ROID). Securitizers also maintain a better diversied loan
portfolio, which, however, seems to be of a lower credit quality as suggested by
loan-loss provision and non-performing loan ratios. Further, these rms purchase
more credit protection than their non-securitizing peers. This provides evidence
to support the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis for asset securitization discussed
above. Finally, BHCs not involved in the originate-to-distribute market maintain
a lower asset-liability mismatch on the balance sheet, suggesting that these rms
resort to stricter asset-liability management practices.
4.5.2 Economic environment
In the second group of controls, the overall economic and business conditions
are captured by the annual growth rate in the gross domestic product (GDPG),
and the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADSI) sourced from
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia database [Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti,
2009; and Aruoba and Diebold, 2010], respectively. The latter measure accounts
for the real economic activity at high frequency, on the basis of both high- and low-
frequency information on six major economic indicators (i.e. weekly initial jobless
claims, monthly payroll employment, industrial production, personal income less
transfer payments, manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly real GDP). This
index has an average value of zero, with progressively greater values indicating
better than average business conditions and vice versa. The descriptive statistics
for both gures are outlined in Table 4.2: Panel B.
To get more stable estimates in the empirical model, all considered explana-
tory variables (! = Y;G) are treated for outliers via type I winsorization11, with
xed cut-o¤ points of !  4^. Alternatively, the variables are winsorized at the
1 and 99 percentiles, with the results being robust to the variable winsorization.
11Type I winsorization commonly refers to the procedure of replacing outliers with the exact
value of the interval limit, while with Type II outliers are transformed to predestined weighted
average between their original and the cut-o¤ values.
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Table 4.2
Selected characteristics of bank holding companies
This table provides a comparison of selected nancial characteristics for securitizers and non-
securitizers over the 2001 to 2009 period. A bank holding company (BHC) is dened as securitizer
if it reports at least one securitization transaction over the analysed period in Schedule HC-S
of the Federal Reserve Systems FY-9C lings. Reported are the mean [median] values of the
considered accounting variables. This includes an institutions asset growth rate (AGR); equity
capital (CAP) calculated as the ratio of BHCs book value of equity capital to its total assets; the
Herndahl-Hirschman (non)interest revenue concentration index H_NITR(H_NOIR) calculated
on the basis of twelve (eight) part breakdown of the (non)interest income; the proportion of total
assets that are liquid (LATA); the Herndahl-Hirschman loan concentration index (H_LOAN)
computed considering ve loan categories; the banks provision for loan and lease losses scaled by
total loans (LLP); maturity gap (GAP) calculated as the di¤erence between interest-earning assets
and interest-bearing liabilities maturing or being repriced within one year, scaled by the banks
total assets; the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) NECP purchased by a bank;
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is NPL; return on assets (ROA); the measure of
bank revenue diversication (ROID); and the ratio of the institutions risk-weighted to total assets
(TRA). The economic environment is proxied by the annual growth rate in the gross domestic
product (GDPG), and the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADSI).***, **, and
* denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively for an appropriate mean
[median] equality test.
Variable Securitizers Non-securitizers All BHCs Equality test
mean/[median] mean/[median] mean/[median] mean/[median]
Panel A: BHC nancial characteristics
Asset growth rate 0.101 0.126 0.121 1.04
AGR [0.077] [0.091] [0.088] [3.03***]
Capitalisation 0.098 0.091 0.093 -3.20***
CAP [0.088] [0.088] [0.088] [0.34]
Interest income HHI 0.076 0.064 0.067 -1.96*
H_NITR [0.019] [0.016] [0.017] [4.54***]
Liquidity 0.264 0.261 0.262 -0.45
LATA [0.242] [0.238] [0.239] [0.37]
Loan HHI 0.530 0.608 0.590 10.51***
H_LOAN [0.530] [0.601] [0.582] [10.34***]
Loan loss provision 0.006 0.004 0.005 -5.66***
LLP [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [6.34***]
Maturity gap 0.177 0.160 0.164 -2.56**
GAP [0.141] [0.130] [0.132] [2.09**]
Net credit protection 6.54E-04 1.38E-05 1.61E-04 -3.66***
NECP [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.48]
Non-interest income HHI 0.177 0.213 0.205 5.02***
H_NOIR [0.142] [0.191] [0.177] [6.72***]
Non-performing loans 0.012 0.010 0.010 -4.16***
NPL [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [7.77***]
Return on assets 0.012 0.009 0.009 -4.78***
ROA [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [3.59***]
Revenue Diversication 0.427 0.330 0.352 -10.56***
ROID [0.409] [0.300] [0.315] [9.94***]
Total risk adjusted assets 0.749 0.740 0.742 -1.37
TRA [0.758] [0.748] [0.750] [1.58]
Panel B: Economic environment characteristics
GDP growth 0.017 0.023 0.021 13.93***
GDPG [0.020] [0.025] [0.025] [14.21***]
Business conditions index -0.952 -0.095 -0.422 57.01***
ADSI [-1.077] [-0.130] [-0.155] [35.79***]
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Table 4.3
Correlation matrix for selected variables
This table presents the bivariate correlations between the considered explanatory variables. Spearman(Pearson) correlation coe¢cients are above
(below) the diagonal. Variable denitions and sources are provided in Appendix 4.2. p values are in parentheses.
AGR CAP H_NITR LATA H_LOAN LLP GAP NECP H_NOIR NPL ROA ROID TRA GDPG ADSI TSEC
AGR -0 .134 -0 .138 -0 .087 0.133 -0 .064 0.058 0.013 -0 .057 -0 .228 -0 .007 -0 .111 0.086 0.084 0.141 -0 .030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.545) (0.007) (0.000) (0.740) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.163)
CAP 0.022 -0 .028 -0 .059 0.006 -0 .079 0.073 -0 .047 -0 .022 0.050 0.257 0.079 0.085 -0 .019 -0 .068 0.037
(0.309) (0.190) (0.006) (0.771) (0.000) (0.001) (0.027) (0.308) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.366) (0.001) (0.083)
H_NITR 0.100 0.046 0.593 -0 .092 0.150 -0 .120 0.045 0.069 0.170 -0 .194 0.070 -0 .505 -0 .345 -0 .135 0.121
(0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LATA 0.091 0.037 0.135 -0 .156 -0 .198 -0 .135 0.044 0.074 -0 .126 0.087 0.093 -0 .800 0.052 0.220 0.037
(0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.083)
H_LOAN 0.029 -0 .038 0.106 -0 .046 -0 .244 -0 .141 -0 .022 0.084 -0 .154 -0 .152 -0 .346 -0 .003 0.047 -0 .051 -0 .258
(0.167) (0.071) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.309) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.890) (0.027) (0.015) (0.000)
LLP -0 .053 0.055 0.416 -0 .160 -0 .146 0.023 -0 .044 -0 .035 0.552 -0 .276 0.036 0.195 -0 .420 -0 .194 0.170
(0.012) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.276) (0.039) (0.098) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GAP -0 .004 0.161 -0 .059 -0 .096 -0 .131 -0 .004 -0 .014 -0 .115 -0 .070 0.121 0.149 0.238 0.064 0.078 0.084
(0.840) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.838) (0.514) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
NECP -0 .001 -0 .021 0.026 0.018 -0 .086 0.087 -0 .031 0.045 -0 .037 -0 .002 0.067 -0 .048 -0 .003 -0 .029 0.052
(0.964) (0.320) (0.216) (0.391) (0.000) (0.000) (0.147) (0.032) (0.081) (0.911) (0.002) (0.025) (0.874) (0.177) (0.015)
H_NOIR -0 .012 -0 .010 0.021 0.011 -0 .041 0.133 -0 .026 0.451 -0 .006 -0 .087 -0 .186 -0 .160 -0 .013 -0 .069 -0 .210
(0.575) (0.636) (0.313) (0.616) (0.052) (0.000) (0.229) (0.000) (0.767) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.550) (0.001) (0.000)
NPL -0 .079 -0 .043 0.445 -0 .082 -0 .008 0.603 -0 .078 0.031 0.057 -0 .274 0.007 0.100 -0 .341 -0 .242 0.161
(0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.718) (0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.007) (0.000) (0.751) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.006 0.609 -0 .253 0.132 -0 .102 -0 .355 0.147 -0 .022 -0 .048 -0 .334 0.241 -0 .004 0.229 0.253 0.089
(0.764) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.307) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.859) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROID 0.003 -0 .050 -0 .052 0.086 -0 .341 0.010 0.150 0.055 -0 .040 -0.083 0.105 -0 .061 0.088 0.183 0.219
(0.871) (0.017) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.009) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TRA -0 .074 -0 .047 -0 .118 -0 .813 -0 .092 0.136 0.205 -0 .042 -0 .042 0.075 -0 .098 -0 .017 0.005 -0 .151 0.028
(0.001) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.421) (0.804) (0.000) (0.187)
GDPG 0.022 -0 .008 -0 .506 0.069 0.037 -0 .379 0.067 -0 .016 -0 .036 -0 .336 0.203 0.093 -0 .005 0.644 -0 .023
(0.295) (0.714) (0.000) (0.001) (0.078) (0.000) (0.001) (0.444) (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.818) (0.000) (0.274)
ADSI 0.052 -0 .042 -0 .337 0.211 -0 .080 -0 .244 0.060 -0 .065 -0 .027 -0 .273 0.182 0.117 -0 .177 0.479 0.009
(0.014) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.664)
TSEC -0 .004 0.039 0.013 -0 .013 -0 .073 0.106 0.057 0.086 0.069 0.103 0.051 0.212 0.001 -0 .029 0.011
(0.867) (0.067) (0.525) (0.536) (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.959) (0.170) (0.606)
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4.6 Empirical Results
The discussion begins with the results obtained in the rst stage estimation
in Section 4.6.1. The multivariate regression analysis is discussed in section 4.6.2.
4.6.1 Bank interest rate sensitivities
The interest rate exposure of analysed BHCs is assessed via a four-factor
GARCH(n;m) model formalised in (4.8). This model is estimated for each bank-
year, with Table 4.4 presenting comparative statistics of estimated interest rate
factors for securitizers and their non-securitizing peers.
At least 10% of the examined BHCs are signicantly a¤ected by the adverse
movements in di¤erent components of the interest rate yield curve, thereby indi-
cating the inability of risk managers to timely adopt adequate hedging strategies.
Notably, while the e¤ect of interest rate shocks on the values of both securitizers
and non-securitizers is similar in its magnitude, the proportion of securitizers sig-
nicantly a¤ected by these shocks is appreciably higher. This, in a way, supports
the rst empirical hypothesis which argues that securitization is unlikely to be
employed as a risk-transfer mechanism.
The majority of the signicant interest rate factors are negative, suggesting
that BHCs maintain a positive duration mismatch between their interest sensitive
assets and liabilities.
4.6.2 Securitization and interest rate risk
For the main research hypotheses, the panel model in (4.11) is rst estimated
with time- and state-xed e¤ects applied to the entire sample of BHCs. The sen-
sitivities of equity values to unanticipated changes in the yield curve level, slope,
and curvature estimated from (4.8) are interchangeably used as the endogenous
variable in this model. The explanatory variables that control for the company
nancial characteristics, and the country economic conditions, are as discussed in
previous section. All right-hand side measures are lagged to avoid simultaneity
bias. When the economic environment proxies are added into the model, the
time-xed e¤ect is relaxed.
Considering rst the intermediaries exposure to changes in the long end of the
yield curve, Table 4.5 outlines the empirical results for Hypothesis 1. The proxy
for bank securitization activities (TSEC) enters Table 4.5 positively and signi-
cantly at the one percent level. This implies that BHCs with a greater outstand-
ing value of securitized assets tend to increase interest rate exposure, with this
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Table 4.4
Selected BHCs market measures of risk
This table provides a comparison of selected measures of market risk for securitizers and non-
securitizers over the 2001 to 2009 period. A bank holding company (BHC) is dened as securitizer
if it reports at least one securitization transaction over the analysed period in Schedule HC-S of
the Federal Reserve Systems FY-9C lings. Reported are the mean [median] values of pertinent
risk measures. The market measures of risk are represented by the coe¢cient estimates from a
four factor GARCH market model. Specically, for each bank-year, I run a four-factor time series
regression of BHC weekly returns on the market returns (MRK), and unanticipated changes in
zero-coupon yield curve level (LEV), slope (SLO), and curvature (CUR). The estimation requires
at least 30 weekly return observations for each bank-year. The corresponding US zero-coupon
yield curve level, slope, and curvature are estimated using Diebold and Lee (2006) parameteriza-
tion of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model. The unanticipated changes in the yield curve factors
at time t are calculated as the di¤erence between the actual changes in these factors and ones
forecasted via an appropriate specication of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model.
The percentage of coe¢cients signicant at the 5% level (% of which is negative) is in italics.
***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively for an
appropriate mean [median] equality test.
Variable Securitizers Non-securitizers All BHCs Equality test
mean/[median] mean/[median] mean/[median] mean/[median]
Systematic risk 9.72E-01 6.62E-01 7.32E-01 -8.78***
[9.04E-01] [5.78E-01] [6.63E-01] [8.99***]
Signicance at 5% level 75.00% 49.62% 55.35%
IR Level 7.14E-04 1.16E-03 1.06E-03 0.15
[2.66E-03] [2.24E-04] [7.29E-04] [0.58]
Signicance at 5% level 9.51% 7.30% 7.80%
% negative -47.06% -46.27% -46.49%
IR Slope -9.94E-03 -8.57E-03 -8.88E-03 0.35
[-9.88E-03] [-9.44E-03] [-9.61E-03] [0.02]
Signicance at 5% level 11.94% 9.64% 10.16%
% negative -68.75% -72.88% -71.78%
IR Curvature 6.27E-05 -8.60E-04 -6.52E-04 -0.86
[3.84E-04] [-4.95E-07] [-6.78E-08] [0.77]
Signicance at 5% level 13.99% 7.24% 8.77%
% negative -61.33% -67.67% -65.39%
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evidence providing additional support for the proposed hypothesis. This is also
consistent with the view that securitization is unlikely to serve as a risk-transfer
mechanism, and is instead motivated by the desire for greater protability.
To attest the second part of the hypothesis, concerning the duration of assets
securitized, I aggregate securitizations by the maturity of the underlying assets
into three categories: long-term (1-4 family residential mortgages), medium term
(home equity lines of credit and commercial and industrial loans), and short-term
(auto loans, credit card receivables, and other consumer and commercial loan and
leases). Given that commercial and industrial loans commonly include short- and
medium- term lending to businesses, they enter both short- and medium-term
categories interchangeably. The results, also reported in Table 4.5, are robust to
either specication.
It appears that increases in interest rate exposure are mainly driven by secu-
ritization of long-term assets, which are mainly represented by residential mort-
gages. This is not surprising given that these type of loans dominate securitiza-
tions and asset sales, and the funds released from these transactions are likely to
be reutilized to extend the loans of similar long-term maturity, yet lower qual-
ity. This is in line with the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis, which suggests
that banks commonly securitize safer, low-yield, assets and retain more prof-
itable, though riskier, ones on the balance sheet. This also is consistent with
the empirical ndings of Ambrose, Lacour-Little and Sanders (2004), and is fur-
ther supported by the observation of higher proportion of non-performing loans
and the asset-liability maturity gap measure for securitizing rms. Besides, the
distribution of riskier, opaque, assets would incur a heavy discount due to the
lemons problem suggested by Akerlof (1970), and would introduce an impedi-
ment to the banks external funding channel once the market participants learn
about the underlying quality of securitized products.
Accordingly, the retained mortgages are subjected to greater interest rate risk,
with their credit quality likely to further deteriorate as the interest rate shocks
are passed on to customers [Drehmann, Sorensen and Stringa, 2006; Keswani,
Marsh, and Zagonov, 2009].
Against this background, it can be argued that banks with high involvement
in the originate-to-distribute market function more as brokers, who generate fees
by matching the complementary transactions between borrowers and securitized-
debt investors, than nancial intermediaries. Under this disintermediation
business model, the bank shifts the majority of originated loans, and, therefore,
has a comparative advantage in selecting the projects most suitable for securiti-
zation. Further, given that loans exit the balance sheet soon after origination, the
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Table 4.5 
Yield curve level exposure and securitization by maturity category 
This table presents the panel estimation results for the regression which evaluates bank holding companies’ (BHC) 
interest rate risk with respect to the maturity of securitized assets over the 2001 to 2009 period. The dependent 
variable is the absolute value of the coefficient measuring the sensitivity of BHC’s i equity returns to unanticipated 
changes in the level of the US sovereign zero-coupon yield curve at year t. This coefficient is estimated from a four 
factor GARCH market model. Specifically, for each bank-year, I run a four-factor time series regression of BHC 
weekly returns on the market returns (MRK), and unanticipated changes in zero-coupon yield curve level 
(LEV), slope (SLO), and curvature (CUR). The estimation requires at least 30 weekly return observations for 
each bank-year. The corresponding US zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature are estimated using 
Diebold and Lee (2006) parameterization of Nelson and Siegel (1987) model. The unanticipated changes in the 
yield curve factors at time t are calculated as the difference between the actual changes in these factors and the 
ones forecasted via an appropriate specification of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. A bank 
holding company is defined as securitizer (columns 1 to 4) if it reports at least one securitization transaction 
over the analysed period in Schedule HC-S of the Federal Reserve System’s FY-9C filings. The explanatory 
variables on the right-hand side are as follows: TSEC is the outstanding principle balance of assets securitized or 
sold measured as the proportion of total assets; the outstanding balance of securitized long-, medium-, and short-
term loans are LT_SEC, MT_SEC, and ST_SEC respectively; the asset growth rate (AGR); equity capital (CAP) 
calculated as the ratio of BHC’s book value of equity capital to its total assets; H_NITR(H_NOIR) is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman (non)interest revenue concentration index calculated on the basis of twelve (eight) part 
breakdown of the (non)interest income; the proportion of total assets that are liquid (LATA); H_LOAN is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman loan concentration index computed considering five loan categories; GAP is the balance 
sheet maturity gap calculated as the difference between interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities 
maturing or being repriced within one year, scaled by the bank’s total assets; NECP is the net credit protection 
(protection bought minus sold) purchased by a bank; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is NPL; 
ROID is the measure of bank revenue diversification; and return on assets is represented by ROA. The 
regression also includes year- and state-dummies which are not reported. Heteroskedasticity - and 
autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Securitizers All bank holding companies 
TSEC 0.053 
   
0.025 
   
 
3.61*** 
   
2.59*** 
   LT_SEC 
 
0.053 
   
0.028 
  
  
3.52*** 
   
2.76*** 
  
MT_SEC 
  
-0.015 
   
-0.091 
 
   
-0.04  
   
-0.33  
 
ST_SEC 
   
0.196 
   
-0.026 
    
1.44  
   
-0.49  
         AGR -0.028 -0.028 -0.026 -0.030 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
-2.06** -2.00** -1.79* -2.04** 1.95* 1.96** 1.98** 1.97** 
CAP -0.197 -0.199 -0.100 -0.081 -0.180 -0.179 -0.177 -0.176 
 
-1.02  -1.02  -0.51  -0.41  -2.89*** -2.88*** -2.84*** -2.82*** 
CAP2 0.564 0.570 0.440 0.375 0.292 0.295 0.292 0.296 
 
2.14** 2.14** 1.65  1.38  3.14*** 3.17*** 3.14*** 3.17*** 
H_NITR -0.060 -0.059 -0.072 -0.074 -0.039 -0.038 -0.041 -0.040 
 
-1.75* -1.70* -2.06** -2.14** -2.29** -2.25** -2.38** -2.35** 
LATA 0.063 0.061 0.062 0.068 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 
2.19** 2.12** 2.13** 2.31** 1.08  1.05  1.02  0.99  
H_LOAN 0.050 0.048 0.064 0.071 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 
 
2.30** 2.18** 2.93*** 3.18*** 4.09*** 4.00*** 4.16*** 4.08*** 
GAP 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 
 
0.20  0.19  0.14  0.11  1.97** 1.95* 2.04** 2.02** 
NECP 0.476 0.484 0.552 0.530 0.819 0.825 0.875 0.883 
 
1.42  1.44  1.62  1.56  3.19*** 3.21*** 3.41*** 3.43*** 
H_NOIR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 
1.37  1.41  1.67* 1.50  0.73  0.78  0.67  0.69  
NPL 0.702 0.718 0.810 0.751 0.796 0.795 0.817 0.819 
 
3.21*** 3.28*** 3.68*** 3.36*** 8.56*** 8.55*** 8.81*** 8.82*** 
ROA -1.574 -1.551 -1.506 -1.472 -0.411 -0.410 -0.401 -0.403 
 
-4.55*** -4.46*** -4.27*** -4.18*** -3.23*** -3.22*** -3.15*** -3.16*** 
ROID -0.008 -0.008 0.005 -0.001 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 
 
-0.54  -0.49  0.32  -0.03  -1.68* -1.66* -1.13  -1.03  
Constant 0.027 0.028 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 
 
0.93  0.95  0.24  0.10  0.33  0.34  0.24  0.24  
         Observations 516 516 516 516 2225 2225 2225 2225 
BHCs 68 68 68 68 304 304 304 304 
Period fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
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Table 4.6 
Yield curve slope exposure and securitization by maturity category 
This table presents the panel estimation results for the regression which evaluates the bank holding companies’ (BHC) interest 
rate risk with respect to the maturity of securitized assets over the 2001 to 2009 period. The dependent variable is the absolute 
value of the coefficient measuring the sensitivity of BHC’s i equity returns to unanticipated changes in the slope of the US 
sovereign zero-coupon yield curve at year t. This coefficient is estimated from a four factor GARCH market model. 
Specifically, for each bank-year, I run a four-factor time series regression of BHC weekly returns on the market returns 
(MRK), and unanticipated changes in zero-coupon yield curve level (LEV), slope (SLO), and curvature (CUR). The 
estimation requires at least 30 weekly return observations for each bank-year. The corresponding US zero-coupon yield 
curve level, slope, and curvature are estimated using Diebold and Lee (2006) parameterization of Nelson and Siegel (1987) 
model. The unanticipated changes in the yield curve factors at time t are calculated as the difference between the actual 
changes in these factors and ones forecasted via an appropriate specification of the autoregressive moving average 
(ARMA) model. A bank holding company is defined as securitizer (columns 1 to 4) if it reports at least one securitization 
transaction over the analysed period in Schedule HC-S of the Federal Reserve System’s FY-9C filings. The explanatory 
variables on the right-hand side are as follows: TSEC is the outstanding principle balance of assets securitized or sold 
measured as the proportion of total assets; the outstanding balance of securitized long-, medium-, and short-term loans are 
LT_SEC, MT_SEC, and ST_SEC respectively; the asset growth rate (AGR); equity capital (CAP) calculated as the ratio of 
BHC’s book value of equity capital to its total assets; H_NITR(H_NOIR) is the Herfindahl-Hirschman (non)interest 
revenue concentration index calculated on the basis of twelve (eight) part breakdown of the(non)interest income;the 
proportion of total assets that are liquid (LATA); H_LOAN is the Herfindahl-Hirschman loan concentration index 
computed considering five loan categories; GAP is the balance sheet maturity gap calculated as the difference between 
interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities maturing or being repriced within one year, scaled by the bank’s 
total assets; NECP is the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) purchased by a bank; the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans is NPL; ROID is the measure of bank revenue diversification; and return on assets is 
represented by ROA. The regression also includes year- and state-dummies which are not reported. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Securitizers All bank holding companies 
TSEC 0.083 
   
0.053 
   
 
3.98*** 
   
4.00*** 
   LT_SEC 
 
0.085 
   
0.056 
  
  
3.98*** 
   
4.12*** 
  
MT_SEC 
  
0.057 
   
-0.422 
 
   
0.11  
   
-1.12  
 
ST_SEC 
   
0.223 
   
0.004 
    
1.14  
   
0.05  
         AGR -0.037 -0.036 -0.033 -0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-1.90* -1.81* -1.59  -1.76* -0.16  -0.14  -0.09  -0.12  
CAP -0.151 -0.148 0.023 0.044 -0.011 -0.009 -0.003 -0.005 
 
-0.55  -0.54  0.08  0.16  -0.13  -0.10  -0.04  -0.06  
CAP2 0.376 0.374 0.150 0.077 0.057 0.062 0.056 0.057 
 
1.00  0.99  0.39  0.20  0.45  0.50  0.44  0.45  
H_NITR 0.022 0.026 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 
0.46  0.53  0.09  0.03  -0.01  0.04  -0.16  -0.15  
LATA 0.087 0.085 0.088 0.094 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.016 
 
2.14** 2.09** 2.11** 2.25** 1.32  1.27  1.20  1.24  
H_LOAN 0.034 0.029 0.054 0.061 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.018 
 
1.10  0.92  1.73* 1.93* 1.67* 1.54  1.74* 1.79* 
GAP -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.35  -0.33  -0.40  -0.43  -0.12  -0.12  0.01  0.00  
NECP 0.324 0.334 0.443 0.419 0.061 0.078 0.184 0.175 
 
0.68  0.70  0.91  0.86  0.18  0.23  0.53  0.50  
H_NOIR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 
 
-1.81* -1.79* -1.45  -1.57  -0.67  -0.60  -0.79  -0.75  
NPL 0.345 0.362 0.513 0.445 0.490 0.489 0.535 0.535 
 
1.11  1.16  1.63  1.39  3.89*** 3.88*** 4.25*** 4.24*** 
ROA -1.516 -1.480 -1.402 -1.365 -0.472 -0.473 -0.457 -0.454 
 
-3.07*** -2.99*** -2.79*** -2.71*** -2.74*** -2.75*** -2.64*** -2.62*** 
ROID -0.031 -0.033 -0.013 -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 
 
-1.42  -1.51  -0.61  -0.85  -1.69* -1.67* -0.84  -0.88  
Constant 0.037 0.038 0.005 0.000 0.047 0.047 0.044 0.043 
 
0.89  0.93  0.11  0.01  1.84* 1.85* 1.71* 1.69* 
         Observations 516 516 516 516 2225 2225 2225 2225 
BHCs 68 68 68 68 304 304 304 304 
Period Fixed Effect: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
e¤ective duration of assets and liabilities held on the balance sheet is short-term
and can be closely matched. Given this background, the active players in securi-
tization markets are expected to be less exposed to the risk of changing interest
rates, with this view being reected in the second research hypothesis.
To test this idea empirically, I reformulate the model in (4.11) in a non-linear
form as follows:
kit = '+1TSECi;t 1+2TSEC2i;t 1+Y 0i;t 1 +G0t 1+T 0t+ i+ "it (4.12)
where, kit represents the stock return sensitivity of bank i to unanticipated
changes in the yield curve level, slope, and curvature at year t. TSECit is the
it-th observation on the company securitization proxy, and Yit is the it-th obser-
vation on M company specic nancial characteristics. Tt and i are vectors of
year- and state-dummies respectively.
Given the model parameterization, I predict a negative sign on the coe¢cient
estimate for the squared securitization proxy (TSEC2), and a positive sign on
TSEC variable: 1 > 0 and 2 < 0.
The estimation results in Table 4.8 support the hypothesized relationship,
implying that interest rate risk initially increases with the value of assets secu-
ritized, but declines with bank disintermediation. A graphic representation of
the relationship between the BHCs exposure to shocks at the long end of the
term structure, its capitalization, and securitization activities are portrayed in
Figure 4.2. Once again, the results are driven by the securitization of long-term
assets, with non-linearity being only conrmed for the long-term interest rates
represented by the yield curve level.
In a similar manner, the remaining interest rate factors (yield curve slope and
curvature) are evaluated in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. For all three measures of interest
rate risk the results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that banks do
not necessarily resort to securitization to curb their risk exposure. As discussed
above the parameter estimate for the securitization proxy (TSEC) enters all Ta-
bles signicantly positive. In this respect, the magnitudes of @IRR=@TSEC
suggest a great economic signicance. Thus, a one percent increase in the pro-
portion of total assets securitized translates into about 0:053 percent increase in
BHCs exposure to shocks in the yield curve level. This, in turn, would imply
that a typical US securitizer will incur an additional $1:79 million decline in its
market value following a typical shock in the yield curve level. The corresponding
values for interest rate slope and curvature are $4:01 million and $1:17 million
respectively.
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Table 4.7 
Yield curve curvature exposure and securitization by maturity category 
This table presents the panel estimation results for the regression which evaluates the bank holding companies’ (BHC) interest 
rate risk with respect to the maturity of securitized assets over the 2001 to 2009 period. The dependent variable is the absolute 
value of the coefficient measuring the sensitivity of BHC’s i equity returns to unanticipated changes in the curvature of the US 
sovereign zero-coupon yield curve at year t. This coefficient is estimated from a four factor GARCH market model. 
Specifically, for each bank-year, I run a four-factor time series regression of BHC weekly returns on the market returns 
(MRK), and unanticipated changes in zero-coupon yield curve level (LEV), slope (SLO), and curvature (CUR). The 
estimation requires at least 30 weekly return observations for each bank-year. The corresponding US zero-coupon yield 
curve level, slope, and curvature are estimated using Diebold and Lee (2006) parameterization of Nelson and Siegel (1987) 
model. The unanticipated changes in the yield curve factors at time t are calculated as the difference between the actual 
changes in these factors and ones forecasted via an appropriate specification of the autoregressive moving average 
(ARMA) model. A bank holding company is defined as securitizer (columns 1 to 4) if it reports at least one securitization 
transaction over the analysed period in Schedule HC-S of the Federal Reserve System’s FY-9C filings. The explanatory 
variables on the right-hand side are as follows: TSEC is the outstanding principle balance of assets securitized or sold 
measured as the proportion of total assets; the outstanding balance of securitized long-, medium-, and short-term loans are 
LT_SEC, MT_SEC, and ST_SEC respectively; the asset growth rate (AGR); equity capital (CAP) calculated as the ratio of 
BHC’s book value of equity capital to its total assets; H_NITR(H_NOIR) is the Herfindahl-Hirschman (non)interest 
revenue concentration index calculated on the basis of twelve (eight) part breakdown of the (non)interest income; the 
proportion of total assets that are liquid (LATA); H_LOAN is the Herfindahl-Hirschman loan concentration index 
computed considering five loan categories; GAP is the balance sheet maturity gap calculated as the difference between 
interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities maturing or being repriced within one year, scaled by the bank’s 
total assets; NECP is the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) purchased by a bank; the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans is NPL; ROID is the measure of bank revenue diversification; and return on assets is 
represented by ROA. The regression also includes year- and state-dummies which are not reported. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Securitizers All bank holding companies 
TSEC 0.013 
   
0.008 
   
 
2.61*** 
   
2.50** 
   LT_SEC 
 
0.013 
   
0.008 
  
  
2.58** 
   
2.19** 
  
MT_SEC 
  
0.028 
   
0.006 
 
   
0.23  
   
0.06  
 
ST_SEC 
   
0.076 
   
0.034 
    
1.68* 
   
1.84* 
         AGR -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
-0.55  -0.51  -0.41  -0.68  4.52*** 4.51*** 4.51*** 4.51*** 
CAP -0.089 -0.086 -0.056 -0.049 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 
 
-1.38  -1.33  -0.87  -0.76  -0.97 -0.98 -0.95 -1.05 
CAP2 0.174 0.168 0.129 0.104 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.036 
 
1.97** 1.90* 1.46  1.17  1.25  1.28  1.25  1.13  
H_NITR -0.023 -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
 
-2.00** -1.93* -2.22** -2.33** -2.29** -2.27** -2.37** -2.45** 
LATA 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 
1.39  1.37  1.41  1.63  -0.85  -0.88  -0.88  -0.74  
H_LOAN 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
0.24  0.11  0.60  0.94  0.15  0.10  0.24  0.47  
GAP -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
-0.38  -0.33  -0.41  -0.44  0.63  0.70  0.75  0.81  
NECP 0.079 0.081 0.097 0.090 -0.021 -0.016 -0.003 -0.016 
 
0.70  0.72  0.87  0.80  -0.24  -0.18  -0.03  -0.18  
H_NOIR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
-2.07** -2.07** -1.87* -2.04** 0.12  0.20  0.12  0.09  
NPL -0.021 -0.020 0.004 -0.019 0.128 0.128 0.134 0.132 
 
-0.29  -0.27  0.05  -0.26  4.01*** 4.02*** 4.23*** 4.14*** 
ROA -0.344 -0.332 -0.318 -0.306 -0.102 -0.100 -0.098 -0.094 
 
-2.98*** -2.88*** -2.74*** -2.64*** -2.33** -2.30** -2.23** -2.15** 
ROID -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
 
-2.13** -2.30** -1.75* -2.09** -3.18*** -3.15*** -2.78*** -3.09*** 
Constant 0.031 0.031 0.026 0.025 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 
3.25*** 3.26*** 2.75*** 2.60*** 2.80*** 2.79*** 2.71*** 2.72*** 
         Observations 516 516 516 516 2225 2225 2225 2225 
BHCs 68 68 68 68 304 304 304 304 
Period Fixed Effect: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 
Table 4.8 
Nonlinearity between interest rate risk and securitization 
This table presents the panel estimation results for the regression which evaluates the bank holding companies’ (BHC) interest rate risk with respect to the maturity of securitized assets over the 
2001 to 2009 period. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the coefficient measuring the sensitivity of BHC’s i equity returns to unanticipated changes in the level (columns 1-5), slope 
(columns 6-10), and curvature (columns 11-15) of the US sovereign zero-coupon yield curve at year t. These coefficients are estimated from a four factor GARCH market model. Specifically, for 
each bank-year, I run a four-factor time series regression of BHC weekly returns on the market returns (MRK), and unanticipated changes in yield curve level (LEV), slope (SLO), and 
curvature (CUR). The estimation requires at least 30 weekly return observations for each bank-year. The corresponding US zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature are 
estimated using Diebold and Lee (2006) parameterization of Nelson and Siegel (1987) model. The unanticipated changes in the yield curve factors at time t are calculated as the 
difference between the actual changes in these factors and ones forecasted via an appropriate specification of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. Only BHCs reporting at 
least one securitization transaction over the analysed period in Schedule HC-S of the Federal Reserve System’s FY-9C filings are considered. The explanatory variables on the right-hand 
side are as follows: TSEC is the outstanding principle balance of assets securitized or sold measured as the proportion of total assets; the outstanding balance of securitized long-, medium-, 
and short-term loans are LT_SEC, MT_SEC, and ST_SEC respectively; the ratio (and the squared ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank’s total assets CAP. Each regression also 
includes year- and state- dummies, and the following firm-specific variables which are not reported: the asset growth rate (AGR); the proportion of total assets that are liquid (LATA); 
H_LOAN is the Herfindahl-Hirschman loan concentration index computed considering five loan categories; NECP is the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) purchased 
by a bank; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is NPL; ROID is the measure of bank revenue diversification; and return on assets is represented by ROA. The regressions in 
columns 2, 7, and 12 also incorporate the economic environment proxies (not reported) as follows: annual growth rate in the gross domestic product (GDPG), and the Aruoba-Diebold-
Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADSI). When the economic environment proxies are added into the model, the time-fixed effect is relaxed. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent t-values based on White’s robust standard error are reported in italics. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 
Level Slope Curvature 
TSEC 0.102 0.093 
   
0.112 0.098 
   
0.014 0.013 
   
 3.95*** 3.47*** 
   
3.06*** 2.66*** 
   
1.65* 1.43 
   
TSEC2 -0.028 -0.027 
   
-0.026 -0.026 
   
-0.003 -0.003 
   
 
-1.80* -1.65* 
   
-1.15  -1.12  
   
-0.52  -0.60  
   
LT_SEC 
  
0.103 
    
0.115 
    
0.014 
  
   
3.79*** 
    
3.02*** 
    
1.61  
  
LT_SEC2 
  
-0.028 
    
-0.027 
    
-0.003 
  
   
-1.74* 
    
-1.16  
    
-0.51  
  
MT_SEC 
   
0.610 
    
0.748 
    
0.365 
 
    
0.71  
    
0.62  
    
1.30  
 
MT_SEC2 
   
-11.013 
    
-14.521 
    
-6.705 
 
    
-0.71  
    
-0.67  
    
-1.34  
 
ST_SEC 
    
0.342 
    
0.352 
    
0.026 
     
2.08** 
    
1.53  
    
0.48  
ST_SEC2 
    
-0.269 
    
-0.713 
    
0.070 
     
-0.55  
    
-1.04  
    
0.44  
CAP -0.271 -0.197 -0.274 -0.108 -0.094 -0.187 -0.008 -0.190 0.013 0.030 -0.122 -0.089 -0.121 -0.094 -0.089 
 
-1.40  -0.99  -1.40  -0.55  -0.48  -0.68  -0.03  -0.69  0.05  0.11  -1.89* -1.36  -1.87* -1.47  -1.40  
CAP2 0.726 0.678 0.741 0.502 0.429 0.490 0.466 0.506 0.213 0.140 0.232 0.222 0.231 0.190 0.180 
 
2.79*** 2.52** 2.82*** 1.91* 1.65* 1.33  1.25  1.37  0.58  0.38  2.68*** 2.52** 2.66*** 2.23** 2.09** 
                Observations 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 
BHCs 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Period fixed effect Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.13 
1
8
1
 
Figure 4.2
E¤ect of securitization and capitalisation on BHCs interest rate
exposure
Turning to the remaining bank characteristics in (4.11), the majority of coe¢-
cients estimates are statistically signicant and bear the expected sign. Consistent
with prior empirical research, the relationship between equity capital and bank
risk taking are U-shaped. That is, both undercapitalised and well capitalised
intermediaries are generally riskier than banks with intermediate, optimal capi-
tal levels. Further, the institutions with higher degree of revenue heterogeneity
also enjoy lower risk exposures, and so are the companies with higher asset base
growth rate. Not surprisingly, the coe¢cient on the ratio of non-performing loans
enters the table negative, owed to the intrinsic link between credit and interest
rate risks (Drehmann, Sorensen and Stringa, 2006).
4.6.3 Robustness checks
To corroborate the ndings from the basic model in (4.11), I perform a compre-
hensive set of robustness checks. These include the use of di¤erent time horizons
and subsamples; the assumption of alternative model specication and distrib-
utional properties; and an extensive treatment of endogeneity and simultaneity
biases.
In the context of this study, endogeneity may arise when the BHCs decision
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to participate in the market for securitized products does not only inuence,
but is inuenced by its interest rate exposure. In this scenario, the exogenous
treatment of securitization activities would introduce simultaneity bias in the
regression estimates. Furthermore, additional factors may jointly inuence the
variability in both measures, biasing the ordinary least squares estimation and
making it di¢cult to infer causal relationship. To address these concerns, I detect
potential endogeneity via a Hausman test and resort to a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) panel estimation procedure by introducing a set of instruments for the
BHCs securitization activities as appropriate. To identify suitable instruments, I
address the banks decision to securitize by analysing its nancial characteristics
in the probit framework (not reported). The results remain robust to the choice
of estimation technique. Column 1 of Table 4.9 details the empirical output for
the 2SLS regression assuming the BHCs exposure to the shocks in the yield
curve level as an endogenous variable. Although not reported, the results for the
remaining interest rate proxies also remain statistically unchanged.
Furthermore, caution should also be taken in isolating the risk management
motives of asset securitization from auxiliary inducements. In particular, the
incentive to securitize may be circumscribed by the level of loan demand and
current economic conditions. Faced with unusually high demand for loans, banks
would resort to asset sales to extract higher loan origination rents, and to satisfy
the existing customer demand for funds. On the other hand, weaker loan demand
conditions following the economic downturn make it di¢cult for an intermediary
to successfully perform the securitization transaction. This is due to low liquidity
and demand for ABS, and higher credit risk of the underlying asset mix resulting
in market mispricing. Such economic conditions would also a¤ect the level of
bank interest rate exposure.
In this respect, the analysed sample period provides a unique opportunity to
explicitly test this supposition by separating the time horizon into pre-crisis and
crisis episodes. This also provides a comparison of the e¤ectiveness of securitiza-
tion in curbing interest rate risk between the two periods. In addition, the sample
of companies is separated into a number of sub-samples on the basis of ranking
by the banks (1) size, (2) liquidity, and (3) net derivative usage (hedging   trad-
ing). Selected are the top 25% and the bottom 75% of values in each category,
with a total of six portfolios constructed.
The pertinent results for these tests are also reported in Table 4.9. The coe¢-
cients estimates on the bank securitization proxy remain robust to the considered
time horizon, thus reconrming the ndings in the previous section. Not surpris-
ingly, it appears that BHCs are subjected to greater risk exposure in the second
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Table 4.9
Robustness test (yield curve level)
This table presents the panel estimation results for the regressions which evaluate the
bank holding companies (BHC) interest rate risk with respect to securitization, us-
ing di¤erent time horizons (column Crisis); subsamples (columns SIZE, LATA,
NDUS); and the model econometric specications (column 2SLS). The dependent
variable is the absolute value of the coe¢cient measuring the sensitivity of BHCs i
equity returns to unanticipated changes in the level of the US sovereign zero-coupon
yield curve at year t. These coe¢cients are estimated from a four factor GARCH mar-
ket model (4.8). Only BHCs reporting at least one securitization transaction over the
analysed period in Schedule HC-S of the Federal Reserve Systems FY-9C lings are
considered. Reported are the coe¢cients estimate for the TSEC explanatory variable,
which represents the outstanding principle balance of assets securitized or sold as the
proportion of total assets. Each regression also includes year- and state-dummies, and
the following rm-specic variables which are not reported: the ratio (and the squared
ratio) of book value of equity capital to banks total assets CAP; the asset growth
rate (AGR); the proportion of total assets that are liquid (LATA); H_LOAN is the
Herndahl-Hirschman loan concentration index computed considering ve loan cate-
gories; NECP is the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) purchased by
a bank; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is NPL; ROID is the measure
of bank revenue diversication; and return on assets is represented by ROA. All BHCs
are split into a number of sub-samples on the basis of ranking by the banks size (col-
umn SIZE); liquidity (column LATA); and net derivative usage (column NDUS).
Selected are the top 25% and the bottom 75% of values in each category with a total
of six portfolios. Coe¢cients on TSEC are reported for each portfolio. The test sta-
tistics (F statistics) for the Wald coe¢cient restriction test with the null hypothesis
testing the equality of coe¢cient estimates for the Top 25% and the Bottom 75%
portfolios in each category is reported in column entitled WALD, with the associated
p value reported in brackets below. Heteroskedasticity - and autocorrelation consistent
t values based on Whites robust standard error are reported in italics. ***, **, and *
represent signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
2SLS Crisis SIZE LATA NDUS WALD
TSEC 0.192
3.77***
Pre-crisis (2001-2006) 0.035 67.5
2.59*** (0.000)
Crisis (2007-2009) 0.244
9.50***
Top 25% 0.023 3.73
0.94 (0.054)
Bottom 75% 0.084
4.74***
Top 25% 0.153 20.93
6.37*** (0.000)
Bottom 75% 0.018
1.04
Top 25% 0.007 36.79
0.40 (0.000)
Bottom 75% 0.177
7.63***
Observations 516 516 516 516 516
BHCs 68 68 68 68 68
Period xed e¤ect Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.08 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.27
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crisis-episode. Turning to the measure of bank size, the estimate on the securiti-
zation proxy remains signicant only for the smaller companies. This might be
explained by the fact that larger BHCs are better equipped to weather the yield
curve shocks owed to better diversied portfolios and unrestricted access to the
markets for derivative products. On the other hand, these rms might also pursue
the disintermediation business model, therefore reducing the balance sheet du-
ration gap and concomitant exposure to interest rate movements. Once the bank
liquidity and derivative activities are considered the estimation suggests that the
risk exposure is greater for the companies retaining higher liquidity bu¤ers and
for BHCs which are the net traders of derivative instruments. The intermediary
is classied as the net-trader if the notional amount of all derivative instruments
held for trading exceeds that of instruments held for hedging.
4.7 Concluding remarks
The recent turmoil in global nancial markets, prompted by the US subprime
mortgage meltdown, has once again accentuated the importance of banking sector
prudency for overall economic stability worldwide. Securitization is consensually
regarded as the key culprit in the subprime debacle, with a plethora of works
addressing possible remedies for the market for securitized assets. These contri-
butions, however, are largely concerned with the underlying causes of the current
events, not the risks facing the nancial system in the aftermath of the crisis.
None has explicitly addressed the issue of bank interest rate risk, the importance
of which becomes increasingly apparent in the current monetary environment.
This concern has been recently agged by regulatory authorities both in the US
and in Europe, with supervisors emphasising the necessity of establishing robust
practices to measure, monitor, and control bank interest rate exposures.
In this context, the move from the originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute
model of lending profoundly transformed the natural asset intermediation func-
tion performed by banks for centuries and compromised the importance of tra-
ditional asset-liability practices of interest rate risk management. Against this
background, this work empirically examines the impact of securitization on bank
interest rate risk. In particular, the research questions whether securitization is
conducive to the optimal hedging of bank interest rate risk, or is merely a funding
source enabling these companies to pursue more protable, yet riskier, projects
The empirical results reported in this work suggest that banks resorting to
asset securitization do not, on average, achieve an unambiguous reduction in their
exposure to the term structure developments. It appears that interest rate risk
185
generally increases with the maturity of assets securitized, with securitization of
long-term assets driving the results.
In addition, banks with very high involvement in the originate-to-distribute
market enjoy lower interest rate risk, thereby suggesting an asymmetric U-shape
relationship between bank risk and securitization. This observation, however,
does not imply superior risk management practices in these institutions but is
merely a result of disintermediation. In particular, I argue that BHCs with high
involvement to the market for securitized products function more as brokers, who
generate fees by matching the complementary transactions between borrowers
and securitized-debt investors, than nancial intermediaries. Under this dis-
intermediation business model, the importance of interest generating revenues
declines, and so is the e¤ective duration of assets held on the balance sheet. Ac-
cordingly, the duration gap remains at minimal levels, and the intermediary is
better protected against term structure developments.
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Appendix 4.1
Panel A: Securitisers
BHC name RSSD ID Ticker BHC name RSSD ID Ticker
1st Source Corporation 1199602 SRCE Guaranty Federal Bancshares, Inc. 2618940 GFED
AMCORE Financial, Inc. 1208661 AMFI Huntington Bancshares, Inc. 1068191 HBAN
Arrow Financial Corporation 1048812 AROW Independent Bank Corporation 1201925 IBCP
Associated Banc-Corp 1199563 ASBC Indiana United Bancorp. 1209109 MSFG
Auburn National Bancorporation, Inc. 1129533 AUBN International Bancshares Corporation 1104231 IBOC
Bank of America Corporation 1073757 BAC Key Corp. 1068025 KEY
Bank of New York Company, Inc. 1033470 BK LNB Bancorp, Inc. 1071669 LNBB
BOK Financial Corporation 1883693 BOKF Marshall & Ilsley Corporation 1199497 MI
Camden National Corporation 1130249 CAC MB Financial, Inc. 1090987 MBFI
Capital One Financial Corporation 2277860 COF Mid Penn Bancorp, Inc. 1944204 MPB
Capitol Bancorp Ltd. 1247334 CBC Monroe Bancorp 1210299 MROE
Carolina First Corporation 1141599 TSFG Northern States Financial Corporation 1210589 NSFC
Charles Schwab Corporation 1026632 SCHW Northrim Bancorp Inc. 3025385 NRIM
Citigroup, Inc. 1951350 C Norwest Corporation 1120754 WFC
City Holding Company 1076262 CHCO Pacic Capital Bancorp. 1029884 PCBC
Comm Bancorp, Incorporated 1118229 CCBP Popular, Inc. 1129382 BPOP
Doral Financial Corporation 2184164 DRL Regions Financial Corporation 1078332 RF
Eagle Bancorp, Inc. 2652104 EGBN Republic Bancorp, Inc. 1097025 RBCAA
East West Bancorp, Inc. 2734233 EWBC S.Y. Bancorp, Inc. 1249730 SYBT
Exchange National Bancshares, Inc. 2038409 HWBK Santander Bancorp. 2847115 SBP
Fifth Third Bancorp 1070345 FITB State Street Boston Corporation 1111435 STT
First BanCorp 2744894 FBP SunTrust Banks, Inc. 1131787 STI
First Busey Corporation 1203602 BUSE Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc. 1117156 SUSQ
First Citizens BancShares, Inc. 1075612 FCNCA The Chase Manhattan Bank 1039502 JPM
First Empire State Corporation 1037003 MTB The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 1069778 PNC
First Financial Bancorp. 1071276 FFBC TIB Financial Corp. 2457943 TIBB
First Financial Corporation 1208595 THFF U.S. Bancorp. 1119794 USB
First Horizon National Corporation 1094640 FHN UnionBancorp, Inc. 1206591 TRUE
First Midwest Bancorp, Inc. 1208184 FMBI United Bancorp, Inc. 1071502 UBCP
FirstMerit Corporation 1070804 FMER United Bancshares, Inc. 1136009 UBOH
FNB Corp. 1133473 FNBN United Bankshares, Inc. 1076217 UBSI
Franklin Resources, Inc. 1246216 BEN W Holding Company Incorporated 2801546 WHI
Fulton Financial Corporation 1117129 FULT Wintrust Financial Corporation 2260406 WTFC
German American Bancorp 1098620 GABC Zions Bancorporation 1027004 ZION
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Appendix 4.1
Panel B: Non-Securitisers
BHC name RSSD ID Ticker BHC name RSSD ID Ticker
1st Constitution Bancorp. 2784920 FCCY Carrollton Bancorp. 1469800 CRRB
ABC Bancorp 1082067 ABCB Cascade Bancorp. 1848003 CACB
Access National Corp. 3109904 ANCX Cascade Financial Corp. 2568362 CASB
Alliance Bankshares Corp. 3123638 ABVA Cass Information Systems, Inc. 1098648 CASS
Alliance Financial Corp. 1140510 ALNC Cathay General Bancorp, Inc. 1843080 CATY
American National Bankshares Inc. 1076691 AMNB Center Bancorp, Inc. 1048764 CNBC
American River Bankshares 2312837 AMRB Center Financial Corp. 3003178 CLFC
AmeriServ Financial, Inc. 1117316 ASRV Centerstate Banks of Florida, Inc. 2868129 CSFL
Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. 1472257 ANNB Central Virginia Bankshares, Inc. 1140677 CVBK
Banc Corp. 2731858 SUPR Century Bancorp, Inc. 1111088 CNBKA
BancFirst Corp. 1133286 BANF Chemical Financial Corp. 1201934 CHFC
Bancorp Rhode Island, Inc. 2896458 BARI Citizens Banking Corp. 1205688 CRBC
BancorpSouth, Inc. 1097614 BXS Citizens Holding Company 1083475 CIZN
Bancshares of Florida, Inc. 2796624 BOFL City National Corp. 1027518 CYN
Bank of Commerce Holdings 1030040 BOCH CNB Financial Corp. 1118340 CCNE
Bank of Granite Corp. 1143481 GRAN CoBiz Inc. 1060328 COBZ
Bank of Hawaii Corp. 1025309 BOH Codorus Valley Bancorp, Inc. 1142475 CVLY
Bank of South Carolina Corp. 2297701 BKSC Colony Bankcorp, Inc. 1085170 CBAN
Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. 1097089 OZRK Columbia Bancorp. 2378440 CBBO
Banner Corp. 2126977 BANR Columbia Banking System, Inc. 2078816 COLB
Bar Harbor Bankshares 1115385 BHB Comerica Incorporated 1199844 CMA
BB&T Corp. 1074156 BBT Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 1049341 CBSH
Berkshire Bancorp, Inc. 2728157 BERK Commercial Bancorp. 1029893 WCBO
BNC Bancorp. 3141650 BNCN Commercial National Financial Corp. 1823738 CNAF
Boston Private Bancorp, Inc. 1248078 BPFH Commonwealth Bankshares, Inc. 1250606 CWBS
Bridge Capital Holdings 3280988 BBNK Community Bank Shares of Indiana, Inc. 2356073 CBIN
Britton & Koontz Capital Corp. 1084212 BKBK Community Bank System, Inc. 1048867 CBU
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp. 1140994 BMTC Community Capital Corp. 1398937 CPBK
C&F Financial Corp. 2183493 CFFI Community Central Bank Corp. 2443526 CCBD
Camco Financial Group 1251256 CAFI Community Trust Bancorp, Inc. 1070644 CTBI
Capital Bank Corp. 2741156 CBKN Community West Bancshares 2626299 CWBC
Capital City Bank Group, Inc. 1085509 CCBG Cowlitz Bancorp. 1984040 CWLZ
Cardinal Financial Corp. 2682996 CFNL CPB Inc. 1022764 CPF
Carolina Bank Holdings, Inc. 2943473 CLBH Crescent Banking Company 1958827 CSNT
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Appendix 4.1
Panel B: Non-Securitisers (CONTD)
BHC name RSSD ID Ticker BHC name RSSD ID Ticker
Crescent Financial Corp. 3027709 CRFN Greene County Bancshares, Inc. 1133277 GRNB
Cullen&Frost Bankers, Inc. 1102367 CFR Hancock Holding Company 1086533 HBHC
CVB Financial Corp. 1029222 CVBF Hanmi Financial Corp. 2900261 HAFC
Dearborn Bancorp, Inc. 2193906 DEAR Harleysville National Corp. 1117192 HNBC
Eastern Virginia Bankshares, Inc. 2626691 EVBS Harleysville Savings Financial Corp. 2861492 HARL
ECB Bancorp, Inc. 2686659 ECBE Heartland Financial USA, Inc. 1206546 HTLF
EuroBancshares, Inc. 3106864 EUBK Heritage Commerce Corp. 2634874 HTBK
Evans Bancorp, Inc. 1401190 EVBN Heritage Financial Corp. 2166124 HFWA
F.N.B. Corp. 3005332 FNB Heritage Oaks Bancorp. 2253529 HEOP
Farmers Capital Bank Corp. 1098732 FFKT Home Federal Bancorp. 3059504 INCB
Fauquier Bankshares, Inc. 1076600 FBSS Horizon Bancorp. 1209136 HBNC
Fidelity Southern Corp. 1081118 LION Hudson City Bancorp, Inc. 2792680 HCBK
Financial Institutions, Inc. 1032464 FISI Independent Bank Corp. 1136803 INDB
First Bancorp. 1076431 FBNC Independent Community Bancshares, Inc. 2176413 MBRG
First Citizens Banc Corp. 1246533 FCZA Integra Bank Corp. 1132654 IBNK
First Commonwealth Financial Corp. 1071306 FCF Intervest Bancshares Corp. 2049302 IBCA
First Community Bancorp. 2875332 PACW ISB Financial Corp. 2291914 IBKC
First Community Corp. 2337401 FCCO Jacksonville Bancorp, Inc. 2737766 JAXB
First Financial Bankshares, Inc. 1102312 FFIN Je¤ersonville Bancorp. 1048504 JFBC
First Financial Service Corp. 3150997 FFKY Lakeland Bancorp, Inc. 1404799 LBAI
First M & F Corp. 1095982 FMFC Lakeland Financial Corp. 1208906 LKFN
First Mariner Bancorp. 2322304 FMAR Landmark Bancorp, Inc. 3030307 LARK
First Merchants Corp. 1208559 FRME Leesport Financial Corp. 1136139 VIST
First National Lincoln Corp. 1133932 FNLC LSB Bancshares, Inc. 1076002 NBBC
First Regional Bancorp. 1029428 FRGB Macatawa Bank Corp. 2634696 MCBC
First State BanCorp. 1364071 FSNM MBT Financial Corp. 2907822 MBTF
First United Corp. 1132672 FUNC Mercantile Bank Corp. 2608763 MBWM
First West Virginia Bancorp, Inc. 1070336 FWV Merchants Bancshares, Inc. 1023239 MBVT
Firstbank Corp. 1134322 FBMI MetLife, Inc. 2945824 MET
Friedman, Billings, Ramsey Group, Inc. 2926636 FBR MetroCorp Bancshares, Inc. 2344799 MCBI
Frontier Financial Corp. 1031346 FTBK MidSouth Bancorp, Inc. 1086654 MSL
Glacier Bancorp, Inc. 2003975 GBCI Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc. 1209828 MBHI
Glen Burnie Bancorp. 2001328 GLBZ Monmouth Community Bancorp. 2910055 CJBK
Great Southern Bancorp, Inc. 2339133 GSBC Nara Bancorp, Inc. 2961879 NARA
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Panel B: Non-Securitisers (CONTD)
BHC name RSSD ID Ticker BHC name RSSD ID Ticker
National Bankshares, Inc. 1139925 NKSH Princeton National Bancorp, Inc. 1207600 PNBC
National Penn Bancshares, Inc. 1117026 NPBC PrivateBancorp, Inc. 1839319 PVTB
NB&T Financial Group, Inc. 1070756 NBTF Prosperity Bancshares, Inc. 1109599 PRSP
NBC Capital Corp. 1100037 CADE Provident Financial Services, Inc. 3133637 PFS
NBT Bancorp Inc. 1139279 NBTB Quad City Holdings, Inc. 2125813 QCRH
New York Community Bancorp, Inc. 2132932 NYB Republic First Bancorp, Inc. 1398807 FRBK
NewSouth Bancorp, Inc. 2521509 FSBK Corus Bankshares, Inc. 1200393 CORS
North Country Financial Corp. 1123933 MFNC Royal Bancshares of Pennsylvania, Inc. 2324429 RBPAA
North Valley Bancorp. 1029334 NOVB Rurban Financial Corp. 1071454 RBNF
Northern Trust Corp. 1199611 NTRS S&T Bancorp, Inc. 1071397 STBA
Norwood Financial Corp. 2365356 NWFL Salisbury Bancorp, Inc. 2693273 SAL
Ohio Legacy Corp. 2873039 OLCB Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc. 1248304 SASR
Ohio Valley Banc Corp. 2012436 OVBC Savannah Bancorp, Inc. 1493560 SAVB
Old National Bancorp. 1098303 ONB SCBT Financial Corp. 1133437 SCBT
Old Point Financial Corp. 1076673 OPOF Seacoast Banking Corp. of Florida 1085013 SBCF
Old Second Bancorp, Inc. 1206911 OSBC Shore Bancshares, Inc. 2429838 SHBI
OptimumBank Holdings, Inc. 3251661 OPHC Sierra Bancorp. 2976396 BSRR
Oriental Financial Group Inc. 2490575 OFG Silicon Valley Bancshares 1031449 SIVB
PAB Bankshares, Inc. 1083934 PABK Simmons First National Corp. 1094828 SFNC
Pacic Continental Corp. 2762973 PCBK Smithtown Bancorp, Incorporated 1048997 SMTB
Pacic Mercantile Bancorp. 2869733 PMBC Somerset Hills Bancorp. 2950480 SOMH
Park National Corp. 1142336 PRK South Alabama Bancorp. 1138012 BTFG
Parke Bancorp. 3347292 PKBK Southern Community Financial Corp. 2981831 SCMF
Patriot National Bancorp, Inc. 2840479 PNBK Southern Missouri Bancorp, Inc. 3266227 SMBC
Peapack-Gladstone Financial Corp. 2651590 PGC Southside Bancshares, Inc. 1245068 SBSI
Penns Woods Bancorp, Inc. 1117688 PWOD Southwest Bancorp, Inc. 1062621 OKSB
Pennsylvania Commerce Bancorp, Inc. 2807614 COBH Southwest Georgia Financial Corp. 1081538 SGB
Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina, Inc. 2818245 PEBK State Bancorp, Inc. 1138861 STBC
Peoples Bancorp, Inc. 1070578 PEBO Sterling Bancorp. 1039454 STL
Peoples Financial Corp. 1133174 PFBX Sterling Bancshares, Inc. 1105425 SBIB
Peoples Holding Company 1098844 RNST Su¤olk Bancorp. 1130865 SUBK
Pinnacle Financial Partners, Inc. 2925657 PNFP Sun Bancorp, Inc. 1139242 SNBC
Premier Financial Bancorp, Inc. 2007647 PFBI Sussex Bancorp. 2461463 SBBX
PremierWest Bancorp. 2867542 PRWT Synovus Financial Corp. 1078846 SNV
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Panel B: Non-Securitisers (CONTD)
BHC name RSSD ID Ticker BHC name RSSD ID Ticker
Taylor Capital Group, Inc. 2495039 TAYC United Security Bancshares, Inc. 1086168 USBI
TCF Financial Corp. 2389941 TCB Univest Corp. of Pennsylvania 1116609 UVSP
Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc. 2706735 TCBI Valley National Bancorp. 1048773 VLY
The First of Long Island Corp. 1048894 FLIC Village Bank and Trust Financial Corp. 3251027 VBFC
The Wilber Corp. 1048670 GIW Virginia Commerce Bancorp, Inc. 2856377 VCBI
Tompkins Trustco, Inc. 2367921 TMP Virginia Financial Group, Inc. 2502049 STEL
Tower Financial Corp. 2745604 TOFC Waccamaw Bankshares, Inc. 3004689 WBNK
TriCo Bancshares 1030170 TCBK Washington Banking Company 2406174 WBCO
TrustCo Bank Corp of NY 1048513 TRST Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. 1115349 WASH
Trustmark Corp. 1079562 TRMK Webster Financial Corp. 1145476 WBS
Umpqua Holdings Corp. 2747644 UMPQ WesBanco, Inc. 1070448 WSBC
Union Bankshares Corp. 1971693 UBSH West Bancorporation, Inc. 1210066 WTBA
Union Bankshares, Inc. 1114940 UNB Westamerica Bancorp. 1025541 WABC
Union Financial Bancshares, Inc. 3177341 PCBS Whitney Holding Corp. 1079740 WTNY
United Community Banks, Inc. 1249347 UCBI Wilmington Trust Corp. 1888193 WL
United Missouri Bancshares, Inc. 1049828 UMBF Wilshire Bancorp, Inc. 3248513 WIBC
United Security Bancorp. 1031627 AWBC WVS Financial Corp. 2140115 WVFC
United Security Bancshares 3015975 UBFO
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Variable names and denitions
Variable FR-Y9C Form data item
Capital Adequacy
CAP Capital ratio BHCK3210/BHCK2170
Asset Quality
GAP 1Y maturity gap abs[(BHCK3197  (BHCK3296 + BHCK3298))/(BHCK2170  (BHCK2145 + BHCK2150 +
BHCK2130 + BHCK3163 + BHCK0426))]
LATA Liquid assets to total assets (BHCK0010 + BHDMB987 + BHCKB989 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1773) / BHCK2170
H_LOAN Loan Herndahl index (TCI+UCI)2 + REL2 + AGL2 + CLR2 + TOL2
TCI Total C&I loans ratio (BHCK1763 + BHCK1764) / (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123)
UCI US C&I loans ratio BHCK1763 / (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123)
REL Loans secured by real estate BHCK1410 / (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123)
AGL Agriculture loans BHCK1590 / (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123)
CLR Consumer loans (BHCKB538 + BHCKB539 + BHCK2011) / (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123)
TOL Total other loans [BHCK2122 - (BHCK1410 + BHCK1590 + BHCK1763 + BHCK1764 + BHCK1296 +
BHCK2081 + BHCKB538 + BHCKB539 + BHCK2011)] / (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123)
NPL Non-performing loans (BHCK5526 + BHCK5525 - BHCK3507 - BHCK3506) / BHCK2122
Earnings, E¢ciency & Protability
ROA Return on assets BHCK4340/BHCK2170
ROID Revenue diversication 1-j(BHCK4107 - BHCK4079)/(BHCK4107 + BHCK4079)j
H_NOIR Non-interest income diversication
(8 parts)
(BHCK4070/BHCK4079) + (BHCK4483/BHCK4079) + (BHCKA220/BHCK4079) +
(BHCKB490/BHCK4079) + (BHCKB491/BHCK4079) + (BHCKB492/BHCK4079) +
(BHCKB493/BHCK4079) + (BHCKB494/BHCK4079)
H_NITR Interest income diversication (12
parts)
(BHCK4435/BHCK4107) + (BHCK4436/BHCK4107) + (BHCKF821/BHCK4107) +
(BHCK4059/BHCK4107) + (BHCK4065/BHCK4107) + (BHCK4115/BHCK4107) +
(BHCKB488/BHCK4107) + (BHCKB489/BHCK4107) + (BHCK4060/BHCK4107) +
(BHCK4069/BHCK4107) + (BHCK4020/BHCK4107) + (BHCK4518/BHCK4107)
O¤ - Balance Sheet Activities
TSEC Outstanding principal value of as-
sets securitized
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 +
BHCKB711) / BHCK2170
RSEC 1-4 family residential securitization BHCKB705/BHCK2170
HSEC Home equity lines securitization BHCKB706/BHCK2170
CRSEC Credit cards receivable securitiza-
tion
BHCKB707/BHCK2170
ASEC Auto loans securitization BHCKB708/BHCK2170
CSEC Other consumer loans securitiza-
tion
BHCKB709/BHCK2170
CISEC C&I loans securitization BHCKB710/BHCK2170
AOSEC All other loans, leases, and other
assest securitization
BHCKB711/BHCK2170
LT_SEC Long-term assets securitized RSEC
MT_SEC Medium-term assets securitized HSEC + CISEC
ST_SEC Short-term assets securitized CRSEC + ASEC + CSEC + AOSEC
NECP Net credit protection (Bought-
Sold)
[(BHCKC969 + BHCKC971 + BHCKC973 +BHCKC975) - (BHCKC968 + BHCKC970 +
BHCKC972 +BHCKC974)] / BHCK2170
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
Interest rate risk exposure of nancial intermediaries has been a subject of con-
siderable research since the 1970s. A substantial body of literature has been
developed since. The researchers have addressed many pressing issues regarding
the measurement and modelling of the rms interest rate risk.
Despite extensive research in the area, the majority of existing contributions
o¤er rather contrasting results regarding the e¤ect of interest rate changes on
nancial institutions equity returns. Numerous reasons have been put forward to
explain these inconsistencies, but none has been explicitly examined. There is also
a shortage of works analysing the key determinants of the nancial institutions
interest rate exposure.
Furthermore, following the global nancial crisis of 2007-2010, the attention
of practitioners and academics has been mostly on the credit, liquidity and op-
erational risks, and not on interest rate risk. As a result, the oversight and
management of interest rate risk has fallen in priority at many nancial rms.
This potentially detrimental development has been recently highlighted by
the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2008) and regulatory authorities
both in the US and in Europe. These regulators emphasise that interest rate risk
remains one of the most important risks faced by nancial institutions and stress
the importance of accurately measuring and managing this risk. They further
conclude that banks have accepted greater levels of interest rate risk in recent
years.
Motivated by these issues, this thesis studies the relationship between inter-
est rate changes and nancial intermediaries equity returns in three empirical
chapters. Each chapter examines this relationship from a di¤erent perspective,
but they all share the same goal of enhancing theoretical and practical knowledge
about the subject and identifying important avenues for further research.
In Chapter 2, I employ an international sample of banks and insurance com-
panies and empirically address the exposure of these institutions to interest rate
movements. All G-10 countries and other important regions of Asia (Hong Kong)
and Pacic Rim (Australia) are considered in this analysis. This chapter explores
whether the growing quantity and popularity of innovative risk management in-
struments has inuenced the interest rate exposure of nancial institutions in
recent years. The inadequacies of the presently popular methods used to quan-
tify the exposure of the nancial intermediaries to interest rate risk are also
examined. In addition, I question the researchers choice of interest rate proxy in
the previous studies.
The empirical results presented in this chapter reveal two important ndings.
First, the majority of analysed nancial institutions remain signicantly exposed
to uctuations in di¤erent components of the interest rate yield curve. This
indicates the inability of risk managers to forecast accurately the developments
in the entire shape of the term structure and implement appropriate hedging
strategies. Second, the statistical inferences regarding the interest rate factor
signicance are a¤ected by the choice of interest rate proxy and econometric
specication of the model adopted in the research. This nding points to the
importance of the interest rate proxy and model choice for future research. This
also sheds light to the origins of the disparity in the previous works.
Chapter 3 examines the link between interest rate risk faced by banking insti-
tutions, their balance sheet composition and national bank regulation. The work
presented in this chapter analyses the key determinants of bank interest rate risk
and employs both company level and market specic information. Among the
company level measures I consider the banks income structure, their capitalisa-
tion, balance sheet composition, and o¤-balance sheet activities. Many of these
measures have been disregarded by previous research in the area. As regards
to the market specic information, both country macroeconomic characteristics,
country bank regulation and institutional development are considered. These
regulatory characteristics have not been used in the interest rate risk literature
to date.
The ndings outlined in this chapter suggest a close link between banks inter-
est rate exposures and their nancial characteristics. The compositions of banks
balance and o¤-balance sheet portfolios are particularly important in explaining
their interest rate risk. Accordingly, future research in the area should pay a
closer attention to factors determining the structure of these portfolios. It is
also important to analyse whether and to what extent managerial compensation
schemes a¤ect on- and o¤-balance sheet positions. From a theoretical viewpoint,
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managers with larger equity holdings aim to minimise a banks interest rate ex-
posure and hence support a less aggressive balance sheet structure. The opposite
is true for managers with large stock option holdings.
The results also suggest that regulatory and supervisory characteristics have
a signicant impact on bank interest rate risk. This impact, however, depends on
the provision and design of deposit insurance in the target bank country. For in-
stance, stringent capital, diversication and information disclosure requirements
seem to reduce banks interest rate exposure by more in countries with no explicit
deposit insurance. From the perspective of policy makers, these results provide
improved information for formulating banking sector policies.
In addition, banks with insured depositors benet to a greater extent from reg-
ulatory impediments to engaging in insurance activities. Against this background,
restricting banks operations in the securities market increases their interest rate
risk exposure. This e¤ect is stronger for banks with insured depositors.
The latter observation is surprising and contradicts the view that banks tend
to increase their risks when a larger scope of activities is allowed. However, as
Laeven and Levine (2009) suggest, the relationship between bank risk and activity
restrictions depends on the institution ownership structure. Accordingly, future
research analysing the relationship between banks interest rate exposure and
regulatory characteristics should introduce controls for the ownership structure.
Chapter 4 considers in depth the impact of securitization on bank interest rate
risk. In this respect, the theoretical benets of securitization for e¢cient man-
agement of bank interest rate risk are unambiguous. Nonetheless, no empirical
study to support this theory has hitherto been conducted.
I address this by answering empirically three key questions, using an extensive
sample of the US publicly traded bank holding companies over 2001 to 2009. First,
I analyse whether and to which degree the US bank holding companies are a¤ected
by interest rate risk. Second, I question if securitization can be used to manage
e¤ectively banks interest rate risk. Finally, I examine whether the interest rate
exposure varies among banks securitizing assets of di¤erent maturities and risk
characteristics.
The ndings of this analysis suggest that banks resorting to asset securitiza-
tion do not achieve a visible reduction in their interest rate risk exposure. The
interest rate risk increases with the maturity of assets securitised. It is higher
for intermediaries securitizing actively long-term loans, such as residential mort-
gages. Accordingly, it appears that while securitization helps banks in matching
better the duration of their assets and liabilities, the funds released from these
transactions are reinvested in lower quality assets. This observation o¤ers a valu-
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able insight to both managers and policymakers seeking to utilise securitization
in a bid to curb bank interest rate risk.
Against this background, banks with a very high involvement in securitization
activities enjoy lower interest rate risk. These institutions commonly securitized
the majority of loans soon after origination. Therefore, the importance of interest
generating revenues declines, and so is the e¤ective duration of their assets and
liabilities on the balance sheet. Accordingly, the duration gap remains minimal
resulting in lower interest rate risk.
It is important to remember that the analysis in this chapter is based on a
sample of U.S. banks. Therefore, the reported evidence cannot be used to infer
the relationship between banks securitization activities and their interest rate
exposure for other countries. This should be analysed in future research.
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